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Summary 
The progress of society is determined in part by its institutions (e.g. their levels of 
efficacy and corruption) and in part by dynamics within the population (e.g. the 
levels of tension between social groups). The quantitative measurement of relevant 
variables offers valuable insight into the extent and direction of social change. The 
key questions I address in this thesis are whether a subset of subjective indicators of 
the progress of society can be meaningfully used in time-series analysis (Chapter 2) 
and whether individual-level characteristics are predictive of self-reported 
generalised trust (Chapters 4 and 5).  
In the first substantive chapter (Chapter 2) I find that the sensitivity of subjective 
evaluations to real world events can destabilise the relationships between variables, 
resulting in a lack of invariance across time. This highlights the importance of testing 
for measurement invariance before using such constructs in substantive analyses 
and discourages time-series analysis using Harrison et al.’s (2011) evaluation of 
national performance domain. In the second and third substantive chapters 
(Chapters 4 and 5) I find support, respectively, for Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the 
moral foundations of generalised trust and for Personality Theory (Delhey & 
Newton, 2003).  
Much emphasis has been placed on generalised trust as an indicator of social 
cohesion, and its apparent decline in recent decades has been cited by many as a 
cause for concern. My findings in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that those who are 
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lowest in generalised trust are likely to score highly on depression and feelings of 
vulnerability. Future work should consider possible ways to increase social cohesion 
while addressing the likely concerns of those with low levels of generalised trust.  
Chapter 5 also compares the personality-based predictors of self-reported trust with 
those of behaviour as the Sender and Returner in the trust game. My findings do not 
support the use of the trust game as a behavioural measure of generalised trust.   
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Chapter 1 
Introductory Chapter: Subjective indicators of the progress of society 
1.1 Introduction 
The progress of society is often evaluated via objective indicators such as Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), the Human Development Index (HDI) and other statistics as 
offered by sources such as Eurostat and the World Bank. These objective measures 
are subjected to analyses that inform the development and evaluation of policy as 
well as for academic purposes. They are also used to draw inferences about the 
quality of life of those living within that society (e.g. the Gini indicator of income 
inequality). However, to properly measure the impact of policy, social or system 
changes upon those living within the society, it would be appropriate to use 
subjective data (Harrison, Jowell, & Sibley, 2011; Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009).  
Subjective indicators have for some time been deployed in social surveys to measure 
social cohesion – a concept that taps, essentially, the extent to which the members 
of society function together as a harmonious unit. Measures of social cohesion seek 
evaluations of the state of society on a range of key domains. While there is 
considerable overlap with measures of social cohesion, measures of the progress of 
society seek in addition to capture the degree of disturbance caused by suboptimal 
conditions.  
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With a reported drop in social cohesion in recent decades (Kearns & Forrest, 2000; 
Putnam, 2000), interest has risen in identifying ways to improve levels of cohesion 
and, in doing so, raise levels of wellbeing within the population (Farrell et al., 2008; 
Kearns & Forrest, 2000). Measuring across time the constructs that are relevant to 
the perceived progress of society offers a valuable tool for evaluating the extent and 
direction of social change, and its consequences for the wellbeing of the population. 
Aside from being of interest in themselves, such indicators can be informative 
regarding the effectiveness of interventions and initiatives designed to improve the 
conditions in which people live.  
This chapter reviews the available theoretical literature on the measurement of 
subjective evaluations of the progress of society (due to the newness of this field, no 
empirical studies have yet emerged). Using social cohesion as a starting point, I 
introduce Harrison et al.’s (2011) proposed set of indictors of the progress of society 
before discussing the utility of subjective indicators, the causes of variation between 
and within societies, and the potential impact of subjective evaluations upon not 
just the individual’s own life but also their social environment and the broader 
society. I then identify the work that is still to be done in this important, emerging 
area of research and the first step to be taken in this thesis in support of its 
development. In the remainder of this review, I describe the indicators that will be 
used in the first substantive chapter and their relevance to the quality of society1. I 
then give an overview of the other chapters in this thesis.  
1
 In this chapter, the term quality of society will be used interchangeably with the terms progress of 
society, wellbeing of society and societal wellbeing. 




1.1.1 Social cohesion 
 
 “The constituent dimensions of social cohesion here are: 
common values and a civic culture; social order and social 
control; social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; 
social networks and social capital; and territorial belonging 
and identity.”  
(Kearns & Forrest, 2000: 996) 
 
Social cohesion is regarded as a positive thing – cohesion implying that individuals, 
groups and communities function as one society and contribute positively to the 
achievement of shared goals. The more idealised perspective on the antecedents of 
social cohesion include shared moral values and behavioural norms, and the 
demonstration (amongst members of the public) of an active interest in civic and 
political life. An alternative, less romanticised, view is that social cohesion results 
from the placid acceptance of one’s ‘lot’ in life – “a by-product of the routines, 
demands and reciprocities involved in everyday life... social cohesion is about getting 
by and getting on at the more mundane level of everyday life” (Kearns & Forrest, 
2000: 998).  
 
“... a society lacking cohesion would be one which displayed 
social disorder and conflict, disparate moral values, extreme 
social inequality, low levels of social interaction between and 
within communities and low levels of place attachment.”  
(Forrest & Kearns, 2001: 2128)  
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A low level of social cohesion is likely to result in a society marked by conflict, 
corruption and distrust not only amongst the public but between the public and 
their local and national institutions. It is widely theorised that these conditions are 
associated with lower levels of personal and social wellbeing (Farrell et al., 2008).  
 
With a reported reduction in social cohesion in recent decades (Kearns & Forrest, 
2000; Putnam, 2000), interest has risen in identifying ways to improve levels of 
cohesion. It is expected that doing so would both raise levels of wellbeing within the 
population and improve the state of society, as higher levels of social support allow 
government resources to be redirected to fund other services (Kearns & Forrest, 
2000; Farrell et al., 2008).  
 
Forrest and Kearns (2001) outline the domains on which social cohesion should be 
measured (see Table 1.1). Items measuring the domains of social cohesion ask the 
respondent to report, for example, their own level of tolerance (under social order 
and social control) and these scores are averaged across respondents to generate 
country means. Clearly, this tells us the mean level of self-reported tolerance. 
Building on the social cohesion literature, Harrison et al. (2011) propose a set of 
items that measures the perceived quality of society. Whereas the classical social 
cohesion measures inform us, for example, of the average level of self-reported 
tolerance, Harrison et al.’s equivalent measure asks respondents to evaluate the 
degree of tolerance within society.  
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Table 1.1: Forrest and Kearns’ (2001) domains of social cohesion 
Domain  Description 
Common values and civic culture Common aims and objectives; common moral 
principles and codes of behaviour; support for 
political institutions and participation in politics 
Social order and social control Absence of general conflict and threats to the 
existing order; absence of incivility; effective 
informal social control; tolerance; respect for 
difference; intergroup co-operation 
Social solidarity and reductions in 
wealth disparities 
Harmonious economic and social development 
and common standards; redistribution of public 
finances and of opportunities; equal access to 
services and welfare benefits; ready 
acknowledgement of social obligations and 
willingness to assist others 
Social networks and social capital High degree of social interaction within 
communities and families; civic engagement and 
associational activity; easy resolution of 
collective action problems 
Place attachment and identity Strong attachment to place; intertwining of 
personal and place identity  




Below, I give a brief overview of Harrison and colleagues’ (2011) set of indicators 
and the theoretical basis for its development.  
 
 
1.1.2 Measuring the quality of society 
 
In their report on The Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 
Stiglitz et al. (2009) highlighted the multidimensional nature of societal wellbeing. 
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However, they stopped short of proposing a set of indicators that should be 
measured.  
 
In partial response to this, Harrison et al. (2011) compiled a set of indicators to 
measure individuals’ perceptions of the progress of the society in which they live. 
This work began in 2007 and resulted in a set of 35 items being drawn from existing 
social surveys to measure twelve ‘domains’, oriented predominantly within 
Lockwood’s (1964) social integration and system integration:  
 
“Whereas the problem of social integration focuses attention 
upon the orderly or conflictful relationships between the 
actors, the problem of system integration focuses on the 
orderly or conflictful relationships between the parts, of a 
social system”  
(Lockwood, 1964: 245) 
 
Harrison and colleagues (2011) describe five indicators of perceived social 
integration, four of perceived system integration and three that measure ‘overall 
perceptions of society’ (Harrison et al., 2011: 73). These domains and the survey 
sources cited by the authors are listed in Table 1.2 below.  
  




Table 1.2: The twelve domains of the perceived quality of society 
 Domain No. of items (source) 
Perceived social 
integration 
Trust within society 3 (ESS) 
Perception of societal tolerance 3 (Gallup World Poll) 
Absence/ presence of social 
conflict 
3 (EQLS) 
Perception of distributive justice 3 (ISSP, ESS) 
Anomie 2 (Eurobarometer) 
Perceived system 
integration 
Trust/ confidence in institutions 5 (ESS or EVS) 
Evaluation of national 
performance 
3 (ESS) 
Provision of public services 2 (ESS) 
(Perceived) quality of public 
services 
6 (EQLS)  
Overall perceptions of 
society 
Satisfaction with society 1 (Eurobarometer) 
Intention to emigrate/ remain 1 (Gallup World Poll) 
Situation of society relative to 
time and place 
3 (Eurobarometer) 
(Source: Adapted from Appendix A, Harrison et al., 2011: 73) 
 
 
The domains put forward by Harrison et al. (2011) aim to capture the individual’s 
evaluation of how well society is functioning at the social and system levels.  At the 
social level these measure the degree of trust between strangers, tolerance and 
conflict between social groups, inequality in the system’s treatment of different 
social groups, and political disenchantment. At the system level they target 
confidence in institutions (such as parliament and the police), satisfaction with the 
country’s performance on key dimensions, and the perceived quality of services 
provided by the national and local authorities.  
 
According to Lockwood (1964), perceived social integration offers a subjective 
evaluation of the level of social cohesion within society, while perceived system 
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integration taps the respondent’s level of support for the authorities and political 
regime. Interestingly, at least at the theoretical level both social and system 
integration appear to fall within Forrest and Kearns’ (2001) indicators of social 
cohesion.  
 
As mentioned earlier, a key feature that distinguishes the measurement of the 
progress of society from that of social cohesion is the inclusion of items that 
measure subjective evaluations of the extent to which negative indicators of social 
cohesion are problematic. For example, Harrison et al.’s (2011) measure of 
perception of distributive justice asks whether some groups within society receive 
unfair advantages. This offers augmentation to the information available from 
objective measures; even where there are high levels of inequality, if citizens are 
accepting of these circumstances we may expect the level of inequality to have little 
impact on support for institutions or satisfaction with society. We can see from the 
third column in Table 1.2 that at the time of compilation no one survey offered 
measures for the complete set of indicators.  
 
The addition of the final domain in the list, situation of society relative to time and 
place, asks the respondent to evaluate society’s current position relative to its 
position in the past and their expectation of whether it will improve or decline in the 
future. Again, the individual’s standpoint on this domain is likely to add important 
contextual information to their responses on the other indicators. In the next 
section I discuss the use utility of subjective indicators and any issues that need to 
be borne in mind when using them in social research.  





1.1.3 The use of subjective indicators  
 
Although valued by survey researchers, subjective indicators have not previously 
been used in the manner proposed by Harrison et al. (2011). This section examines 
their usefulness and their strength or vulnerability in the face of potential 
confounding influences. I address their overall utility (i.e. why it is desirable to use 
subjective indicators), theories of their origins and susceptibility to influence, and 




The utility of subjective indicators 
 
Although they cannot achieve the same degree of standardisation as objective 
indicators, subjective evaluations of the quality of society can be used in a number 
of ways. Firstly, it is generally our beliefs, not objective reality, that determine our 
behaviour. For example, if I believe my neighbourhood to be unsafe I will avoid 
certain behaviours that I feel put me at risk of becoming a victim of violent crime. 
Objectively, my neighbourhood may actually be very safe and the likelihood of 
violent crime very low, but it is my perception that influences my behaviour, my 
stress levels and perhaps my interaction with my neighbours, and has a negative 
impact on my wellbeing. Additionally, in the realm of system integration, if I do not 
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have confidence in the political regime I am less likely to vote in the next election 
irrespective of the actual quality of its performance or the level of corruption within 
the regime.  
 
Secondly, subjective indicators do of course provide valuable feedback regarding the 
valence of citizens’2 feelings about the evaluation objects and the pattern of any 
changes over time, and permit cross-national comparisons. Such information offers 
a means to evaluate the impact (or lack thereof) of changes to policy and services, 
and other forms of social intervention. For example, a particular policy change may 
be designed to produce a certain outcome, however, if no change is observed in the 
relevant indicators then this may suggest that the intervention was not successful. 
Discrepancies between objective and subjective measures can also flag areas where 
further investigation is needed. For example, a service that is performing 
outstandingly according to objective measures may receive a poor evaluation in 
subjective indicators perhaps due to a lack of public awareness of the service or the 
service not being objectively evaluated on dimensions that are most important to 
the public (Glaser & Denhardt, 2000).  
 
A lack of attention to subjective indicators would therefore signal missed 
opportunities to glean vital information about how well society – its institutions and 
services – is serving its population and how well the members of the population are 
working together. The inclusion of evaluations of the fairness of the current 
circumstances within society also permits investigation into the degree of concern 
                                                          
2
 Here, I use the word citizens to mean ‘people who live in that particular society’. I do not distinguish 
between those who do and do not hold legal citizenship.  
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about particular policy topics amongst individuals and different groups within 
society. However, subjective indicators do have limitations – such as their 
vulnerability to influence by local, national or global events (e.g. Stoop, 2007).  
 
 
The origins of and influences on subjective evaluations 
 
At the individual level, the valence of subjective evaluations may vary due to several 
factors. Taking genuine variation within society first: individuals differ in factors such 
as their expectations, priorities and frequency and nature of exposure to the 
evaluation object as well as their level of ‘grievance asymmetry’ – their focus on 
negative versus positive evaluations (Yang & Holzer, 2006). Whether we are talking 
about a public service (such as the education system or public transport), 
institutions (such as the police or parliament) or even the trustworthiness of 
strangers, people will naturally evaluate the object from different perspectives and 
against different criteria. In addition, individuals living in different regions and those 
from different social backgrounds are likely to observe varying quality of service 
from any specified service or institution. Those who do not use a service or have had 
no dealings with that particular institution will still be willing to evaluate it on the 
basis of media attention and information passed on from other people (Denters, 
Gabriel, & Torcal, 2007; Glaser & Denhardt, 2000).  
 
Evaluations can also be artificially manipulated by one’s underlying support or 
distaste for the incumbent authorities. Evaluations of political institutions, as well as 
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their performance and the quality of the services they provide, may all be 
instinctively upgraded during the term of a political party one supports or 
downgraded when a party one opposes is in power (Denters et al., 2007).  
 
Variation may also arise due to differences in interpretation of the question. Sturgis 
and Smith (2010) report that approximately 25% of respondents, when asked to 
evaluate the trustworthiness of people ‘in general’, report having made their 
decision based on people they know. This increases their level of self-reported trust 
but not because they have more trust in strangers, rather, they have answered a 
different question to the one they were asked.  
 
When comparing subjective evaluations between societies, differences may arise 
due to objective variation in the quality of those societies or due to cultural factors 
that influence individuals’ response styles. Possible objective differences between 
societies include the types of political regime and welfare state, level of national 
wealth and the degree of income inequality, corruption and fractionalisation. The 
possible impact of cultural factors, however, relates to issues such as individuals’ use 
of the response scale (for example, some cultures expressing stronger views than 
others; e.g. Chen, Lee, & Stevenson, 1995) and differing tendencies towards 
acquiescence bias (the tendency to agree; e.g. Smith, 2004). While one would expect 
to observe that higher quality societies receive more positive evaluations, these 
potential confounding factors may generate contrary findings.  
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Clearly, there are a number of potential influences on subjective evaluations and 
these influences may introduce a degree of unreliability into the data we obtain. 
However, what matters for one’s feelings about the society in which they live is not 
the accuracy of their evaluations but rather their valence. A person who has a high 
level of confidence in institutions, is very satisfied with the levels of micro- and 
macro-performance (i.e. the performance of local and national authorities, 
respectively) and who believes that the society they live in is a socially harmonious 
place full of trustworthy people, is likely to feel positive about society. This person 
may be very much mistaken on all counts, but if they are oblivious to this fact then it 
will not affect their feelings about living in that society. The impact of an objectively 
good or bad society upon the wellbeing of its inhabitants will therefore vary 
depending upon the extent to which those inhabitants are (a) aware of the situation, 
and (b) accepting of it. The next section discusses the potential individual-level, 
social and societal correlates of positive and negative perceptions of social and 
system integration.  
 
 
1.1.4 The correlates of positive and negative subjective evaluations  
 
Positive and negative evaluations of the quality of society are associated with 
different effects at the level of the individual, as well as their social environment and 
the broader society. While it would not be appropriate to refer to these as either 
causes or consequences of their bearer’s perceptions of social and system 
integration, as detailed below certain relationships have been observed in a number 
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of empirical studies. All reported effects are observed when controlling at least for 
the respondents’ socioeconomic status (income and/ or occupation) and standard 
demographic characteristics (age, gender and education).  
 
 
Individual-level correlates  
 
People who perceive a high level of social integration and stability (that other people 
are generally trustworthy and tolerant, that there is little conflict within and 
between social groups, that the allocation of resources is fair) are more likely to 
report higher levels of physical wellbeing and happiness (e.g. Helliwell & Putnam, 
2004). More positive perceptions of system integration (a higher level of trust in 
institutions and greater satisfaction with micro- and macro-performance) are 
associated with, for example, a more positive attitude towards law abidance (Marien 
& Hooghe, 2011).  
 
 
Correlates at the social level 
 
A higher level of civic participation is associated with a higher level of perceived 
social integration, and this encourages the formation of informal groups. This in turn 
permits the development of a positively reinforcing norm of reciprocity and broader 
support networks. The perception of high tolerance and little conflict is likely to 
facilitate intergroup cohesion and to nurture bridging social capital. The opposite 
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scenario – a low level of perceived social integration – is more likely to lead to the 
reinforcement (intentionally or otherwise) or antisocial norms and the strengthening 
of bonding social capital (Newton, 2001; Putnam, 2000).  
 
A higher level of perceived system integration may be visible in the social 
environment as participation in local government, greater voter turnout in local 
elections and support for events organised by local institutions (Putnam, 2000; 
Uslaner, 2002). Norms of positive interaction between the public and local 
authorities are likely to promote good citizenry and thus a low crime rate. In this 
way, higher perceived social integration may become self-perpetuating as both 
cause and effect.  
 
 
Society-level correlates  
 
A higher aggregate level of perceived social integration is likely to imply that the 
population are accepting and supportive of institutions that promote equal 
opportunities, progressive social and welfare policies and positive attitudes towards 
diversity (Boix & Posner, 1998; Uslaner, 2002). Positive perceptions of factors 
relating to system integration are likely to be associated with political engagement, 
higher voter turnout, and a progressive population electing public officials who 
share their values (Boix & Posner, 1998; Knack, 2002). Alternatively, a low average 
level of perceived social integration is likely to indicate social discord. Where the 
population has a choice, this may prompt votes for officials who promise to change 
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the status quo or, in the case of severe disaffection with the system, action that 
bypasses the official channels (Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels, 2011).   
 
 
1.1.5 Concluding comments 
 
We have seen that the individual’s subjective evaluations of social and system 
integration offer insight into the impact of policy decisions on the population and 
are associated with behaviours that have potentially far-reaching consequences.  
 
As described above, Harrison et al. (2011) put forward a dashboard of indicators 
taken from a variety of cross-national surveys. These indicators are intended for use 
in the measurement of subjective evaluations of the progress of society. Some of 
these indicators comprise sets of items that are theoretically connected and have 
previously demonstrated the expected associations. Others, however, are at present 
more speculative. For example, the three item social trust scale is known to be 
conceptually and empirically sound (e.g. Allum, Patulny, Read, & Sturgis, 2010; Allum 
et al., 2011), while the items comprising the indicators of micro- and macro-
performance have been less widely examined. Before we can have confidence that 
these constructs can be reliably measured and meaningfully interpreted, it is 
necessary to assess their measurement invariance over time and cross-nationally.  
 
In the section that follows I give an overview of the remaining chapters, with 
Chapter 2 embodying my first step in support of progressing the use of these 
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indicators. However, while researching the background literature for Chapter 2, I 
became aware of some compelling gaps in the literature on generalised social trust. 
For the second and third substantive chapters, I therefore narrowed my focus to 
research questions relating to the aetiology of generalised social trust. In total, there 
are five further chapters in this thesis: the first substantive chapter, a review of the 
literature on the measurement and origins of generalised social trust, the second 
and third substantive chapters and finally the concluding chapter. Below I give an 
overview of each of these in turn.  
 
 
1.2 Thesis overview 
 
Chapter 2  
The perceived quality of society: measurement invariance over time 
 
The task for the first substantive chapter of this thesis was to establish the degree of 
measurement invariance over time of the indicators proposed by Harrison et al. 
(2011). However, given that no one survey instrument offered items representing all 
twelve domains, I restricted the number of domains to those that were present in 
one survey. Of those listed in Table 1.2 above, the European Social Survey (ESS) 
offered measures for more domains than any other. These domains were: social 
trust (within perceived social integration), and trust in institutions, evaluation of 
national performance and the perceived quality of public services (within perceived 
system integration).  





These four domains are measured by thirteen items from the core questionnaire of 
the European Social Survey (Rounds 2 – 5, spanning the years 2002 – 2010). In 
subjecting these items to multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA), I 
found that the theorised five-factor measurement model did not demonstrate scalar 
invariance over time. This was due to the evaluation of national performance factor, 
which comprised three items: satisfaction with the economy, democracy and 
government performance. The financial crisis, which began in 2006, resulted in a 
substantial deterioration in individuals’ satisfaction with the economy but left their 
satisfaction with democracy and the government relatively intact. This dismantled 
the evaluation of national performance factor. A six-factor model, with ‘satisfaction 




Literature review: inter-individual variation in generalised trust  
 
This chapter reviews the literature on the measurement and aetiology of generalised 
trust. With the popular focus on the social origins of generalised trust (e.g. Putnam, 
2000), I look primarily at theories that operate at the levels of the individual and 
society. I conclude that there is as yet a dearth of material testing the individual-
level theories – the theory of the moral foundations of trust (MFTT; Uslaner, 2002) 
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and Personality Theory (Delhey & Newton, 2003). I conclude by highlighting areas 




The moral foundations of generalised trust?  
 
In my second substantive chapter, I use multilevel modelling to test Uslaner’s (2002) 
theory of the moral foundations of generalised trust (MFTT). I test whether values 
predict trust and whether the relationships between values and trust are consistent 
across different societal contexts. Taking individual-level data from the European 
Social Survey, my outcome measure is the generalised trust question (GTQ) and my 
main predictor variables are theoretically relevant constructs from Schwartz’s (2001) 
Human Values Scale. The second level in the model, the society-level, is populated 
using national statistics taken from sources such as the World Bank.  
 
This study finds statistically significant relationships between certain values 
constructs and generalised trust. Random slopes analysis revealed that the 
coefficients for these constructs are generally consistent cross-nationally, barring a 
borderline significant effect for Conformity/ Tradition in some models.  
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Chapter 5  
Testing Personality Theory: identifying the individual-level drivers of self-reported 
trust, behavioural trust and trustworthiness  
 
In this final substantive chapter I report the design, implementation and results of an 
experiment that tested whether the individual’s personality shows associations with 
their level of generalised trust and their behaviour in the trust game. Participants in 
this two-part experiment first completed a questionnaire and, a week later, played 
two rounds of the trust game. My primary outcome measures were the generalised 
trust question (measured in the questionnaire), and behavioural trust and 
trustworthiness (inferred from their behaviour in the trust game). To measure 
personality I used the 240-item NEO-PI-3.  
 
I found that while aspects of one’s personality significantly predict all three outcome 
measures, there is little correspondence between the drivers of self-reported trust 
and behavioural trust. At the trait level Agreeableness is positively associated with 
both self-reported trust and behavioural trustworthiness, while trust and altruism 
are the only predictors they have in common at the facet level (trustworthiness 
being associated with two further facets within Agreeableness).  
 
This indicates support for the Personality Theory of generalised trust, but does 
generate some uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of using the trust game as 
a behavioural measure of generalised trust: as discussed in Chapter 5, future 
research should investigate alternative game designs.   







In my concluding chapter I review the findings of my three substantive chapters and 
the contributions they make to the literature. In doing so, I discuss the possible 
implications of my results for future research into generalised trust, and the 
relevance of individual-level characteristics (such as personality) to social research.  
 
  









The progress3 of society is commonly measured using objective indicators such as 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the Human Development Index (HDI), the proportion 
of the population that has attained a certain level of education, the Gini coefficient 
of income inequality and the level of institutional corruption. A more progressive 
society would tend to score more highly on GDP, the HDI and education and lower 
on corruption and income inequality (e.g. LSE, 2008) .  
 
Recorded as national statistics, such data offer standardised measures that should 
be comparable across time and between countries. However, objective measures do 
not tell us what it is like to live in a society and there is a growing movement 
towards the use of subjective indicators, such as those gathered in social surveys 
(Harrison et al., 2011; Stiglitz et al., 2009). Using subjective indicators, the progress 
(or wellbeing) of society has been conceptualised both as the aggregate of 
individuals’ self-reported happiness or life satisfaction (e.g. Allin, 2007), and as 
individuals’ evaluations of the qualities of the society itself (Harrison et al., 2011; see 
also Sirgy, 2011). Beyond the simple garnering of information relating to public 
opinion, such data offers important feedback to the authorities regarding how well 
                                                          
3
 For the purposes of this chapter, I use the term ‘progress of society’ interchangeably with ‘quality of 
society’, ‘wellbeing of society’ and ‘societal wellbeing’. 
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changes (for example, improvements in service provision) have been communicated 
to the public and how well society is responding to earlier policy initiatives.  
 
Analyses such as these often rely on mean scores from groups of items that purport 
to measure a single underlying construct. The use of mean scores in comparative 
(e.g. time-series or cross-national) analyses requires that the survey items 
demonstrate measurement invariance4: that for all groups (e.g. time points or 
countries), these items are equally representative of the underlying construct(s). 
However, this is often simply assumed and without testing the level of measurement 
invariance it is not possible to know whether one’s results can be meaningfully 
interpreted.  
 
This chapter examines the degree of measurement invariance demonstrated by a 
subset of Harrison et al.’s (2011) indicators of the progress of society, within a UK 
dataset. The full set of indicators comprises some domains that are relatively well-
established (such as social trust) and others that appear to be new to the field (such 
as evaluation of national performance). At the time of writing, no large-scale dataset 
measures the full range of indicators. This chapter therefore examines the 
measurement invariance of thirteen items that cover four domains: social trust, 
trust in institutions, evaluation of national performance and perceived quality of 
public services.  
 
                                                          
4
 I use the terms ‘measurement invariance’ and ‘measurement equivalence’ interchangeably.  
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In the sections that follow, I give a brief overview of Harrison et al.’s (2011) 
proposed indicators and the goals of measurement invariance testing (a fuller 
description of each can be found in Chapter 1 (Section 1.1.2) and in Section 2.2.3 of 
this chapter, respectively). I then discuss each of the above domains in turn, 
describing its theoretical and empirical associations (where available), and any 
theoretical and empirical bases for my expectations regarding the items’ factor 
structure and degree of measurement invariance. Finally, I report on the methods 
used to test my hypotheses and the results obtained.  
 
 
2.1.1 Subjective indicators of the progress of society 
 
Harrison et al.’s (2011) measures of the perceived progress of society include items 
relating to other people within society, as well as institutions and their performance. 
Lockwood (1964) identifies the quality of relationships amongst individuals within 
society as an issue of social integration, and that of relationships between parts of 
society (such as its institutions) as issues of system integration. On this basis, 
Harrison et al. (2011) propose a set of items that function as indicators of the 
progress of society. Measures of social trust, tolerance, social conflict, perceived 
distributive justice and anomie fall within social integration, while system 
integration comprises trust in institutions, evaluation of national performance, 
provision of public services and perceived quality of public services. Harrison and 
colleagues also propose measures for overall perceptions of society: satisfaction with 
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society, intention to emigrate/ remain, and situation of society relative to time and 
place (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1.2, for a fuller discussion).  
 
These measures aim to tap not only the individual’s evaluation of how well society is 
functioning but also their judgement regarding whether any suboptimal 
performance is problematic. This permits evaluation of whether an objectively poor 
level of progress is detrimental to the functioning of society. These foci stand 
Harrison et al.’s (2011) set of indicators aside from the typical measures of societal 
wellbeing (which tend to aggregate individual wellbeing) and from those that 
measure social cohesion (which tend to ask respondents’ own level of, for example, 
tolerance, rather than asking the respondent to evaluate the level of tolerance 
within society).  
 
Before they can be used substantively in comparative research, the measurement 
properties of these domains should be tested both across time and cross-nationally. 
As noted above, no single dataset offers measures for all twelve domains. In this 
study, I therefore test (using UK data only) the degree of measurement invariance 
over time of four domains: social trust, trust in institutions, evaluation of national 
performance and perceived quality of public services. Full measurement invariance 
comprises three hierarchical elements: configural, metric and scalar invariance. 
Configural invariance would indicate that each item loads on the same factor(s) at 
each time point, metric invariance that the item is measured on the same scale 
across time, and scalar invariance that it holds similar relationships with the other 
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items that load on the same factor (Section 2.2.3 below offers a more detailed 
discussion of measurement invariance).  
 
The remainder of this Introduction describes each of the four domains in turn: what 
the domain measures, its associations with other constructs, and any existing 
theoretical and empirical literature relating to whether the items should measure a 
single underlying construct. Where available, this information informs my 
expectations regarding the behaviour of these survey items when subjected to 




2.1.2 (Generalised) social trust 
 
Broadly speaking, trust is defined as the belief “... that others will not deliberately or 
knowingly do us harm, if they can avoid it, and will look after our interests, if this is 
possible” (Delhey & Newton, 2005: 311). In the case of generalised social trust, the 
truster applies this belief to the unknown other on the basis that most people can be 
trusted irrespective of demographic, social or cultural dis/similarity to themselves 
(Uslaner, 2002). The paragraphs that follow give a brief overview of the theories 
regarding where social trust comes from and describe its empirical associations in 
multivariate analyses.  
 
 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
39 
 
What drives social trust?  
 
There are several theories of the origins of generalised trust. Some regard the 
propensity to trust as inherent to the individual and predominantly determined by 
attributes such as personality traits (personality theory; Delhey & Newton, 2003) or 
values (the theory of the moral foundations of trust; Uslaner, 2002), while others 
emphasise social aspects such as the individual’s standing (success and wellbeing 
theory; Delhey & Newton, 2003) and participation in their social environment 
(voluntary organisations theory and social networks theory; Putnam, 2000). And 
finally, two theories highlight the importance of the broader social and societal 
context in which the individual lives (Delhey & Newton, 2003), citing the relevance 
of the local area (community theory) and the broader society (societal theory) to 
individuals’ levels of social trust. These latter two theories bear strong resemblance 
to institutional theory, which posits that generalised trust is associated with the 
behaviour of local and national institutions both directly (effective order institutions 
serving to deter untrustworthy behaviour) and indirectly (cooperative, non-corrupt 




Empirical associations  
 
In regression analyses, self-reported generalised trust tends to be positively 
associated with a higher level of education (Albanese, De Blasio, & Sestito, 2013; 
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Fehr, 2008; Naef & Schupp, 2009b), and to show a non-linear association with age 
such that younger and older people are more trusting while those of working age 
are less-so (Fehr, 2008). Results regarding its relationships with gender are mixed, 
with some studies finding higher trust scores amongst males (Naef & Schupp, 2009b) 
and others amongst females (Albanese et al., 2013; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & 
Sunde, 2008; Gundelach, 2014). These associations hold in multi-level models that 
also account for variables at the level of society (e.g. Gundelach, 2014; Herreros, 
2012; C.-S. Lee, 2013; Park & Subramanian, 2012; Polillo, 2012; Reeskens, 2009; 
Robbins, 2011; Wang & Gordon, 2011; You, 2012). In addition, socioeconomic 
indicators such as occupational prestige, household income and the degree of 
comfort living on that income have been found to be positively associated with 
generalised trust (Fehr, 2008; Naef & Schupp, 2009b; Paxton, 2007).  
 
Much work has also investigated the associations between characteristics of the 
country or society and the mean level of social trust across the population sample. 
Social trust is usually found to be positively associated with indicators of social 
progress, with higher aggregate levels of trust reported in democratic countries 
(Uslaner, 2002), those that have a universalistic welfare state (Rothstein & Stolle, 
2002), a lower level of inequality (Knack & Keefer, 1997), higher national wealth and 
a lower level of corruption (Uslaner, 2002). A positive association has also been 
observed between level of social trust and trust in institutions (e.g. Allum et al., 
2010).  
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The sections below describe the measurement of social trust, and discuss the 
theoretical and empirical literature relating to these items’ behaviour in CFA and 
MGCFA across time.  
 
 
2.1.2.1 Measuring social trust 
 
The construct used here comprises three measures of social trust: Noelle-
Neumann’s generalised trust question and two that are taken from the Rosenberg 
(1957) Misanthropy Scale (Zmerli, Newton, & Montero, 2007). The generalised trust 
question (GTQ) asks whether other people can be trusted (or if you cannot be too 
careful), the second question asks whether others would in general seek to be fair 
(or to take advantage), and the third asks whether others would seek to be helpful 
(or are mostly looking out for themselves; see Table 2.1, Section 2.2.1 for the full 
item and response wording).  
 
 
2.1.2.2 Methodological behaviour: theoretical orientations  
 
The three items measure whether in general others can be trusted, seek to be fair 
and seek to be helpful. The treatment of these items in the literature indicates that 
all three are expected to measure one underlying construct, generalised social trust. 
In this section I discuss the theoretical support for this idea (or the lack thereof).  
 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
42 
 
These items all seek to measure the respondent’s evaluations of ‘the generalised 
other’, the average stranger one might encounter in the street. However, there do 
appear to be some differences between them. For example, unlike scenarios that 
require trust, those involving fairness and helpfulness are not necessarily inherently 
risky. To regard others as trustworthy is therefore a stronger display of confidence in 
the generalised ‘other’ than regarding them as fair or helpful. However, this 
argument may only be relevant in behavioural contexts and therefore it may not 
stand in self-report data. When deciding whether to show trust behaviourally, many 
factors come into play; however, when responding to survey questions we are more 
likely to draw on our internal sense of optimism regarding the goodness of human 
nature, that is, our degree of underlying faith that the majority of people are not 
interested in causing harm but would actually have objectively good intentions. 
From the opposite angle: if we expect that others will, in general, be looking out for 
themselves or seeking to take advantage of us, then we would be wise to be 
cautious rather than trusting.  
 
Despite the differing evaluations sought by these items, it is reasonable to anticipate 
that they will draw on a common underlying feeling regarding human nature. In 
theory, it is also likely that these items will demonstrate a degree of measurement 
invariance across time. Following the discussion above, it seems reasonable to 
expect this factor model to be maintained across time (configural invariance). 
Similarly, there is scant reason to anticipate changes to the factor-item relationships 
(metric invariance) over such a short time span. A test of scalar invariance, however, 
reflects on the item means at each time point and these may of course vary. It 
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seems unlikely that the magnitude of any changes in item means between 2004 – 
2010 would be sufficient to undermine the integrity of the factor. However, it is 
possible that events such as the terrorist attacks in London in 2005 had an impact.  
 
I turn now to examine how these items have behaved in methodological tests in the 
existing literature, examining both evidence relating to the factor structure of these 
items and their invariance over time.  
 
 
2.1.2.3 Methodological behaviour: empirical evidence  
 
In analyses of pooled data, a number of studies have found support for the single-
factor model of social trust using dichotomous measures and responses on eleven-
point scales (e.g. Allum et al., 2010; Allum et al., 2011). In comparative analyses, 
Reeskens and Hooghe (2008) and Coromina and Davidov (2013) investigate the 
invariance of the social trust factor across time.  
 
In multi-group structural equation modelling (MGSEM) on data from the first two 
Rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS; ESS1, ESS2), Reeskens and Hooghe 
(2008) find that when modelled on one factor, the social trust items achieve metric 
equivalence across time for sixteen of the twenty countries included in their 
analyses. This means that the factor loadings are similar across the two Rounds of 
the survey, permitting meaningful comparison over time of the relationships 
between the latent constructs (e.g. the relationship between social trust and other 
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constructs, across time). The items do not, however, demonstrate scalar equivalence 
so it would be difficult to meaningfully compare mean scores across the two Rounds 
(Van der Veld & Saris, 2011).  
 
Using data from seven countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Switzerland), across four Rounds of the ESS (ESS1 – ESS4), Coromina 
and Davidov (2013) implement MGCFA to test the measurement invariance of the 
three items across these 28 groups (each country at each time). In a one-factor 
model, the items demonstrate an acceptable level of metric invariance but do not 
achieve full scalar invariance across groups. Considering the time-series analyses 
within each country, only the data from France and the Netherlands achieve scalar 
invariance across all four Rounds. No scalar invariance across Rounds was observed 
for Germany or Spain. These results imply that while social trust (as measured via 
these three items) may be meaningfully discussed in relation to other constructs, 
the potential value in comparing mean social trust scores across time varies cross-
nationally.  
 
The items within the social trust factor have demonstrated configural invariance 
cross-nationally and across time. However, in the two studies cited there is mixed 
evidence for metric and scalar invariance. None of the studies found to date have 
assessed the degree of measurement invariance of these items in a UK sample 
across time.  
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2.1.2.4 Summary  
 
This study will initially confirm the basic factor model for the three social trust items 
using UK data from Round 2 of the ESS. The findings of previous studies encourage 
confidence that these items will load on a single factor. The findings of Reeskens and 
Hooghe (2008) and Coromina and Davidov (2013) indicate that the social trust factor 
achieves configural invariance. However, appropriate expectations regarding metric 
and scalar invariance are less clear.  
 
 
2.1.3 Trust in Institutions 
 
“Where trust in government used to refer to the belief that 
government will not become autocratic or allow people to be 
arrested unjustly, it now refers to more down to earth matter 
such as the reliability of service delivery or the expectation 
that policy will correspond to one’s wishes” 
(Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003: 334)  
 
Here, institutions refers to the actors or groups of actors (e.g. politicians or political 
parties), and the institutions (e.g. parliament or cabinet) that are inherent within the 
national infrastructure of a democracy. In addition, it also covers the ‘institutions of 
the Rechtsstaat’; that is, institutions (such as the police) that exist primarily to 
enforce the law (Denters et al., 2007)5. Kotzian (2011: 25) defines institutional trust 
                                                          
5
 Denters et al. (2007) classify political parties as (groups of) actors. This appears to be in accordance 
with convention (Global Citizen, 2007) 
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as the extent to which citizens “trust in the moral integrity of institutions” and 
“[have] confidence in the capabilities of institutions”. It is theorised that the level of 
trust an individual will feel towards each institution will vary with their knowledge of 
the institution, their socio-demographic and socio-economic background, and their 
perception of the quality of that institution (Hudson, 2006).  
 
It is widely noted that trust in political institutions has substantially declined since 
the 1960s (Bouckaert, Van de Walle, Maddens, & Kampen, 2002; Inglehart, 1999; 
Nye, Zelikow, & King, 1997; Putnam, 2000). Theories around this loss of trust 
primarily focus on socio-cultural and political factors: the loss of generalised trust 
within society and its subsequent impact on trust in institutions, the rise of 
‘cognitive mobilisation’ and the hypothesised heightened prevalence of 
postmodernist values (and the subsequent change in citizens’ policy preferences and 
their evaluation criteria when assessing institutions’ trustworthiness). Other theories 
include the existence of a ‘culture of distrust’ (in which it is fashionable or socially 
acceptable to denigrate political actors and institutions) and a subsequent ‘spiral of 
silence’, in which citizens who disagree with the popular view feel too discouraged 
to voice their opinion honestly (Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). Finally, the media 
are widely cited as a causal mechanism in the reported deterioration of trust in 
institutions, avidly recounting tales of questionable behaviour amongst the political 
elite (Inglehart, 1999; Nye et al., 1997). 
 
While critical evaluation of institutions is regarded as healthy in a democratic setting 
(Hooghe et al., 2011; Kaase, 1999; Van de Walle, Van Roosbroek, & Bouckaert, 
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2008), a certain level of trust is important to institutions’ continued functioning (e.g. 
Hetherington, 1998; Marien & Hooghe, 2011). The literature discusses the potential 
negative consequences of trust dropping below a hypothetical ‘critical threshold’: 
negative outcomes for the government include citizen unwillingness to vote 
(Hooghe et al., 2011) and pay taxes (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003). More 
seriously, it is feared that a loss of support for the political system could result in a 
decline in government performance (Hetherington, 1998) and an increase in public 
support for ‘anti-system’ parties (Hooghe et al., 2011).  
 
 
What drives trust in institutions? 
 
As noted above, theoretical accounts of the roots of trust in institutions discuss key 
socio-cultural and political factors. Socio-cultural explanations are built on social 
capital theory (and the importance of generalised social trust, social inclusion and 
civic participation to the maintenance of trust in institutions; Putnam, 2000), the 
valence of citizens’ values and political ideology (determining which institutions and 
individuals they are willing to trust; Levi & Stoker, 2000), and factors such as their 
cognitive ability (citizens’ understanding of contemporary issues will influence which 
policies they are willing to support; Schoon & Cheng, 2011).  
 
Political factors include institutions’ performance (or rather, citizens’ perceptions of 
performance and the proximity to their prior expectations; Van de Walle & 
Bouckaert, 2003. See Yang & Holzer, 2006, for a review), citizens’ perceptions of 
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institutions’ responsiveness (valuing political actors and institutions that are 
responsive to their needs and preferences; Levi & Stoker, 2000), the presence of 
one’s preferred political party in government (Rothstein & Stolle, 2002), exposure to 
the media (and reports of corrupt and unethical activities; Bouckaert et al., 2002) 
and the state of the economy (making life more or less financially comfortable; 





In cross-national, multivariate analyses on pooled data (the 21 countries in ESS1) 
and controlling for society-level attributes (corruption, GDP, income inequality, 
unemployment, inflation and cabinet stability), Kotzian (2011) examined the 
predictors of trust in parliament, politicians, the police and the legal system. He 
found that trust is significantly associated with key demographic variables such as 
gender (females being more trusting), age and education (mixed findings across 
institutions). In addition, feeling close to a political party (not necessarily the one in 
power), a higher level of political efficacy and feeling that politicians care about their 
citizenry are each positively associated with level of trust. However, being a member 
of a minority group is associated with reporting a significantly lower level of trust 
than the majority, and for each predictor variable the results vary across institutions. 
Satisfaction with macro- and micro-performance (as one variable) is significantly and 
substantially predictive of trust in all four institutions. Other studies have noted 
significant positive associations between trust and attitudes towards law abidance 
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(Marien & Hooghe, 2011) and reported levels of social trust (Allum et al., 2010; 
Allum et al., 2011).  
 
At the level of society, Kotzian (2011) reports that each of the characteristics listed 
above is significantly predictive of trust in most institutions. However, the direction 
of the association for each predictor varies across institutions.  
 
The remainder of this section will discuss the measurement and methodological 
characteristics of trust in institutions. A review of the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature will guide my expectations regarding the behaviour of these 
items when subjected to CFA and MGCFA.  
 
 
2.1.3.1 Measuring trust in institutions  
 
Trust in institutions is often assessed via a battery of items that measure 
respondents’ trust (or confidence) in a range of national institutions and actors. The 
ESS measures respondents’ trust in parliament, political parties, politicians, the legal 
system and the police. This is a somewhat modest array of institutions when 
compared to those evaluated in other surveys (e.g. the European Values Study, 
which additionally includes measures of trust6 in the military, church, press and civil 
service).  
 
                                                          
6
 Some surveys instead measure confidence in institutions, however, these are regarded and treated 
as interchangeable with measures of trust in institutions.  
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In the sections that follow, I review the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
relating to the measurement invariance of these items. Due to the variance in the 
set of institutions evaluated across different instruments, I discuss only those studies 
that use ESS data.  
 
 
2.1.3.2 Methodological behaviour: theoretical orientations 
 
The items in this domain measure citizens’ trust in separate but related institutions. 
The existing literature discusses two possible factor models for the trust in 
institutions items: (a) Denters et al. (2007) propose that the different types of 
institution will load on three separate factors: political actors, political institutions 
and the order (Rechtsstaat) institutions; and (b) Hooghe (2011) describes a two-
factor solution: the political institutions (comprising both political actors and 
institutions) and the order institutions.   
 
Denters et al. (2007) hypothesise that citizens differentially evaluate the political 
actors (politicians and political parties) and institutions (parliament) of a democracy, 
and separately again the enforcement institutions (the police and the courts). 
However, they do not appear to cite a theoretical basis for their hypothesis but base 
it on the findings of earlier empirical research. It may make sense to theorise that 
citizens will evaluate individual actors within the political system differently to the 
institutions, similarly to the way one might differentiate between showing support 
for the incumbent government versus showing support for the political regime. 
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However, it is not yet clear that respondents consider the question of political trust 
in this way: whether, when asked how much trust they have in Parliament, the 
respondent considers how much trust they have in Parliament as a regime, or 
Parliament as a collection of politicians and political parties (Easton, 1975).  
 
A somewhat popular theory is that the items measuring trust in institutions load 
onto two factors: political trust and trust in the law. This is perhaps due to the 
public’s differing relationship with the two sets of institutions (Kotzian, 2011; 
Thomas, 1998). As authorities, the legal institutions exist independently of the public 
vote, while members of parliament are voted into office by the public. It is therefore 
possible that citizens not only have different expectations of them, but regard them 
in a different way to the actors within legal (or order) institutions.  
 
The political and the order institutions also have different roles within society and 
their representations and associations, whether driven by the media or by social 
discourse, are quite different in character. At least, this should be the case in 
established democracies; in new democracies and societies with non-democratic 
regimes, the order institutions may be strongly political (Marien, 2013).  
 
Hooghe (2011) offers support for the proposed single factor behind political actors 
and institutions, citing the ‘cognitive miser’ and ‘satisficing’ concepts, and the 
embeddedness of all political actors and institutions within a single culture. The 
cognitive miser effect suggests that individuals evaluate the institution they are 
most familiar with and extrapolate this to form judgements on the remaining 
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institutions. Satisficing, in its weaker form, may result in a respondent giving 
answers that are less than accurate but are approximately representative (i.e. giving 
an answer that is ‘good enough’). In its strong form, satisficing can result in a 
respondent’s data bearing little or no relation to their actual perspective: the 
respondent simply offers “a reasonable answer without referring to any internal 
psychological cues specifically relevant to the attitude, belief, or event of interest” 
(Krosnick, Narayan, & Smith, 1996: 31).  
 
Hooghe’s (2011) second theory regarding the reason why trust in political actors and 
political institutions should be rooted in a single attitude relates to the way we 
perceive the overriding political culture at the time: political actors and institutions 
within a nation all “… share the norms of the same political culture, and therefore 
they will behave in the same corrupt or trustworthy manner”. Hooghe further 
explains that “… as a heuristic shortcut, it makes sense to arrive at a comprehensive 
judgement on political trust, since we know the behaviour of politicians and 
institutions will be determined mainly by the political culture, which is a system 
characteristic, not a characteristic of the specific institution” (Hooghe, 2011: 274).  
 
Hooghe’s (2011) position does have intuitive appeal. While it appears that no 
comparable argument has been presented relating to why levels of trust in the order 
institutions should be drawn from a single underlying attitude, it seems reasonable 
to expect that similar processes to those conjectured for political trust may apply. 
Having discussed the potential factor structure of these items, I now consider the 
likelihood that the model will be invariant across time.  




As noted earlier, configural invariance would indicate that the items fit the same 
factor structure across time. The UK being an established democracy should mean 
that the public view its political and legal institutions as distinct entities (Marien, 
2013), resulting in separate evaluations. However, it is difficult to use logic to inform 
any expectations regarding the potential for the trust in institutions model to 
achieve metric or scalar invariance.  
 
 
2.1.3.3 Methodological behaviour: empirical findings  
 
Analyses using ESS data pooled across countries has generated single-factor 
(Listhaug & Ringdal, 2008; Marien, 2013) and two-factor (e.g. Allum et al., 2010) 
models for trust in institutions. The lack of a three-factor solution may in part be due 
to the number of items in the ESS, which offers only five in comparison to the seven 
available to Denters et al. (2007). This may reduce the potential for observing 
differential factor loadings between Denters et al.’s three types of institutions.  
 
It has not been possible to identify any prior studies that have evaluated the 
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2.1.3.4 Summary  
 
As discussed above, there are theoretical and empirical reasons for expecting CFA on 
the five ESS items measuring trust in national institutions to result in a two-factor 
solution. It appears that the longitudinal measurement invariance of the five items 
fielded in the ESS is yet to be tested.  
 
In implementing CFA to test the factor structure of these items, I expect to find a 
two-factor model for ESS2: political trust (trust in politicians, parliament and political 
parties) and trust in the law (trust in the police and the legal system). While there 
are no existing findings to suggest whether the model should achieve configural, 
metric or scalar invariance, due to the UK being an established democracy I would 
expect the factor structure to be invariant over time. However, it is not clear 
whether I should expect this model to demonstrate metric or scalar invariance.  
 
 
2.1.4 Macro-performance: evaluations of national performance 
 
This domain seeks to capture citizens’ satisfaction with institutions’ performance at 
the macro-level (i.e. the national government). Due to a lack of prior research that 
conceptualises evaluations of national performance in this manner, I have 
encountered no prior literature that discusses its drivers and empirical associations. I 
therefore base my consideration of these on the available related literature.  
 




What drives evaluations of national performance?  
 
Evaluations of national performance should, to some extent, reflect actual 
performance. However, similarly to trust in institutions, evaluations of national 
performance are likely to be influenced by individuals’ positive or negative bias 
towards the political incumbents: evaluations may be instinctively upgraded (during 
the term of a political party one supports) or downgraded (when a party one 
opposes is in power). While it is not possible to accurately determine the extent of 
such a bias, controlling for the presence in power of the individual’s preferred party 
may help to account for the variance in ratings.  In addition, geographical region and 
socio-economic status are likely to have an impact, with those who are most 
negatively affected by (perceived) poor performance reporting the worst 
evaluations.  
 
After describing the measurement of evaluation of national performance, a review 
of the existing literature will establish the level of theoretical and empirical support 
for the idea that these three items measure a single construct and whether we 
should expect the factor model to be invariant across time.  
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2.1.4.1 The measurement of evaluations of national performance  
 
These three measures ask respondents to rate their satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in this country, the performance of the economy and the way the 
government is doing its job. These items are often worded similarly in different 
surveys but their response scales do vary. Although each of these items has been 
widely used in previous studies, I am yet to find any instance of them being used as 
measures of a single latent construct.  
 
 
2.1.4.2 Methodological behaviour: theoretical orientation 
 
Due to the lack of existing work that uses these items as measures of a single 
construct, I refer back to their theoretical origins. In discussing Fuchs’ forms of 
political support, the ESS Core Questionnaire Development Document (Thomassen, 
2001: Chapter 5) identifies the items measuring satisfaction with the state of the 
economy and the performance of the government as tapping the respondent’s level 
of satisfaction with the ‘day-to-day output’ of the authorities. This is described as an 
indicator of the respondent’s specific support for the authorities, borne of their 
perceptions of the short-term utility of the outputs the authorities generate. Scores 
on these two measures are likely to vary with perceived changes in the nature or 
quality of such outputs.  
 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
57 
 
The remaining item, satisfaction with democracy, is purported to measure neither 
specific nor diffuse support (Easton, 1965; Kim, 2009) and there is some debate 
regarding quite what it does measure (see Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001, for 
an overview). Diffuse support is characterised as “… a reservoir of favorable 
attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which 
they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” 
(Easton, 1965: 273). A high level of diffuse support is therefore able to withstand the 
observation of contraventions to one’s preferences, even though specific support 
may wane. While this may apply well to support for democracy (which is generally 
regarded as the best regime of those available), ‘satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in this country’ is likely to reflect one’s feelings about the actual 
choices available – for example, whether these permit a clear preference regarding 
which party to vote for.  
 
The state of the economy and the continuance of an effectively functioning 
democratic regime are both heavily influenced by the government. Degree of 
satisfaction with the government may therefore parallel satisfaction with either the 
functioning of democracy or the state of the economy. It seems feasible that the 
interdependence of these measures will draw them together as measures of a single 
construct, particularly if they were to tap the individual’s underlying level of support 
for the system (for example, one’s preferred political party being in power may 
result in a positive bias towards all aspects of performance).  
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It appears possible that, in statistical analyses, these items will load on one factor. 
However, given the lack of a firm theoretical or empirical foundation to this domain 




2.1.4.3 Methodological behaviour: empirical evidence 
 
With the lack of previous research into the factor structure of these three items, I 
draw inferences regarding their likely associations from studies that have 
investigated the drivers of satisfaction with democracy.  
 
Satisfaction with democracy has been found to be sensitive to self-reported 
pessimism regarding the future trajectory of the national economy (Kim, 2009), to 
an objectively-measured drop in the rate of economic growth (Fuchs & Klingemann, 
1995. Cited in ESS, 2001: 186) and to the quality of national institutions as indicated 
by objective measures of, for example, the level of corruption and the quality of the 
‘rule of law’ (Wagner, Schneider, & Halla, 2009). Although a little abstract, these 
findings do offer some support for the notion that the three measures of satisfaction 
– with democracy, the government and the state of the economy – may measure a 
single underlying construct.  
 
Clearly, citizens’ level of satisfaction with these aspects of national performance is 
likely to vary over time with changes in the country’s political and economic 
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landscapes. However, it is not clear whether such changes would influence these 
items’ methodological interdependence.  
 
 
2.1.4.4 Summary  
 
The lack of a proper theoretical foundation or empirical evidence for the factor 
structure of these items makes it unrealistic to attempt to predict whether their 
factor structure will hold and, if it does, whether this model will demonstrate 
configural, metric or scalar invariance over time.  
 
 
2.1.5 Micro-performance: perceived quality of public services 
 
In some cases, public services are coordinated at the national level (such as the UK 
state pension) and, in others, responsibility is held at the level of local government 
or other local agencies (for example, public transport). Services can differ on a range 
of dimensions, such as their aims and measurable service objectives, plus of course 
the subjective and objective value of the services they provide. The quality of these 
services can have a massive impact on service users’ lives.  
 
Evaluations of the quality of public services clearly indicate the un/favourableness of 
citizens’ views of these services and operate as important feedback mechanisms for 
the authorities particularly regarding attempts to improve services or to improve 
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communication to citizens about these services (Morgeson & Petrescu, 2011). 
Similarly to evaluation of national performance, there appears to be no empirical 
literature on the drivers of perceptions of the quality of public services. Below, I 
briefly discuss the factors that may influence subjective evaluations of the quality of 
public services, and then discuss the measurement of this domain and any 
theoretical and empirical literature relating to its likely behaviour in CFA and MGCFA 
models. Finally, I outline my hypotheses and research questions.  
 
 
What drives perceived quality of public services?  
 
It is assumed that perceptions of the quality of public services are driven by one’s 
experiences of using these services (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003), as well as 
exposure to reports in the media and social dialogue. However, differences in 
expectations (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003), priorities and frequency of exposure 
to these services are likely to affect individuals’ perceptions.   
 
Perceptions of the quality of public services may also depend upon factors such as 
one’s awareness of which authority provides the service (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2005; DeHoog, Lowery, & Lyons, 1990). For example, one may feel that a particular 
authority is ineffectual or corrupt, or simply that its services are inadequate or over-
priced: services that the respondent believes to be provided by this authority may 
all, through a process of generalisation, be deemed unsatisfactory (Bouckaert et al., 
2002; Easton, 1975). Mode of service delivery may also influence perceptions due to 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
61 
 
accessibility, for example, a service that uses increasingly technological means may 
risk alienating those without access to the newer technology.  
 
The ESS measures evaluations of services relating to health and education, which are 
largely delivered personally to the public by other individuals. This introduces a 
range of confounding influences on the quality of service provision both within and 
between local areas. However, services that are coordinated at the local level should 
be better tailored to meet the needs of the community and should be of a 
subjectively higher quality.  
 
 
2.1.5.1 Measurement of perceived quality of public services  
 
The ESS asks respondents to rate the quality of just two public services: the health 
service and the education system. Other surveys measure a higher number of 
services, for example, the European Quality of Life Survey in 2007 sought 
evaluations of health services, the education system, public transport, care services 
for the elderly and the state pension system. It is clear that findings from analyses 
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2.1.5.2 Methodological behaviour: theoretical expectations 
 
Similarly to evaluation of national performance, there appears to be no prior work 
that uses these measures as a single domain. Given the range of potential drivers of 
evaluations of the quality of public services (as discussed above), it is not clear 
whether these measures are likely to draw on a single latent construct. The 
importance placed on health care and education, and their strength as media and 
policy topics, may mean that these two services prompt well-defined evaluations 
rather than the catch-all ratings borne of heuristic processing7 (which may be 
satisfactory for less visible and less emotive services).  
 
With regard to the potential for these items to demonstrate measurement 
invariance over time: it is fair to expect estimations of the quality of public services 
to vary with changes to service provision. Unless changes to one service signal 
changes to another, it is not clear why these items should maintain a degree of 
inter-reliance over time.  
 
 
2.1.5.3 Methodological behaviour: empirical findings 
 
Searches of the existing literature have not produced any studies that empirically 
test the associations between evaluations of the quality of different public services.  
                                                          
7
 ‘Heuristic processing’ is  used here to indicate “... information-processing rules of thumb that enable 
us to think in ways that are quick and easy but that frequently lead to error” (S. Brehm, Kassin, & 
Fein, 1999: 104) 





2.1.5.4 Summary  
 
It is unclear whether the specific items available in the European Social Survey 
should be expected to correlate highly with each other and whether the correlation 
they achieve should be invariant over time. However, due to the low number of 
items and the nature of these two services with respect to their key delivery 
characteristics (Kampen, De Walle, & Bouckaert, 2006), the results obtained here 
must be viewed with caution and should not be generalised to alternative measures 
that comprise a different set of services.  
 
 
2.1.6 Hypotheses and research questions 
 
The aim of this study is to test the measurement invariance over time of a set of 
thirteen items measuring four or five underlying constructs. The first stage in the 
analyses is to test the factor structure of the individual domains: social trust, trust in 
institutions, evaluation of national performance and perceived quality of public 
services:  
 
Hypothesis 1 The social trust items will generate a one-factor model.  
Hypothesis 2 The trust in institutions items will form a two-factor model: political 
trust and trust in the law. 
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Research question 1 Will the evaluation of national performance items form a one-
factor model? 
Research question 2 Will the two quality of public services items demonstrate a 
strong correlation?  
 
 
The next stages involve compiling a unified model and testing different levels of 
measurement invariance for this model as a whole. The final research question is 
therefore broader:  
 
Research question 3 Will the model achieve configural, metric and scalar invariance 
over time?  
 
 




This study uses data from the European Social Survey (ESS). First fielded in 2002, the 
ESS is a biennial cross-national survey that takes a representative sample of the 
population aged 15 years and above in each participating country. The National 
Coordinators in each country determine an appropriate sampling frame and the 
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samples are weighted such that when the population weights are applied each 
country has a sample of 1500 respondents8.  
 
The high methodological standards adhered to in the development, fieldwork and 
maintenance of the ESS make its data an attractive prospect for analysis. In addition, 
the ESS website offers comprehensive survey documentation as well as information 
about any anomalies or deviations in the questionnaire design, fieldwork or data9. 
The analyses in this chapter use only data from the United Kingdom. Across the 
lifetime of the ESS, the unweighted sample size for the UK is around 1500 – 2500.  
 
This study initially uses data from Round 2 of the ESS (ESS2) to develop a 
measurement model and then tests this model in multi-group confirmatory factor 
analysis (MGCFA) on Rounds 2 – 5 of the survey (ESS2 – ESS5; fieldwork 
implemented in 2004 - 2010). The MGCFA uses a cumulative dataset comprising UK 
data from ESS2 – ESS5. The first Round of the ESS (ESS1) is not used in this study due 
to one of these items being absent from its questionnaire.  
 
 
Items and measurement scales 
 
This study uses thirteen items from the core questionnaire of the ESS. As described 
above, these items are theorised to measure five underlying evaluations. All items 
                                                          
8
 Design weights are also available, to account for between-respondent differences in the likelihood 
of being sampled. 
9
 The survey data and documentation are publically available via www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
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are measured on eleven-point scales with anchored end-points; the full question 
and response scale wording for each item is in Table 2.1 below.   
 
 
Table 2.1: Items used, including question wording and response scale 
Item name Item wording Response scale 
Social trust 
ppltrst … generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people? 
0 (You can’t be too 
careful) – 10 (Most 
people can be trusted) 
pplfair … do you think that most people would try to 
take advantage of you if they got the chance, or 
would they try to be fair? 
0 (Most people would 
try to take advantage of 
me) – 10 (Most people 
would try to be fair) 
pplhlp  Would you say that most of the time people try 
to be helpful or that they are mostly looking 
out for themselves? 
0 (People mostly look 
out for themselves) – 
10 (People mostly try to 
be helpful) 
Trust in political institutions 
 … please tell me… how much you personally 
trust each of the institutions I read out…  
0 (No trust at all) – 10 
(Complete trust) 
trstprl … [country]’s parliament?  
trstplt … politicians?   
trstprt … political parties?   
Trust in the law 
 … please tell me… how much you personally 
trust each of the institutions I read out…  
0 (No trust at all) – 10 
(Complete trust) 
trstlgl … the legal system?   
trstplc … the police?   
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Item name Item wording Response scale 
Evaluation of national performance 
stfeco On the whole how satisfied are you with the 
present state of the economy in [country]?  
0 (Extremely 
dissatisfied) – 10 
(Extremely satisfied) 
stfgov Now thinking about the [country] government, 
how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its 
job? 
 
stfdem And on the whole, how satisfied are you with 
the way democracy works in [country]? 
 
Perceived quality of public services 
stfedu … please say what you think overall about the 
state of education in [country] nowadays?  
0 (Extremely bad) – 10 
(Extremely good) 
stfhlth … please say what you think overall about the 
state of health services in [country]nowadays?  
 
Source: European Social Survey Round 3 Core Questionnaire (ESS, 2006) 
 
 
2.2.2 Methods I  
 
Step 1: Testing the factor structure for each domain 
 
This first phase of the analyses uses confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test 
whether the indicators measure their theorised underlying constructs (Figure 2.1), 
and also to test how well the full measurement model fits the data (Figure 2.2). The 
measurement model specifies which items should measure each latent construct. 
CFA estimates the proportion of the variance in the observed variable (item) that is 
explained by the factor mean (latent construct).  
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Factor analysis considers the relationship between the respondent’s score on the 
factor (e.g. political trust) and their score on the individual item (e.g. trust in 
politicians), investigating this relationship across a high number of respondents. The 
more closely the item score (trust in politicians) tracks the factor score (political 
trust), the higher the factor loading for that item. The factor loading is the 
proportion of item variance that is explained by variance in the factor.  
 
I implement CFA using the statistical programme Mplus. Where a factor is 
hypothesised to be formed by only two items, I perform correlation analysis (rather 
than CFA) to determine the strength of their association.  
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Step 2: Developing a measurement model for the five factors  
 
This step generates a measurement model for the full thirteen items (Figure 2.2) 
using data from ESS2. The presence of other indicators in the model may potentially 
challenge the integrity of the expected factors, so this analysis provides a more 
robust test than the single-domain CFA models. The modification indices may 
identify alterations to the specified model, however, it is important to consider their 
theoretical worth before adopting them. I test the resulting model for ESS2 using 
data from ESS3 – ESS5 (Step 3) and, finally, on all Rounds (using MGCFA) to establish 





In assessing the goodness of fit for each model tested, I give particular attention to 
the Chi-square statistic, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and 
the Comparative Fit Index (CFI). A well-fitting model should have a RMSEA value 
below 0.05 and a CFI value above .95. The fit indicated by the Chi-square statistic is 
relative to the number of degrees of freedom (df) in the model: dividing the Chi-
square by the degrees of freedom should give a result below or approximately equal 
to 3.00.  However, the Chi Square statistic is sensitive to sample size. When testing 
the measurement model on individual Rounds, the sample will be between 1500 and 
                                                          
10
 The use of modification indices to inform adjustments to my models does mean that they will be 
rather data driven. This is appropriate because my goal in this chapter is to identify how I can use 
these items in substantive research. However, my resulting models should not be applied to other 
datasets without appropriate testing.  
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2500, however, in multi-group analyses it will reach nearer to 9,000. This means that 
I may obtain a statistically significant Chi-square value, indicating poor model fit, 
despite the model being a good fit to the data (Byrne, 2012).  
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2.2.3 Methods II 
 
The second aim of this study is to ascertain the degree of measurement invariance 
of this model over time. As discussed earlier, Step 3 tests how well the 
measurement model identified for ESS2 fits the data from ESS3 - ESS5. Multi-group 
CFA then establishes whether any variation in the measurement model across these 
Rounds is statistically significant. The methods for testing this and the implications 
of the different possible outcomes are discussed in Step 4.11  
 
 
Step 3: Testing the measurement model on data from Rounds 3 – 5  
 
This stage in the analyses entails testing the fit of the measurement model from Step 
2 when applied to data from the other Rounds. A close fit to the data from these 
other Rounds would suggest that the model is suitable for testing in time-series 
analysis.  
 
In the event that the model is not a good fit for one or more Rounds (for example, if 
one Round requires a different factor structure), it would not be appropriate to 
include this Round in the multi-group tests of measurement invariance.  
 
 
                                                          
11
 I note the recent publication by Davidov et al. (2015) that describes a more lenient method, the 
approximate Bayesian measurement equivalence approach. While it is not possible to examine this 
here, it would be interesting to compare the models obtained under the two approaches.  
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Step 4: Testing the invariance of the measurement model across Rounds 2 – 5  
 
A series of steps need to be followed in order to assess configural, metric and scalar 
invariance across time (e.g. Brown, 2006). These three forms of measurement 
invariance are hierarchical, such that metric invariance requires configural 
equivalence, and scalar equivalence requires both configural and metric 
equivalence.  
 
Configural equivalence is the lightest test of measurement invariance, establishing 
whether the factor structure formed by the items is invariant across groups (in this 
case, across time). Configural invariance will be evidenced in the ESS2 – ESS5 
measurement model if the pattern of factor loadings is the same across Rounds. If 
achieved, it will show that each construct measures the same thing across these 
Rounds of the survey.  
 
To achieve metric equivalence requires that, in addition to having the same factor 
structure, the factor model reports statistically similar factor loadings across time. 
Achieving equivalent factor loadings would indicate that the item is measured on the 
same scale across Rounds of the survey, so a unit change in the item in Round 2 is 
equivalent to a unit change in Rounds 3 – 5. Metric invariance in the measurement 
model would indicate that the relationships between the factors can be compared 
across groups, for example via examination of their covariances and unstandardised 
regression coefficients (Davidov et al., 2015).  
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In order to achieve scalar invariance, the intercepts for all items must be invariant 
across groups. The item’s intercept is its predicted score when the factor score is 
zero. The item’s intercept describes its relationship with the latent variable (factor), 
so for each item, this value acts as its ‘origin’ (NSD, 2013a). Were the observed 
variables perfectly representative of the underlying construct, their intercepts would 
be zero – tracking each other and the factor exactly and receiving identical scores. 
Intercept invariance would indicate that the item is similarly representative of its 
factor across time. 
 
If all items that load on a single factor are consistently driven primarily by the factor 
mean (the underlying construct), the relationship between the factor and each item 
should remain approximately constant and the intercepts should be invariant across 
groups. A non-invariant intercept could occur if, for example, a media scandal has 
caused citizens’ trust in politicians to drop but not their trust in political parties or 
parliament. Here, the drop in trust in politicians would not be driven by a change in 
the respondent’s underlying evaluation of political institutions, but rather by current 
affairs relating specifically to the trustworthiness of politicians. The relationship 
between this item and the underlying construct would therefore have changed.  
 
Scalar invariance would permit comparison of the factor means (i.e. mean scores on 
social trust, political trust, etc.) across the Rounds tested. In the event that the 
model does not achieve full scalar equivalence, it may be possible to report partial 
invariance.  
 




Reporting partial scalar invariance 
 
In a partially invariant model, a non-invariant intercept is not problematic provided 
that three criteria are met: (1) The factor holds at least two other items that have 
invariant intercepts, (2) the non-invariant intercept can be explained, and (3) the 
non-invariant intercept has no substantial impact on the value of the factor mean 
(e.g. Brown, 2006; Byrne, 2012). It is important to check that these requirements are 
met before determining that partial measurement invariance is an appropriate 
solution to the factor analysis. Should investigations show that the solution fails on 
one or more of these criteria, it may be necessary to eject from the factor the item 
with the non-invariant intercept. In the example given above, this would entail 
removing ‘trust in politicians’ from political trust, allowing it to join the model 
separately on its own factor.  
 
 
Approach to the analyses  
 
Testing for measurement invariance across groups can be implemented sequentially 
– testing first for configural equivalence, then for metric and finally scalar 
equivalence. Alternatively, one can test the most constrained model, scalar 
equivalence, and work backwards to release constraints as necessary in order to 
establish which forms of invariance are satisfied. The method used here will be 
determined by the quality of model fit obtained for each Round at Step 3 (in the 
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event that the model is a good fit in all Rounds, a test of configural invariance would 
seem redundant).  
 
 




The first phase of analysis (Steps 1 – 2) uses data from ESS2, fielded in 2004 – 2005. 
The next phase (Steps 3 – 4) use ESS2 – ESS5 (2004 - 2011). Details of sample size 





Table 2.2 displays the demographic data that describe the ESS respondents per 
Round alongside the official statistics for the general population in those years. 
Directly comparable data were not available for every statistic and deviations are 
noted beneath the table.  
  




Table 2.2: Sample versus population statistics for Rounds 2 – 5 of the ESS 
 2004 (%) 2006 (%) 2008 (%) 2010 (%) 
 ESS2 Eurostat
c
 ESS3 Eurostat ESS4 Eurostat ESS5 Eurostat 
Gender a         
Male 48.9 47.8 47.5 48.0 47.6 48.2 45.5 48.4 
         
Age          
15-24 years 15.2 15.1 14.9 15.5 13.7 15.8 14.5 15.6 
25-49 years 45.3 41.7 41.3 41.5 45.6 41.0 40.5 40.7 
50-64 years 20.8 20.9 23.6 21.0 22.2 21.2 25.0 21.3 
65+ years 18.7 18.9 20.2 18.8 18.5 18.9 20.0 19.4 
         
Education          
Aged 30-34: ISCED 
5-6 
32.7 33.6 56.8 36.5 58.5 39.7 47.5 43.0 
         
Unemploymentb          
Unemployed 
during last 7 days 
5.9 4.7 4.2 5.4 5.0 5.6 5.6 7.8 
Data calculated from: European Social Survey (2004 - 2010); Eurostat (Schäfer, Feith, Fritz, 
Johansson-Augier, & Wieland, 2007) 
ESS data weighted by design weight 
a Non-ESS population data calculated from Eurostat data: Eurostat provided ‘number of 
women per 100 men’. In each case there were more women than men. For each Round, the 
difference was halved and subtracted from 50% to form a “% male” value.  
b Eurostat unemployment data = unemployment rate for that year; ESS rate = % 
respondents reporting unemployed in last 7 days and either actively looking or not actively 
looking for work.  
c Eurostat age data are provided as % of total population. Figures given here have been 
proportionally adjusted to give approximate % of population aged 15 years and above (due 
to the method used, these figures marginally underestimate the actual proportions).   
 
 
Compared to national statistics, the ESS sample generally appears representative of 
the UK population aged 15 years and above for gender. However, the ESS tends to 
over-sample 30 – 34 year olds educated to ISCED 5 – 6, and may under-represent 
people who are unemployed (although note the difference in what these 
unemployment figures represent; Table 2.2, footnote b).  
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2.3.3 Item distributions and discussion of trends 
 
Examination of item distributions (Appendix 2B) is useful to check whether the data 
are normally distributed and that the proportion of missing values is not high 
enough to cause concern. In the present context, examination of item means across 
time is likely to give a preliminary indication of whether the items behave as one 
would expect if they were driven by five latent constructs. I discuss this below, in 
addition to giving an overview of the implications of the skewness and kurtosis 
statistics and sample size, and how I handle missing data.  
 
Figure 2.3 below shows the trajectories of the items’ mean scores. Within each 
latent construct items generally appear to track similar routes across time, indicating 
that in most cases these items are likely to generate the expected factor structure. 
Evaluation of national performance, however, clearly deviates from this pattern with 
‘satisfaction with the economy’ alone dropping two units between ESS3 (2006) and 
ESS4 (2008). This corresponds to the start of the global financial crisis and may mean 
that by 2008 ‘satisfaction with the economy’ was being driven by something other 
than the respondent’s underlying level of specific support for the authorities.  
  





Data source: European Social Survey (2004 – 2010)  
 
Figure 2.3a – d (clockwise from top left): Plots illustrating the trajectories of the 
thirteen items (the hypothesised political trust and trust in the law factors are 
merged for the sake of parsimony). In each case, the measurement scale runs from 0 
(negative evaluation) to 10 (positive evaluation).  
 
 
Standard deviations for all indicators fall within the range 1.90 – 2.50, implying that 
use of the measurement scales is broad but the majority of the responses do cluster 
to within two to three points of the mean score.  
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Implications for further analyses and treatment of the data 
 
Skewness and kurtosis These statistics (which report deviation from normality in the 
horizontal and vertical planes, respectively)12 indicate that most of these items are 
not normally distributed. I therefore estimate CFA and MGCFA using the non-
parametric robust maximum likelihood (MLR) method rather than maximum 
likelihood (ML). Robust maximum likelihood uses estimates of standard errors and 
chi square that are robust to non-normally distributed data (Muthen & Muthen, 
2013).  
 
Sample size Some model fit indices are influenced by sample size. Due to the large 
number of cases in each Round it is likely that some indices will give unreliable 
results, particularly at Step 4 when multi-group analyses involve a total sample 
approaching 9,000 cases. In this event it will be necessary to afford less attention to 
the Chi Square statistic, which is sensitive to sample size.  
 
Missing data The rates of missing data are not so high as to give cause for concern. 
However, since the purpose of CFA is to investigate the relationships between 
indicators and groups of indicators, it seems to make little sense to include cases 
where one or more of these indicators is missing. The analyses conducted for this 
study will therefore exclude any cases where one or more of these data items is 
missing (listwise exclusion).  
                                                          
12
 A diagnosis of skew is made if the skewness value for that indicator falls outside the range: +/-
SE(skew)*2 . Similarly, a diagnosis of kurtosis is made if the kurtosis value falls outside the range: +/-
SE(kurtosis)*2 (UNE, 2000). 





2.3.4 Analyses: Phase I 
 
Step 1: Testing the factor structure for each domain 
 
I implemented confirmatory factor analysis or correlation analysis for each theorised 
factor, using data from a single Round of the European Social Survey (ESS). With the 
low number of items assigned to each factor, testing the factors individually meant 
that in most cases there was no possibility of obtaining goodness of fit statistics. The 
purpose of this first step is therefore to determine how closely each item is 
associated with the latent construct it is expected to measure. The results from 
these analyses are given in Figure 2.4 below.  
 
Social Trust It was hypothesised that the three social trust items would measure a 
single underlying construct (hypothesis 1). This expectation was supported by the 
data, with ‘people can be trusted’ (.718), ‘people try to be fair’ (.677) and ‘people try 
to be helpful’ (.564) loading well on a single factor (see Figure 2.3a).  
 
Trust in Institutions: Political Trust and Trust in the Law In Section 2.1.3, I 
hypothesised that the trust in institutions items represent two factors: political trust 
and trust in the law (hypothesis 2). However, this model generates fit statistics that 
are less than optimal (χ2 = 27.259 (df = 4), RMSEA = .057, CFI = .990, TLI = .976, SRMR 
= .016), suggesting a misspecification. Examination of the modification indices 
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suggests permitting a correlation between the residual variances (random 
measurement error) of two variables within the political trust factor: ‘trust in 
politicians’ and ‘trust in political parties’. This suggestion makes sense theoretically. 
Re-specifying the model to free this parameter and allow the error terms for these 
two items to correlate results in improved model fit (χ2 = 6.806 (df = 3), RMSEA = 
.026, CFI = .998, TLI = .995, SRMR = .006). 
 
As shown in Figure 2.3b, the three items measuring trust in politicians (.883), 
political parties (.839) and parliament (.855) load heavily on political trust, and ‘trust 
in the legal system’ (.857) and ‘trust in the police’ (.713) load well on trust in the law. 
The two factors correlate at .721.  
 
Evaluation of National Performance It was not clear whether one should expect 
these three items to be driven by a single underlying construct (research question 1). 
As shown in Figure 2.3c, a one-factor solution for this domain results in a model in 
which all items load well on the latent construct, at .772 (‘satisfaction with the 
economy’), .870 (‘satisfaction with the government’) and .742 (‘satisfaction with 
democracy’).  
 
Quality of Public Services Again, it was not clear whether one should expect the two 
items ‘state of education’ and ‘state of the health service’ to correlate (research 
question 2). Spearman’s Rho analysis (for non-parametric data) shows that these 
items have a medium-strength correlation (rho = .494; see Figure 2.3d).   
 




Summary The items correlate and load sufficiently well that it would be reasonable 
to test a full measurement model that includes all thirteen items, challenging the 
factors to maintain their boundaries despite the presence of additional, and quite 
possibly associated, variables. Step 2 below discusses the findings from this 
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Step 2: Developing a measurement model for the five factors 
 
The initial measurement model specifies that the thirteen items should load onto 
five factors: (a) social trust, (b) political trust, (c) trust in the law, (d) evaluation of 
national performance, and (e) perceived quality of public services. This model 
(without the correlation between ‘trust in politicians’ and ‘trust in political parties’; 
Model A) was an acceptable fit to the data (χ2 = 212.981 (df = 55), RMSEA = .041, CFI 
= .977, TLI = .967, SRMR = .028). However, permitting these two political trust items 
to correlate (Model B) results in a better fit (χ2 = 141.934 (df = 54), RMSEA = .031, 
CFI = .987, TLI = .981, SRMR = .023; see Table 2.3). Each factor does maintain its 
integrity in this model. The resulting (standardised) coefficients from Model B are 
presented in Figure 2.5.  
 
The factor loadings indicate that the items are substantially driven by their theorised 
underlying constructs, with around 50 – 75% of the item variance accounted for in 
most cases. Mathematically, the proportion of variance in the observed measure 
that is accounted for by the underlying construct is equal to [the factor loading] 
squared. The proportion of item variance not accounted for by the underlying factor 
is given as a ‘residual’ or ‘random error’ term: for most items in Model B, 25 – 50% 
of item variance is unaccounted for by the posited factor, with this rising to 60 – 70% 
for two of the social trust items. Although not problematic to the model, this does 
suggest that the majority of the variance in these two items is driven by something 
other than the respondents’ level of generalised social trust.  




One other piece of information to note is the factor correlations which are generally 
moderate to strong, however, the correlation between political trust and evaluation 
of national performance is very high (Spearman’s rho = .80). This borders on a 
breach of discriminant validity, suggesting it may be worth testing whether 
modelling their six indicators as a single construct would significantly impair the 
model fit (Brown, 2006)13. Social Trust obtains the weakest factor correlations, 
which is to be expected given that this relates to social rather than system 
integration.  
  
                                                          
13
 Modelling the trust in institutions and evaluation of national performance items on a single factor 
results in a poorly fitting model: χ
2
 = 512.857 (df = 9), RMSEA = .179, CFI = .854, TLI = .757, SRMR = 
.077. Making the recommended adjustments to the model (permitting a correlation term between 
‘trust in political parties’ and ‘trust in politicians’, and between ‘satisfaction with the government’ 
and ‘satisfaction with the economy’ did improve upon this initial model. However, the two-factor 
solution seen in Figure 2.5 still offers a significantly better fit to the data.  
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Step 2 tested the goodness of fit of a measurement model for all thirteen items. CFA 
has shown that this model is a good fit to the data, with these items loading on the 
five latent constructs tested in Step 1. Step 3 involves testing whether this model 
also fits the data from three subsequent Rounds of the survey. Provided the model 
fit is acceptable, multi-group CFA will test its measurement invariance over time 
(Step 4).  
 
 
2.3.5 Analyses: Phase II 
 
Step 3: Testing the measurement model on data from Rounds 3 – 5  
 
In Step 2, the model for Round 2 (Figure 2.5) established that the basic 
measurement model is a good enough fit to the data, but an improvement 
approaching significance can be obtained by including a correlation between the 
error terms for ‘trust in politicians’ and ‘trust in political parties’. The first step 
towards testing a multi-group CFA is to test whether the measurement model from 
Round 2 fits the data from ESS3 – ESS5. Considering the borderline significance of 
the improvement to model fit obtained by adding this item correlation, it seems 
advisable to first test the most basic measurement model – Model ESS2A (see Table 
2.3 below).  
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In Rounds 3, 4 and 5, Model ESS2A achieves model fit that is approximately 
acceptable. The Chi Square values are unacceptably high, but I suspect this is due to 
the sample sizes since all other model fit statistics indicate a good enough fit to the 
data – aside from the TLI value for Rounds 3 and 4, which is just under .95 and 













Table 2.3: CFA on individual Rounds of the ESS  
  χ2  df χ2 change RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR 
  (Values indicative of a good fit to the data:  ≤ .050 ≥ .95 ≥ .95 ≤ .050) 
ESS2         
A Initial model 212.981 55  .041 .977 .967 .028 
B As A + trstplt WITH trstprt 141.934 54 71.047 (1 df) .031 .987 .981 .023 
C As B + TrstLaw BY stfdem 101.645 53 40.289 (1 df) .023 .993 .989 .020 
         
ESS3         
A Initial model 325.185 55  .049 .963 .948 .034 
B As A + trstplt WITH trstprt 166.869 54 158.316 (1 df) .032 .985 .978 .023 
C As B + TrstLaw BY stfdem 134.595 53 32.274 (1 df) .027 .989 .984 .021 
         
ESS4         
A Initial model 351.477 55  .050 .959 .942 .034 
B As A + trstplt WITH trstprt 239.293 54 112.184 (1 df) .040 .975 .963 .029 
C As B + TrstLaw BY stfdem 155.078 53 84.215 (1 df) .030 .986 .979 .023 
D As B + stfgov WITH stfeco 179.019 53 60.274 (1 df) .033 .983 .975 .024 
         
ESS5         
A Initial model 296.291 55  .047 .968 .955 .027 
B As A + trstplt WITH trstprt 215.009 54 81.282 (1df) .039 .979 .970 .024 
C As B + TrstLaw BY stfdem 156.986 53 58.023 (1 df) .032 .986 .983 .021 
D As B + stfdem WITH stfeco 171.607 53 43.402 (1 df) .034 .985 .977 .021 
Data source: European Social Survey (2004 – 2010)  
 




The modification indices indicate that, for each Round, permitting the correlation 
between ‘trust in politicians’ and ‘trust in political parties’ would substantially 
improve the Chi Square value. In practice, whilst the change in Chi Square is highly 
significant, the changes in the other model fit statistics indicate a significant 
improvement across the board only for Round 3. As described earlier, the Chi Square 
statistic is highly sensitive to sample size, and the marker points for a significant 
improvement in the other fit statistics are a change greater than .015 in RMSEA and 
greater than .01 in CFI (Chen, 2007). However, considering that the addition of this 
parameter results in a significant improvement in CFI across all Rounds, and the 
improvement in RMSEA is substantial (.01) in two Rounds, it seems worth retaining 
this adjustment.  
 
The modification indices for Model ESS2B suggest adding a cross-loading from the 
trust in the law construct to ‘satisfaction with democracy’. Although not previously 
considered, this new parameter may make theoretical sense, given Denters et al.’s 
(2007) three-factor model of trust in institutions and the relevance of the order 
institutions to maintaining the legitimate functioning of democracy: high-quality 
institutions are likely to be associated with a well-functioning democracy (Rothstein 
& Stolle, 2008).  
 
The results of freeing this parameter are given in Table 2.3 above, as Model C for 
each Round. ‘Satisfaction with democracy’ loads weakly on its new factor, with 
standardised factor loadings ranging from just .194 (Round 3) to .293 (Round 4). 




Despite being low, these cross-loadings are statistically significant and they do result 
in some improvement to the model fit. As noted in Table 2.3, the improvement to 
Chi Square ranges from 32 to 84 for just one degree of freedom. Whilst this is 
indicative of a significant improvement in model fit, examination of the other fit 
statistics indicates that the only Round in which adding this new parameter may 
result in a significant improvement to model fit is Round 4, where CFI improves by 
.011 (although the change in RMSEA is not strong enough to support this). For this 
reason, the more parsimonious Model B should be preferred for all four Rounds of 
the ESS.  
 
Further modification indices are suggested for each Round. However, with their 
expected change in Chi Square being lower than that for the preceding parameter it 
seems hardly worth testing their effect on the alternative model fit indices: Model B 
demonstrates sufficiently good fit to the data that it should be tested in MGCFA.  
 
 
Step 4: Testing the invariance of the measurement model across Rounds 2 – 5  
 
It is clear from the results of Step 3 that the measurement model generated using 
ESS2 is also a good fit to the data from Rounds 3, 4 and 5. This final step, Step 4, 
tests whether this measurement model is invariant across Rounds.  
 
The factor loadings noted in the measurement models for Rounds 2 – 5 strongly 
suggest that this model will achieve metric (and therefore also configural) invariance 
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(see Figure 2.5 for the model for ESS2, and Appendix 2C for the models for ESS3 – 
ESS5). I therefore decided to begin by testing whether the data support the 
requirements of scalar invariance, which requires that the factor structure, factor 
loadings and item intercepts are invariant across Rounds.  
 
The model fit statistics for Step 4 are presented in Table 2.4 and it is clear that 
Model B does not demonstrate scalar invariance. However, the unstandardised 
factor loadings are all strong and significant in each Round, and the correlations 
between factors are all below 1.0 (Davidov, 2008). The size of the factor loadings 
indicate that the observed indicator scores are significantly predicted by the mean 
score of their factor, and the factor correlations are low enough to demonstrate 
discriminant validity; no two factors are measuring the same latent construct. To 
identify the cause behind the poor fit for Model B, it is necessary to examine the 
modification indices.  
 
Immediately apparent are the large expected improvements in Chi Square indicated 
by permitting the intercept for ‘satisfaction with the economy’ to vary across 
Rounds of the ESS. The expected improvement in Chi Square ranges from 329.165 
(Round 2) to 491.157 (Round 3). This alteration to the MGCFA model is put to the 
test in Model B1. The model fit statistics show this model to have adequate fit to the 
data (see Table 2.4).  
 








Table 2.4: Results of MGCFA on ESS Rounds 2 – 5  
  χ2 df χ2 change RMSEA CFI TLI SRMR 
  (Values indicative of a good fit to the data: ≤ .050 ≥ .95 ≥ .95 ≤ .050) 
B Scalar invariance 2382.549 264  .064 .927 .914 .058 
B1 Partial scalar invariance 1015.211 261 1367.338 .038 .974 .969 .034 
         
D Two-factor ENP 899.726 242 1482.823a .037 .977 .971 .032 
D1 Two-factor ENP; two-factor QPS 504.681 219 395.045b .026 .990 .986 .022 
D2 Two-factor ENP; TrstLaw BY 
stfdem 
642.929 241 256.797b .029 .986 .982 .027 
D3 Three-factor ENP 538.839 220 360.887b .027 .989 .984 .025 
         
Testing sub-groups of Rounds for scalar invariance 
X ESS2 – ESS3: one-factor ENP 346.864 124  .031 .984 .980 .027 
X1 ESS2 – ESS3: two-factor ENP 265.890 114 80.794 .027 .989 .985 .024 
Data source: European Social Survey (2004 – 2010).  
a versus Model B.  b versus Model D.  
 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
96 
 
The five-factor model obtained in B1 may be eligible for a report of partial scalar 
invariance, provided that the non-invariant intercept: (a) is on a factor with at least 
two items with invariant intercepts, (b) is explainable, and (c) does not have a 
substantial impact on the value of the factor mean. Model B1 meets criterion (a), as 
‘satisfaction with the economy’ is on a factor with two other items and both of these 
have invariant intercepts. The variance in the intercept for ‘satisfaction with the 
economy’ is also explainable, satisfying criterion (b), with respondents’ drop in 
satisfaction with the economy occurring in parallel to the global financial crisis that 
began between 2006 – 2008 (Rounds 3 and 4 of the ESS). However, this explains the 
substantive findings – the actual scores – rather than the methodological findings. I 
discuss this issue further, before broaching criterion (c).  
 
It appears as though, prior to the financial crisis, the three items measuring 
evaluation of national performance were driven by a shared latent construct. 
However, with the financial crisis, ‘the economy’ became singled-out as an entity in 
itself (and was publicly identified as a poorly-performing entity). In addition, this 
change in the state of the economy was attributed to the banking industry, thereby 
distancing it from evaluations of the government or the functioning of democracy. It 
therefore makes sense that even though respondents’ satisfaction with the 
economy changed, their satisfaction with the government and democracy did not. 
Given that the data modelled here run only until 2012 and the financial crisis is still 
on-going, not enough time has passed to be able to assess whether the evaluation of 
national performance items will regroup as a cohesive factor. This may happen 
either if the economy bounces back, or if the government’s response to the crisis 
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leaves the public feeling sufficiently disillusioned that their levels of satisfaction on 
the other two measures (the government and democracy) drop.  
 
This account offers a compelling explanation for the non-invariance of the 
‘satisfaction with the economy’ item over time, which bodes well for its continued 
inclusion in the factor. However, it is yet to be proven that the non-invariant 
intercept has no substantial impact on the factor mean. An insubstantial impact on 
the factor mean may arise when the item with the non-invariant intercept is one of 
many that measure the same underlying attitude, a higher number of observed 
scores meaning that a change in one score does little to influence the overall mean. 
Alternatively, the factor mean may retain equilibrium if, for example, while scores at 
the lower end of the scale drop, those at the higher end rise leaving the mean score 
relatively unchanged.  
 
In the present scenario, only three items measure the latent attitude and scores on 
‘satisfaction with the economy’ have dropped across the scale. It is therefore likely 
that the factor mean will be substantially affected by this non-invariant intercept. 
Comparing the factor means generated by Model B and Model B1 confirms that 
there is a large difference between them, and that criterion (c) is not met and Model 
B1 does not meet the criteria for partial scalar invariance. This means that the 
current configuration of the evaluation of national performance factor should not be 
used to compare mean scores across Rounds of the survey.  
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Model D gives the model fit indices for a test of scalar equivalence using a 
measurement model that includes a two-factor solution for evaluation of national 
performance. As indicated in Table 2.4, this model is a much better fit for the data: 
RMSEA has improved by .027 and CFI by a massive .05. The factor loadings are still 
strong and significant, and the correlations between factors are still low enough to 
demonstrate discriminant validity.  
 
The modification indices do identify a number of areas of possible strain in the 
model. These vary across Rounds, however, the re-specifications expected to have a 
more substantial impact on model fit relate to the ‘performance’ factors evaluation 
of national performance, perceived quality of public services and satisfaction with 
the economy. The data suggest that for Rounds 3 and 5, the perceived quality of 
public services factor should be split into two. For Round 4, they recommend cross-
loadings be opened between satisfaction with the economy and the remaining two 
indicators of evaluation of national performance, in addition to correlations between 
these items’ error terms.  
 
I have undertaken further analyses to test whether these re-specifications would be 
beneficial. Model D1 investigates the impact on model fit if the two indicators on 
the perceived quality of public services factor are separated to form one education 
factor and one health factor: RMSEA improves by .011 and CFI by .013. Whilst this 
does present a marginally significant improvement in model fit, this is achieved at 
the expense of 23 degrees of freedom. This change is therefore rejected in favour of 
maintaining a relatively parsimonious model.  
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The next modification tested is the cross-loading of ‘satisfaction with democracy’ on 
trust in the law. Model D2 demonstrates a better fit to the data than Model D, 
however, the improvements in RMSEA (.008) and CFI (.009) are non-significant. The 
final model tested, Model D3, breaks the remaining ENP factor into two items – this 
means that the original three items now each load on their own factor. The model fit 
is an improvement over the original Model D, however, similarly to Model D1, the 
improvement in model fit is not sufficient to justify the loss of 22 degrees of 
freedom.  
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Figure 2.6: Final measurement model for ESS2 – 5 (Model D, ESS2 coefficients)  
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Following the additional tests of modifications to the measurement model, it seems 
safe to regard Model D – the six-factor model presented in Figure 2.6 – as final. In 
this model, the primary difference from the original Model B is that the ‘satisfaction 
with the economy’ item has been split from the evaluation of national performance 
factor14.  
 
Clearly, the financial crisis has divorced the ‘satisfaction with the economy’ item 
from ‘satisfaction with the government’ and ‘satisfaction with the functioning of 
democracy’. This has led to respondents’ scores on this item being driven by actual 
evaluations of the economy rather than by a more generic underlying level of 
support for the system.  
 
Research question 3 asks whether the measurement model demonstrates configural, 
metric or scalar invariance over time. The six-factor measurement model does 
satisfy the criteria for scalar (and configural) invariance and, on this basis, these data 
can be subjected to time-series analysis for the comparison of factor means amongst 




                                                          
14
 Applied just to ESS2 and ESS3 (before the financial crisis), the five-factor measurement model is 
well-fitting and fully scalar invariant: χ
2
 = 346.864 (df = 124), RMSEA = .031, CFI = .984, TLI = .980, 
SRMR = .027. Re-specifying this as a six-factor model (as per Model D) does not significantly improve 
the model fit.  





The six-factor measurement model (Model D) satisfies the requirements of scalar 
invariance, indicating that not only can the relationships between underlying 
constructs be compared across time, but so can the mean scores of each construct.  
 
As with any MGCFA model, however, there are certain limitations to the 
measurement model obtained here which are worth keeping in mind. Naturally, 
these findings cannot be generalised to items from other datasets (including across 
other Rounds of the ESS), or to latent constructs that comprise different variables, 
such as the six items from the European Quality of Life Survey (2007) that Harrison 
et al. (2011) put forward to measure perceived quality of public services.  
 
By nature, these indicators are vulnerable to environmental change and this renders 
them liable to fluctuations between Rounds. In the present analyses, it appears that 
a crisis in the global economy has disturbed the status quo within a single factor and 
it has been necessary to adjust the model to account for this. In future Rounds of the 
ESS there may be different environmental influences. It is therefore important that 
anybody undertaking time-series analysis of these data implement their own 
evaluation of measurement invariance across the specific Rounds and items they 
intend to use.  
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Chapter 3 
Literature review: Inter-individual variation in generalised trust 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
“Trust is the chicken soup of social life... Yet, like chicken 
soup, it appears to work somewhat mysteriously. It might 
seem that we can only develop trust in people we know. Yet, 
trust’s benefits come when we put faith in strangers.” 
(Uslaner, 2002: 1) 
 
Similarly to Putnam’s (2000) ‘thin trust’, generalised trust refers to trust in strangers 
(the stranger being the generalised ‘other’). There is broad agreement that 
generalised trust is required for the efficient and effective functioning of society, 
however, there is little understanding of where this trust comes from and why it 
differs amongst individuals. Several theories have been put forward in the literature 
regarding the origins of generalised trust. Some cite the importance of the 
individual’s social environment and their place within it, others the importance of 
the community or societal context, and others the relevance of the individual’s 
personality or moral values.  
 
It appears as though the factors most often discussed in the literature, social 
participation and social networks, are primarily valued for their contribution to the 
smooth functioning of society (e.g. Putnam, 2000). Taking account of the proportion 
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of the population that is involved in such groups and networks may be helpful in 
explaining the variance in generalised trust between societies, and encouraging their 
development may result in a higher level of trust overall. However, irrespective of 
how many such groups or networks are operational within a society there is still 
inter-individual variance in levels of generalised trust. This variance between 
individuals has scarcely been investigated in the literature despite the existence of 
two models (although one more comprehensively argued than the other) that posit 
the routes via which trust may come about. A handful of studies have tested the 
extent to which either values (representing Uslaner’s [2002] theory of the moral 
foundations of trust) or personality traits (representing Personality Theory as named 
by Delhey & Newton, 2003) predict individuals’ levels of generalised trust. 
 
This literature review investigates what is already known regarding the individual-
level, dispositional characteristics that are associated with generalised trust. In 
addition, given the importance of the broader society in determining the social 
normative context in which the individual lives, I also look at literature that discusses 
the relevance of the characteristics of society. Factors such as the type of political 
system and the level of corruption therein may encourage, or necessitate the 
suppression of, particular personal inclinations. In some cases, this social normative 
influence may be important in determining the relationship between individuals’ 
dispositional attributes and the level of generalised trust they are willing to report or 
demonstrate. For example, a high level of government corruption may make the 
population reluctant to trust, so that even those individuals whose traits or values 
should be suggestive of a trusting disposition may prefer to be cautious.  
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The aim of this review is to examine the work that has already been done and to 
identify appropriate avenues for further research into this important but 
understudied area. I begin now with an overview of generalised trust and its 
relevance to the functioning of society. I then discuss the two individual-level 
theories of the aetiology of generalised trust that are the foci of my second and third 
substantive chapters.  
 
 
3.1.1 Generalised trust and social capital 
 
According to social capital theory, generalised trust is essential to the wellbeing and 
cohesion of communities and societies. While particularised trust (trust in known 
others or in those who are similar to oneself), or Putnam’s ‘thick trust’, is essential 
for harmonious personal relationships, generalised trust permits the harmonious 
functioning of the community and society.  
 
Researchers in the social sciences have given much attention to the subject of 
generalised trust, developing and testing a range of theories about its drivers. 
Generalised trust has been found to vary not only amongst individuals but also 
amongst countries, with characteristics of the society and its institutions (for 
example, the levels of inequality and corruption) being associated with the 
aggregate level of self-reported generalised trust.  
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“Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and 
human capital refers to properties of individuals, social 
capital refers to connections among individuals – social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them.”  
(Putnam, 2000: 19) 
 
Two forms of social capital are discussed in the literature, ‘bonding’ capital and 
‘bridging’ capital:  
 
“Bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological 
superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a 
sociological WD-40.”  
(Putnam, 2000: 23)  
 
Generalised trust promotes bridging capital, which facilitates and nurtures 
cooperation between social groups (groups characterised, for example, by religion, 
class, age or occupation) and thereby reduces social tensions (Davies, Wilkins, 
Harrison, Sibley, & Owen, 2011). Bonding capital is more the domain of 
particularised trusters: while trusting only those who are similar to ourselves – 
whether that’s with respect to social class, religion or any other attribute – may 
mean that we still have a strong support network, it is more likely to promote 
intergroup tension than cohesion, branding-by-implication the out-groups as 
untrustworthy (Putnam, 2000).  
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While the amount of social support available to the individual and their degree of 
integration into society (the individual’s own level of social capital) is important, a 
focus solely on the welfare of the individual does not achieve harmony within 
society. For this harmony to develop, between social groups and between the 
echelons of the various institutions and organisations within society, we need 
bridging capital and we need generalised trust.  
 
In the next section, I discuss the measurement of and empirical associations 
demonstrated by self-reported generalised trust. In Section 3.1.3.1, I discuss the 
measurement of behavioural trust and trustworthiness, and their prevalence in 
experimental studies.  
 
  
3.1.2 Self-reported generalised trust 
 
3.1.2.1 Measuring self-reported trust 
 
Although survey measures of trust vary widely, self-reported generalised trust is 
often measured using a variant of the generalised trust question (GTQ). The GTQ, 
which has been fielded in a range of national and cross-national surveys as well as in 
smaller-scale studies, asks: “In general, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. The response set 
varies between instruments, with many offering a dichotomous response option: 
“you can’t be too careful” versus “most people can be trusted”. Other instruments 
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offer more response options, with the broadest being an eleven-point scale, as 
fielded in the European Social Survey, which runs from 0 to 10: 0 represents “you 
can’t be too careful” and 10 represents “most people can be trusted”.  
 
Generalised trust is sometimes represented by the three-item ‘social trust scale’. In 
addition to the GTQ, the social trust scale presents two other items from 
Rosenberg’s (1957) Misanthropy Scale. One item asks the respondent to evaluate 
the helpfulness of other people (“Would you say that most of the time people try to 
be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?”) and the other asks 
them to evaluate others’ fairness (“Do you think that most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?”; the response 
sets for these items are equivalent in wording and scale to those for the GTQ).  
 
There is some debate in the literature regarding whether the social trust scale or the 
GTQ alone offers the most appropriate measure of generalised trust. Below, I review 
some of the literature on this issue and seek to reach a defensible conclusion.  
 
 
Measuring trust: one item or three?  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, factor analysis of the three ‘social trust’ items returns a 
robust single factor. However, there is some debate regarding whether, 
independently, they all measure the same thing. My discussion here draws on 
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representations of these items’ trajectories over time as well as data obtained via 
cognitive interviewing.  
 
Using data from the General Social Survey (GSS), fielded in the USA between 1972 – 
1993, Yamagishi, Kikuchi, and Kosugi (1999) plot the trajectories of the proportion of 
respondents who said that ‘most people can be trusted’ and the proportion who 
said that ‘most people would try to be helpful’. Using data from selected years 
(skipping 1974, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1985 and 1992), it appears as though the 
two items alternate between coalescing and deviating (see Appendix 3A.1). In 
addition, it appears as though while the proportion who say ‘most people can be 
trusted’ demonstrates an overall downward trend, the trend for those who say that 
‘most people would try to be helpful’ appears positive. The implication is that these 
two measures report meaningfully different trajectories, however, it is worth noting 
that between 1973 and 1987 the chart for both measures resembles a set of 
gnashing teeth; each mean score rises or falls by up to 15% over the space of one or 
two years. It is therefore difficult to know whether any apparent differences are 
meaningful.  
 
Rahn and Transue (1998) offer a more straightforward chart of the trajectories for 
the three items in the social trust scale, again using data from the GSS (see Appendix 
3A.2). However, they included in their data those respondents who answered 
“undecided”, as if it were the mid-point on a three-point scale. This figure gives the 
appearance of charting a gradual decline in positive evaluations regarding trust, 
helpfulness and fairness, but it is uninformative due to the lack of acknowledgement 
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that ‘undecided’ is not an evaluation but rather the absence thereof; these items 
may chart a rise in indecision or apathy rather than a decline in trust.  
 
The evidence so far is hardly compelling. Taking a different approach, Uslaner (2002) 
discusses the results of a ‘think aloud’ study into how respondents decided their 
answers to the three social trust questions in the American National Election Study 
(ANES; study implemented in the year 2000). The thoughts shared by respondents 
regarding their decision-making were categorised as either ‘general’ or ‘experience’. 
‘General’ would indicate that the answer given reflected a worldview (for example, 
“Still an optimist about people and you try to trust people first”; Uslaner, 2002: 73), 
while a comment categorised as ‘experience’ would indicate that the respondent 
reflected on past experience (e.g. “[For the] most part people try to be helpful, 
thinking of people in general, thinking of people opening doors for you if your hands 
are full...”; Uslaner, 2002: 73). Those who declined to give an explanation were 
classified as ‘no content’.  
 
Ideally, if these questions all measure generalised trust, we would hope the 
respondents were responding from ‘general’ viewpoints on all three items. 
However, the degree to which this occurred varied. Of those who gave a ‘think 
aloud’ explanation, 72% responded to the GTQ from a ‘general’ perspective (with 
the remaining 28% responding based on experience), while 56% responded to the 
‘fairness’ item from a ‘general’ viewpoint and 39% to the ‘helpfulness’ question 
(Uslaner, 2002). Across the whole sample (i.e. including those who did not give a 
‘think aloud’ response), the proportion of responses driven by a ‘general’ worldview 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
111 
 
   
was  highest for the GTQ (58%), reducing slightly for the item measuring evaluations 
of others’ fairness (44%) and further still for evaluations of others’ helpfulness 
(29%).  
 
It is possible that individuals’ overall thought processes inform their inclinations 
regarding generalised trust. However, the ‘think aloud’ responses given regarding 
the three social trust questions suggest that responses to these items may be driven 
by different factors. The point of generalised trust is that it operates heuristically or 
instinctively and does not require a great deal of thought before answering. A 
prudent way forward in the investigation of specifically generalised trust therefore 
appears to be to use the GTQ in isolation from the other two questions.  
 
In the sections that follow, I give an overview of the characteristics associated with 
self-reported generalised trust before discussing the behavioural measures of trust 
(and trustworthiness). I then move on to discuss the theories regarding the origins of 
generalised trust, focussing on those operating at the individual-level and the level 
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3.1.2.2 Self-reported trust: associations with other variables 
 
Association with variables measured at the micro-level 
 
In regression analyses, self-reported generalised trust tends to be associated with a 
range of socio-demographic variables including age, gender and education (e.g. 
Freitag, 2003; Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009; Paxton, 2007). While trust is consistently 
positively associated with a higher level of education (Albanese et al., 2013; Fehr, 
2008; Naef & Schupp, 2009b), the results for gender and age are mixed: some 
studies cite higher trust scores amongst males (Naef & Schupp, 2009) and others 
amongst females (Albanese et al., 2013; Dohmen et al., 2008), and while some 
studies find that self-reported trust increases with age (Albanese et al., 2013; 
Dohmen et al., 2008) others report the opposite (Naef & Schupp, 2009).  
 
The significant associations between trust and socio-demographic attributes hold in 
multi-level models that also account for variables at the level of society (e.g. 
Gundelach, 2014; Herreros, 2012; C.-S. Lee, 2013; Olivera, 2013; Park & 
Subramanian, 2012; Polillo, 2012; Reeskens, 2009; Robbins, 2011; Wang & Gordon, 
2011; You, 2012). In addition, socioeconomic indicators such as occupational 
prestige, household income and the degree of comfort living on that income have 
been found to be positively associated with generalised trust: a more prestigious 
occupation, a higher income or level of financial comfort are associated with a 
higher level of generalised trust (Paxton, 2007; Naef & Schupp, 2009). 
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Association with variables measured at the macro-level 
 
Although generalised trust is measured at the level of the individual, much work has 
investigated the associations between characteristics of the country or society and 
aggregate generalised trust (that is, the mean level of generalised trust reported 
across the population sample). Generalised trust is usually found to be higher in 
democratic countries (Uslaner, 2002), those that have a universalistic welfare state 
(Rothstein & Stolle, 2002), a lower level of income inequality (Knack & Keefer, 1997), 
higher national wealth (Uslaner, 2002) and a lower level of corruption (Uslaner, 
2002). There are mixed findings regarding the relevance of ethnic homogeneity 
(Dinesen & Sønderskov, 2013; Paxton, 2007; You, 2012).  
 
 
3.1.3 Behavioural trust (and trustworthiness)  
 
3.1.3.1 Measuring behavioural trust (and trustworthiness) 
 
Although these theories are about trust, this review also considers trustworthiness. 
With findings from some studies indicating that scores on self-reported measures of 
trust relate more strongly to behavioural trustworthiness than to behavioural trust, 
there is some uncertainty around quite what these measures are capturing (e.g. 
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). Behaviour in the ‘trust game’ is 
commonly taken as behavioural measures of generalised trust and trustworthiness.   




In the standard trust game, there are two players – a Sender and a Returner. In 
some versions of the game both players begin with a sum of money, often around 
£10 (or $10 or €10), while in others only the Sender starts the game with such an 
endowment and the Returner starts the game with zero. The Sender is asked to 
decide how much money to transfer to the Returner. Typically they are permitted to 
send any sum from their £10, while in other versions of the game they are restricted 
– often to sending either all of the £10 or sending £0. Any amount of money they 
transfer to their game partner is multiplied (usually tripled) by the researchers. The 
Returner then holds this sum of money and is free to choose how much money to 
transfer back to the Sender. Again, in some games this amount may be entirely 
open, while in others it is restricted: often the Returner may transfer either an 
amount slightly higher than the ‘split equally’ amount, or an amount slightly lower. 
In most cases, the participants in the trust game are unaware of who their game 
partner is.  
 
The amount transferred by the Sender is taken as an indication of their degree of 
generalised trust (generalised because their game partner is unknown to them). The 
amount transferred by the Returner is taken as a measure of their trustworthiness. 
Experiments involving the trust game are often implemented alongside a 
questionnaire that measures personal attributes or psychological constructs that are 
expected to be relevant to the participant’s decisions.  
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3.1.3.2 Behavioural trust and trustworthiness: prevalence in experimental studies 
 
In the standard, open-transfer version of the trust game, participants are able to 
send or return as much money as they like rather than choosing between two 
prescribed alternatives. The amount transferred by the Sender varies widely 
between studies: in their meta-analysis, Johnson and Mislin (2011) find that 
although on average Senders transfer around 50% of their initial stake to the 
Returner, this figure varies between 22% and 89%. In versions where the permitted 
transfer amounts are restricted, Senders may be able to invest either all or none of 
their endowment. This experimental design has been found to result in an 
investment rate of approximately 40% (Ermisch, Gambetta, Laurie, Siedler, & Noah 
Uhrig, 2009). In their meta-analysis, Johnson and Mislin (2011) report that the 
degree of trust shown by Senders varies with age, such that older Senders are less 
trusting than those who are younger, and there may also be cross-cultural variation. 
In addition, Naef and Schupp (2009) report that students show more trust than non-
students,  
 
In the standard trust game (where players can transfer any amount), Returners 
transfer on average around 37% of the available money to the Sender, but this 
amount also varies widely between studies (between 11% and 89%; Johnson & 
Mislin, 2011). In the two main binary designs of the game, the Returner may be 
asked to choose between transferring zero or just over half of the money held to the 
Sender, or between sending just under or just over half. Ermisch et al. (2009) report 
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that in the former circumstances approximately 50% of Returners are trustworthy, 
the remaining 50% electing to keep the entire sum.  
 
Johnson and Mislin (2011) report that trustworthiness in the standard, open-transfer 
version of the trust game has been found to vary with age (such that older transfer 
more money back to the Sender) and that students tend to be less trustworthy than 
non-students. Müller and Schwieren (2012) report that the primary predictor of the 
sum returned to the Sender is the amount of money the Sender invested with the 
Returner in the first place. In the section that follows, I consider the appropriateness 
of using the trust game as a behavioural measure of generalised trust.  
 
 
3.1.3.3 Self-reported trust and behaviour in the trust game 
 
In an effort to capture a behavioural measure of generalised trust, some researchers 
have turned to the trust game. In this section I discuss whether we should expect 
behaviour in the trust game to reflect the individual’s self-reported level of 
generalised trust.  
 
 
Self-reported trust and behavioural trust 
 
Studies in the available literature report conflicting findings regarding the 
associations between self-reported and behavioural trust, with some observing an 
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association (e.g. Fehr, Fischbacher, Von Rosenbladt, Schupp, & Wagner, 2003) and 
others reporting no significant relationship (e.g. Holm & Nystedt, 2008; Naef & 
Schupp, 2009b).  
 
It is worth bearing in mind that the generalised trust question (GTQ) is generic and 
context-free, while the trust game measures trust in a rather specific context: when 
playing the trust game, individuals are likely to be mindful of a different set of 
concerns and rely on different heuristics than when answering survey questions 
about trust. In addition, while the trust game is played anonymously there is no 
mention of anonymity in the GTQ (Sapienza, Toldra‐Simats, & Zingales, 2013); it is 
therefore possible that respondents to the latter are mindful of their past success 
rate in determining who is and is not trustworthy. Despite this, Holm and Nystedt 
(2008) did find a correlation between self-reported trust and behavioural trust when 
there was no monetary incentive – i.e. the trust game was played hypothetically.  
 
 
Self-reported trust and behavioural trustworthiness 
 
As noted by Glaeser et al. (2000), there is some evidence that self-reported 
generalised trust may correlate more strongly with behavioural trustworthiness than 
with behavioural trust (see also Ermisch et al., 2009 and Lazzarini, Madalozzo, Artes 
& Siqueira, 2005; although see Fehr et al., 2003).  
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An association between self-reported trust and trustworthiness makes some sense 
theoretically. As pointed out by Evans and Revelle (2008), it is possible that the 
Returner who is high in generalised trust will be more likely to view the Sender as a 
game partner than as an opponent and this may make them more inclined to work 
with them cooperatively. In addition, it is possible that our expectation of others’ 
degree of trustworthiness is at least partly driven by our own trustworthiness (the 
‘false consensus effect’ as noted by, for example, Butler, Giuliano & Guiso [2012]; 





There appears to be little theoretical (or empirical) support for the expectation that 
self-reported trust will correspond to behavioural trust as measured by the trust 
game. In the section that follows, I describe the theories that posit the drivers of 
generalised trust.  
 
 
3.2 Theoretical accounts of the origins of generalised trust  
 
There are several theories of the origins of generalised trust. Some regard the 
propensity to trust as a characteristic that is inherent to the individual and 
predominantly determined by attributes such as personality traits (Personality 
Theory; Delhey & Newton, 2003) or values (Moral Foundations of Trust Theory; 
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Uslaner, 2002). Others emphasise the importance of the individual’s standing 
(Success and Wellbeing Theory; Delhey & Newton, 2003) and participation in their 
social environment (Voluntary Organisations Theory centres on formal participation, 
while Social Networks Theory focuses on the myriad informal groups that form 
amongst friends and associates; Putnam, 2000).  
 
The final set of theories note the importance of the broader context in which the 
individual lives: Community Theory and Societal Theory (Delhey & Newton, 2003) 
cite, respectively, the impact that characteristics of the local area and the broader 
society have upon individuals’ levels of generalised trust. These bear strong 
resemblance to institutional theory, which posits that generalised trust is associated 
with the behaviour of local and national institutions both directly (effective order 
institutions serving to deter untrustworthy behaviour) and indirectly (cooperative, 
non-corrupt institutions serving as role models to members of the public; Rothstein 
& Stolle, 2008).  
 
The socially-oriented theories have received a great deal of attention but mixed 
reviews in the empirical literature (e.g. Sturgis, Patulny, & Allum, 2009; Sturgis, 
Patulny, Allum, & Buscha, 2012) and authors often cite the likelihood of self-
selection into membership of such groups; people who are keen to participate may 
be more well-disposed towards others in the first place (e.g. Uslaner, 2002). The 
existing literature demonstrates that individuals’ dispositional characteristics – such 
as their traits and values – are associated with such variables as their social 
behaviour (Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Pollet, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2015), 
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career success (Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, & Barrick, 1999) and self-reported 
wellbeing  (e.g. Boyce, Wood, & Powdthavee, 2013; Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008). 
It therefore seems reasonable to suspect that these individual-level factors may 
contribute to determining both one’s inclination to participate in formal and 
informal social groups, and one’s proclivity for trust versus caution.  
 
Below, I briefly discuss the distinction between personality and values, before 
discussing these theories in turn and the findings from studies that have tested 
them. I then turn to look at Societal Theory (or Institutional Theory), and discuss the 
potential influences of society-level characteristics on generalised trust and any 
studies that have investigated this.  
 
 
3.2.1 Individual-level theories: the relevance of personality and values 
 
The two individual-level theories cite values and personality as the driving forces 
behind generalised trust. Before exploring each of these theories I would first like to 
discuss the defining characteristics of traits versus values. Although undeniably 
connected (see Appendix 3B for McCrae and Costa’s [1996] model of the theoretical 
association between traits and values, and Parks-Leduc, Feldman & Bardi [2014] for 
a meta-analysis of the empirical associations between them), a clear distinction can 
be drawn – at least in theoretical terms – between the two sets of constructs.  
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“Traits describe “what people are like” rather than the 
intentions behind their behavior. Values refer to “what people 
consider important,” the goals they wish to pursue.”  
(Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002: 790) 
 
Olver and Mooradian (2003) discuss values as generally stable but malleable 
constructs, which are determined not only by one’s personality but also by 
environmental influences such as perceived social norms, life experience and 
interactions with other people. Roccas et al. (2002) distinguish values by highlighting 
their evaluative quality in comparison to the descriptive nature of traits. A single 
attribute can be a trait or a value; as a trait it would describe an attribute of the 
person, but as a value something to aspire to but not necessarily embody.  
 
“Values refer to “what people consider important,” the goals 
they wish to pursue... values vary in their importance as 
guiding principles (ranging from at least minimally to 
supremely important). People believe their values are 
desirable, at least to a significant reference group, whereas 
traits may be positive or negative.”  
(Roccas et al., 2002: 790) 
 
A person’s values tell us what they think is important, and values are chosen under 
social and cultural influence. The bearer of a particular value holds it in high regard 
and expects certain people amongst a salient in-group to do likewise. Although there 
is some debate in the literature around the definition of values (for example, 
whether they relate to behaviour or to goals; De Raad & van Oudenhoven, 2008), all 
appear to note this normative component: values are socially meaningful 
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preferences that have implications for the way we live our lives. Traits, on the other 
hand, are involuntary predispositions – our internal programming that influences 
our perceptions and responses.  
 
Below I discuss the two individual-level theories (Personality Theory and the theory 
of the moral foundations of trust) in turn, considering the theoretical argument for 
their relationship with generalised trust, the measurement of their posited predictor 




3.2.2 Personality Theory  
 
Personality Theory declares that the individual’s propensity for generalised trust is 
not only determined by, but is part of, their underlying character. This fits with 
McCrae and Costa’s (1999) Big Five model of personality traits, in which trust is 
identified as a facet within Agreeableness.  Delhey and Newton (2003) posit 
optimism and the feeling of being in control of one’s own life, to be appropriate 
proxy measures for personality, and that both should be associated with a high 
propensity for generalised trust (Delhey and Newton, 2003; Uslaner, 2002). In 
contrast, a low level of generalised trust is likely to be associated with a generally 
‘misanthropic’ perspective (Delhey & Newton, 2003: 95). Consistent with the 
common definition of personality traits, according to Personality Theory one’s level 
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of generalised trust is a relatively stable characteristic although it may change in 
response to life events (Delhey and Newton, 2003).  
 
Using a range of measures, personality has been found to have associations with 
occupational success (Gelissen & de Graaf, 2006), self-reported prosocial behaviour 
(Caprara et al., 2012), happiness (Steel et al., 2008), life satisfaction (Steel et al., 
2008; Boyce et al., 2013), career success (Judge et al., 1999) and the size of one’s 
social network (Pollet et al., 2015; though this may only be apparent in homogenous 
samples – see Roberts, Wilson, Fedurek & Dunbar, 2008). 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Conceptualising and measuring personality  
 
Theories of the origins and structure of personality abound: the psychodynamic 
approach (with proponents such as Freud, Jung and Adler) concentrates on the 
relevance of the unconscious, the humanistic approach (e.g. Rogers and Maslow) 
highlights the person’s potential for positive change and growth, while the trait 
perspective (Allport, Catell, Eysenck and the Big Five) focuses on personality as 
something that we can observe and measure (Ewen, 2010). Ewen advises that while 
the psychodynamic and humanistic perspectives originate in clinical contexts, the 
trait perspective is oriented towards research uses. Interested in measuring the 
relationship between trust and personality in a non-clinical population, it is the trait 
approach that I focus on here.  
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“Allport defined a trait or disposition as ‘a generalised 
neuropsychic structure (peculiar to the individual), with the 
capacity to render many stimuli functionally equivalent, and 
to initiate and guide consistent (equivalent) forms of 
adaptive and stylistic behaviour’”  
(Boyle, Matthews, & Saklofske, 2008: 2)  
 
The trait models subscribe to the idea that personality is a set of interpretive filters 
that can influence the way we perceive ourselves and everything around us.  They 
can affect our feelings, thoughts, motivations and of course our behaviour (Boyle et 
al., 2008). While it is now widely recognised that our personality is driven in part by 
genetic inheritance and by the social environment, empirical associations have been 
observed between the individual’s personality traits and their biochemistry and 
neurological structures (Canli, 2006; Stelmack & Rammsayer, 2008).  
 
A number of models have been developed within the trait approach (see Table 3.1 
for a selection of these)15. While the original models tend to comprise many items, 
permitting the measurement of personality ‘facets’ in addition to ‘traits’, some short 
forms have been developed. Although the short versions of these inventories do not 
retain the detail of the long versions, they do scale well with them as measures of 
the Big Five traits. Comprising as few as fifteen items, they can permit investigation 
of personality in large, representative population samples. To date, few surveys have 
tested personality using validated indicators, but The German Socio-economic Panel 
(GSOEP) and the UK’s British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and Understanding 
Society have each fielded the fifteen-item version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-S; 
                                                          
15
 For a detailed discussion of each model, see Boyle et al. (2008).  
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Gerlitz & Schupp, 2005). In Section 3.2.2.2 I discuss the findings from studies that 
have tested personality theory using data from these surveys, while in 3.2.2.3 I look 








Table 3.1: Trait models of personality – their name, structure and their theorised dimensions and facets 
Name Structure Personality dimensions and facets 
California Personality 
Instrumenta   
Four clusters comprising 
twenty ‘scales’ (facets of 
personality), measured by 
434 items. 
Cluster I – Interpersonal style and orientation: dominance, capability for status, 
sociability, social presence, self-acceptance, independence, empathy  
Cluster II – Normative orientation and values: responsibility, socialisation, self control, 
good impression, communality, wellbeing, tolerance 
Cluster III – Cognitive and intellectual functioning: achievement via conformance, 
achievement via independence, intellectual efficiency 
Cluster IV – Role and personal style: psychological mindedness, flexibility, femininity/ 
masculinity 
Comrey Personality 
Scalesb   
Eight dimensions 
comprising forty ‘facets’, 
measured by 180 items.  
Trust vs. Defensiveness (T): lack of cynicism, lack of defensiveness, belief in human worth, 
trust in human nature, lack of paranoia 
Orderliness vs. Lack of Compulsion (O): neatness, routine, order, cautiousness, 
meticulousness 
Social Conformity vs. Rebelliousness (C): law enforcement, acceptance of social order, 
intolerance of nonconformity, respect for law, need for approval 
Activity vs. Lack of Energy (A): exercise, energy, need to excel, liking for work, stamina 
Emotional Stability vs. Neuroticism (S): lack of inferiority feelings, lack of depression, lack 
of agitation, lack of pessimism, mood stability 
Extraversion vs. Introversion (E): lack of reserve, lack of seclusiveness, no loss for words, 
lack of shyness, no stage fright 
Mental Toughness vs. Sensitivity (M): no fear of bugs, no crying, no romantic love, 
tolerance of blood, tolerance of vulgarity 
Empathy vs. Egocentrism (P): sympathy, helpfulness, service, generosity, unselfishness 
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Name Structure Personality dimensions and facets 
Sixteen Personality 
Factor Questionnairec   
Five global, comprising 
fifteen primary factors (six 
featuring twice in different 
global factors), measured 
by 185 items in the fifth 
edition. 
Extraversion/ Introversion: warm – reserved, lively – serious, bold – shy, private – 
forthright, self-reliant – group-oriented 
High Anxiety/ Low Anxiety: emotionally stable – reactive, vigilant – trusting, apprehensive 
– self-assured, tense – relaxed  
Tough-mindedness/ Receptivity: warm – reserved, sensitive – unsentimental, abstracted – 
practical, open-to-change – traditional  
Independence/Accommodation: dominant – deferential, bold – shy, vigilant – trusting, 
open-to-change – traditional  
Self-control/ Lack of Restraint: lively – serious, rule-conscious – expedient, abstracted – 




Five traits, comprising 36 
facets measured by 240 
items 
Neuroticism: anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, 
vulnerability 
Extraversion: warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, positive 
emotions 
Openness: fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, values 
Agreeableness: trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, tender 
mindedness 
















dimensions, comprising 21 
traits, measured by 440 
items  
Extraversion: activity, sociability, expressiveness, assertiveness, ambition, dogmatism, 
aggressiveness 
Neuroticism: inferiority, unhappiness, anxiety, dependence, hypochondria, guilt, 
obsessiveness 
Psychoticism: risk-taking, impulsivity, irresponsibility, manipulativeness, sensation seeking, 
tough-mindedness, practicality 
HEXACOf  Six dimensions, comprising 
24 ‘facets’ and measured 
by 100 items  
Honesty-humility: sincerity, fairness, greed-avoidance, modesty 
Agreeableness (versus anger): forgiveness, gentleness, flexibility, patience 
Emotionality: fearfulness, anxiety, dependence, sentimentality 
 Extraversion: social self-esteem, social boldness, sociability, liveliness 
Conscientiousness:  organisation, diligence, perfectionism, prudence 
Openness to Experience: aesthetic appreciation, inquisitiveness, creativity, 
unconventionality  
Sources: a Boer, Starkey & Hodgetts, 2008; b Comrey,  2008; c Cattell & Mead, 2008; d McCrae & Costa, 1999; e Furnham,  Eysenck & Saklofske, 2008; f 
Lee & Ashton, 2004.  
 
 





3.2.2.2 Testing Personality Theory: predicting self-reported generalised trust 
 
In this section and the section that follows, I report the findings from studies that 
have sought to predict self-reported and behavioural trust using personality traits. In 
Section 3.2.2.4 I describe my concerns regarding these studies, as well as the use of 
proxy measures in place of a recognised measure of personality.  
 
The development of brief trait inventories, and their inclusion in nationally 
representative surveys, has facilitated  more thorough tests of the association 
between personality and generalised trust. Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, and 
Kosse (2012) undertake analyses on data from the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP) survey. The GSOEP has fielded measures of personality traits (the fifteen-
item Big Five Inventory; BFI-S) as well as generalised trust.16 The authors report 
significant correlations between personality traits and generalised trust, with the 
strongest association for Neuroticism (r = -.192) followed by Openness (r = .128), 
Agreeableness (r = .095), Conscientiousness (r = -.068) and Extraversion (r = .058; for 
all, p< .01). However, the coefficients for Conscientiousness and Extraversion do 
seem rather small; it is possible that the statistical significance of these relationships 
is driven by the large sample size.  
 
                                                          
1616
 The GSOEP measures generalised trust using three items, each measured on a four-point scale 
(totally agree, agree slightly, disagree slightly and totally disagree): “On the whole, one can trust 
people”, “Nowadays one can’t rely on anyone” and “If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be 
careful before one can trust them” (GSOEP, 2003, 2008).  
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Again using the GSOEP, Dohmen et al. (2008) use OLS regression analysis to 
determine the effects of traits on trust. They too use the BFI-S measure of traits and 
the same measures of trust (although Dohmen and colleagues omit the neutral mid-
point of the scale for the trust measures). In a model that accounts for age, gender 
and height, the authors report significant effects for four of the five traits: 
Neuroticism (-.148), Openness (.109), Conscientiousness (-.083) and Agreeableness 
(.079; all p < .01).  
 
Albanese et al. (2013) report findings from another model based on GSOEP data. 
This time trust, measured by the three standard items, is predicted by impatience 
(-.055, p < .01), risk aversion (-.075, p < .01), age (.001, p < .05), gender (being 
female; .103, p < .01), education (.078, p < .01), negative reciprocity (which the 
authors cite as betrayal aversion; -.088, p < .01), positive reciprocity (.016, ns) and 
altruism (.056, p < .01), in addition to the Big Five traits: Openness (.020, p < .05), 
Conscientiousness (-.100, p < .01), Extraversion (.008, ns), Agreeableness (.015, ns) 
and Neuroticism (-.116, p < .01). Albanese and colleagues also produce a model that 
includes measures of locus of control (.056, p < .01) and optimism (.098, p < .01) 
alongside the Big Five traits. However, as will be discussed later, the inclusion of 
optimism is likely to distort the effect of Neuroticism (which is reported to be 
associated with heightened sensitivity to negative feelings and expectations; e.g. 
Simon et al., 2010). The presence of optimism and locus of control in the latter 
model did reduce the coefficient for Neuroticism by some margin (-.079, p < .01), 
although it remained significant.  
 





3.2.2.3 Testing Personality Theory: predicting behavioural trust and trustworthiness 
 
In correlation analysis of behavioural data, Becker et al. (2012) report that their 
experimental dataset generated significant, positive associations for Openness 
(.123) and Agreeableness (.167), a significant negative association for 
Conscientiousness (-.130; for all p < .01)  and non-significant associations for 
Extraversion and Neuroticism. In their experimental dataset, traits were measured 
using either the BFI-S (Gerlitz & Schupp, 2005) or the sixty-item NEO-FFI (McCrae & 
Costa, 2010).  
 
Müller and Schwieren (2012) ask whether personality can predict behaviour in 
economic games. While the reason for an association between personality and 
small-scale economic behaviour may not be immediately apparent, behaviour in the 
trust game is likely to be socially driven. Games such as the trust game, or the 
dictator or ultimatum games, involve negotiating a complex social environment in 
which participants’ behaviour is likely to be influenced by all salient predispositions, 
including personality traits.  
 
In an experiment with 138 participants in Germany, Müller and Schwieren (2012) 
implemented a version of the trust game in which both players were given ten 
‘experimental currency units’ (ECU10, worth approximately €3.33) at the start. The 
Sender could choose to transfer any portion of this ECU10 to the Returner. Any units 
transferred were tripled, and the Returner could then transfer any amount from 
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their new total endowment back to the Sender. Participants completed a 
questionnaire that included the 240-item NEO-PI-R questionnaire (McCrae & Costa, 
2010).  
 
The authors report that in correlation analyses Neuroticism (-.339, p < .01) and 
Agreeableness (.284, p < .05) were significantly associated with the amount of 
money transferred by the Sender, with a trend towards significance for 
Conscientiousness (-.258, p < .1)17. These findings were maintained in regression 
analysis, with coefficients indicating that Neuroticism (-.400, p < .01) is the most 
important in driving trust (or rather, with these two negative coefficients, a lack of 
trust), followed by Conscientiousness (-.353, p < .01) and finally Agreeableness (.246, 
p < .05; the model also included age and gender, which were both non-significant).  
 
Investigating the association between Sender behaviour and the facets within the 
three significantly predictive traits, Müller and Schwieren (2012) report that several 
facets demonstrate significant correlations: anxiety, angry hostility and depression 
within Neuroticism (all negatively associated with the amount sent), trust and 
straightforwardness within Agreeableness (both positively associated), and order 
and deliberation within Conscientiousness – with a trend towards significance for 
achievement striving (all negatively associated). However, in regression analysis that 
also accounts for age and gender, none of these significantly predict behaviour (in a 
                                                          
17
 Müller and Schwieren (2012) identify Conscientiousness as being significantly correlated with the 
Sender’s decision, however, this is significant at the level of p < .1; in this study I use the 5% cut-off 
value.  




model that excludes demographic variables, anxiety, trust and order remain 
significant).  
 
Müller and Schwieren (2012) elected to only investigate facet-level associations 
within traits that showed a significant association with behaviour. The rationale 
behind this decision is not clear and appears to restrict the efficacy of their 
investigation. Similarly, given that personality varies between the genders and 
across the life course, it is likely that the inclusion of these variables in their models 
detracted from the observed relationship between personality and trust.  
 
In the section below, I describe why further research into Personality Theory would 
be of value to the field.  
 
 
3.2.2.4 Testing Personality Theory: why is further investigation needed? 
 
Clearly, Personality Theory has been tested and has not been completely ignored. 
However, the manner in which it has been tested has not necessarily given 
personality the best opportunity to reveal its full associations with self-reported 
trust and with behavioural trust and trustworthiness. Two key issues stand out to 
me that indicate the literature would benefit from further investigation of this 
theory: the representation of personality using two or three proxy indicators, and 
the almost exclusive use of brief personality inventories.  
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While the social and societal theories are represented by measures that at least 
have strong face validity (see Delhey & Newton, 2003), Personality Theory is 
represented by either (a) broad measures such as optimism for one’s future and the 
degree of feeling of control over one’s life (Delhey & Newton, 2003), or (b) brief trait 
inventories, the content of which may vary considerably between instruments.  
 
Although respondents’ scores on the broad measures of optimism and feeling of 
control over one’s life may to some extent be indicative of an aspect of the 
individual’s disposition, it is not necessarily the case that they represent personality. 
Responses to both measures may be strongly influenced by material resources or a 
realistic evaluation of one’s circumstances and potential for positive change. This is 
obviously different to the definition of personality given earlier. In addition, as 
discussed below, there is some evidence that optimism specifically about one’s 




Representing personality: the right type of optimism?  
 
Sharpe, Martin, and Roth (2011) investigated the statistical relationships between 
optimism and the Big Five traits. Using five samples, predominantly of 
undergraduate and graduate students, measures of optimism were variably 
obtained in different samples using the Life Orientation Test (LOT), the Worldview 
Personality Optimism-Pessimism Scale (WVPI-OP) and the International Personality 




Item Pool Optimism Scale (IPIP-OP). Personality traits were (variably) measured 
using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R), the NEO Five-Factor 
Inventory (NEO-FFI), the Big-Five Factor Markers (BFM), the Ten Item Personality 
Inventory (TIPI) and the International Personality Item Pool Big Five Domain Scales 
(IPIP-BFD).  
 
In correlation analyses, Sharpe et al. (2011) found optimism to be positively 
associated with Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness and negatively 
associated with Neuroticism. The strongest relationships with optimism were 
observed for Extraversion and Neuroticism, except for the WVPI-OP scale in one 
sample, for which BFM-Agreeableness demonstrated the second-strongest 
association (second to NEO-Extraversion). In hierarchical regression analysis, with 
Neuroticism and Extraversion entered in the first step and the remaining three traits 
in the second, the majority of the variance accounted for in the full model had 
already been explained in step 1, although step 2 did offer significant increases to 
the proportion of variance explained. This supports previous research cited by the 
authors, which reports that optimism is most often positively associated with 
Extraversion and negatively associated with Neuroticism (see Sharpe et al. [2011] for 
a review). Again, the exception for Sharpe and colleagues was for the sample that 
measured personality traits using the NEO and the BFM, for which BFM-
Agreeableness proved to be the strongest predictor of optimism.  
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“... the optimist tends to have a basic personality profile 
marked by high Emotional Stability, Extraversion, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. This personality profile 
leads to the development of optimistic beliefs and, thus, an 
overall positive worldview...”  
(Sharpe et al., 2011: 950)  
 
The rationale for using optimism as a proxy measure for personality is clear: it is 
strongly and consistently associated with personality traits (Sharpe et al., 2011). 
However, Sharpe and colleagues further interrogate their findings to identify where 
the predictors of the different measures of optimism deviate. In one sample, 
optimism was measured using both the LOT and the WVPI-OP. The authors point out 
that, while both scales are significantly associated with Neuroticism and 
Extraversion, the WVPI-OP scale demonstrates a significant relationship with 
Agreeableness and the LOT shows a significant relationship with Conscientiousness. 
After examining the content of the scales, they report that “the LOT is more 
narrowly focused on expectations about the future whereas the WVPI scale is a 
broader measure of positive orientation toward the world. Thus, the LOT aligns 
much more with concepts of persistence and conscientious pursuit of goals, while 
the breadth of the WVPI scale aligns with a positive attitude toward stimuli external 
to the self and an overall agreeable disposition toward others” (p. 950-1).  
 
Bringing this discussion back to focus on generalised trust: It is precisely this positive 
worldview that should be associated with an inclination towards a more inclusive 
moral community and the willingness (or even desire) to believe that most people 




can be trusted. Yet, the measure of optimism that is commonly used in large-scale 
surveys asks respondents to rate how optimistic they feel about their future. This, 
clearly, is at risk of tapping the perspectives more aligned with conscientiousness 
and persistence. It therefore seems that optimism for one’s future is not an 
appropriate proxy for personality in the context of generalised trust; generalised 
trust is instead associated with trait optimism.  
 
 
The use of brief personality inventories  
 
It is often reported that the shortened personality scales offer sound alternatives to 
the longer inventories: they offer good scale reliability, and levels of discrimination 
between traits that are equivalent to their longer counterparts (John & Srivastava, 
1999). However, the way these brief inventories are developed may have 
consequences for the observed associations between personality and trust. This may 
account for the range of findings in the literature and, depending upon the specific 
items used to measure each trait, could even have reversed the direction of the 
trait-trust association.  
 
The type of associations found between personality constructs and trust-related 
cognitions and behaviours will vary depending on quite what the personality scales 
measure. For example, one may expect to find that Agreeableness is positively 
associated with generalised trust – this would seem a reasonable expectation, given 
the prosociality associated with trait Agreeableness and that trust is a facet within 
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Agreeableness in McCrae and Costa’s (2010) Five Factor Model. However, the 
content of the brief inventories tends to be determined by selecting the items that 
are most important to each trait factor (John & Srivastava, 1999). Agreeableness 
may therefore not be measured in the same way in all trait inventories: some may 
not even include the items that are predictive of the trust decision.  
 
 
3.2.2.5 Suggestions for future research 
 
In order to test personality theory, it does seem appropriate to use a measure of 
personality rather than proxies such as optimism and feeling of control over one’s 
own life – both of which are likely to reflect evaluations of one’s circumstances 
rather than personality traits. In addition, it would be interesting to test to what 
extent traits predict self-reported generalised trust when measured by the full set of 
items in McCrae and Costa’s (2010) NEO inventory. The inclusion of all items would 
mean that, in addition to the trait scores, one may obtain scores for the facets 
within each trait. Better differentiation within trait measures would lead to more 
accurate identification of any relevant personality constructs. Investigating 
associations at the facet level would also allow isolation of the trust facet, to check 
whether this is in fact driving any observed relationship between trust and 
Agreeableness. While Müller and Schwieren (2012) did test this, methodological 
concerns discourage me from relying on their reported findings.  
 
  




3.2.3 Moral foundations of trust theory 
 
Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the moral foundations of trust (MFTT) has been described 
as an extension to personality theory (Delhey & Newton, 2003). In McCrae and 
Costa’s (1999: 163) model of ‘the five-factor theory personality system’ (Appendix 
3B), goals such as those identified in Schwartz’s Human Values Scale are driven by 
one’s underlying personality traits. Several studies note substantial empirical 
associations between traits and values (e.g. Olver & Mooradian, 2003; Vecchione, 
Alessandri, Barbaranelli, & Caprara, 2011). Though conceptualised by Delhey and 
Newton (2003) as an extension of personality theory, I treat Uslaner’s (2002) MFTT 
as a distinct model. This is due to its unique assertion that generalised trust is 
moralistic in nature.  
 
“Moralistic trust is not about having faith in particular people 
or even groups of people. It is a general outlook on human 
nature and… a commandment to treat people as if they were 
trustworthy.”  
(Uslaner, 2002: 17-18)  
 
Uslaner’s (2002) conceptualisation of moralistic trust is of a moral drive to treat 
others as if they are trustworthy. Uslaner defines moralistic trust as akin to a deeply 
held value that, as with many values, is either driven by one’s own sense of 
appropriate behaviour, or influenced by the environment and driven by social 
normative concerns. An alternative to moralistic trust is strategic trust, in which the 
decision to trust is based on one’s knowledge of the potential trustee (knowledge 
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perhaps gained via experience or reputation); strategic trust operates with regard to 
those we know, rather than strangers (Uslaner, 2002). According to Uslaner’s 
definition, strategic trust therefore cannot be applied broadly to “most people”.  
 
Moralistic trust decrees both that we trust because we feel it is the right thing to do, 
and that we trust those who we expect to share our values and, hence, to be worthy 
of our trust (Uslaner, 2002). Therefore, by placing our trust in the generalised other, 
we identify them as a member of our ‘moral community’ (Uslaner, 2002: 27). 
Generalised trust (trust in strangers) is, according to Uslaner, rooted in moralistic 
trust with those who have a higher level of generalised trust having a more 
widespread, inclusive moral community (a broader ‘radius of trust’; Delhey, Newton, 
& Welzel, 2011). However, Uslaner’s theory does acknowledge that even a moral 
drive to trust is not unquestioningly honoured and that consideration is always given 
to whether trust seems to be an appropriate or advisable approach in any given 
situation.  
 
Uslaner (2002) asserts that an alternative to being a generalised truster is to be a 
particularised truster (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Particularised trusters have a 
narrow radius of trust, preferring to place trust only in those who they feel sure are 
like themselves, for example, those who are known to them or who they regard as 
members of a salient in-group (defined perhaps by their perception of the person’s 
age, race or socio-economic status): they feel they can safely regard similar others as 
a member of their moral community. Particularised trusters therefore report a low 




level of generalised trust, believing that the majority of people (being unlike 
themselves) cannot generally be trusted.  
 
The MFTT may be tested by investigating the extent to which survey measures of 
values, such as Schwartz’s Human Values Scale (2001), predict trust-related outcome 
measures. In the section that follows, I discuss the measurement of values, before 




3.2.3.1 Measuring values 
 
In reviewing the literature, Morales‐Vives, De Raad, and Vigil‐Colet (2012) identify 
six values models. Of these, only one was developed for the purpose of examining 
individuals’ values in cross-national comparative research. This is essential if wishing 
to test MFTT in addition to evaluating the impact of societal characteristics on 
generalised trust. Schwartz’s (2001) model of human values describes ten values: 
Universalism, Benevolence, Traditionalism, Conformity, (Need for) Security, Power, 
Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-direction (Bilsky, Janik & Schwartz, 
2011; see Table 3.2 below).18   
 
                                                          
18
 Hofstede’s (2001) Cultural Dimensions Theory and Inglehart and Baker’s (2000) revised 
Modernisation Theory were also intended for use cross-nationally, however, they were designed to 
draw comparisons between countries rather than between individuals. They would therefore not be 
suitable for examining the relationship between trust and values as individual, dispositional 
characteristics. 
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Also shown in Table 3.2 is Graham et al.’s (2011) Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). 
Excluded from Morales-Vives et al.’s (2012) review – perhaps too late into the field 
for inclusion – MFT responds to Shweder, Much, Mahapatra and Park’s (1997) 
theory that values are driven by one’s political ideology. While MFT is intended to 
capture individuals’ values and it has been translated into many languages 
(moralfoundations.org, 2015), as far as I am aware it has not yet been fielded in a 
context that would permit cross-national comparisons.  
  




Table 3.2: Schwartz’s (2001) human values and Graham et al.’s (2011) moral values  
Value Questionnaire items 
Schwartz’s human values 
Response scale: very much like me, like me, somewhat like me, a little like me, not 
like me, not like me at all 
Self-direction Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. 
He likes to do things in his own original way.  
It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he 
does. He likes to be free and not depend on others.  
Stimulation He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He 
thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life. 
He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to 
have an exciting life.  
Hedonism Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” 
himself.  
He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to 
him to do things that give him pleasure.  
Achievement It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to 
admire what he does.  
Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will 
recognise his achievements.  
Power It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of 
money and expensive things. 
It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants 
people to do what he says.  
Security It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids 
anything that might endanger his safety. 
It is important to him that the government ensures his safety 
against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can 
defend its citizens.  
Conformity It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to 
avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.  
He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks 
people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is 
watching. 
Tradition It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to 
draw attention to himself. 
Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs 
handed down by his religion or his family. 
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Value Questionnaire items 
Benevolence It's very important to him to help the people around him. He 
wants to care for their well-being.  
It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to 
devote himself to people close to him.  
Universalism He thinks it is important that every person in the world should 
be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal 
opportunities in life.  
It is important to him to listen to people who are different from 
him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to 
understand them. 
He strongly believes that people should care for nature. 
Looking after the environment is important to him. 
 
Graham et al.’s moral values 
Response scale: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly 
agree, moderately agree, strongly agree 
Harm Compassion: Compassion for those who are suffering is the 
most crucial virtue 
Animal: One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a 
defenseless animal. 
Kill: It can never be right to kill a human being 
Fairness Fairly: When the government makes laws, the number one 
principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly. 
Justice: Justice is the most important requirement for a society. 
Rich: I think it’s morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of 
money while poor children inherit nothing. 
Ingroup History: I am proud of my country’s history. 
Family: People should be loyal to their family members, even 
when they have done something wrong. 
Team: It is more important to be a team player than to express 
oneself. 
Authority Kidrespect: Respect for authority is something all children need 
to learn. 
Sexroles: Men and women each have different roles to play in 
society. 
Soldier: If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding 
officer’s orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty. 




Value Questionnaire items 
Purity Harmlessdg: People should not do things that are disgusting, 
even if no one is harmed. 
Unnatural: I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that 
they are unnatural. 
Chastity: Chastity is an important and valuable virtue. 
 
 
Given its suitability for cross-national comparative study and its presence in the 
European Social Survey, the remainder of this section focuses on Schwartz’s (2001) 
model of human values.  
 
 
The Schwartz Human Values Scale 
 
The Schwartz Human Values Scale is a set of 21 items that Schwartz theorises should 
represent ten distinct (but related) values. According to Schwartz’s theory, these ten 
values combine to form four higher-level constructs: Self-transcendence 
(Universalism and Benevolence), Conservation (Tradition, Conformity and Security), 
Self-enhancement (Power, Achievement and Hedonism) and Openness to Change 
(Stimulation, Self-direction and Hedonism; Hedonism is theorised to fall across both 
Self-enhancement and Openness to Change). Schwartz (2001) proposes that these 
values form a quasi-circular structure, such that conflicting values are situated 
directly opposite each other (see Figure 3.1, below).  
 
 





Figure 3.1: Theoretical model of relations among ten motivational types of values. 
Adapted from Schwartz (2001: 270, Figure 1).  
 
 
The structure of the HVS appears generally sound, with values only merging – where 
they do so under factor analysis – with a neighbouring, and therefore related, value. 
Davidov (2008, 2010) tests this structure with the data from Rounds 2 and 3 of the 
ESS, respectively. Using multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA), 
Davidov (2010) demonstrates that the number of values that emerge from the 21 
HVS items varies across countries from four (Cyprus, Estonia and Slovakia) to seven 




(Austria, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland).  
 
In Section 3.2.2.2 I discuss studies that have used Schwartz’s model to test Uslaner’s 
(2002) theory of the moral foundations of trust.  
 
 
3.2.3.2 Testing MFTT: predicting self-reported generalised trust 
 
It appears from the available literature that few studies have investigated the extent 
to which Schwartz’s (2001) values predict trust. Here I describe the models and 
findings of those that have done so, and then consider possible adjustments to their 
methods that might be of benefit to the literature.  
 
Schwartz (2007b) used hierarchical linear modelling to investigate the individual- 
and societal-level associations with trust in a large, multi-national sample. Using an 
indexed score (created using the GTQ and a second measure – whether most people 
would try to be fair or try to take advantage19), he tested the predictive capacity of 
the ten HVS value priorities alongside other variables. Schwartz finds significant, 
positive effects of Universalism and Benevolence, and a significant negative 
association for (Need for) Security. Conformity was not significantly associated with 
trust.  
                                                          
19
 "Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would 
they try to be fair?” (Measured on an eleven-point scale, where 0 means ‘most people would try to 
take advantage of me’ and 10 means ‘most people would try to be fair’). 




Also testing Schwartz’s HVS alongside a range of other variables20, Reeskens (2009) 
identifies positive effects on social trust21 for prioritisation of Schwartz’s 
Universalism and Benevolence values, and negative effects for prioritisation of 
Tradition and Security. Reeskens tested only those HVS constructs that he theorised 
to be most strongly associated with social trust (i.e. the above four plus Conformity, 
which showed no association with trust).  
 
Reeskens (2009) subsequently investigated whether the effects of values on trust 
are the same cross-nationally. In this analysis, the values coefficients are allowed to 
vary between countries. Reeskens added to his model the country-level variables 
GDP per capita and whether the country has a Protestant tradition. In a model that 
accounts for the individual’s values, characteristics of their social environment and 
their place within it, their community and the society they live in, Reeskens reports 
that there is indeed cross-national variation in the association between values and 
self-reported trust.  
 
The empirical literature does offer some support for Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the 
moral foundations of trust. However, the methods used to date are not necessarily 
the most appropriate for examining these relationships; the inclusion in these 
models of characteristics that are likely to drive one’s values or trust, is likely to have 
obscured the associations reported by the regression analyses.  
                                                          
20
 Socio-demographics, degree of urbanisation, life circumstances (marital status, children, 
employment), voluntary activities, religious participation, financial comfort and television use. 
21
 Reeskens’ (2009) outcome variable was the mean score across the three items in the social trust 
scale: the GTQ, and items evaluating others’ degree of helpfulness and fairness. 





In Section 3.2.3.3, I move on to discuss a study that has examined the extent to 
which individuals’ values predict their behaviour in the trust game.  
 
 
3.2.3.3 Testing MFTT: predicting behavioural trust and trustworthiness 
 
Chuah (2010) conducted an experiment to test whether values predict trust-related 
behaviour. The data collected included Schwartz’s HVS and behaviour as the Sender 
and Returner in the trust game. In Chuah’s version of the trust game, the Sender 
could invest between £0 - £4 with the Returner. The amount invested was then 
tripled and the Returner able to transfer any amount back to the Sender.  With 96 
participants, factor analysis (with Varimax rotation) identified five factors, which the 
author named as follows:  
 
o Exploration (‘personal freedom and novelty’): Openness to Change items in the 
HVS  
o Community (concern for the welfare of society and nature): Universalism and 
Security items, as well as the ‘helpfulness component’ of Benevolence 
o Ambition (seeking success for its own sake): Self-enhancement items, but 
excludes ‘the pursuit of riches’ 
o Submission (to external expectations): Tradition and Conformity items and the 
‘loyalty’ component of Benevolence 
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o Gratification (‘rich socialite/ playboy millionaire’): Hedonism items, in addition 
to ‘the pursuit of riches’.  
 
Chuah (2010) found that Schwartz’s original factor structure did not hold when 
measured using the 21-item Human Values Scale. Although the resulting factors are 
somewhat different, the inadequacy of this scale for representing the full set of ten 
values supports Davidov’s (2008, 2010) findings from factor analyses on data from 
the European Social Survey. Chuah tested how well trust correlates with both 
Schwartz’s ‘prescribed values’ as well as her own derived values. In the analysis of 
the former, she found that trusting behaviour as the Sender in the trust game 
correlated positively with Universalism and negatively with Benevolence, while 
behaviour as the Returner correlated positively with (Need for) Security and 
negatively with Conformity. Using her derived values dimensions, Chuah reported 
that trusting behaviour is positively correlated with Community and trustworthiness 
is negatively correlated with Submission.  
 
In regression analyses that account for demographic variables, similar results were 
obtained: Schwartz’s Universalism was still observed to be positively associated with 
trusting behaviour and trustworthiness negatively associated with Conformity, while 
the associations with Benevolence and Security were non-significant. The results for 
the derived values remained the same as in the correlation analysis, with a positive 
association between trusting behaviour and Community, and a negative association 
between trustworthiness and Submission (Chuah, 2010).  
 




While there appears to be some association between values and behaviour in the 
trust game, these are not necessarily those one might intuitively expect when 
predicting trust. In the above study, this is particularly the case when the HVS 
constructs are used in accordance with Schwartz’s (2001) model. In the section that 
follows, I describe the need for further exploration of MFTT.  
 
 
3.2.3.4 Testing MFTT: why is further investigation needed?  
 
It appears that little research has been undertaken into the efficacy of Uslaner’s 
(2002) theory of the moral foundations of trust (MFTT). In the literature that tests 
the associations between values and self-reported trust, both existing studies 
examining the associations between Schwartz’s human values and self-reported 
generalised trust risk over-controlling for factors that may be associated with or 
even driven by one’s underlying values. For example, as noted earlier, prosocial 
individuals may self-select into participation in voluntary activities; Reeskens’ 
inclusion of this in his model may therefore have obscured the relationship between 
values and trust (e.g. Sturgis et al., 2009). In addition, both Reeskens’ and Schwartz’s 
(2007) use of outcome measures that are mean scores across multiple questionnaire 
items may have resulted in the prediction of something slightly different to 
generalised trust.  
 
Finally, in his random slopes model that tests whether the relationships between 
values and trust are stable cross-nationally, Reeskens (2009) uses five of the values 
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as presented in Schwartz’s (2001) human values model. However, Davidov (2010) 
found that in most countries the discriminant validity between Universalism and 
Benevolence, and between Conformity and Tradition, is too poor to warrant 
representing these values individually and that related values should be combined in 
order to ensure one is measuring the same thing across countries. It is therefore not 
clear whether all of the values measure the same thing in each of the countries 
studied. An alternative factor structure, obtained by Davidov (2010) using multiple-
group confirmatory factor analysis, would combine Universalism and Benevolence 
(to form their higher-order value dimension, Self-transcendence) and combine 
Conformity and Tradition (to form two thirds of the higher-order Conservation value 
dimension). Using this alternative structure may have an impact on the findings 
regarding the relevance of the different value dimensions to trust, as well as the 





In a search of the available literature, it appears that two studies have tested the 
association between values and self-reported trust, and one study has tested the 
extent to which values predict behavioural trust and trustworthiness. The results of 
these studies do offer some encouragement regarding the relatedness between 
values and generalised trust. What is missing is a theory regarding why particular 
values should be associated with generalised trust (beyond Uslaner’s assertion of 




the moral foundations of trust). Further testing of MFTT may help us to gain an 
understanding of this relationship and of the nature and origins of generalised trust.  
 
In the next section I turn to examine the theoretical and empirical literature relating 
to the idea that one’s level of generalised trust is influenced by the society in which 
they live.  
 
 
3.2.4 Characteristics of society: Societal (or Institutional) Theory 
 
“... universalistic, power-sharing institutions, as well as those 
that sanction noncooperative behavior, provide an 
environment of credibility – allowing generalized trust to 
flourish” 
(Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009: 1556) 
 
Similarly to Delhey and Newton’s (2003) Societal Theory, Rothstein and Stolle’s 
(2008) institutional theory does not make any claims about the true origins of one’s 
underlying level of trust. Rather, it considers the extent to which the individual’s 
inclination to trust may be influenced by the society’s institutions. According to this 
theory, the individual’s response to the generalised trust question (GTQ) is indicative 
of their evaluation of the trustworthiness of society (Delhey & Newton, 2003: 97; 
Putnam, 2000).  
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Societal Theory focuses on respondents’ evaluations of the attributes of the country 
or society in which they live; this theory bears close resemblance to institutional 
theory (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). I therefore use these two terms interchangeably. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, institutional theory can be tested in two ways: via 
subjective evaluations (for example, the degree of confidence one has in public 
institutions) and via objective measures (such as national wealth or the degree of 
income inequality). Here, I focus on objective data because this is the more 
interesting issue: it makes sense that an individual’s evaluations of how trustworthy 
society is will influence their level of trust in strangers as this may just reflect the 
individual’s perceptual bias. Objective data, however, should bypass this potential 
bias and offer a relatively accurate description of society.  
 
These objective attributes relate to the nature of national institutions (such as the 
government and the police), as well as their observed impact on society; for 
example, the degree of income inequality, the type of political regime, the presence 
of corruption within government, state endorsement of egalitarian policies and the 
type of welfare system (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). It is generally theorised that a 
society will promote trust if it has a high level of equality, a democratic regime, low 
levels of government corruption, a universal welfare state and if it endorses policies 
that promote the inclusion of minority groups. In addition, societies with a higher 
level of trust are often wealthier. This may be because wealthier societies are often 
endowed with the above qualities (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).    
 




Institutional Theory is built on the expectation that the characteristics and nature of 
national institutions will influence (or perhaps determine): (1) how safe the 
individual feels, (2) their expectation that other people will be trustworthy versus 
untrustworthy, (3) the trustworthiness of the individual’s own behaviour, and (4) 
aspects of the individual’s lifestyle that are dependent on, for example, welfare  
policy and the degree of universalism versus discrimination employed therein 
(Rothstein & Stolle, 2008).  
 
Rothstein and Stolle (2008) describe their theoretical grounding for these expected 
effects:  
 
(1) Feeling un/safe and in/secure: This relates to both institutional corruption and 
efficacy. Corruption in the political institutions (such as government or 
parliament) or order institutions (such as the police or the courts) leaves the 
population uncertain whether they will receive fair treatment and whether the 
decisions taken by the authorities are legitimate. In corrupt societies there is 
also the risk of, for example, unfair conviction even in the event that one has 
not done anything wrong. Similarly, the efficacy of institutions can be crucial, for 
example, low-efficacy order institutions fail to reassure the population that 
‘treacherous’ behaviour will be penalised. In each instance, Rothstein and Stolle 
(2008) theorise, members of the population will not feel secure enough to place 
their trust in strangers.  
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(2) Extrapolating the trustworthiness of those in public office to members of the 
broader population: It should be the norm that people who are endowed with a 
particular responsibility are able and motivated to live up to it. If they cannot be 
trusted to do so, then it is theorised that via social normative influence this will 
set the tone for interactions amongst members of the public.  
 
(3) Individuals’ degree of trustworthiness: If one believes that the people holding 
public office use corrupt or treacherous means to get what they want, this may 
encourage members of the public to do likewise. Corruption can become the 
norm and also be seen as a necessity in order to get one’s needs met.  
 
(4) The individual’s life will be positively or negatively influenced by state 
institutions: Corrupt or inefficacious institutions are likely to employ 
discriminatory practices, resulting in a negative impact on the lives of those 
discriminated against and inspiring distrust in public institutions. A similar effect 
is likely to be observed in societies where income inequality is higher (for 
example, in those without a welfare state).  
 
Institutional Theory predicts that corruption and inefficacious state institutions will 
result in unfair and unequal treatment that causes damage to individuals within the 
population and, eventually, the loss of generalised trust. This mirrors the 
expectations at the individual-level where insecurity, low levels of universalism and 
low levels of benevolence are associated with particularised trust.  
 




Herreros (2012) notes that, in a state that is either ineffectual in enforcing law and 
order or that cannot be trusted to do so fairly, trust within society is likely to 
plateau; the inclination of ‘opportunistic types’ to take advantage wherever possible 
discourages even trusting individuals from believing that most people can indeed be 
trusted. This results in the trusting contingent being ‘crowded out’ and becoming as 
untrusting as the particularised trusters. Due to this levelling effect, Herreros 
theorises that the effect of individual-level variables that would ordinarily promote 
trust, such as level of education (or indeed one’s values), will be negligible in low 
quality societies.  
 
 
Reflections on Rothstein and Stolle’s theory 
 
While these processes may indeed be evidenced in society, the influence of the law 
appears less about promoting trust than providing assurance: if one’s inclination to 
trust is dependent on feeling confident that criminal behaviour will be punished, 
then they are not acting from a feeling of generalised trust but rather from 
confidence that the potential criminal will be deterred from proving themselves 
untrustworthy because they do not want to face punishment (Yamagishi et al., 
1999). There is also a risk of confounding ‘trust’ and ‘cooperation’ – clearly the two 
are not the same (Herreros, 2012), with ‘cooperation’ implying that there may be at 
least an element of reluctance to engage in the prosocial behaviour. It is therefore 
possible that state intervention may, through the employment of legal deterrents, 
elicit forced cooperation and thereby reduce the levels of generalised trust within 
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society (Herreros & Criado, 2008). However, it is acknowledged that state sanctions 
can generate a safe environment that is conducive to the development of 
generalised trust, which can in turn modify social norms and result in the 
establishment of a more trusting society (Herreros, 2012: 485). Irrespective of the 
underlying mechanism, it is still the case that a higher quality legal system and 
government are likely to promote behaviour that is consistent with trustfulness and 
trustworthiness. We should therefore expect that the endorsement of generalised 
trust will vary cross-nationally, amongst countries with national institutions that vary 
on these dimensions.  
 
It is also worth noting that since wealthier societies tend to have higher levels of 
equality and efficacy, and lower levels of corruption, it may be difficult to distinguish 
between these effects. To cite each independently as an influence on levels of 
generalised trust may therefore be somewhat misleading. Finally, there is an 
argument that the causal pathway operates in the opposite direction: a higher level 
of generalised trust within society may result in a higher quality society due to the 
election of non-corrupt officials and support for egalitarian policies (e.g. Uslaner, 
2002). While I make no claims regarding the direction of causality, it is worth being 
aware that this conceptualisation of institutional theory exists – although it has 
received little acclaim (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008).  
 
As described above, Societal Theory predicts that people who live within a more 
progressive society will, on average, report higher levels of generalised trust. I 
discuss below studies that have evaluated the association of such characteristics, 




and characteristics relating to the composition of society (e.g. ethnic and religious 




3.2.4.1 Measuring and testing the characteristics of society: predicting self-reported 
trust 
 
Perhaps largely for logistical reasons, Societal Theory has predominantly been tested 
using measures of self-reported (rather than behavioural) trust. While there is ample 
survey data from a large enough range of countries to detect effects of national-
level variables, it would be unusual for an experimental study to recruit sufficient 
samples from enough countries to be able to compare the effects of national-level 
variables on measures of behavioural trust and trustworthiness. For this reason, I 
discuss here only the work that has been done on large-scale survey data.  
 
Corruption is commonly measured using the Corruption Perceptions Index. This 
takes ratings of the level of corruption within a society from experts as well as 
businesses and private households (Transparency International, 2013). In society-
level models (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Rothstein & Stolle, 
2008; Zak & Knack, 2001) and multilevel models (Dinesen, 2013 [one-country study]; 
Rothstein & Stolle, 2002 [one-country study]; Wang & Gordon, 2011; You, 2012), 
corruption is negatively associated with generalised trust: that is, the more corrupt 
the society, the lower the level of generalised trust reported by its population 
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(although, see Freitag & Bühlmann, 2005 and Uslaner, 2002, 2004 for non-significant 
findings).  
 
Government effectiveness is represented by such measures as those within the 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2014). Here, 
government effectiveness captures “perceptions of the quality of the public services, 
the quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2010 in Herreros, 2012). These are sourced from surveys of households, companies, 
‘business information providers’, NGOs and public-sector bodies (Kaufman et al., 
2010: 5). Empirical studies have found that a more efficacious government is 
associated with a higher level of self-reported trust (Herreros, 2012; Rothstein & 
Stolle, 2008).  
 
Government response to diversity and migrants Zimdars and Tampubolon (2012) 
examine the state’s treatment of migrants as measured by the Migrant Policy Index 
(MIPEX). They report that countries in which the government has implemented 
policies to support the integration of migrants into the national community record 
higher levels of generalised trust within the population. Clearly it is not possible to 
determine whether such policies were introduced to promote integration and 
happened to be successful, or if such policies were formally introduced because 
integration was already underway and support for this was already evidenced 
amongst the population.   





Inequality The way in which a government manages the risk of intergroup tensions 
can exert a powerful influence over the behaviours of social groups. Policies and 
initiatives that promote intergroup cohesion and integration can help to build 
generalised trust and aid the development of a predominantly harmonious society 
(Uslaner, 2004: 502; Zimdars & Tampubolon, 2012). In contrast, those that classify 
their citizens, for example through non-universalistic welfare states or discrimination 
of minority groups, act as proponents of intergroup tension and discord.  
 
Inequality of income distribution, measured by the Gini Index, appears to have a 
substantial negative impact on trust across the board in single-level models (e.g. 
Berggren & Jordahl, 2006; Bidner & Francois, 2011; Bjørnskov, 2007; Delhey & 
Newton, 2005; Finseraas & Jakobsson, 2012; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Paldam, 2009; 
Zak & Knack, 2001. Although Robbins [unpub] found no significant association) and 
in multi-level models that also account for individual-level variables (e.g. Herreros, 
2012; Olivera, 2013; Park & Subramanian, 2012; Polillo, 2012; Wang & Gordon, 
2011; You, 2012).  
 
National wealth A higher level of national wealth, measured as GDP per capita, has 
been found to be associated with higher levels of generalised trust (Delhey & 
Newton, 2005; Hamamura, 2012; Finseraas & Jakobsson, 2012; Gundelach, 2014; 
Lee, 2013; Olivera, 2013; Paldam, 2009; Park & Subramanian, 2013; Pollilo, 2012; 
Reeskens, 2009; Robbins, 2011; Wang & Gordon, 2011), but in other studies it has 
failed to achieve a substantial enough relationship to be statistically significant 
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(Berggren & Jordahl, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007; Herreros, 2012; Kong, 2013; Robbins, 
2012; You, 2012). A non-significant associations appears to occur when other 
contextual variables are added into the model. For example, Hamamura (2011) 
found that accounting for the level of income inequality and the society being a 
collectivist (vs. individualist) culture rendered the GDP coefficient non-significant. As 
noted earlier, wealthy countries do tend to be countries with more progressive, non-
corrupt institutions; it is therefore likely to be difficult to distinguish the ‘effect’ of 
GDP versus that of certain other characteristics (as discussed above; You, 2012).  
 
Religious composition This is often included in statistical models as either the 
proportions of the population that belong to specific religious groups, or a dummy 
variable to indicate the country’s official religious tradition. With a noted negative 
effect of hierarchical religions on trust (Berggren & Jordahl, 2006), and a positive 
effect of Protestantism, studies often use a variable that indicates the proportion of 
Protestants or whether it is a Protestant country. The relationship between religious 
tradition and generalised trust is reported by both society-level (Delhey  & Newton, 
2005; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Rothstein & Stolle, 2008) and multilevel (Park & 
Subramanian, 2013; Reeskens, 2009; Robbins, 2011) studies. Conversely, Bjørnskov 









3.2.4.2 Testing Societal Theory: predicting behavioural trust and trustworthiness  
 
Johnson and Mislin (2011) report their findings from a meta-analysis of studies using 
the trust game. The studies cited were implemented in a range of countries that 
exhibit different degrees of income inequality, corruption, ethnic heterogeneity and 
other measures that have been found to be associated with levels of self-reported 
trust. While the authors report no significant associations between the country-level 
variables and behavioural trust, they do find significant associations for 
trustworthiness such that higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity or income inequality 





It appears that certain features of society have a relatively consistent association 
with self-reported generalised trust and behavioural trustworthiness. National-level 
variables could therefore provide important contextual information in models 
designed to assess the relationship between values or personality and these two 
outcome measures. The relationship between society-level constructs and 
behavioural trust is less clear, however, further investigation may elucidate the 









While the individual-level theories of the origins of generalised trust have been 
tested to some extent, the scarcity of these studies means that variations to the 
design of the study or data handling remain untested. Elaborating on the existing 
studies may help to uncover the internal processes that contribute to determining 
whether one reports being trusting or cautious. For Personality Theory this may be 
achieved by using the full NEO personality inventory to predict self-reported trust as 
well as behavioural trust and trustworthiness, and by capturing these behavioural 
measures using a trust game design that more sharply polarises participants into 
trusting/ untrusting and trustworthy/ untrustworthy.  
 
With regard to the relationships between values and self-reported trust, Reeskens 
(2009) covers many bases. However, his handling of the HVS variables and use of the 
social trust scale (rather than the GTQ alone), as well as the presence of additional 
variables in his model, may be obscuring the relationship between values and trust. 
 
And finally, regarding behavioural trust and trustworthiness, more work is needed 
that uses alternative trust game designs and different samples to compare with 
Chuah’s (2010) study. Future work could also investigate the predictive utility of 
traits versus values in explaining scores on trust-related outcome measures.  
 
Despite what appears to be a general disinterest in the individual-level theories of 
generalised trust, there is some evidence that trust is associated with the 




individual’s personality and values. While unlikely to be completely resistant to 
influence by features of the society in which the person lives, Personality Theory and 
the Moral Foundations of Trust Theory do deserve further evaluation.  
  









The term generalised trust refers to trust in strangers, where the stranger is the 
‘generalised’ other. While particularised trust (trust in known others or in those who 
are similar to oneself) is essential for harmonious personal relationships, generalised 
trust permits the harmonious functioning of the community and society (Uslaner, 
2002).  
 
There is as yet no definitive account of who trusts and why. The literature describes 
theories that cite the potential individual, social and societal origins of trust (see 
Delhey & Newton, 2003 for an overview). However, while a comparatively vast 
literature reports conflicting findings regarding the socially-oriented theories, the 
individual-level personality (Delhey & Newton, 2003) and moral foundations of trust 
(Uslaner, 2002) theories have been somewhat neglected (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
This is surprising, given the influence that an individual’s psychological disposition is 
likely to have on their interpretation of social phenomena. Perhaps due to the 
limited data available, some studies exclude these constructs altogether (e.g. Van 
der Veld & Saris, 2010) while others use proxies for personality that are instead 
likely to be indicators of other things (e.g. Delhey & Newton, 2003; see Chapter 3 for 
more detail).  





This chapter seeks to begin to remedy this inattention to the individual-level origins 
of generalised trust, by using Schwartz’s Human Values Scale (Schwartz, 2001) to 
test Uslaner’s (2002) theory of ‘the moral foundation of trust’ (MFTT)22. In addition, I 
use multilevel modelling to test the robustness of the relationship between values 
and trust against influence by society-level characteristics (e.g. Rothstein and Stolle, 
2008). My measure of trust is a single item, the generalised trust question (GTQ).  
 
The GTQ and the human values items are measured at the level of the individual 
(Level 1 in the multilevel model), with each respondent reporting their level of trust 
and their degree of association with the vignettes that characterise each of the 
human values. Level 2 is populated by variables measured at the level of society and 
may include: national wealth (Gross Domestic Product per capita; GDP), inequality 
(the General Inequality Index coefficient; Gini), the level of corruption (Corruption 
Perception Index; CPI) and government effectiveness (as reported in the World Bank 
Governance Indicators).23  
 
Below, I give a brief recap of the literature relating to moralistic trust discussed in 
Chapter 3. I then discuss its relationship with values before considering the literature 
regarding the potential influence of society-level characteristics on this relationship.  
 
 
                                                          
22
 This is the name I have given this theory and not a name that Eric Uslaner has used to describe it. 
Any inaccuracies implied by its use are therefore mine.  
23
 I identify in Section 4.3.2 the variables that I use in my models. 
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4.1.1 Generalised trust at the individual-level (Level 1) 
 
Here I look at Uslaner’s (2002) conceptualisation of generalised trust as ‘moralistic’ 
trust and use his descriptions of the generalised truster and the particularised 
truster to develop a theory regarding which values are likely to be associated with 
generalised trust.  
 
 
4.1.1.1 Generalised trust as moralistic trust 
 
Uslaner (2002) defines moralistic trust as a moral drive to treat others as though we 
expect them to live up to the trust placed in them:  
 
“Moralistic trust is not about having faith in particular people 
or even groups of people. It is a general outlook on human 
nature and… a commandment to treat people as if they were 
trustworthy.”  
(Uslaner, 2002: 17-18)  
 
Generalised trust has been found to be positively associated with a range of 
personal attributes, including age (e.g. Gundelach, 2014; Herreros, 2012; Park & 
Subramanian, 2012. See Olivera [2013] for conflicting findings and Lee [2013] for a 
non-significant effect), being male (e.g. Olivera, 2013; You, 2012; Zimdars & 
Tampubolon, 2012 – see Lee [2013] for conflicting results, and Gundelach [2014] 
and Herreros [2012] for a non-significant effect), level of education (e.g. Gundelach, 




2014; Paxton, 2007; Olivera, 2013; You, 2012) and socio-economic status (Paxton, 
2007).  
 
In discussing moralistic trust, Uslaner (2002) notes that the moralistic truster trusts 
both because they feel it is the right thing to do and because they trust those who 
they expect to share their moral values (hence, to be trustworthy; Uslaner, 2002). By 
placing our trust in the generalised other we identify them as a member of our 
‘moral community’ (Uslaner, 2002: 27). This stands in contrast to particularised 
trusters, who purportedly have a narrower radius of trust and prefer to place trust 
only in those who they feel sure are like themselves: those who are known to them 
or who they regard as members of their in-group (on some salient dimension, 
defined perhaps by their perception of the person’s age, ethnicity or socio-economic 
status). 
 
The logic of an association between trust and values is not difficult to comprehend: 
it is obvious that few would choose to place their trust in somebody they knew to be 
of questionable moral character. We expect those of dubious values to be motivated 
to betray our trust, valuing their material gain from doing so far above any altruistic 
reward that somebody else may have felt from behaving in a trustworthy manner.  
 
As a moral choice, trust is conceptualised (in contract to particularised trust) as 
something that is driven by intention. Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the moral 
foundations of trust asserts that generalised trust is  in part a social signal: for the 
generalised truster the act of trusting another person is not simply driven by 
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necessity (e.g. ‘if I don’t place my trust in this person, X will not happen and I’ll have 
to go without Y’) but by a disinclination to subscribe to a negative worldview 
regarding other people. It is irrelevant whether this disinclination comes naturally or 
has had to be stubbornly clung to over the years through occasional errors of 
judgement. To the generalised truster, it is important that they continue to treat 
others as though they are trustworthy.  
 
In the next section, I consider which values are likely to be associated with 
generalised trust. One would expect that, if generalised trusters are optimistic 
individuals who intend to treat others as though they are trustworthy, they should 
be people who like other people; a high score on the generalised trust question 
(GTQ) would run counter to a misanthropic outlook. With this in mind, examining 
Schwartz’s (2001) model it is clear that certain values stand out as being more 
relevant to the social sphere. I discuss below the available empirical evidence 
regarding the moral foundations of trust. After identifying my hypotheses for the 




4.1.1.2 Generalised trust and human values 
 
Reeskens (2009) reported that Schwartz’s (2001) Conformity and Tradition should be 
relevant to the maintenance of social structures and norms, while Self-
transcendence values should determine the breadth of one’s moral community. In 




this section, I examine the literature on values and trust in order to elaborate on this 
assertion and explore the mechanisms that may drive Uslaner’s (2002) postulated 
relationship between values and trust.  
 
 
The nature of generalised versus particularised trusters 
 
Uslaner (2002) describes the generalised truster as a secure, optimistic individual 
with a healthy sense of self-determination:  
 
“Moralistic trust is predicated upon a view that the world is a 
benevolent place with good people… that things are going to 
get better, and that you are the master of your own fate.”  
(Uslaner, 2002: 23) 
 
Meanwhile, particularised trusters are characterised rather differently:  
 
“Particularized trusters view the outside world as a 
threatening place, over which they have little control. They 
may even see conspiracies against them. They are self-
centred, fear that the deck is stacked against them, and have 
authoritarian tendencies; they often have difficult times 
establishing personal relationships. Most of all, they are 
pessimistic about the future and their own ability to control 
it.”  
(Uslaner, 2002: 31)  
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These two quotes illustrate the stark differences in character that may be expected 
between generalised and particularised trusters. Uslaner (2002) reports that an 
individual who has a high level of generalised trust is likely to care about other 
people, and to be optimistic about the future and their own capacity to have a 
positive influence on it. In contrast, particularised trusters are described as self-
centred, pessimistic individuals who have ‘authoritarian tendencies’ and who feel 
the world to be ‘a threatening place’ that they  have little capacity to control. It is 
clear that these two characters are likely to hold different values. Considering which 
of Schwartz’s (2001) values may underlie generalised trust may therefore be 
approached from two directions: which values are likely to be associated with 
generalised trust and which with particularised trust.  
 
 
The moral foundations of generalised trust versus the moral foundations of 
particularised trust 
 
The description of the generalised truster is of somebody who is likely to be 
prosocial, perhaps as indicated by Schwartz’s Self-transcendence values 
(Universalism and Benevolence).24 Meanwhile, the description of particularised 
trusters as having ‘authoritarian tendencies’ may be helpful in considering the 
                                                          
24
 While it could be argued that Schwartz’s Self-direction and Stimulation values would be relevant to 
generalised trust (with their focus, respectively, on the importance of determining one’s own path in 
life and a fondness for taking risks), their position on the opposite side of Schwartz’s quasi-circular 
values wheel to the Conservation values means it would not be appropriate to include them in these 
models. In addition, it is debatable whether they can be considered as ‘moral’ values (Schwartz, 
2007a).  




possible mechanism behind moralistic trust. We can do this by examining the moral 
standpoints that are associated with right-wing versus liberal ideologies.  
 
Authoritarianism is associated with right-wing values, and certain of the Schwartz 
HVS constructs have been found to correlate with both right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO; von Collani & Grumm, 2009). Graham 
et al. (2011) develop a model, Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; see Chapter 3, Table 
3.2), that examines the origins of values. MFT tests Shweder et al.’s (1997) theory 
that, counter to the common assumption that one’s ideological affiliation reflects 
one’s values, the individual’s values are driven by their underlying ideology:  
 
“… liberalism was hypothesized to indicate a morality in 
which the individual is the locus of moral value. In such a 
moral world, moral regulation revolves around protecting 
individuals from harm or unfair treatment by other 
individuals or by the social system. In contrast, conservatives 
– at least, the social conservatives of the religious right – try 
to create more tightly ordered communities… In such a moral 
world, the individual is not the primary locus of moral value; 
the building block of society is thought to be the family, and a 
much greater emphasis is placed on virtues and institutions 
that bind people into roles, duties, and mutual obligations.”  
(Graham et al., 2011: 368)  
 
In the taxonomy of their Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), Graham et al. (2011) 
hypothesise that the more liberal-minded will prioritise the prevention of Harm and 
the promotion of Fairness, while the more conservative will prioritise loyalty to the 
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Ingroup, obedience to Authority and the maintenance of Purity25. Graham and 
colleagues’ investigation into the latent constructs that underlie these values 
support their theoretical distinction between liberals and conservatives.  
 
 
Human values and ideological orientation 
 
Given the characters described above by Uslaner (2002), we should expect the 
particularised and generalised trusters to report virtually opposite scores on the 
values dimensions relating to interpersonal and intergroup dynamics. If I am correct 
in transferring Graham et al.’s (2011) Moral Foundations Theory to the motivations 
behind generalised and particularised trust, there should be some evidence of an 
association between ideological orientation (i.e. liberal versus conservative) and 
human values.  
 
This relationship has been examined in a number of studies. While testing their 
Moral Foundations Theory, Graham et al. (2011) investigated the correlations 
between their moral values and Schwartz’s (2001) human values, finding that both 
the constructs relating to Conservation and those relating to Security correlate with 
Graham et al.’s Authority (respectively, r = .62 and r = .48), Ingroup (r = .53 and r = 
.53) and Purity (r = .54 and r = .37) values. Similarly, Von Collani and Grumm (2009) 
report that Right-wing Authoritarianism correlates with Schwartz’s higher-order 
                                                          
25
 Capitalisation indicates the names of the moral values within Graham et al.’s (2011) Moral 
Foundations Theory: Harm, Fairness, Ingroup, Authority and Purity (see Chapter 3, Table 3.2). 




Conservation (r = .40) construct. Conservation also correlates positively with their 
General Prejudice value (r = .38).  
 
Meanwhile, Graham et al. (2011) report that their Harm avoidance value correlates 
with Schwartz’s (2001) constructs relating to Benevolence (r = .47) and social justice 
(r = .52), and von Collani and Grumm (2009) that Right-wing Authoritarianism and 
General Prejudice correlate negatively with Schwartz’s higher-order Self-
transcendence (respectively, r = -.29 and r = -.27) and Openness to Change (r = -.33 
and r = -.28) values.  
 
 
Ideological orientation, human values and generalised trust 
 
It stands to reason that those who prioritise the reputation of the family or 
community (Shweder et al., 1997) are likely to prefer to trust only those who they 
feel sure will not violate the code of conduct, while the more egalitarian values of 
those who prioritise the welfare of the individual (Haidt & Graham, 2007) indicate 
that they still regard those who are dissimilar (on whatever dimension) as members 
of the same moral community. Harbouring an expansive moral community is 
essential to the experience of Uslaner’s (2002) moralistic trust. 
 
It appears that the moral foundations of generalised trust – and indeed the moral 
foundations of particularised trust – may have their origins in one’s ideological 
orientation. This works well in theory, but we have not yet examined the (albeit 
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limited) empirical evidence currently available. In the next section I discuss the 
studies that have tested the relationship between Schwartz’s human values and 
generalised (or social) trust.26  
 
 
4.1.1.3 Empirical findings regarding the moral foundations of trust  
 
Though not widely tested, Uslaner’s (2002) moral foundations of trust theory (MFTT) 
has gained some support in the literature. Schwartz (2007) and Reeskens (2009) 
both report findings from studies that investigate the strength of Schwartz’s human 
values in predicting social trust.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, both Schwartz (2007) and Reeskens (2009) find that 
certain HVS constructs significantly predict social trust. Schwartz finds that 
prioritising Universalism and Benevolence is associated with a higher level of self-
reported social trust27, while (Need for) Security is associated with a lower level of 
social trust. He reports a non-significant finding for Conformity and Tradition. The 
findings regarding Universalism and Benevolence lend support to the theory that 
trust is higher in those who hold egalitarian values, while the finding for Security 
may reflect the particularised truster’s feelings of vulnerability (Uslaner, 2002). It 
                                                          
26
 I was unable to find any studies that test the MFTT using a measure of generalised trust alone (i.e. 
the GTQ). The social trust scale comprises the GTQ as well as two items that ask respondents to rate 
others’ degree of helpfulness (versus looking out for themselves) and fairness (versus trying to take 
advantage).  
27
 Schwartz (2007) captured generalised trust using both the GTQ and the item that asks respondents 
to evaluate the fairness of other people.  




makes sense that those who prioritise security concerns are likely to be more risk 
averse and therefore less likely to endorse placing trust in strangers.  
 
Using Schwartz’s HVS, Reeskens (2009) identifies positive effects on social trust28 for 
respondents’ inclinations to prioritise Universalism and Benevolence values, and 
negative effects for inclinations to prioritise Tradition and Security. These effects 
persist despite the presence in the model of a range of other items associated with 
generalised trust (e.g. marital status, having children, income satisfaction, degree of 
urbanisation of the local area and participation in voluntary organisations).  
 
The findings of both Schwartz (2007) and Reeskens (2009) support the theory of an 
association between values and social trust. The direction of these findings is also in 
line with the expectations generated by the theory I described above. Those who 
prioritise Universalism and Benevolence (i.e. the prevention of harm to individuals) 
are more inclined to report generalised trust, while those who are more concerned 
about Security are less trusting. The conflicting and null effects regarding Tradition 
and Conformity, however, are less encouraging.    
 
 
4.1.1.4 Summary and hypotheses: individual-level drivers of generalised trust  
 
The theoretical and empirical literature described above offer some encouragement 
regarding Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the moral foundations of generalised trust. 
                                                          
28
Reeskens’ (2009) dependent variable is the mean score across the three items in the social trust 
scale: the GTQ, and items evaluating others’ degree of helpfulness and fairness. 
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While the empirical evidence does not show unequivocal support for all aspects of 
the theory I outlined in Section 4.1.1.2, there appears to be reason to expect certain 
of Schwartz’s values to be useful in testing this model.  
 
Based on the theory and findings discussed above, I expect that people who 
prioritise Benevolence and Universalism values (i.e. who hold a liberal, egalitarian 
ideology and an orientation towards the prevention of harm to individuals) will 
report higher levels of generalised trust, while those who prioritise Security will 
report lower levels of trust. In addition, it seems likely that prioritising Conformity 
and Tradition should be associated with an overriding concern for protecting the 
status of the in-group. However, while there is reason to expect these values to be 
negatively associated with one’s level of generalised trust, the empirical evidence 
presents mixed findings.   
 
Hypothesis 1 Prioritising Universalism and Benevolence will be positively associated 
with generalised trust.  
Hypothesis 2 Prioritising Security will be negatively associated with trust. 
Research question 1 Is prioritisation of Conformity and Tradition negatively 
associated with trust?  
 
This section has described the first part of this investigation: testing the relationship 
between values and generalised trust. In the section that follows I discuss the 
possible influence of societal characteristics on generalised trust and consider 
whether these attributes may influence the relationships between values and trust.  






4.1.2 The impact of the characteristics of society (Level 2)  
 
It may be tempting to assume that any association between values and trust should 
be replicated globally. However, it is probable that variables at the societal level will 
exert an influence over the degree to which the individual is willing to place trust in 
their fellow citizens. The associations between values and trust may therefore vary 
as certain societal characteristics influence the degree to which the average citizen 
feels inclined to trust or to show caution. However, these same features of society 
may have an impact on individuals’ values; since values are at least in part driven by 
social norms, the type of society the person lives in is to some extent likely to shape 
their value priorities. It is not clear whether these effects occur in parallel, with one’s 
values and proclivity for generalised trust both being affected by society, or if the 




4.1.2.1 The characteristics of society and generalised trust 
 
“... universalistic, power-sharing institutions, as well as those 
that sanction noncooperative behavior, provide an 
environment of credibility – allowing generalized trust to 
flourish” 
(Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009: 1556) 




As discussed in Chapter 3, a range of society-level characteristics are theorised to 
influence individuals’ levels of generalised trust. Rothstein and Stolle (2008) 
postulate that institutions exert an influence on generalised trust by affecting (1) 
feelings of safety, (2) the expectation of others’ trustworthiness, (3) the individual’s 
own trustworthiness (via the ‘false consensus effect’; Orbell and Dawes, 1991), and 
(4) the individual’s lifestyle, via the degree of equality in the distribution of 
resources and access to opportunities (see Section 3.2.4 for a discussion of how 
these effects may occur). In measurable terms, these equate to an impact of such 
attributes as the efficaciousness of and degree of corruption within state institutions 
(such as the legal system and the government), the types of political system (e.g. 
democracy versus authoritarian) and welfare state (e.g. means tested versus 
universalistic), and the level of national wealth (although this may be relevant 
primarily due to its positive association with government effectiveness and lower 
levels of corruption).  
 
Empirical studies report that a higher level of generalised trust is positively 
associated with a lower level of corruption (e.g. Wang & Gordon, 2011; You, 2012 – 
although see Freitag & Bühlmann [2005] and Uslaner [2002, 2004] for non-
significant findings), a higher level of government effectiveness (e.g. Herreros, 2012; 
Rothstein & Stolle, 2008), more cross-cuttingness across dimensions of diversity 
(Finseraas & Jakobsson, 2012)29, efforts by the state to integrate migrants (Zimdars 
                                                          
29
 Cross-cuttingness relates to individuals’ membership in multiple social groups: While a group of 
individuals may form an in-group on one dimension (for example, ethnicity), they may in fact be 
members of different groups on another dimension (for example, religion). This may positively reduce 




& Tampubolon, 2012), low levels of inequality (e.g. Herreros, 2012; Olivera, 2013; 
Park & Subramanian, 2012), higher national wealth (e.g. Gundelach, 2014; Park & 
Subramanian, 2013; Reeskens, 2009 – although see Berggren & Jordahl [2006], 
Herreros [2012] and Kong [2013] for non-significant associations), a Protestant 
tradition (Park & Subramanian, 2013; Reeskens, 2009; Robbins, 2011b – see 
Bjørnskov [2007, 2008] for a non-significant finding regarding Protestantism) and 
non-hierarchical religion (Berggren & Jordahl, 2006). Amongst these associations we 
see support for Rothstein and Stolle’s (2008) theory, with a range of societal 
characteristics showing significant relationships with generalised trust.  
 
 
4.1.2.2 Human values and the characteristics of society  
 
Given that my models will include both values and society-level characteristics, it is 
important to consider the potential interactions between these and the impact this 
may have on the results. I discuss this here in relation to values measured on 
aggregate and compared at the national level. Inglehart and Baker (2000: 23) report 
clustering relating to the society’s religious tradition and history of communism, 
with cross-national variation in attitudes towards authority (the prevalence of 
traditional versus secular orientations) and in the prevalence of ‘survival’ versus 
‘self-expression’ values.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the degree of ‘in-group solidarity’ and facilitate the nurturing of a broader moral community 
(Finseraas & Jakobsson, 2012).  
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Inglehart and Baker chart countries’ positioning on these two values dimensions 
using a set of quadrants30, revealing that the spread of countries mirrors the global 
distribution of wealth, with the poorest countries in the Traditional/ Survival 
quadrant and the wealthiest in the Secular/ Self-expression quadrant. A country’s 
wealth has implications for the prevalence of materialist versus post-materialist 
values, with those in wealthier countries more likely to endorse post-materialist 
concern for quality of life over concern for economic sufficiency (Inglehart & Baker, 
2000). This means that respondents in countries with higher GDP may give lower 
priority to Schwartz’s Conservation values (Conformity, Tradition and Security) than 
those in countries with lower GDP.  
 
In addition to modelling values at the individual-level, Schwartz’s (2006) model also 
describes values at the aggregate level. These cultural values form three dimensions: 
Autonomy–Embeddedness, Hierarchy–Egalitarianism and Harmony–Mastery. The 
first examines whether the society is more concerned with independence and self-
fulfilment (Autonomy) or the maintenance of social norms and tradition 
(Embeddedness), the second whether it endorses social equality (Egalitarianism) or 
inequality (Hierarchy), and finally whether it seeks to exist harmoniously within ‘the 
social and natural world’ (Harmony) or if it seeks to control them (Mastery – 
Schwartz 2006; Vauclair & Fischer, 2011: 647). While measurement is taken at the 
individual-level, these cultural values are analysed as mean scores at the level of 
society.  
                                                          
30
 I use the term ‘quadrant’ loosely: The deployment of two bipolar scales means that the chart area 
could be presented as a 2 x 2 quadrant, however, the pattern of placements within that area is 
approximate.  





In predicting leniency towards ‘dishonest-illegal issues’, Vauclair and Fischer (2011) 
report interaction effects between the society’s placement on the Hierarchy–
Egalitarianism scale and individuals’ average religiosity and income. Amongst 
cultures oriented towards Egalitarianism, tolerance of dishonesty shows a negative 
relationship with income; as income increases, tolerance of dishonesty decreases. 
The opposite trend is observed in cultures that are oriented towards Hierarchy. A 
similar interaction effect is observed between Egalitarianism and income: in 
Egalitarian cultures individuals’ tolerance of dishonesty decreases as mean income 
increases; however, in cultures oriented towards Hierarchy, there is no measurable 
effect of mean income on leniency towards dishonesty.  
 
It appears clear that the dominant values within a society can influence the values of 
those living within it. In the next section I draw together the elements discussed 
above to consider the possible impact of society’s characteristics on the expression 
of generalised trust.  
 
 
4.1.2.3 Characteristics of society, values and generalised trust 
 
As outlined in Section 4.3 and as discussed in Chapter 3, societal characteristics that 
indicate the quality of society are associated with the average level of self-reported 
generalised trust.  Recall also the theory discussed above, based on Graham et al.’s 
(2011) Moral Foundations Theory, regarding the relevance to trust of the 
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prioritisation of concern for the individual versus concern for the social group. This 
lends intuitive appeal to the idea that values promoted at the institutional level may 
have a normative influence on individuals’ value priorities and directly or indirectly 
influence the prevalence of generalised trust within the population.  
 
“... value-attitude relations linking motivational orientations 
(values) to social evaluations (attitudes) will vary 
systematically to the extent that... the environment 
reinforces or impedes the expression of motivations”  
(D. Boer & Fischer, 2013: 6)  
 
As discussed by Inglehart and Baker (2000), a country’s economic standing and 
degree of industrialisation have an impact on levels of education and income, in 
addition to permitting evolution of the population’s values. Provided the society’s 
institutions support a reduction in survival concerns, an increase in wealth and 
industrialisation are likely to reduce the need for security and a move towards post-
materialism should eventually promote the prioritisation of egalitarian values. Given 
the earlier discussion of the drivers of generalised trust it would be reasonable to 
expect that, in most cases, societies should see an increase in trust as their affluence 
and degree of egalitarianism increases.  
 
Schwartz (2007) included the cultural values Egalitarianism and Embeddedness in his 
regression model and notes that these two variables account for 43% of the variance 
in trust between countries. However, it seems reasonable to flag the possibility that 
their inclusion may have had an impact on the reliability of the model since they do 




have theoretical associations with the individual-level values. In addition, despite 
having only twenty countries in the model, Schwartz employed six country-level 
variables. This exceeds the majority of the recommendations regarding the number 
of Level 2 cases required per Level 2 variable and may have made these results 
somewhat unreliable (Snijders & Bosker, 2012).  
 
Reeskens’ (2009) final model is a multilevel model that includes two variables 
measured at the level of society – GDP and the presence/ absence of Protestant 
tradition. He reports that, in random intercepts analysis, these two variables are 
highly predictive of levels of generalised trust. In random slopes analysis, Reeskens 
finds that the slopes of the five values (Security, Universalism, Benevolence, 
Conformity and Tradition) do vary cross-nationally. This indicates that the 
relationship between each value and generalised trust is not consistent across 
countries, but rather varies with GDP and religious tradition.  
 
In the next section I outline my hypotheses. In Section 4.1.3 I then describe the 
developments that the current study offers in comparison to the analyses presented 
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4.1.2.4 Summary and hypotheses: the characteristics of society 
 
I described my hypotheses for the individual-level (Level 1) predictors of generalised 
trust in Section 4.1.1.4. Here I present my hypotheses relating to the variables that 
operate at the level of society (Level 2).  
 
 
Societal-level drivers of generalised trust  
 
Values and levels of generalised trust vary cross-nationally, and the pattern of 
variance in both appears to be associated with national-level characteristics such as 
the society’s wealth and the nature of its political system. With this in mind, I 
anticipate that a higher level of generalised trust will be observed in societies that 
have higher GDP per capita, lower income inequality, lower corruption and a higher 
level of government effectiveness.  
 
Hypothesis 3 GDP will be positively associated with generalised trust. 
Hypothesis 4 Income inequality will be negatively associated with trust. 
Hypothesis 5 Corruption will be negatively associated with trust. 
Hypothesis 6 Government effectiveness will be positively associated with trust. 
 





The quality of society and the relationships between values and trust 
 
Having tested the relationship between values and trust, and between 
characteristics of society and trust, I then use random slopes models to test whether 
the relationships between values and trust are consistent under different societal 
conditions. While Reeskens (2009) observed significant differences in these 
relationships cross-nationally, given my adjustments to the use of the variables and 
specification of the models, it is not clear whether my results will parallel these.  
 
Research question 2 Are the relationships between the human values constructs and 
generalised trust stable cross-nationally?  
 
 
4.1.3 Developments to existing research 
 
Reeskens (2009) noted that there has been scant attention paid in the empirical 
literature to testing Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the moral foundations of generalised 
trust. It appears from my review of the literature that this is still the case (see 
Chapter 3). I therefore conduct another test of the theory which, while asking similar 
research questions to those tackled by Reeskens, makes adjustments to the data 
handling and analyses that should improve the reliability and interpretability of the 
results.  
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In his use of the human values constructs, it is unclear whether Reeskens (2009) 
adjusted the scores to take account of respondents’ use of the scale (centring the 
scores around the respondent’s mean score as described on the website of the 
Norwegian Social Sciences Data Service; NSD, 2013). Also, Reeskens uses the five 
individual values in his models while the literature suggests that in order to obtain 
cross-national equivalence it would be more appropriate to combine certain values 
so that they approximately resemble Schwartz’s four higher order values (Davidov, 
2008, 2010).31  
 
In addition, Reeskens’ (2009) models include a wide range of individual-level 
variables. While this to some extent demonstrates the robustness of the values 
constructs as predictors of social trust, the presence of these variables is likely to 
influence the observed associations between values and trust. For example, the 
inclination to participate in voluntary organisations may be driven by the individual’s 
values – in which case its inclusion in the model would unnecessarily detract from 
the magnitude of the relevant values’ relationship with social trust. And, finally, 
Reeskens’ analyses seek to illuminate the relationship between values and social 
trust, measured as the mean score on the three-item social trust scale, rather than 
strictly generalised trust (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of this distinction).  
 
Although perhaps subtle, these adjustments are necessary to ensure an adequate 
test of Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the moral foundations of generalised trust.  
                                                          
31
 Equivalence would indicate that each construct holds the same meaning cross-nationally. This is 
important when seeking to interpret the results and understand the possible origins of generalised 
trust.  






4.2 Data and Methods 
 
To address the research questions outlined above I use data from Round 3 of the 
European Social Survey (ESS). Twenty-five countries participated in Round 3 of the 
ESS: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and 
United Kingdom.32 The Round 3 questionnaire was fielded in 2006. Responses to this 
Round of the survey should be relatively uncorrupted by the instability and 
uncertainty wrought by the financial crisis that began around this time.  
 
I use multilevel modelling to test the hypotheses and research question outlined 
above. A multilevel model is a regression analysis that accounts for the effects of 
variables at more than one level of measurement. In the present case, I examine the 
predictive capacity of variables measured at the levels of the individual (Level 1) and 
society (Level 2). At the individual-level I include the Schwartz HVS items in addition 
to standard demographic controls. At the society-level, I include measures of key 
characteristics of society: GDP per capita, income inequality, corruption and 
government effectiveness.  
  
                                                          
32
 I exclude the data from Latvia and Romania from this study due to their having no design weights.  
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
190 
 
In the sections below I describe the outcome variable, and the individual- and 
society-level predictor variables.  
 
 
4.2.1 Dependent and predictor variables 
 
4.2.1.1 Dependent variable: generalised trust 
 
As discussed earlier, my dependent variable is the generalised trust question (GTQ). 
Similarly to that used in the General Social Survey (amongst others), the GTQ in the 
ESS reads: “In general, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. Responses to this item are measured 
on an eleven-point scale, which runs from 0 to 10 where a higher score indicates a 
higher level of trust: 0 represents “you can’t be too careful”, and 10 represents 
“most people can be trusted”.  
 
 
4.2.1.2 Individual-level predictor variables: Schwartz’s human values  
 
The human values I use in this study, and the items used to measure them, are 
described in Table 4.1 below. This is a subset of the full 21-item scale, using only the 
eleven items that measure Universalism, Benevolence, Security, Conformity and 
Tradition. Each item is measured on a six-point Likert scale: (1) very much like me, 
(2) like me, (3) somewhat like me, (4) a little like me, (5) not like me, and (6) not like 




me at all. Before using the HVS items it is necessary to perform certain 
manipulations (as mentioned above, and as recommended by Schwartz [online] and 
instructed by NSD [2013]), in order to take account of its quasi-circular structure 
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1) and the fact that since these are value priorities, the 
score for each value is relative to that of each of the others. I outline these 
manipulations in Section 4.2.2.1 below.  
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Table 4.1: Schwartz’s HVS constructs and measures  
Construct Item wording 
Universalism 
Understanding, appreciation, 
tolerance and protection for 
the welfare of all people and 
for nature. 
(1) He thinks it is important that every person in the 
world should be treated equally. He believes 
everyone should have equal opportunities in life.  
(2) It is important to him to listen to people who are 
different from him. Even when he disagrees with 
them, he still wants to understand them.  
(3) He strongly believes that people should care for 
nature. Looking after the environment is important 
to him.  
 
Benevolence 
Preservation and enhancement 
of the welfare of people with 
whom one is in frequent 
personal contact.  
 
(4) It is very important to him to help the people around 
him. He wants to care for their well-being.  
(5) It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He 
wants to devote himself to people close to him.  
(Need for) Security 
Safety, harmony and stability 
of society, of relationships, and 
of self. 
(6) It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. 
He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.  
(7) It is important to him that the government ensures 
his safety against all threats. He wants the state to 
be strong so it can defend its citizens. 
 
Conformity 
Restraint of actions, 
inclinations, and impulses likely 
to upset or harm others and 
violate social expectations or 
norms.  
(8) He believes that people should do what they are 
told. He thinks people should follow rules at all 
times, even when no one is watching.  
(9) It is important to him always to behave properly. He 




Respect, commitment and 
acceptance of the customs and 
ideas that one’s culture or 
religion impose on the 
individual. 
  
(10) It is important to him to be humble and modest. He 
tries not to draw attention to himself.  
(11) Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the 
custom handed down by his religion or his family.  








4.2.1.3 Society-level predictor variables 
 
As noted earlier, existing research has demonstrated associations between 
generalised trust and a range of society-level characteristics such as GDP, ethnic 
diversity, corruption, state efficacy and income inequality. These national-level 
statistics serve to set the individual-level data in context.  
 
Table 4.2: Country-level contextual variables (Level 2) 
Construct Variable Source 
National wealth GDP per capita World Bank national accounts data and OECD 
National Accounts data files; NESSTAR 
Corruption CPI score NESSTAR; Transparency International 





World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
 
Table 4.2 identifies the Level 2 variables that were considered for inclusion in this 
study and the data sources used. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country is 
the “market value of all officially recognized final goods and services produced” over 
a defined time period. GDP per capita is the value of GDP divided by the number of 
people in the population of that country. This figure is the one I use as an indicator 
of standard of living within that country. GDP per capita is calculated by dividing the 
country’s GDP by the midyear population (The World Bank Group, 2014). It is an 
open numeric variable and the figures given by the World Bank are measured in US 
dollars. In my analyses I rescale this variable to be scored in thousands.  
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The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) uses ‘expert assessment and opinion surveys’ 
to award individual countries a score to reflect their degree of corruption. This score 
may range from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates a high level of corruption and 100 that 
the country has very little corruption.  
 
The Gini coefficient measures the degree of equality of income distribution within a 
country. This is usually scored from 0 to 1, where a score of 0 would indicate 
perfectly equal distribution and the nearer a country scores to 1 the greater the 
degree of inequality.  
 
The measure of government effectiveness is a set of perceptions-based measures 
that draw together “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies”. These perceptions are surveyed from companies and 
households in addition to relevant organisations and public-sector groups (Kaufman 
et al., 2010: 4). Government effectiveness is scored from -2.5 to 2.5, where a higher 
positive score indicates a higher level of effectiveness.  
 
  




4.2.2 Methods and analyses 
 
4.2.2.1 Preparing the human values variables 
 
Before the Schwartz HVS items can be used, the raw scores need to be centred to 
account for each respondent’s use of the scale. Instructions for how to do this can 
be found on the European Social Survey’s data website (NSD, 2013; see also 
Schwartz, online). Each respondent’s prioritisation score on each value construct is 
generated by subtracting their own mean score (across all ten HVS values) from their 
raw score on that value. This sets zero as the score for ‘average priority’ and means 
that if a participant scored 3 on Security, but their overall mean score was 3.5, then 
this person’s value priority for Security would be -.5. Since their ‘mean prioritisation’ 
is zero, a score of -.5 tells us that this person affords Security (as measured by the 
HVS) slightly below-average priority. In referring to a ‘value priority’, I therefore 
refer to the priority indicated by these figures (the priority of each value relative to 
the other values in Schwartz’s model), rather than a priority ranking made by the 
respondent themselves.  
 
The reason for centring these data is to ensure that the respondent’s score on a 
particular value reflects its place in their value priorities. For example, if two 
respondents score an average of 3 on Universalism (“somewhat like me”), for one 
person this may be the lowest score they obtain across the ten human values, while 
for the other person it could be the highest. Therefore, by looking at just the one 
score in isolation it is not possible to determine how important the value is to the 
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respondent. Centring the respondent’s ten values scores around their mean score 
therefore takes their use of the response scale into account.  
 
My aim here is to test the relative importance of certain HVS constructs to 
generalised trust. For example, to test whether someone who gives Universalism or 
Benevolence the highest priority reports a higher level of generalised trust than 
someone who prioritises, for example, Security. As noted above, centring the HVS 
values constructs in the recommended manner sets them in a hierarchy that’s 
personalised to each respondent. This allows me to meaningfully interpret the 
results irrespective of individuals’ use of the response scale.  
 
 
4.2.2.2 Individual-level ‘control’ variables  
 
With factors such as age, gender and level of education having shown significant 
associations with generalised trust, there is an argument for excluding them from 
my  analyses: since they are also likely to be associated with the individual’s values 
(but not necessarily likely to influence the relationship between values and trust), 
their presence in the model may simply absorb some of the association and mask 
the relationship between the values items and generalised trust. However, since it is 
conventional to include these variables as standard, I present both models that 
include them and models that omit them.  
 




One variable that could in theory influence the association between values and trust 
is financial insecurity (a self-report measure of the degree of comfort living on one’s 
current household income): somebody may hold egalitarian values and not be overly 
concerned about Security, but a lack of financial resources may lead them to be 
cautious about who they trust due to the difficulty of recouping any losses they 
might incur in the event of betrayal. Given that financial insecurity is also 
independently associated with generalised trust, it is possible that the presence of 





My primary analyses are multilevel models, where Level 1 is the individual and Level 
2 is the society or country they live in. I begin with random intercept models which 
test the associations between the outcome variable and the variables at Level 1 and 
Level 2. However, these models are unable to evaluate the impact of Level 2 
variance on the Level 1 predictor variables, assuming instead that this is the same 
across groups (countries). I examine the random intercept models first, to test for 
any associations between human values and trust (testing hypotheses 1 and 2, and 
research question 1) and between the characteristics of society and trust 
(hypotheses 3 – 6). I then run random slopes models to evaluate the extent to which 
the relationships between Level 1 predictor variables (the HVS values constructs) 
and the outcome variable (generalised trust) are stable despite variation in the Level 
2 characteristics (testing research question 2).  




When developing the models it is important to be mindful of the potential for 
multicollinearity amongst the predictor variables. This may be a particular problem 
at Level 2 (the level of society): since wealthy countries tend to be less corrupt and 
to have more effective governments, it is possible that to include more than one of 
these variables in a single model would equate to including the same predictor 
variable twice. This would interfere with the estimation of the strength of the 
relationships between predictor and outcome variables, resulting in unreliable 




4.2.3.1 Generating the multilevel models 
 
This multilevel analysis splits the variance in generalised trust into variance at the 
individual level (Level 1) and at the country/ society level (Level 2). While both 
random intercept and random slopes models examine the proportion of variance 
explained at each level, in random intercept models these effects are held constant 
across all countries. In random slopes models, the relationships between the 
predictor variables (Level 1) and the outcome measure can be permitted to vary 
across groups (Level 2; in this instance, cross-nationally).  
 
I use the bottom-up method of model building, which means that I begin with a 
small set of predictor variables and add more in stages. This allows me to monitor 




any changes that occur as new variables are added to the model and reduces the 
risk of ignoring a variable that appears to have a non-significant association with 
trust due to the presence of a moderating variable.  
 
I begin with the ‘null’ model (Model 0), which predicts the generalised trust score 
using only the constant and the residual (‘error’) terms:  
 
                              
Equation 4.1a: Model 0 
 
   tells me the average level of generalised trust across all subjects, while     
indicates the amount of unexplained variance in generalised trust at the country-
level (Level 2) and      the amount of unexplained variance at the individual-level 
(Level 1).   
 
 
Random intercepts models 
 
The next set of models are random intercepts models, which investigate whether 
there is a significant association between human values and generalised trust. These 
models hold the relationship between values and trust constant and, when the 
country-level variables are added (Level 2), simply report the relationship between 
each predictor variable (at Level 1 and Level 2) and generalised trust.  
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Equation 4.1b: Model 1 
 
The first experimental model (Model 1) looks only at the key individual-level (Level 
1) variables. The subscript “i” indicates variance at the individual level, while the 
subscript “j” indicates the society level: the subscript “ij” refers to “person i in 
society j”.  This model includes only the values constructs that are theorised to be 
relevant to generalised trust: (Need for) Security, Universalism, Benevolence, 
Conformity and Tradition. However, for methodological reasons these constructs 
have undergone some respecification: Davidov’s (2010) analysis of the factor 
structure of the HVS variables from Round 3 of the European Social Survey indicates 
that rather than including all five values as independent variables in the model, it 
would be more appropriate to group Universalism and Benevolence (thus forming 
their higher-order value, Self-transcendence; see Figure 3.1), and to group 
Conformity and Tradition. This results in three (rather than five) values constructs 
being added to Model 1, with Security, Self-transcendence and Conformity/ 
Tradition the only predictors.33 
 
Model 2 adds the demographic variables age, gender and education, while Model 3 
adds financial insecurity.  
 
                                                          
33
 The “-gm” alongside each predictor in Model 1 means “minus grand mean” and indicates that 
these scores have been centred using the mean score across all respondents in that society/ country.  




                                                  
                                          
                                                        
                                  
                                       
                                     
                               
Equation 4.1c: Model 4 
 
Models 4 (Equation 4.1c above) and 5 test the impact of the two society-level 
variables on trust: Model 4 tests the effect of income inequality, and Model 5 tests 
the effect of corruption. Model 6 includes both of these Level 2 variables.34  
 
 
Plotting each human values construct against predicted trust scores 
 
To offer an initial evaluation of the relevance of random slopes models, I plot for 
each country the relationship between each values construct and the predicted 
mean generalised trust score. This allows me to compare the slopes cross-nationally 
and to evaluate the need for further analysis: if there is no apparent difference in 
the slopes, then there would be little purpose in performing the random slopes 
analysis. The predicted trust scores are generated on the basis of the constant plus 
the centred value as shown below in Equations 4.2a – c.  
 
                                                          
34
 Due to extremely strong correlations between three of the four Level 2 variables, I include only two 
of these society-level variables in the analyses (see Section 4.3.2).  
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Equation 4.2a: Trust and Self-transcendence 
 
                                     
Equation 4.2b: Trust and (Need for) Security 
 
                                         




Random slopes models 
 
Assuming that the proportion of variance at Level 2 indicates a possible need for 
random slopes analysis, I then use random slopes models to examine the cross-
national stability of the relationships between generalised trust and human values. 
Here, the slope (in the graphed relationship between each HVS construct and 
generalised trust) is allowed to vary; finding statistically significant variation in these 
slopes would indicate that the relationship between the predictor variable (the HVS 
construct) and outcome variable (trust) is not consistent cross-nationally.  
 
As my key predictor variables, I allow only the HVS constructs to show variation in 
their regression slopes. In addition to giving a beta coefficient for each predictor 
variable, random slopes analysis generates two matrices of coefficients which report 
the variance in the slopes of these relationships as well as the covariance between 
their intercept and slope. This covariance indicates the pattern of slopes across the 
whole sample; for example, a positive covariance would indicate that the countries 




with the largest intercepts also have the steepest slopes, while a negative 
covariance would indicate that the countries with the smallest intercepts have the 
steepest slopes. A covariance close to zero would indicate no particular pattern.  
 
The random slopes models would mirror the random intercept models described 
above, for example:  
 
                                                           
                      
Equation 4.3a: Model 1 RS 
 
Here, the “ij” subscript to the β-coefficients indicates that they are subject to 
random variance at both the individual-level (Level 1) and society-level (Level 2). A 
significant degree of society-level variance, for any one human values construct, 
would indicate that the relationship between this construct and generalised trust 
differs cross-nationally.  
 
 
4.3 Results and Discussion 
 
Here I discuss the findings from my analyses. I first look at the characteristics of the 
sample, and then the distribution of scores on the dependent variable and the 
various individual-level predictor variables. In doing so, I look for trends that indicate 
the nature of the relationship between generalised trust and each predictor 
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variable. I then examine the correlation between each predictor variable and 
generalised trust, before presenting the results of the multilevel analysis.  
 
 
4.3.1 Descriptive analyses 
 
4.3.1.1 The sample 
 
It is important to consider whether the sample used in this study is representative of 
the general population, because a non-representative sample may give context to 
the results. Here I first describe the range of countries, before examining the 
composition of each country’s sample in comparison to the figures held by Eurostat.  
 
Country My analyses use data from twenty countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, the Ukraine and 
the United Kingdom. As noted earlier, five countries were excluded from this study 
due to a lack of design weights (Latvia and Romania) and due to a contrary factor 
structure in Davidov’s (2010) investigation of Schwartz’s Human Values Scale 
(Cyprus, Estonia and Slovakia).  
 
Age In order to compare the age distributions, some adjustment to the ESS data was 
necessary. Eurostat provides age distributions for each country (ages 15 – 24, 25 – 
49, 50 – 64 and 65 years and above) as a proportion of the total population, while 




the ESS samples only those aged 15 and above (so the distributions taken from 
within the ESS sample will necessarily be as a proportion of the population aged 15 
years and above, rather than of the entire population of that country).  
 
The ESS sample for each country was drawn from the same population as the 
Eurostat data, so I have assumed that the proportion of the population aged 0 – 14 
would be the same. I therefore scaled-down the proportion of respondents to the 
ESS within each age category in order to account for the missing 0 – 14 year olds and 
permit comparisons with the proportions reported in the Eurostat dataset.  
 
As shown in Appendix 4A.1, the age distribution within the ESS sample is 
comparable to that reported by Eurostat; it is broadly representative of the general 
population in each country and in most cases each age category is only up to a few 
percentage points different. Exceptions to this are a slight overrepresentation (in the 
ESS sample) of working age adults in France (6% higher than Eurostat) and of young 
people in Austria (8% higher, with a corresponding underrepresentation of older 
adults).  
 
Gender It was not possible to obtain Eurostat figures for the gender ratio in each 
country. However, as can be seen in Appendix 4A.1, in each case 40-50% of the 
sample are male.  
 
Education The education data supplied by Eurostat describe the proportion of 25 – 
64 year olds who are educated to ISCED 3 and above. Extracting the corresponding 
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data from the ESS indicates that while in most countries (Austria, Bulgaria, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Sweden 
and Slovenia) the ESS sample appears approximately representative of the general 
population, in four countries (Belgium, Germany, France and Norway) the ESS over-
represents people with this level of education, and in two (the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands) this educational group are under-represented.35 
 
Financial insecurity In each country, 5.7 – 78.5% of the sample reported finding it 




Figure 4.1: Proportion of respondents who report finding it ‘difficult’ or ‘very 
difficult’ to cope on their current household income 
 
 
                                                          
35
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It is worth noting that with the ends of the scale largely polarised into Western 
Europe (lefthand side) and Eastern Europe (righthand side), it may be difficult to 




4.3.1.2 Dependent variable 
 
As noted above, respondents rated their level of trust on an eleven-point scale 
where 0 indicated “You cannot be too careful” and 10 indicated “Most people can 
be trusted”. Aggregate levels of trust range from 7.05 (SD = 2.07; Denmark) to 3.39 
(SD = 2.77; Bulgaria) and the mean level of generalised trust across all countries is 
5.02. The five highest aggregate GTQ scores belong to countries in Northern Europe, 
while of the five lowest scores one belongs to Portugal and the remainder to 
countries in Eastern Europe. As would be expected across this range of countries, 
there is cross-national variation in levels of generalised trust (see Appendix 4A.2).  
 
The four graphs in Figure 4.2 display the mean trust scores cross-nationally, with 
countries listed in order of decreasing GDP, increasing income inequality, increasing 
corruption and decreasing government effectiveness. I have omitted the country 
names because the important thing for us to note from these graphs is the slope: 
the relationship between the Level 2 variable and generalised trust. In each case, I 
would expect the level of trust to follow a downward trajectory to mirror the 
theorised deterioration in the quality of societal conditions. While the slopes are by 
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no means perfectly smooth, a downward slope is demonstrated for three of the four 






Figure 4.2a – d (clockwise from top left): The pattern of generalised trust by GDP, 
income inequality, corruption and government effectiveness 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Human values 
 
Prioritisation of the Schwartz human values constructs does vary cross-nationally. It 
is clear from Figure 4.3 that Self-transcendence and Security are generally awarded 
above-average priority and almost always prioritised above Conformity/ Tradition. In 
general, Security and Conformity/ Tradition are afforded higher importance in 
countries that have lower GDP, while Self-transcendence undergoes a drop in 
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As noted earlier, respondents’ scores on each value construct were generated by 
subtracting their own mean score (across Schwartz’s ten HVS values) from their raw 
score on each value. This means that if someone scored 3 on Security, but their 
overall mean score was 3.5, then this person’s value priority for Security would be -
.5. With ‘average priority’ now being set at zero, a score of -.5 tells us that this 
person affords Security slightly below-average priority.  
 
Figure 4.3 shows the mean value priority afforded each HVS construct (those 
included in this study: Self-transcendence, Security and Conformity/ Tradition) by 
the respondents in each country. For example, Norway’s score of zero for 
Conformity/ Tradition tells us that, on average, respondents in Norway afford 
Conformity/ Tradition average priority (in relation to the full set of values measured 
in Schwartz’s HVS). Moving higher up the chart, Norway scores .20 for Security and 
approximately .70 for Self-transcendence. These figures tell us that, on average, 
respondents in Norway give these latter two values higher priority than Conformity/ 
Tradition and prioritise Self-transcendence above both Security and Conformity/ 
Tradition.  
  





Figure 4.3: A score of 0 would indicate average priority; scores shown indicate the 
degree to which, across the sample, each value is given above- or below-average 
priority (countries in order of decreasing GDP) 
 
 
In general we see in Figure 4.3 that while in wealthier countries Self-transcendence 
is afforded the highest priority, there comes a point at which the subjective 
importance of Self-transcendence drops and the importance of Security rises – in 




4.3.1.4 Human values and generalised trust 
 
We have seen that both trust and values vary cross-nationally in the raw data. In 













































































































































Prioritisation of human values cross-nationally 
Self-transcendence Security Conformity/ Tradition 




and 2: that the prioritisation of Self-transcendence values is to some extent 
associated with a higher level of generalised trust (hypothesis 1), and prioritisation 
of Security is (to some extent) associated with a lower level of trust (hypothesis 2). 
Research question 1 asks whether prioritising Conformity and Tradition values is 
associated with a lower level of generalised trust; the raw data do show an overall 
downward trajectory, however this may be rather weak. These observations reflect 
the correlation coefficients obtained for these pairings: across the sample, Self-
transcendence correlates with generalised trust at r = .12, Security at r = -.20 and 




Figure 4.4a: Average generalised trust score cross-nationally (countries in order of 

























































































































Generalised trust by (increasing)  
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Figure 4.4b: Average generalised trust score cross-nationally (countries in order of 





Figure 4.4c: Average generalised trust score cross-nationally (countries in order of 
increasing mean prioritisation of Conformity/ Tradition) 
 
 
The descriptive data suggest a degree of support for my hypotheses. Before 
























































































































Generalised trust by (increasing)  























































































































Generalised trust by (increasing)  
Conformity/ Tradition 




indications of multicollinearity between the potential predictor variables: a strong 
correlation (r ≥ .8 or .9) between two or more predictor variables would destabilise 
the model and may generate unreliable coefficients (Field, 2000).  
 
 
4.3.2 Correlations  
 
A two-tailed Pearson correlation (pairwise exclusion) reveals moderate correlations 
amongst the human values constructs at Level 1 (the individual-level).36,37 At Level 2 
(the society-level), three of the country-level variables are very highly correlated: 
GDP per capita, Corruption and Government Effectiveness. In each case, the 
correlation is between .88 and .97 (p < .01), indicating a strong likelihood of 
multicollinearity in the event that more than one of these variables were included in 
the model. Their extremely high correlations also indicate that there is little point 
testing the influence of more than one of these on generalised trust or on the 
relationship between values and trust, because they should all have a similar effect. 
With correlations of .97 (Government Effectiveness) and .90 (GDP per capita), 
Corruption demonstrates the strongest associations with the other two variables; I 
therefore retain this measure in my models. The Gini coefficient for income 
inequality achieves more modest correlations with the other Level 2 variables, 
                                                          
36
 The correlation  between Conformity/ Tradition and Openness does support the expectation noted 
in footnote 1: At r = -.65, it indicates a strong negative association, reflecting these constructs’ 
opposing placements in Schwartz’s quasi-circular structure. While this correlation is not high enough 
to indicate multicollinearity, including both constructs in the model would be likely to render one of 
them insignificant. 
37
 As discussed in Section 2.4.2, the socio-demographic variables do show significant correlations with 
the human values items – in fact, the values items correlate more strongly with these ‘control’ 
variables than they do with generalised trust (see Appendix 4B).  
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ranging from r = -.27 (p < .001, with GDP per capita) to r = -.35  (p < .001, with 
Government Effectiveness). My two Level 2 variables are therefore Corruption and 
Income Inequality.  
 
Below, I outline my findings from the multilevel models and examine the degree of 
support evidenced for the hypotheses outlined in Sections 4.1.1.4 and 4.1.2.4.  
 
 
4.3.3 The null model and calculating the intraclass correlation coefficient  
 
 
                                 
 
  
                 
 
  
                






       
 
 
Equation 4.3: Calculating  , the intraclass correlation coefficient 
 
 
Calculation of Equation 4.3, using the coefficients obtained in Equation 4.2, results in 
an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of    .165. This indicates that the majority 
of the variance in generalised trust scores is within countries (i.e. at Level 1, 
between individuals) and around 16.5% of the variance in trust is attributable to the 




society in which the individual lives (Level 2). While this may not be wholly accurate 
(Nezlek, 2008), it does support the likelihood of between-country variation in levels 
of self-reported generalised trust and warrants investigation via multi-level 
modelling (NSD, 2013c).  
 
 
4.3.4 Random intercepts models 
 
In this section I present the coefficients from my random intercept models (Table 
4.3) and respond to my hypotheses and research questions regarding the extent to 
which Schwartz’s human values and the characteristics of society predict generalised 
trust.  
 





Table 4.3: Results of random intercepts models (dependent variable: Generalised trust)  
 0 1 2 3 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
 Β (SE) B (SE) Β (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Values           
Self-transcendence  .36 (.05) .35 (.05) .37 (.05) .37 (.05) .36 (.05) .37 (.05) .36 (.05) .37 (.05) .36 (.05) 
(Need for) Security  -.34 (.03) -.29 (.03) -.27 (.03) -.27 (.03) -.34 (.03) -.27 (.03) -.34 (.03) -.27 (.03) -.34 (.03) 
Conformity/ Tradition  -.10 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.10 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.10 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.10 (.03) 
Demographics           
Age: 15-24   .09 (.10) .05 (.09) .05 (.09)  .05 (.09)  .05 (.09)  
Age: 25-49   -.09 (.07) -.06 (.07) -.05 (.07)  -.06 (.07)  -.06 (.07)  
Age: 50-64   -.13 (.05) -.11 (.05) -.11 (.05)  -.11 (.05)  -.11 (.05)  
Gender: female   -.07 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.05 (.03)  -.05 (.03)  -.05 (.03)  
Education: ISCED 0-1   -.67 (.10) -.49 (.09) -.49 (.09)  -.50 (.09)  -.50 (.09)  
Education: ISCED 2   -.71 (.07) -.59 (.06) -.59 (.06)  -.59 (.06)  -.59 (.06)  
Education: ISCED 3   -.50 (.07) -.42 (.06) -.42 (.06)  -.42 (.06)  -.43 (.06)  
Finance: Coping    -.40 (.04) -.40 (.04)  -.40 (.04)  -.40 (.04)  
Finance: Difficult    -.74 (.08) -.74 (.08)  -.73 (.08)  -.73 (.08)  
Finance: Very difficult    -1.06 (.11) -1.06 (.11)  -1.06 (.11)  -1.06 (.11)  
Contextual variables           
Gini coefficient     -.08 (.03) -.09 (.04)   -.04 (.02) -.04 (.02) 
Corruption (CPI)       .28 (.05) .34 (.06) .25 (.05) .31 (.05) 
           
Constant 5.08 (.23) 5.07 (.21) 5.58 (.23) 5.87 (.20) 8.40 (1.02) 7.91 (1.20) 3.94 (.36) 2.73 (.42) 5.44 (.68) 4.23 (.83) 
u0j 1.06 (.25) .86 (.21) .84 (.20) .63 (.16) .48 (.09) .67 (.12) .25 (.06) .29 (.07) .22 (.05) .26 (.05) 
e0j 5.33 (.29) 5.21 (.29) 5.13 (.30) 5.06 (.30) 5.06 (.30) 5.21 (.29) 5.06 (.30) 5.21 (.29) 5.06 (.30) 5.21 (.29) 
Data source: European Social Survey Round 3. Weighting: design weight (raw weight from ESS3); Values items centred around their mean.  
Reference categories: age – 64+; gender – male; education – ISCED 4+; financial comfort – living comfortably.  
Coefficients in bold are significant at p ≤ .05.
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Hypothesis 1: Self-transcendence (combined Universalism and Benevolence values) 
will be positively associated with generalised trust 
As can be seen in Model 1, Self-transcendence demonstrates a significant, positive 
association with generalised trust (B = .36, SE = .05; p < .001), with a unit increase in 
prioritisation of Self-transcendence associated with an increase of .36 in generalised 
trust score. This coefficient does not change when demographic variables are added 
to the model.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Security will be negatively associated with generalised trust  
Security demonstrates a significant, negative association with generalised trust (B = -
.34, SE = .03; p < .001): a unit increase in the extent to which the respondent 
prioritises Security results in a .34 decrease in generalised trust score. Although the 
coefficient decreases slightly when demographic variables are added to the model, 
the result does not change.  
 
Research question 1: Conformity/ Tradition will be negatively associated with 
generalised trust  
When demographic variables are excluded from the model, Conformity/ Tradition 
shows a significant negative association with generalised trust (B = -.10, SE = .03, p < 
.001): a unit increase in Conformity/ Tradition being associated with a decrease of 
.10 in generalised trust. This effect is lost when age, gender and education are added 
to the model (B = =.05, SE = .03; ns). With a significant negative correlation between 
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education and Conformity/ Tradition (r = -.21), the former may be concealing the 
effect.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Corruption will be negatively associated with generalised trust 
The nation’s score on the corruption perceptions index (CPI) is significantly 
predictive of generalised trust. Controlling for demographic variables, a unit increase 
on the CPI scale (indicating less corruption) is associated with a .28 (SE = .05, p < 
.001) increase in generalised trust. Excluding demographics from the model does not 
change this finding, neither does including both Level 2 variables in the same model 
(Model 6).  
 
Hypothesis 5: Income inequality will be negatively associated with generalised trust 
The Gini coefficient for income inequality does significantly predict individuals’ 
generalised trust (B = -.08, SE = .03; p < .01): a unit increase in income inequality 
being associated with a drop of .08 in generalised trust. This does not change when 
demographic variables are removed from the model, nor when both Level 2 
variables are included. However, accounting for both Level 2 variables and excluding 
the demographic variables does render this coefficient non-significant.  
 
Hypotheses 4 and 6: GDP and government effectiveness will be positively associated 
with generalised trust 
Due to extremely high correlations with the corruption variable, these items were 
excluded from the analysis. However, given their strong, positive association with 
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corruption it is possible to report that had I tested them these hypotheses would 
have been supported.  
 
 
Summary of findings from random intercept models  
 
Although MLwiN presents unstandardised coefficients, those for the values 
constructs may be directly compared because these items were scored on the same 
measurement scale. Need for Security and Self-transcendence are the strongest 
drivers of generalised trust, with a weaker (but still significant) association for 
Conformity/ Tradition. These results replicate those of Reeskens (2009).  
 
While each of the human values constructs demonstrates a statistically significant 
relationship with generalised trust, it is worth noting that the sample size for these 
analyses is 35,728 across 20 countries. The significance of these results may 
therefore be led by the sample size.  
 
 
4.3.5 Cross-national stability of the relationships between values and generalised 
trust  
 
As noted in Chapter 3, values are driven by a combination of internal and external 
influences. Similarly to one’s level of generalised trust, one’s values may be sensitive 
to the immediate social environment as well as the broader societal context. 
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However, it is not yet clear whether any such influence occurs in tandem – affecting 
both values and trust so that their relatedness to each other is maintained – or if 
these influences may alter the relationships between values and trust.  
 
Before running random slopes models to test the cross-national stability of these 
relationships, I used three models (in which generalised trust was defined only by 
the constant and each value construct) to generate predicted generalised trust 
scores for each score on the values constructs (see Equations 4.4a – c).   
 
Plotting trust against the relevant value provides us with an illustration of their 
predicted relationship for each country in the sample. The resulting graphs are 
shown in Figures 4.5a – 4.5c below. An initial glance at the graphs suggests that 
there are no strong patterns in the covariances, and that the relationships between 
Self-transcendence and trust, and Security and trust, are very similar across the 
different countries with only a few exceptions: In Figure 4.5a, Portugal shows a 
neutral relationship between prioritisation of Self-transcendence values and trust 
while in all other countries this association is positive. In Figure 4.5b, there are two 
cases that stand out as being slightly different to the others: Norway, for which 
there appears to be very little effect of Security on trust and Belgium, which shows a 
steeper downward slope (i.e. a stronger negative relationship between trust and 
Security) than the other countries.  
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In Figure 4.5c, there is some variation in the association between Conformity/ 
Tradition and trust – in some countries the relationship is negative, while in others it 
is neutral or even verging on being positive. 
 
The reason for the findings in Figure 4.5c is not immediately clear. For certain 
countries, such as Norway, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom the effect of 
Conformity/ Tradition on trust appears neutral (a virtually horizontal line). For 
others, such as Finland, Belgium, Ukraine, Portugal and Russia there is a positive 
effect. In the remaining countries, prioritisation of Conformity/ Tradition has a 
negative association with trust, which appears strongest in Poland. These 
differences may be due to the different meanings of conformity and tradition in 
each country: in Norway, for example, conformity would indicate adherence to a 
very different set of social norms than it would in Russia. It may also depend upon 
who prioritises these values in each country: if these values are prioritised mainly by 
groups who are more or less trusting anyway, then the association may be 
coincidental rather than causal. For example, if in a particular country Conformity/ 
Tradition is mainly prioritised by older adults, who may on average be less trusting 
than working age adults, then the observation that prioritising Conformity/ Tradition 
is associated with a lower level of trust may be coincidental.  
 
















Figure 4.5c: Predicted relationships between generalised trust and prioritisation of 
Conformity/ Tradition values 
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It appears as though the association between Security and trust, and between Self-
transcendence and trust, should be very similar cross-nationally – with the exception 
of the few countries mentioned. The relationship between Conformity/ Tradition 
and trust is less consistent and there may be significant differences between 
countries. As indicated in Equations 4.3a – c above, these charts have been 
generated using very simplistic models and it is possible that accounting for the 
effects of socio-demographic variables will influence the relationships between the 
values constructs and generalised trust.  In addition, the variation in slopes observed 
in Figures 4.5a – c is often rather small; it is possible these differences will not reach 
statistical significance. I therefore run a series of random slopes models that parallel 
the random intercepts models described in Table 4.4, to test whether the apparent 
cross-national similarities and differences outlined above remain.  
 
 
4.3.5.1 Random slopes models  
 
Research question 2: Are the relationships between human values and trust stable 
cross-nationally? 
Rows USELF-TRANSCENDENCEj, USECURITYj and UCONFORMITY/TRADITIONj in Table 4.4 below show 
the coefficients obtained when the effect of each HVS construct (i.e. the relationship 
between each values construct and generalised trust) is allowed to vary cross-
nationally. A significant coefficient would indicate that the relationship between the 
HVS construct (e.g. Self-transcendence) and generalised trust varies between 
countries. The results show that these relationships are largely stable, with none of 
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the values constructs reporting significant cross-national variation in their 
association with generalised trust. However, when accounting for demographic 
variables the coefficient for Conformity/ Tradition is borderline significant (B = .01, 
SE = .01; p = .058). This indicates that that the relationship between Conformity/ 
Tradition and trust does tend towards slight cross-national variation.  
 
As noted earlier (Section 4.3.5), cross-national variation in the relationship between 
trust and Conformity/ Tradition may occur due to the different interpretations of 
this human value in different countries: in more progressive societies this may be 
interpreted as conforming to light-touch expectations regarding social norms and 
being considerate to others’ beliefs, while in less progressive societies this may be 
interpreted as a government-enforced requirement to abide by strict codes of 
conduct.  
  
The findings from these analyses do not support those reported by Reeskens (2009), 
who found that the effects of the values constructs do vary cross-nationally. This 
non-concordance may be due to differences in our use of control variables, different 
treatment of the values items, or our choice of outcome measure (my use of the 
generalised trust question versus Reeskens’ use of the social trust scale).  
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Table 4.4: Results of random slopes models (dependent variable: Generalised trust score)  
 1 2 3 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 
 Β (SE) B (SE) Β (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Values          
Self-transcendence .36 (.04) .35 (.04) .36 (.05) .36 (.05) .36 (.04) .36 (.05) .36 (.04) .36 (.05) .36 (.04) 
(Need for) Security -.33 (.03) -.27 (.03) -.26 (.03) -.26 (.03) -.33 (.03) -.26 (.03) -.33 (.03) -.26 (.03) -.33 (.03) 
Conformity/ Tradition -.11 (.03) -.06 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.11 (.03) -.05 (.03) -.11 (.03) -.05 (.02) -.11 (.03) 
Demographics          
Age: 15-24  .06 (.10) .02 (.09) .02 (.09)  .02 (.09)  .02 (.09)  
Age: 25-49  -.11 (.07) -.07 (.07) -.07 (.07)  -.07 (.07)  -.07 (.07)  
Age: 50-64  -.13 (.04) -.12 (.05) -.12 (.05)  -.12 (.05)  -.12 (.05)  
Gender: female  -.06 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.04 (.03)  -.04 (.03)  -.04 (.03)  
Education: ISCED 0-1  -.70 (.09) -.53 (.09) -.53 (.09)  -.54 (.08)  -.54 (.08)  
Education: ISCED 2  -.72 (.07) -.60 (.06) -.60 (.06)  -.60 (.06)  -.60 (.06)  
Education: ISCED 3  -.51 (.07) -.44 (.06) -.44 (.06)  -.44 (.06)  -.44 (.06)  
Finance: Coping   -.39 (.04) -.39 (.04)  -.39 (.04)  -.39 (.04)  
Finance: Difficult   -.73 (.08) -.73 (.08)  -.72 (.08)  -.73 (.08)  
Finance: Very difficult   -1.05 (.11) -1.05 (.11)  -1.04 (.11)  -1.04 (.11)  
Contextual variables          
Gini coefficient    -.10 (.02) -.10 (.02)   -.06 (.01) -.05 (.01) 
Corruption (CPI)      .26 (.04) .30 (.04) .22 (.04) .26 (.04) 
          
Constant 5.08 (.21) 5.61 (.23) 5.88 (.19) 8.94 (.66) 8.08 (.73) 4.08 (.33) 3.03 (.32) 6.15 (.48) 4.77 (.53) 
u0j (intercept) .87 (.22) .85 (.20) .65 (.17) .49 (.10) .67 (.13) .26 (.06) .32 (.08) .23 (.06) .28 (.06) 
uSELF-TRANSCENDENCEj  .02 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.02) .03 (.02) .02 (.02) .03 (.02) .02 (.02) .03 (.02) .02 (.02) 
uSECURITYj .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) 
uCONFORMITY/TRADITIONj .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) 
e0j (intercept) 4.71 (.30) 4.63 (.30) 4.57 (.30) 4.57 (.29) 4.71 (.30) 4.57 (.29) 4.71 (.30) 4.57 (.29) 4.71 (.30) 
eSELF-TRANSCENDENCEj  .49 (.13) .46 (.13) .46 (.13) .46 (.13) .48 (.13) .45 (.13) .48 (.13) .46 (.13) .48 (.13) 
eSECURITYj .18 (.06) .18 (.06) .19 (.06) .19 (.06) .18 (.06) .19 (.06) .18 (.06) .19 (.06) .18 (.06) 
eCONFORMITY/TRADITIONj .37 (.06) .37 (.06) .35 (.06) .35 (.06) .37 (.06) .35 (.06) .37 (.06) .35 (.06) .37 (.06) 
Data source: European Social Survey Round 3, weighted by design weight (raw weight from ESS3). Values items centred around their mean. 
Reference categories: age – 64+; gender – male; education – ISCED 4+; financial comfort – living comfortably.  
Coefficients in bold are significant at p ≤ .05; underlined are borderline significant (.05 ≤ p ≤ .06).   







The initial research questions posed by this study asked (1) whether values predict 
trust, and (2) whether the relationships between values and generalised trust vary 
cross-nationally. The results of the random intercepts analysis show that value 
priorities, as measured by Schwartz’s HVS, are indeed predictive of generalised trust. 
More specifically, prioritisation of the egalitarian Self-transcendence values is 
associated with reporting a higher level of generalised trust, while prioritising 
Security (and perhaps Conformity/ Tradition) is associated with a lower level of 
trust. The egalitarian aspect may support Uslaner’s (2002) theory that generalised 
trust is moralistic in nature, while both this and the finding regarding the 
Conservation values do appear to support the theory discussed above based on 
Graham et al.’s (2011) Moral Foundations Theory – that those who prioritise 
concern for the individual are likely to hold a more inclusive moral community and 
therefore likely to be more trusting.  
 
The results of the random slopes analysis suggest that the relationships between 
values and generalised trust are generally consistent across the countries included in 
these analyses, although some variation may be present in the relation between 
Conformity/ Tradition and trust.  
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Following the theoretical connections between values and trust discussed in Section 
4.1.1.2, it is tempting to argue for an alteration to Uslaner’s theory: that is, that 
particularised trust is also moralistic, but that it relates to a moral concern for the 
protection of the community or society rather than of the individual. However, my 
results are not able to support this proposed alteration because I have no outcome 
measures that were designed to directly capture particularised trust.  
 
 
Limitations of the present study and ideas for future research 
 
The results obtained in this study are clearly different to those reported by Reeskens 
(2009). This may be due to my using the value priorities rather than the raw scores, 
my having used the combined values constructs indicated by Davidov (2010) or my 
simplification of the statistical models (Reeskens’ analyses included a broader array 
of control variables). It would be interesting to replicate Reeskens’ models using the 
derived value priorities, to test whether the treatment of these constructs is 
important (i.e. as single, raw values or the combined, ‘centred’ values identified by 
Davidov [2010]).  
 
The status of particularised trust as a moral value would be worth considering for 
future investigation, perhaps by taking more detailed measures of trust and 
ideological orientation. This would permit a closer examination of the associations 
between ideology, human values and trust. Replicating these analyses on a broader 
range of measures may also distinguish between those who believe most people are 
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As mentioned earlier, there is a relative dearth of research into the individual-level 
drivers of generalised trust – those that are generally inherent to the individual, 
rather than being illustrative of ‘the individual within a social context’ (as would be 
the case with, for example, social success and wellbeing theory). The findings from 
the present study suggest that moral values are empirically and theoretically 
associated with generalised trust. Although the present study does not permit us to 
draw conclusions about the nature of generalised trust, we can conclude that its 
associations with certain values do appear to be universal in the samples tested 
here. Given that these data are drawn from representative population samples from 
20 countries, these findings are generally encouraging.  
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Chapter 5 
Testing Personality Theory: identifying the individual-level drivers of  





As discussed in previous chapters, generalised trust is the ‘thin’ trust that exists 
between strangers (Putnam, 2000). In Chapter 3 I examined the current state of the 
theoretical and substantive literature on generalised trust and found that while 
there has been a great deal of interest in the topic, little consensus has been 
reached regarding the aetiology of generalised trust. Theories of its origins cite (a) 
influences at the level of the individual, (b) the dynamic between the individual and 
their social environment, and (c) characteristics of the community or society in 
which the person lives. As described in Chapter 3, Delhey and Newton (2003) 
conducted analyses that attempted to pit theories at each level against each other. 
In doing so, they implemented relatively sound tests of the social and societal 
theories (types (b) and (c) above), but they left the individual-level theories (type (a)) 
somewhat underexposed. This parallels the broader literature on generalised trust, 
which largely focuses on theories that operate at the social and community levels.   
 
The individual-level theories seek to account for one’s level of generalised trust by 
examining internal characteristics that are key to the person’s individuality: their 
values (Moral Foundations of Trust Theory; Uslaner, 2002) and their personality 
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traits (Personality Theory; Delhey & Newton, 2003). In Chapter 4 I sought to take a 
step towards remedying the inattention to Uslaner’s theory of the moral 
foundations of trust by testing the predictive strength of Schwartz’s (2001) human 
values model on a measure of self-reported generalised trust (the generalised trust 
question, or GTQ). I found that certain values do account for significant proportions 
of the variance in respondents’ generalised trust score, and that this relationship is 
generally stable irrespective of the characteristics of the society in which the 
individual lives.38  
 
This chapter, in turn, tests Personality Theory. As described in Chapter 3, Personality 
Theory identifies the individual’s disposition as central to determining their level of 
generalised trust. This idea is not new; trust is theorised to be a facet within the 
personality trait Agreeableness (McCrae and Costa, 1999), thus firmly locating it 
within the personality system.  However, little research has tested the associations 
between personality and generalised trust.  
 
Using data collected in an experimental context, I assess the extent to which 
personality traits and facets (as measured by McCrae and Costa’s [2005] NEO-PI-3 
questionnaire) predict the individual’s level of self-reported generalised trust. Given 
the tendency observed in the literature for behaviour in the trust game to be held as 
a behavioural measure of generalised trust (and the conflicting findings regarding 
whether self-reported trust predicts behavioural trust or trustworthiness), I also test 
the extent to which personality predicts behavioural trust and trustworthiness.  
                                                          
38
 Characteristics such as the country’s levels of income inequality and corruption. 
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The trust game is a two-player game in which Player 1 decides whether to invest a 
proportion of their monetary stake with Player 2; any amount invested is then 
multiplied by the experimenter and Player 2 decides how to split the money 
between themselves and Player 1. In the present study participants first complete a 
questionnaire and then return to the Lab a week later to play two rounds of the 
trust game.  
 
The inclusion of the trust game in this study enables me to compare the predictors 
of self-reported trust with those of behavioural trust and trustworthiness. I hope to 
elaborate on the existing work that describes the predictors of these outcomes and, 
in doing so, to take some steps towards identifying what the generalised trust 
question (GTQ) measures and whether the trust game is an appropriate behavioural 
equivalent.  
 
In Chapter 3 I discussed the measurement of personality and its associations with 
other constructs. I begin here by specifying my working definition of personality and 




Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
232 
 
5.1.1 Personality and its measurement 
 
 “... the dynamic organization within the individual of those 
psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic 
behavior and thought” 
(Allport, 1961: 28) 
 
“Important and relatively stable characteristics within a 
person that account for consistent patterns of behavior. 
Aspects of personality may be observable or unobservable, 
and conscious or unconscious”  
(Ewen, 2010: 4) 
 
Personality is the driving force behind the way we experience and respond to 
events. A defining characteristic is the consistency of these effects, which generally 
show a high degree of stability irrespective of context.  
 
In Chapter 3 I briefly described the range of conceptualisations of personality and 
focussed in more detail on the trait perspective, which offers a way to measure 
personality and is oriented towards the assessment of personality in non-clinical 
populations (Ewen, 2010). Measurement instruments such as McCrae and Costa’s 
(2005) NEO-PI-3 make the measurement of personality straightforward as the 
individual is able to recognise their own psychological and behavioural tendencies 
and self-report the extent to which each description in the inventory applies to 
themselves.39 
                                                          
39
 While there are a number of biases that may lead to inaccuracies in such measures, these apply to 
all self-report data so I do not discuss them here.  
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McCrae and Costa’s (1999) Big Five traits are Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, and each trait comprises six facets. For 
example, the trait Agreeableness comprises trust, straightforwardness, altruism, 
compliance, modesty and tender-mindedness (McCrae & Costa, 1999; see Table 5.1 
for a description of each trait and a list of its facets). While the full NEO personality 
inventory measures all thirty facets, brief scales have been devised (including some 
by other researchers, such as the Big Five Inventory; John, 2007-9) that measure a 
subset of items – generally those that load most strongly on each trait.  
 
Relating personality to a theory of the key drives of the human organism (DeYoung, 
Peterson, & Higgins, 2005), DeYoung, Peterson, and Higgins (2002) report that these 
five traits can be scaled down to two higher-order personality dimensions: 
Neuroticism, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness loading together on Stability, 
and Extraversion and Openness loading on Plasticity:  
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“Stability and Plasticity can be considered the manifestation 
in personality of two overarching concerns of any organism: 
(1) the need to maintain a stable physical/behavioral 
organization to achieve various goals and (2) the need to 
incorporate novel information into that organization, as the 
state of the organism changes both internally 
(developmentally) and externally (environmentally). As 
personality traits, Stability and Plasticity reflect individual 
differences in the emphasis on, competence in, and capacity 
for meeting each of these two general needs in the ways 
characteristic of human beings.” 
(DeYoung et al., 2005: 828) 
 
DeYoung et al.’s (2002) model offers an early insight into a feature of the five factor 
model that is not necessarily widely known, but will become clear by the end of this 
chapter: there are inter-trait associations at both the trait and facet level. With 
insights from social neuroscience, some of the shared variance is theorised to stem 
from the bio-chemical influences on personality such as the shared use of particular 
brain regions (e.g. DeYoung et al., 2002; DeYoung et al., 2005; Graziano & Tobin, 
2013; Haas, Omura, Constable & Canli, 2007; Haas, Ishak, Denison, Anderson, & 
Filkowski, 2015).  
 
Beyond its intuitive appeal, there do not appear to be any existing theories to 
account for why generalised trust should be rooted in personality. However, it is 
important to consider the possible theoretical relevance of personality to trust in 
order to ensure critical interpretation of the findings from this study and to avoid 
over-interpreting perhaps spurious statistical associations. 
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Table 5.1: Description of each trait in McCrae and Costa’s (1999) Big Five 
Trait Description Facets 
Neuroticism The general tendency to experience negative affects such as fear, sadness, 
embarrassment, anger, guilt, and disgust... men and women high in N are also prone to 
have irrational ideas, to be less able to control their impulses, and to cope more poorly 
with stress than others.  
Anxiety, angry hostility, depression, 
self-consciousness, impulsiveness, 
vulnerability 
Extraversion In addition to liking people and preferring large groups and gatherings, extraverts are 
also assertive, active, and talkative. They like excitement and stimulation and tend to 
be cheerful in disposition. They are upbeat, energetic, and optimistic. 
Warmth, gregariousness, 
assertiveness, activity, excitement 
seeking, positive emotions 
Openness to Experience  Open individuals are curious about both inner and outer worlds, and their lives are 
experientially richer than those of closed individuals. They are willing to entertain novel 
ideas and unconventional values, and they experience both positive and negative 
emotions more keenly than do closed individuals. 
Fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, 
ideas, values 
Agreeableness The agreeable person is fundamentally altruistic. He or she is sympathetic to others 
and eager to help them, and believes that others will be equally helpful in return. By 
contrast, low scorers on A, disagreeable or antagonistic people, are egocentric, 
sceptical of others’ intentions, and competitive rather than cooperative. 
Trust, straightforwardness, altruism, 
compliance, modesty, tender 
mindedness  
Conscientiousness The conscientious individual is purposeful, strong-willed, and determined... high C 
scorers are scrupulous, punctual, and reliable. Low scorers are not necessarily lacking 
in moral principles, but they are less exacting in applying them, just as they are more 
lackadaisical in working toward their goals. 
Competence, order, dutifulness, 
achievement striving, self-discipline, 
deliberation  
Descriptive text quoted from McCrae & Costa, 2010: 19-21; facets taken from McCrae & Costa, 1999 
Reproduced by special permission of the Publisher, Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc., 16204 North Florida Avenue, Lutz, Florida 33549, from the 
NEO Inventories Professional Manual by Paul T. Costa Jr., PhD and Robert R. McCrae, PhD, Copyright 2010 by Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc. 
(PAR). Further reproduction is prohibited without permission of PAR. 





In the next section I briefly discuss the appropriateness of using the trust game as a 
behavioural measure of generalised trust. I then give an overview of Costa and 
McCrae’s (1999) model of the interplay between personality traits and other internal 
characteristics of the individual. This model describes both the factors that they 
suspect drive personality and those that personality influences (see Figure 5.1). I 
then look in more detail at the possible underpinnings of personality before 
proposing a theoretical orientation for the relationship between two key personality 
traits and generalised trust.  
 
 
5.1.2 Personality – its drivers and influence 
 
Costa and McCrae (1999) discuss their theory regarding the interplay between 
personality and other key aspects of the individual. As shown in Figure 5.1, the five 
personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness) are labelled ‘basic tendencies’ and these underpin the 
individual’s values and the construction of the self. Personality traits are found to be 
heritable (see McCrae, Jang, Livesley, Riemann, & Angleitner, 2001) and generally 
stable across the lifecourse (John & Srivastava, 1999; although age-related changes 
in personality have been noted [e.g. McCrae, Martin, & Costa, 2005]), making a 
strong case for their identification as a foundation for the rest of the system (second 
only to the individual’s biological endowment).  
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Figure 5.1: Costa and McCrae’s (1999: 163) five-factor personality system (circle 
directing attention to the basic tendencies added by me). Figure taken from J. S 
Wiggins (Ed), The five-factor model of personality. Copyright © 1996 Guilford 
Publications Inc. Reprinted with permission of Guilford Press.  
 
 
In Costa and McCrae’s (1999) model, the individual’s personality traits (‘basic 
tendencies’) and their values and attitudes (‘characteristic adaptations’) are 
depicted as the core of the personality system, while their biological makeup, as well 
as emotional and social factors are shown as associated influences. Personality traits 
are fed directly only by one’s biological characteristics, and indirectly by ‘external 
influences’ such as life events. Events may alter the individual’s biochemical balance 
(for example, a traumatic injury or illness may result in changes to one’s neurological 
functioning or a change in medication, diet or activity levels may alter their hormone 
levels) and this in turn may produce changes in their personality. Self-reported 
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personality has also been found to vary with age, with particularly marked changes 
between the ages of 20 – 30 years (e.g. McCrae, Martin, et al., 2005).  
 
While this study cannot even begin to unpick the ‘biopsychosocial’ factors that may 
drive one’s personality or one’s propensity for generalised trust, given the lack of a 
sound theoretical basis for Personality Theory it would be worthwhile to give some 
consideration to the mechanisms that may be in operation. First, however, I look at 
some findings from social neuroscience: does the brain offer any evidence for the 
existence of personality?  
 
 
5.1.2.1 Neurological correlates with personality: the evidence 
 
The theoretical associations outlined in Costa and McCrae’s (1999) model have been 
investigated in neurological studies: studies using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) have identified correlates between personality and structural 
differences in the brain, as well as neural activity both at rest and during processing 









 “Extraversion covaried with volume of... a brain region 
involved in processing reward information. Neuroticism 
covaried with volume of brain regions associated with threat, 
punishment, and negative affect. Agreeableness covaried 
with volume in regions that process information about the 
intentions and mental states of other individuals. 
Conscientiousness covaried with volume in lateral prefrontal 
cortex, a region involved in planning and the voluntary 
control of behavior.”  
(DeYoung et al., 2010: 820) 
 
DeYoung and colleagues (2010) report correlations between personality traits and 
brain mass in regions that have theoretical and functional associations with those 
traits (see also Gardini, Cloninger, & Venneri, 2009; Adelstein et al., 2011; Forbes et 
al., 2014). What is of course not clear is which came first: one may demonstrate 
particular personality attributes due to having more substantial brain mass in the 
relevant regions or, alternatively, brain mass in these regions may be more 
substantial due to the higher intensity workout they receive from an owner who has 
a particular personality configuration. In addition, it is not clear what proportion of 
the variance in personality is accounted for by neural structure. Irrespective of this, 
the findings from social neuroscience are encouraging in their support for the trait 
model of personality; a correspondence with objective measures lends credence to 
the notion that the constructs measured by the NEO personality inventory represent 
something tangible.  
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Evidence of the association between neurological activity and personality traits has 
been reported in a range of studies that have examined neurological activity at rest 
(e.g. Hahn, Gottschling, & Spinath, 2012; Kunisato et al., 2011; Aghajani et al., 2014) 
and during cognitive tasks designed to evoke particular responses (e.g. Hahn et al., 
2009; Canli et al., 2001).  
 
There appear to be some grounds on which to have confidence that the NEO 
personality inventory is measuring meaningful interpersonal differences. In the 
section below, I discuss some of the work that has postulated how personality 
develops. My discussion here is restricted to literature that uses the trait model of 
personality and specifically those traits modelled by McCrae and Costa (1999).  
 
 
5.1.2.2 In theory: the drivers of personality  
 
There are a number of theories that one could draw upon when contemplating the 
possible bases of personality, for example the mammalian emotion systems (Davis & 
Panksepp, 2011) and the postulated evolutionarily endowed motive systems (see  
Graziano & Tobin, 2013, for a review). While an analysis of the merits of these is 
beyond this chapter, the fields of personality psychology and social neuroscience 
offer a ready source of both theory and empirical findings that may give insight into 
the possible underpinnings not only of personality but also of the rationale for 
expecting personality to relate to one’s proclivity for trust (and perhaps 
trustworthiness).  





In this section, I give a brief overview of a possible mechanism via which personality 
may drive one’s level of generalised trust. I begin with a description of approach and 
avoidance temperaments and their theorised relevance to the personality traits 
Neuroticism and Extraversion. I then examine the empirical evidence for these 
associations before discussing the possible implications for one’s propensity for 
generalised trust. Clearly this does not encompass the full set of personality traits; 
the breadth of this discussion is necessary limited by time constraints and the 
available literature.  
 
 
5.1.2.3 Approach and avoidance temperaments 
 
The Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) of personality identifies three systems of 
personality: the Behavioural Approach System (BAS), Behavioural Inhibition System 
(BIS; also known as Avoidance) and the Fight-Flight-Freeze-System (FFFS; Corr, 
2008). Here I focus on the first two of these, as the much researched ‘Approach’ and 
‘Avoidance’ temperaments, and their posited relationship to two of the Big Five 
personality traits.  
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“Functionally, approach and avoidance temperaments are 
construed as energizers and instigators of valence-based 
propensities; they are responsible for immediate affective, 
cognitive, and behavioral reactions to encountered or 
imagined stimuli.”  
(Elliott & Thrash, 2008: 320) 
 
Researchers have postulated that an ‘approach versus avoidance’ dichotomy 
underlies the individual’s scoring on Extraversion and Neuroticism (see Corr, 2004). 
It is suggested that one’s tendency towards approach versus avoidance is driven by 
the sensitivity of their neurological reward-processing system to reward versus 
punishment: a heightened (relatively speaking) sensitivity to reward encourages the 
bearer to approach stimuli that are expected to deliver positive outcomes, while a 
heightened sensitivity to punishment makes one more aware of potential negative 
outcomes and promotes the development of a cognitive and behavioural style that 
is oriented towards their avoidance.  
 
Pickering and Corr (2008) offer an explanation of the place of personality traits in 
this process:  
 
  




“RST is built upon a state description of neural systems and 
associated relatively short-term, emotions and behaviours, 
which, according to the theory, give rise to longer-term trait 
dispositions of emotion and behaviour. This theory argues 
that statistically defined personality factors are sources of 
variation that are stable over time and that derive from 
underlying properties of an individual; it is these, and current 
changes in the environment, that comprise the 
neuropsychological foundations of personality.” 
(Pickering & Corr, 2008: 239) 
 
Within this framework, personality traits are described as the measurable (or 
superficial) face of a complex set of interactions between neurological, biochemical, 
psychological and environmental factors.   
 
The approach-avoidance model of behaviour notes that those who tend towards 
approach behaviours are more responsive to reward, while those who tend towards 
avoidance are less sensitive to rewards but more sensitive to punishment (Corr, 
2008; Smillie, 2008; Simon et al., 2010). As explained by Corr (2004) these 
behavioural tendencies operate in parallel and combine to produce the resulting 
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5.1.2.4 The RPS, and Neuroticism and Extraversion 
 
Figure 5.2 below shows Smillie’s (2008) model of the mechanisms via which reward 
and punishment sensitivity relate to Extraversion and Neuroticism (for alternative 
models see Corr, 2004; Carver, 2004; Depue & Collins, 1999. See Matthews, 2008, 
for a critique of RST).  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Smillie’s (2008: 361) model of the process by which reinforcement 
sensitivity may influence personality traits. What is reinforcement sensitivity? 
Neuroscience paradigms for approach-avoidance process theories of personality/ 
Luke D Smillie/ European Journal of Personality Vol. 22. Copyright © 2008 John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  
 
 
Empirical findings from a range of studies support the theorised association 
between reward sensitivity and positive affect, and punishment sensitivity and 
negative affect in both neurological (e.g. Cohen, Young, Baek, Kessler, & Ranganath, 
2005) and survey-based (e.g. Hundt et al., 2013; Segarra et al., 2007; Carver & 
White, 1994) studies.  





Having established that personality may be driven by and influence the individual’s 
biological, social, psychological and neurological assets, I turn now to examine some 
of the possible relationships between personality and trust.  
 
 
5.1.3 Personality and trust-related outcomes 
 
5.1.3.1 Personality and generalised trust: theoretical associations 
 
In this section I draw on the above discussion to posit a theoretical standpoint 
regarding the purported relationship between personality and generalised trust. I 
then discuss the empirical findings presented in the existing literature.  
 
The Approach/ Avoidance model may be a useful parallel to high versus low 
generalised trust: the person who is inclined to be trusting reaches out to the 
potential trustee with the hope (or perhaps expectation) of a positive outcome, 
while the person who is more inclined to be cautious holds back in order to avoid a 
negative outcome. Although betrayal is not ‘punishment’ per se, the aversive 
experience of betrayal is likely to be functionally equivalent to the aversive 
experience of overt punishment.  
 
While the literature connecting personality to generalised trust is too sparse to 
permit extensive hypotheses, examination of the personality traits and facets within 
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McCrae and Costa’s (1999) Big Five may indicate some likely candidates. This task is 
not entirely straightforward. Each trait is composed of six facets that seek to cover 
the full breadth of the personality trait, for example Extraversion holds both warmth 
and assertiveness – which in more extreme cases can lead to very different styles of 
interpersonal interaction. Whether each trait will demonstrate an association with 
trust will therefore depend upon the facets that have combined, for each person, to 
generate that high score. With this in mind, it is questionable whether we can 
reasonably expect entire traits to correspond with a measure such as generalised 
trust. However, given that there is a trend underlying each trait (e.g. perhaps 
‘confidence’ for Extraversion, and ‘niceness’ for Agreeableness), it is worth 
investigating, and the results of prior studies are encouraging (see Section 5.1.3.2.1).  
 
Table 5.2 gives a description, quoted from McCrae and Costa (2010), of each of the 
thirty personality facets in their NEO personality inventory. Below, I briefly discuss 
the extent to which each trait (and, where appropriate, facet) could logically be 
expected to correlate with self-reported generalised trust. I then consider the 
empirical findings to date.   
  




Table 5.2: Facets within the NEO personality inventory (McCrae & Costa, 2010: 21-24) 








Anxiety ... apprehensive, fearful, prone to worry, nervous, tense and 
jittery  
Angry hostility ... the tendency to experience anger and related states such as 
frustration and bitterness 
Depression Prone to feelings of guilt, sadness, hopelessness, and loneliness... 
Self-consciousness ... uncomfortable around others, sensitive to ridicule, and prone 
to feelings of inferiority 
Impulsiveness ... inability to control cravings and urges. Desires... are perceived 
as being so strong that the individual cannot resist them, 
although he or she may later regret the behavior 
Vulnerability ... feel unable to cope with stress, becoming dependent, 









Warmth ... affectionate and friendly... genuinely like people and easily 
form close attachments to others 
Gregariousness ... the preference for other people’s company. Gregarious people 
enjoy the company of others 
Assertiveness ... dominant, forceful, and socially ascendant... speak without 
hesitation and become group leaders 
Activity ... rapid tempo and vigorous movement, a sense of energy, and a 
need to keep busy 
Excitement seeking ... crave excitement and stimulation... like bright colours and 
noisy environments... akin to some aspects of sensation-seeking 
Positive emotions ... tendency to experience positive emotions such as joy, 







Fantasy ... a vivid imagination and an active fantasy life... believe that 
imagination contributes to a rich and creative life 
Aesthetics ... a deep appreciation for art and beauty... moved by poetry, 
absorbed in music, intrigued by art... 
Feelings ... receptivity to one’s own inner feelings and emotions... 
experience deeper and more differentiated emotional states and 
feel both happiness and unhappiness more keenly than others do 
Actions ... the willingness to try different activities, go new place, or eat 
unusual foods... prefer novelty and variety to familiarity and 
routine 
Ideas ... active pursuit of intellectual interests for their own sake... 
open-mindedness and a willingness to consider new, perhaps 
unconventional ideas 
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Trust ... disposed to believe that others are honest and well-
intentioned 
Straightforwardness ... frank, sincere, and ingenuous 
Altruism ... an active concern for others’ welfare... and a willingness to 
assist others in need of help 
Compliance ... tends to defer to others, to inhibit aggression, and to forgive 
and forget 
Modesty ... humble and self-effacing, though they are not necessarily 
lacking in self-confidence or self-esteem 
Tender mindedness ... sympathy and concern for others... moved by others’ needs 













Competence ... the sense that one is capable, sensible, prudent, and 
effective... feel well-prepared to deal with life 
Order ... neat, tidy, and well-organized... keep things in their proper 
places 
Dutifulness ... adhere strictly to their ethical principles and scrupulously fulfil 
their moral obligations as they understand them 
Achievement striving ... high aspiration levels and work hard to achieve their goals... 
diligent and purposeful and have a sense of direction in life 
Self-discipline  ... ability to begin tasks and carry them through to completion, 
despite boredom or other distractions... can motivate themselves 
to get the job done 
Deliberation  ... tendency to think carefully before acting... cautious and 
deliberate 
Reproduced by special permission of the Publisher, Psychological Assessment Resources, 
Inc., 16204 North Florida Avenue, Lutz, Florida 33549, from the NEO Inventories 
Professional Manual by Paul T. Costa Jr., PhD and Robert R. McCrae, PhD, Copyright 2010 by 
Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc. (PAR). Further reproduction is prohibited without 




As described in Table 5.1, this trait taps the extent to which a person is prone to 
irrationality and to negative states such as fear, anger and disgust. Its facets are 
anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness and 
vulnerability. Aside from impulsivity, these terms are so widely used that they 
require no explanation. Impulsivity in the NEO inventory refers not to a delight in 
spontaneity, but rather to decisions borne of emotional instability and perhaps 
internal conflict. Given the pervasiveness of negative affect within this trait and the 




immediacy and dominance of high Neuroticism in influencing decisions (e.g. 
Graziano & Tobin, 2013), it seems reasonable to expect those with higher levels of 
Neuroticism to not be inclined to place their trust in strangers. In terms of the facets 
within Neuroticism, it would not be surprising if most or all of them were negatively 
associated with generalised trust.  
 
Extraversion  
Those who score highly on Extraversion tend to enjoy spending time with other 
people and to be talkative and optimistic. With facets warmth, gregariousness, 
assertiveness, activity, excitement-seeking and positive emotions, extraverts are 
likely to feel at ease socially – although their degree of regard for other people could 
be either high (e.g. warmth) or low (e.g. assertiveness; as described in Table 5.2). 
Given what would appear to be a focus on the positive, it seems fair to expect those 
who score highly on this trait to be willing to trust others despite the chance of 
achieving a less than optimal outcome. In particular, the facets warmth (indicating a 
general positive regard for others) and positive emotions (with its face associations 
with trait optimism as described in Chapter 3; Sharpe, Martin & Roth, 2011) may 
well be positively associated with generalised trust.  
 
Openness  
A person who scores highly on Openness is likely to be receptive to new experiences 
and ideas. The names of its facets – fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas and 
values –  indicate the dimension on which their bearer is open. For example, a high 
score on values is indicative of somebody who is open to questioning cultural and 
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religious values, while one who scores highly on feelings will tend to value their 
feelings and to experience both positive and negative feelings more strongly than 
average. It is not immediately clear that this trait should be associated with trust. 
However, its action facet, which taps openness to new experiences, may predispose 
its bearer to take risks: it may be that this facet is positively associated with trust 
even if the trait as a whole is not.  
 
Agreeableness  
A high score on this trait is likely to indicate a ‘people-person’. With the facets trust, 
straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty and tender-mindedness, 
somebody with high Agreeableness is likely to care about others, be altruistic and 
believe in the goodness of human nature. Ignoring the trust facet, which should 
correlate strongly with the self-reported measure of generalised trust, it seems likely 
that any association between self-reported trust and the other five facets would be 
likely to stem from either moralistic trust (Uslaner, 2002; trusting because it is a nice 
thing to do and the highly agreeable person would not want to upset anybody) or 
compliance. In addition, with the high level of prosociality associated with 
Agreeableness, it is possible that one who scores highly on this trait would evaluate 
the trustworthiness of others (and therefore their own willingness to trust) based on 
their own degree of trustworthiness (and hence be trusting; e.g. Sapienza et al., 
2013). It seems likely that this trait will show a positive association with self-
reported trust.  
 
  





A high score on Conscientiousness typically indicates somebody with a strong sense 
of purpose and a drive to achieve their goals. The facets within Conscientiousness 
are competence, order, dutifulness, achievement-striving, self-discipline and 
deliberation. It is possible that a high score on Conscientiousness would make an 
individual disinclined to trust strangers, due to their preference for planning and 
control: circumstances requiring trust do by their nature have an uncertain outcome 
and to trust requires handing over control to somebody else. This may be 
particularly difficult for those who score highly on order or deliberation.  
 
 
5.1.3.2 Personality drivers of trust and trustworthiness in the literature 
 
In this section I examine the findings of previous studies that have tested the extent 




5.1.3.2.1 Empirical evidence: personality and self-reported trust  
 
A few studies have examined the relationship between personality traits and self-
reported generalised trust, all three of them using the German Socio-economic 
Panel (GSOEP) survey. The GSOEP measures personality using the fifteen-item Big 
Five Index (BFI-S; response scale from 1 = “does not apply to me at all” to 7 = 
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“applies to me perfectly”), and measures trust using the mean score on the 
following three items: “In general, one can trust other people”, “These days you 
cannot rely on anybody else”, and “When dealing with strangers it is better to be 
careful before you trust them” (response options: totally agree, agree slightly, 
disagree slightly, totally disagree). One study ran only correlations, while the other 
two subjected the data to regression analysis.  
 
Becker et al. (2012) report significant correlations between trust and Neuroticism (r 
= -.19), Openness (r = .13), Agreeableness (r = .09), Conscientiousness (r = -.07) and 
Extraversion (r = .06, all p < .01). These results indicate a positive effect of Openness, 
Agreeableness and Extraversion on trust, and a negative effect of Neuroticism and 
Conscientiousness.  
 
Dohmen et al. (2008) ran ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to 
determine the effects of personality traits on trust. In a model that accounted for 
age, gender and height, Dohmen and colleagues report significant associations for 
four of the five traits: Neuroticism (β = -.148), Openness (β =.109), 
Conscientiousness (β = -.083) and Agreeableness (β =.079; all p < .01). Similarly to 
the findings of Becker et al. (2012), they find a positive effect of Openness and 
Agreeableness, and a negative effect of Neuroticism and Conscientiousness.  
 




And finally, Albanese et al. (2013) reported a significant positive association40 for 
Openness (.020, p < .05), and a significant negative association for Neuroticism 
(-.116, p < .01) and Conscientiousness (-.100, p < .01). They report non-significant 
effects for Agreeableness (.015, ns) and Extraversion (.008, ns). However, the 
models used by Albanese and colleagues included measures of risk aversion, positive 
and negative reciprocity and altruism, all of which have theoretical associations with 
the Big Five traits and therefore may have masked the actual relationships between 
the traits and the outcome measure.  
 
A concern regarding the associations reported by each of these studies is that in 
some cases the coefficients seem remarkably low. I therefore suspect that in some 
cases the statistical significance of these associations may be driven by the sample 
size in the GSOEP (over 14,000 cases) rather than by the magnitude of the 
relationship between the predictor and outcome variables.  
 
Clearly, there is some evidence for Personality Theory, albeit not incredibly robust 
given the measures used and the lack of reported effect sizes. Of the three studies 
that tested the associations between generalised trust and personality traits, all 
agree that Neuroticism has a negative effect on trust, while two agree that 




                                                          
40
 Unfortunately it is not clear whether Albanese et al. (2013) present standardised or unstandardised 
coefficients.  
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5.1.3.2.2 Personality and behavioural trust 
 
In correlation analysis of experimental data, Becker et al. (2012) reported significant 
associations for Agreeableness (.17), Conscientiousness (-.13) and Openness (.12; all 
p < .01), with non-significant associations for Extraversion and Neuroticism. In their 
experimental dataset, traits were measured using either the NEO-FFI (N = 319) or 
the BFI-S (N = 170).  
 
Müller & Schwieren (2012) implemented a version of the trust game in which both 
players were given ten ‘experimental currency units’ (ECU, worth approximately 
€3.33) at the start. The Sender could choose to transfer any portion of this ECU10 to 
the Returner. Any units transferred were tripled, and the Returner could then 
transfer any amount from their new total endowment back to the Sender. 
Participants completed a questionnaire that included the 240-item NEO-PI-R 
questionnaire (McCrae & Costa, 2010).  
 
The authors report that trusting behaviour as the Sender is associated with a lower 
level of Neuroticism (-.339, p < .01) and a higher level of Agreeableness (.284, p < 
.05), and shows a trend towards a significant relationship with Conscientiousness 
such that trusting is associated with a lower score on this trait (-.258, p < .1; given 
the magnitude of this correlation, it is possible that the non-significant value is due 
to the low number of cases in the analysis [N = 58])41. These findings were 
                                                          
41
 Müller and Schwieren (2012) identify Conscientiousness as being significantly correlated with the 
Sender’s decision, however, this is significant at the level of p < .1; in this study I use the threshold p < 
.05.  




maintained in regression analysis, with coefficients indicating that Neuroticism 
(-.400, p< .01) is the most important to driving trust, followed by Conscientiousness 
(-.353, p < .01) and finally Agreeableness (.246, p < .05; the model also included age 
and gender, which were both non-significant).  
 
Investigating the association between Sender behaviour and the facets within the 
three significantly predictive traits, Müller and Schwieren (2012) report that several 
facets demonstrate significant correlations: anxiety, angry hostility and depression 
within Neuroticism (all negatively associated with the amount sent), trust and 
straightforwardness within Agreeableness (both positively associated), and order 
and deliberation within Conscientiousness – with a trend towards significance for 
achievement striving (all negatively associated). However, in regression analysis that 
also accounts for age and gender, none of these significantly predict behaviour (in a 
model that excludes demographic variables, anxiety, trust and order remain 
significant).  
 
For both self-reported and behavioural trust, the inconsistency of the results 
reported by these studies is not especially encouraging, However, several points 
should be borne in mind: (1) the GSOEP measures personality traits using only 
fifteen items – this equates to three items per trait; (2) the differing use of the trust 
items means the findings cannot really be compared between studies; (3) the 
inclusion (in regression models) of predictors that are heavily associated with traits 
is likely to undermine the strength of the association between traits and the 
outcome measure; (4) the experimental design used by Müller and Schwieren 
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(2012), in which participants were able to send and return any amount, may not 
have adequately distinguished between those who are trusting/ untrusting, and 
trustworthy/ untrustworthy; and, (5) Müller and Schwieren report having only 58 
cases in their regression analyses, which is likely to have been too few for the 
number of variables in their models (Soper, 2014).  
 
From the results of these studies there may be some overlap in the personality-
based drivers of self-reported and behavioural trust: in both cases, negative 
associations are reported for Neuroticism and Conscientiousness, and a positive 
association for Agreeableness.  
 
The literature that uses the trust game reveals, as discussed in Chapter 3, a range of 
experimental designs. The design of the study may have an impact on the likelihood 
of the players being trusting and trustworthy. For example, whether the Sender may 
invest part of their stake or only ‘all or nothing’ and what options the Returner has 
regarding how to split their spoils. In this study I use a simplified design developed 
by Ermisch & Gambetta (2006) that removes some of these confounding factors.  
 
 
5.1.3.2.3 Personality and behavioural trustworthiness 
 
The relationship between personality and trustworthiness appears to have scarcely 
been investigated. Here I describe the studies that were forthcoming in the 
literature.  





In the same experiment with student participants as that reported above for 
behavioural trust, Becker and colleagues (2012) took participants’ behaviour as the 
Returner in the trust game as a measure of positive reciprocity. They find this 
behaviour to be positively correlated with Openness (r = .17, p < .001) and 
Agreeableness (r = .20, p < .001). While the analysis does not control for the amount 
transferred by the Sender, this is not a problem because Becker and colleagues 
elicited from each Returner the amount they would transfer back to the Sender 
given all possible amounts they could receive.  
 
As described above, Müller and Schwieren (2012) used the NEO-PI-R to examine the 
relationships between personality traits and behaviour as the Returner in the trust 
game. The authors report that the only significant correlation is with the amount 
sent by the Sender in the first place. Looking only at a subsample (those Returners 
who were sent at least ECU5) revealed a significant positive correlation between the 
amount returned and the Conscientiousness facet competence. However, this was 
not supported in regression analysis, leading the authors to conclude that 
trustworthiness is not associated with personality.  
 
This non-correspondence between the personality-based predictors of 
trustworthiness and self-reported trust is not particularly encouraging. However, 
these results may have been heavily influenced by the design of Müller and 
Schwieren’s (2012) version of the trust game. With Senders able to invest any 
proportion of their initial stake, the amount transferred back by the Returner is 
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likely to have been dependent on the amount invested in the first place – so, 
effectively, the Returners were not all responding to the same scenario. In addition, 
with a one-shot game design, only half of their participants provided data for each 
behavioural measure: a sample of approximately sixty participants may offer too 
little power to find any effects.  
 
 
5.1.3.2.4 Summary: trust-related outcome measures and personality  
 
It appears that no study to date has used the full personality inventory to predict 
self-reported trust; this means that previous studies only offer data for the higher-
order traits rather than the facets that comprise them. Without the facet-level data, 
we are missing out on the nuances of what drives the traits’ associations. It is also 
difficult to unpick the results of studies that have modelled factors that are highly 
likely to themselves be driven by personality (such as risk aversion) alongside 
personality variables as predictors of trust in regression models. This is likely to 
corrupt the observed relationships between the personality variables and the 
outcome measure.  
 
In addition, the sparsely populated literature base comprises a range of trust game 
designs. Factors such as whether just the Sender or both participants begin the 
game with a monetary stake, and whether the players may transfer any proportion 
of their endowment or are restricted to a set amount, are likely to have an impact 
on the motives that drive the Sender to invest and the Returner to reciprocate.  





There do however appear to be some associations between personality and trust-
related outcome measures. This study seeks to investigate these associations in 
closer detail by examining the extent to which personality traits and facets predict 
self-reported trust, behavioural trust and trustworthiness.  
 
 
5.1.4 Hypotheses and research questions  
 
There are conflicting reports regarding the associations between self-reported trust 
and the two behavioural measures, and there is little theory to guide hypotheses 
regarding which personality traits and facets are likely to be associated with them. 
With this in mind, while I do make some predictions where the literature appears 
compelling enough to support them, this study is largely exploratory and as such will 
predominantly respond to a series of research questions.  
 
 
5.1.4.1 Personality and self-reported trust  
 
Research question 1: Which personality traits are associated with generalised trust? 
Hypothesis 1: Theoretical accounts posit the relevance of prosocial values to 
generalised trust (e.g. Uslaner, 2002). With higher levels of prosociality, 
Agreeableness should be positively associated with trust.  
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Hypothesis 2: Those who score highly on Extraversion should be more inclined to 
focus on the potential reward from encountering a trustworthy trustee, thus making 
them more inclined to risk betrayal.  
Hypothesis 3: With Neuroticism predisposing its bearer to experience negative 
emotion and to anticipate negative outcomes, those who score highly on this trait 
should be disinclined to risk encountering an untrustworthy trustee.  
Research question 2: Which personality facets predict generalised trust?  
 
 
5.1.4.2 Personality and behavioural trust 
 
Research question 3: Which personality traits and facets are associated with 
behavioural trust?  
 
 
5.1.4.3 Personality and trustworthiness  
 
Research question 4: which traits and facets are associated with behavioural 
trustworthiness?  
Hypothesis 4: Given the prosociality associated with Agreeableness, this trait should 








5.1.5 A note on the possible influence of context 
 
It is possible that participants in this study will demonstrate more trust and 
trustworthiness due to the setting. All participants are members of the University 
community, and they may have participated in multiple experiments at the Lab. This 
may generate a ‘panel’ effect, whereby familiarity induces higher levels of trust and 
trustworthiness than may be observed in a random population sample (Ermisch et 
al., 2009).  
 
 
5.2 Experimental design  
 
Each participant attended two experimental sessions: a questionnaire session, 
followed approximately one week later by two rounds of the trust game. The game 
was presented a week after the questionnaire in an attempt to avoid their responses 
to the questionnaire priming their behaviour during the game. Both the 
questionnaire and the game took place in ESSEXLab, a social sciences laboratory at 
the University of Essex. Participants sit at workstations in cubicles so while they are 
able to hear the experimenter and to attract the experimenter’s attention by raising 
their hand, they cannot see or easily communicate with the other participants.  
 
I hosted the lab sessions using standardised experimenter scripts, consent forms and 
participant information sheets. I often received assistance from a member of staff at 
the beginning of the session to register participants as they came into the Lab.  







Self-reported trust has been found to vary with a range of characteristics including 
age (Gundelach, 2014), gender (Olivera, 2013), ethnicity (Uslaner, 2008) and level of 
education (Gundelach, 2014; Olivera, 2013), as well as varying cross-culturally  
(Ahmed & Salas, 2009; Schwartz, 2007). Meanwhile, behaviour in economic games 
(e.g. Chuah, 2010) has been found to vary between students and non-students (Naef 
& Schupp, 2009), cross-culturally (see Ahmed & Salas, 2009; see also Johnson & 
Mislin, 2011) and with the ethnic composition of the group (Burks, Carpenter & 
Verhoogen, 2003). With these potential influences on the outcome measures, 
identifying a suitable sample was not easy. Budget limitations meant that I would 
not be able to recruit enough participants to test for intergroup differences, so it 
was necessary to recruit as homogenous a sample as possible. In consultation with 
the Lab Manager, I advertised my study to British, white undergraduate students 
aged 18-24 years; as the largest subgroup within the Lab’s participant pool, these 
criteria gave me the best chance of recruiting enough participants for my study.  
 
While these restrictions substantially limit the generalisability of my findings, given 
the low number of participants and the exploratory nature of this study these 
restrictions were necessary in order to avoid having to subcategorise my cases to 
account for these potential influences; doing so would have substantially reduced 
the power of my analyses to detect significant effects. While it is still possible that 




confounding effects materialised (for example, if somebody was born in the UK but 
grew up overseas), this recruitment strategy should reduce the prevalence of such 






I recruited participants using the ESSEXLab computer system, hroot. This holds the 
details of everybody who is registered with the Lab as a participant and allows 
experimenters to specify any criteria they need to recruit by. The specifications I 
used were as follows: degree (Undergraduate), nationality (UK), ethnicity (white) 
and date of birth (recruiting only those aged 18 – 24 years). It became clear that the 
lists of participants assigned to a study in hroot can become corrupted over time (I 
discovered in February that my list from October contained participants who did not 
meet any of my criteria), so I re-generated my list of assigned participants each 
term. In doing so, I re-specified my ‘date of birth’ criterion to avoid recruiting 





On their way into the Lab, participants selected a numbered ball at random from an 
opaque bag. This advised them which workstation they should sit at. While 
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randomisation was not necessary for the questionnaire session, in the trust game 
they were paired at random with other participants in the Lab according to an 
algorithm in the zTree programme (Fischbacher, 2007).  Randomising participants’ 
seating reduced the likelihood of individuals’ seating preferences pre-determining 





I provided participants with a code so that I would be able to match their data from 
the two sessions. While some experimenters ask participants to enter their student 
ID as their unique code, given the potentially sensitive nature of the personality 
measures (e.g. the indicators of depression and anxiety), I wanted participants to be 
assured that nobody would be able to identify them from their data. I used an online 
‘random number generator’ to draw 180 unique five-digit numbers between 10000 
– 19999 and provided these on a slip of paper attached to their Session 1 consent 
form.  
 
At the end of Session 1, participants took their slip of paper with them with the 
intention of bringing it to Session 2 (the trust game). I also wrote these codes on the 
top left corner on the back of the Session 1 consent forms in anticipation that some 
participants might not bring their code with them to Session 2. Once a participant 
had completed both sessions (or had dropped out of the experiment) and I had 




checked that the numbers tallied between sessions, the corner was removed from 
each Session 1 consent form to fully anonymise my dataset.  
 
 
5.2.1 Part 1: the questionnaire  
 
5.2.1.1 Questionnaire content 
 
The questionnaire comprised 297 items, including two batteries of questions to 
measure participants’ values (the Schwartz Human Values Scale – 21 items; 
Schwartz, 2001) and personality traits (the 240-item NEO-PI-3 measuring the Big Five 
traits; McCrae & Costa, 2010). The remaining questions measure participants’ self-
reported social trust (three items), degree of comfort living on their current income 
(one item), ideological orientation (one item), attitude towards risk (seven items), 
and positive and negative reciprocity (six items). Ermisch et al. (2007) note that it is 
difficult to reliably measure trustworthiness via a self-report item; I therefore test 
whether self-reported positive reciprocity is indicative of trustworthiness, and 
whether participants’ negative reciprocity score can be used as a proxy for betrayal 
aversion (Fehr, 2008). One of the social trust items, the generalised trust question 
(GTQ), forms participants’ self-reported generalised trust score. Given its importance 
as an outcome measure in this study, I positioned the GTQ as the first item in the 
questionnaire to avoid corruption by preceding items.  
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The questionnaire also included measures of gender, age, religion, religiosity and 
ethnicity, as well as a few items about their academic status: whether they are an 
undergraduate or postgraduate, their academic department, whether they are full-
time or part-time and their year of study. Finally, I ask a few items that seek to 
measure the quality of the environment they had lived in before coming to 
university: how safe they felt walking alone after dark, and whether they had reason 
to complain about noise, air pollution, lack of access to green spaces, water quality, 
crime or litter (see Appendix 5A for the full list of items)42. 
 
 
5.2.1.2 Questionnaire design  
 
I elected to field the Schwartz HVS before the NEO-PI-3, reasoning that the vignettes 
described in the values items are more subtle while the NEO-PI-3 may instil 
keywords that could prime participants to respond to the values items in a particular 
way. The demographic questions are given at the end of the survey for the same 
reason (aside from gender – unfortunately this had to be asked before the HVS 
items because these are not gender neutral but use he/him/his and she/her to make 
it easier for respondents to identify with the person in the vignette).  
 
The survey was fielded as a self-completion questionnaire, which participants filled 
in online via Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) at private workstations in the Essex 
Social Sciences Experimental Laboratory (ESSEXLab). Work by Martin and Lynn 
                                                          
42
 Due to copyright it is not possible to give more than three items from the NEO-PI-3; a copy of the 
full questionnaire may be available from the publisher, PAR Inc (www4.parinc.com)  




(2011) has investigated the comparability of mixed mode data collection using the 
European Social Survey (ESS) and an ESS-based experiment in the Netherlands. They 
found that respondents in the self-completion mode appear to have been less 
influenced by social desirability concerns and therefore to have given more accurate 
answers to sensitive questions. The questionnaire used in the present study borrows 
its social trust and Schwartz Human Values Scale (HVS) items from the ESS. Martin 
and Lynn report that both the social trust scale (specified as a single factor) and the 
HVS (specified as the four higher-order values dimensions: Self-enhancement, 
Conservation, Openness to Change and Self-transcendence) achieve configural, 
metric and scalar equivalence across face-to-face, telephone and self-completion 
modes. This is encouraging, suggesting that while the choice of mode may influence 
the mean scores it does not appear to have an impact on the integrity of the 
measurement scales.  
 
Although usually administered as a pencil and paper questionnaire, the publisher 
granted  me permission to transcribe the NEO-PI-3 inventory into Qualtrics for the 
purpose of this experiment. The NEO-PI-3 is an updated version of the NEO-PI-R, 
adapted for use in younger samples. In this instance, I elected to use the NEO-PI-3 
because it is less oriented in the American culture and American language (see 
McCrae et al., 2000, for a discussion of the differences between the two 
inventories). I did consider using the UK version of the NEO-PI-R, published by 
Hogrefe, however, it was not clear how much time would be required to arrange this 
and time constraints for pilot testing meant I needed to choose a more immediate 
alternative.   




Given that some of the items in the NEO-PI-3 are quite probing (particularly those 
that measure depression), I felt there was the possibility that these may trigger 
concern for participants about their wellbeing. The final page of my questionnaire 
therefore included contact information for Student Support and for the University’s 
Nightline telephone service.  
 
 
5.2.1.3 Administration and participant reward   
 
At the beginning of the questionnaire session, I read out to the participants three 
standardised documents: an experimenter script, a consent form (Appendix 5C.1) 
and a participant information sheet (Appendix 5C.2). The experimenter script 
ensured that I gave all groups the same information at the start of the session, and 
the other two documents advised participants on issues relating to payment and 
data security (the consent form), and the Lab rules and any tips for how to complete 
the questionnaire (the information sheet).  
 
Pre-testing suggested that the questionnaire may take on average 35 minutes to 
complete, so participants were paid £5 for this first visit to the Lab (this included a 
£2.50 show up fee that all participants are entitled to if they arrive at the Lab on 
time). The consent form reminded participants that they would receive payment for 
the questionnaire at the end of the second session (although, in accordance with 




ESSEXLab rules, any participants who only completed the questionnaire were still 
paid for that first session).  
 
Due to difficulty recruiting participants in the latter stages of the study, I doubled 
the show-up fee so that all participants who arrived at the Lab on time would know 
they were guaranteed to receive at least £5 per session. This meant that for the 




5.2.2 Part 2: the trust game 
 
5.2.2.1 Design of the game  
 
The version of the trust game that I use here was inspired by the experimental 
design developed by Ermisch and Gambetta (2006) and used by Ermisch et al. 
(2009). Participants in the experiment fielded by Ermisch and colleagues were ex-
respondents to the British Household Panel Survey. Those selected to play as the 
Sender were physically given £10 as payment for their participation in an interview. 
They were then given the option of sending this £10 to another participant. They 
were informed that if they did send the money it would be turned into £40 and the 
person who received it (the Returner) would be allowed to transfer either £0 or £22 
back to the Sender. Ermisch and colleagues report that around 40% of Senders 
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chose to invest their £10, and 50% of Returners sent back £22 (i.e. were trustworthy; 
the other 50% kept the £40).  
 
With each player in the game having only a binary choice – to keep the money or 
send it (the Sender), and to return one of two amounts (the Returner) – it is 
reasoned that this design should differentiate well between being trusting or not 
trusting, and between being trustworthy or not trustworthy. In addition, since both 
players will know the rules that each other is playing by, the Sender’s expectations 
(in the event that they choose to invest their money) will be clear to the Returner. 
The Returner therefore knowingly makes a decision that corresponds to either 
other-regard or self-interest. This design also ensures that all Returners are 
responding to the same investment decision. In games where Senders and Returners 
can transfer any amount of money, and the Returner is aware of how much money 
the Sender has invested, Returners are each responding to a different scenario: the 
proportion they transfer back to the Sender then varies depending on the amount 
the Sender invested (Ermisch et al., 2009). In instances of very low investment by 
the Sender, the Returner may not even be given the opportunity to demonstrate 
trustworthiness.  
 
While Ermisch et al.’s (2009) experiment involved a one-shot game, each participant 
in my study played the game twice – once as the Sender and once as the Returner. 
This enabled me to obtain behavioural trust and trustworthiness data from all 
participants. In the Lab, participants were randomly and anonymously paired. After 
the first game, they were re-paired so they would play a different person in the 




second game. The participants only found out how their game partners had behaved 
after both games had been played. This design sought to avoid strategic play and to 
elicit participants’ natural behaviours.  
 
The experiment uses the standard trust game format, in which the Sender begins 
the game with £5 and the Returner starts with £0. The Sender can choose to keep 
their £5 or to invest it with the Returner.  If the Sender keeps the £5, the game is 
over. If they invest their £5, the £5 becomes £15. The Returner then chooses to 
transfer either £0 or £10 to the Sender. The Returner’s decision regarding how much 
money to transfer to the Sender was made before they know whether the money 
has been invested with them: this ensured that trustworthiness data could be 
collected from all participants and that the Returner’s decision would not be 
influenced by the Sender’s behaviour. 
 
 
5.2.2.2 Administration and participant reward 
 
The trust game was programmed as a zTree treatment file. At the beginning of the 
game session, I read out a consent form (Appendix 5C.3) and a participant 
information sheet (Appendix 5C.4). The consent form primarily advised regarding 
data security, while the information sheet explained the game and how their 
winnings would be calculated.  
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All participants were guaranteed to leave the Lab with at least their £2.50 show-up 
fee. However, due to the variable nature of payoffs from this session, this show-up 
fee was paid on top of any winnings in the trust game (under this design: £0, £5, £10 
or £15)43. To calculate participants’ take-home winnings from the two rounds of the 
trust game, zTree chose one of the two rounds of the game at random and all 
participants were paid according to their winnings in that game.  
 
The wording of the participant information sheet encouraged the Sender to feel a 
sense of ownership over their £5 endowment. This was to try to ensure that their 
choice regarding whether or not to invest the £5 would resemble a trust decision 
rather than a cooperation decision. It is evident from the literature that 
trustworthiness and cooperation are experientially and aetiologically different 
constructs, so it is important to frame the task in a way that primes trust and 
trustworthiness rather than cooperation. However, I took care to avoid being 
prescriptive to the Sender or Returner; it was important that they made their 
decisions based on their own drives rather than being swayed by framing effects 
(see Appendix 5C.4 for the wording of the participant information sheet).  
 
  
                                                          
43
 As in the questionnaire sessions, those who participated from the end of February onwards were 
awarded a double show-up fee – meaning that all participants were guaranteed to take home at least 
£5 from the trust game session.  




5.2.2.3 Additional measures 
 
I took the opportunity to collect several other pieces of information via the zTree 
programme. After they had played both rounds of the trust game, and before they 
found out the outcome from these games, participants responded to two 
hypothetical scenarios as though they were additional rounds of the game44. In both 
scenarios the participant took the role of the Sender. They were asked how high a 
probability they would need of receiving £10 from the Returner before they would 
be willing to invest their £5 if the Returner were (a) an anonymous stranger, and (b) 
a computer programme. Together these items form an experimental measure of 
betrayal aversion, since those who are averse to betrayal should require a more 
certain payoff in scenario (a) than in scenario (b).45  
 
After participants had responded to the items measuring betrayal aversion, they 
were informed on-screen of their and their opponents’ scores in the two rounds of 
the game and advised which round they would be paid for. Participants were then 
invited to donate a portion of their earnings to charity. The charity was named as 
Essex Air Ambulance and a cell given into which they could type the amount they 
wished to donate. On-screen information advised that any amount was allowed, 
from £0 upwards in denominations of £0.50. As far as I am aware, this addition to 
the trust game has not been implemented before. With charitable donations 
                                                          
44
 The on-screen instructions made it clear to participants that these questions were entirely 
hypothetical and would in no way affect their scores in the games they had just played.  
45
 In the absence of an appropriate measure of betrayal aversion in the literature, I constructed this 
item based on a measure used by Bohnet, Greig, Herrmann, and Zeckhauser (2008), adapting it for 
the trust game. In theory, those who are averse to betrayal (rather than risk) should report a lower 
MAP when the decision will be made by a computer, since a computer cannot ‘betray’ per se. 
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generally found to be associated with prosocial characteristics, it will be interesting 
to see who. if anybody, takes the opportunity to donate.  
 
Finally, I asked participants to briefly tell me why they made the decisions they did 
as the Sender and as the Returner. This too was exploratory, to see whether I could 
gain any insight into participants’ decisions. I also wanted to check whether anybody 
would mention contextual effects as described earlier. In panel surveys, respondents 
often demonstrate more confiding behaviour due to their sense of familiarity with 
the interviewer or survey. The equivalent behaviour here would be a higher rate of 
investing (as the Sender) or a higher rate of trustworthiness (as the Returner).  
 
 
5.3 Data and methods 
 
In this section I describe the data collected by my questionnaire and game, and the 
methods I used to test my hypotheses. The content of my questionnaire is given 





My outcome measures are self-reported generalised trust, behavioural trust and 
trustworthiness. Generalised trust was measured by the generalised trust question 
(GTQ): “In general, do you feel most people can be trusted or you can’t be too 




careful in dealing with people?” and this item was measured on an eleven-point 
scale, where ‘0’ indicated “You can’t be too careful” and ‘10’ indicated “Most people 
can be trusted”. Behavioural trust was a binary variable and given by the 
participant’s behaviours as the Sender in the trust game: investing their £5 stake 
was scored as being trusting, while keeping it was scored as being cautious. 
Behavioural trustworthiness was also a binary variable, given by the participant’s 
behaviour as the Returner in the trust game: returning £10 was scored as being 
trustworthy, while returning £0 was scored as being untrustworthy.  
 
I measured personality using McCrae and Costa’s (2010) 240-item NEO-PI-3 measure 
of the Big Five personality traits and their facets. Due to copyright it is not possible 
to reproduce here the content of the questionnaire, but each item was measured on 
a five-point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree). PAR 
Inc, the publisher of the NEO inventory, supplied a coding sheet that detailed which 
items have been reverse-coded and how to derive the facet and trait scores from 
the raw data. The 240 items reduce to 30 personality facets and these reduce 
further to the Big Five personality traits (as described in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 above). I 
am able to reproduce here up to three items from the NEO-PI-3 for illustrative 
purposes (see Section 5.4.3.1 for an item from the trust facet, and 5.4.3.2 for one 
item each from the gregariousness and warmth facets).  
 
Risk aversion was measured using a single item, “How do you see yourself: Are you 
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking 
risks?”, which was measured on an eleven-point scale where ‘0’ represented “Not at 
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all willing to take risks” and ‘10’ represented “Very willing to take risks”. I also 
fielded a battery of six items, one of which asks how willing the participant is to take 
risks financially, and another how willing to take risks with their faith in other 
people. These items were scored on the same eleven-point scale as the generic risk 
aversion item.  
 
Positive and negative reciprocity were each measured using three items borrowed 
from the German SOEP questionnaire. The items measuring positive reciprocity are: 
“If someone does me a favour, I am prepared to return it”, “I go out of my way to 
help somebody who has been kind to me before” and “I am ready to undergo 
personal costs to help somebody who helped me before”. And those measuring 
negative reciprocity: “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as 
possible, no matter what the cost”, “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will 
do the same to him/ her” and “If somebody offends me, I will offend him/ her back”. 
Both sets of items are measured on a seven-point scale, where ‘1’ means “does not 
apply to me at all” and ‘7’ means “applies to me perfectly”. The mean score across 
all three items gives the respondent’s positive and negative reciprocity scores.  
 
Financial security was measured by a single item, asking “How well would you say 
you yourself are managing financially these days?“ and scored on a five-point scale: 
living comfortably, doing alright, just about getting by, finding it quite difficult, and 
finding it very difficult.  
 




Quality of the home neighbourhood was measured using the following items: “How 
safe would you – or did you – feel walking alone in this area after dark?” (very safe, 
safe, unsafe, very unsafe); and a set of items measuring whether they had reason to 
complain about noise, air pollution, lack of access to green spaces, water quality, 
crime and litter (very many reasons, many reasons, a few reasons, and no reason at 
all). 
 
The questionnaire also measured Schwartz’s human values (Universalism, 
Benevolence, Conformity, Tradition, Security, Power, Achievement, Hedonism, 
Stimulation and Self-direction), although these are not used in the analyses 
presented here (see Appendix 5A for the vignettes in the HVS and their 
measurement scale).  
 
As reported earlier, the additional variables captured during the trust game are 
betrayal aversion, whether the participant donated any money to charity (and, if so, 
the amount donated), and qualitative descriptions of the participant’s reasons for 
their decisions as the Sender and as the Returner.  
 
The betrayal aversion item was presented after participants had played both rounds 
of the trust game, and asked them to imagine they were playing two more rounds of 
the game as the Sender. The rules were exactly the same, except that in the first 
round the Returner’s decision would be made by an anonymous stranger while in 
the second round this decision would be made by a computer. Participants were 
asked to state the minimum probability they would accept, of receiving £10, before 
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they would be willing to invest their £5 in each scenario. In theory, these two figures 
should match because both relate to the likelihood of receiving £10 from the 
Returner. However, if the participant is averse to betrayal, their minimum 
acceptable probability should be higher in the scenario where the Returner is a 
person: a person can betray, while a computer cannot.  
 
 
5.3.2 Analytical methods 
 
Before constructing my regression models, it was necessary to identify which, if any, 
additional variables need to be accounted for.  In this section I briefly describe my 
approach to analysing the data, first discussing the desirability of testing for any 
unintended effects of the session characteristics before taking a look at the 
moderators that may influence the observed relationships between personality and 
the outcome measures.  
 
 
5.3.2.1 Confounding variables 
 
Given the number of data collection sessions, it would be desirable to first check for 
any effect of these incidental variables. The ways in which Lab sessions may have 
varied include: the time in the academic year, time of day, number of people in the 
session, gender balance, provision of a double show-up fee and occasionally the 
presence of an unofficial participant in the trust game session to ensure I would 




have enough participants to run the game (in consultation with the Lab Manager, I 
decided that each session should have at least six participants in order to give 
credibility to the advice that they would be ‘randomly and anonymously’ paired with 
a different person in each of the two games).  
 
While it would be desirable to check for any unintentional experimental effects 
associated with these variables, the low number of participants means that any 
differences observed between groups may be genuine variation rather than a 
‘treatment’ effect. In addition, some of these variables overlap; for example, the 
offer of an incentive only applies to participants from the end of February onwards 
so this encompasses the Summer term and those groups held in the latter stages of 
the Spring term. Similarly, attempting to investigate the effect of the number of 
participants in the session would result in drawing conclusions based on very few 
sessions for the higher numbers, making it impossible to distinguish between an 
effect of the group size versus an effect relating to those particular sessions (e.g. 
being near to Christmas or the end of term).  
 
For these variables I therefore just describe the proportion of participants who 
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5.3.2.2 Moderator variables 
 
Moderator variables are those that are included in a model not because we are 
interested in their effect on the outcome measure but because we have reason to 
suspect that they may have an influence on the relationship between the key 
predictors and the outcome measure. Here I discuss the variables that are available 
in my dataset and any theoretical grounding for expecting each one to influence the 
relationship between the personality constructs and the trust-related outcome 
measures.  
 
While demographic characteristics (such as age, gender and education) are often 
included in regression models as control variables, there is an argument for 
excluding them. Personality varies with age and gender, and the coding for the NEO 
traits and facets does itself differentiate between genders. In addition, I have no 
reason to expect the demographic variables to influence the relationship between 
personality and the dependent variables; any association should be visible via the 
personality-based predictors. To include these control variables in my models 
therefore risks masking the true effect of personality on trust and trustworthiness. 
To accommodate both perspectives, however, I present two sets of models for each 
outcome variable – one set of models that control for demographic variables and a 
set that do not.  
 
Financial insecurity Financial situation, measured as household income, is reported 
to be positively associated with one’s level of generalised trust (e.g. Naef & Schupp, 




2009; Fehr, 2008). It is reasonable to expect that one’s degree of financial security 
may moderate the relationship between personality and trust; low financial security 
may make one more cautious to avoid the risk of losses that cannot easily be 
replaced.  
 
Game 1 as Sender Those who played as the Sender in Game 1 may be more likely to 
invest their £5 stake; by the time Game 2 Senders make their investment decision, 
they have become aware of any temptation to keep the £15 and also of their own 
(perhaps untrustworthy) behaviour. In addition, when Game 1 Senders play as the 
Returner in Game 2 they may be more likely to be trustworthy as they may have a 
greater appreciation for the chance the Sender has taken in investing.  
 
Positive and negative reciprocity, betrayal aversion and risk aversion For obvious 
reasons, these variables are all likely to influence the degree of trust the individual is 
willing to show and report. However, it is also likely that one’s scores on these 
variables are driven by personality.  
 
Before commencing the preliminary regression models, I test the extent to which 
personality predicts scores on each of the above variables. Despite their being, in 
theory, unrelated to personality I also test these relationships for ‘Game 1 as Sender’ 
and for ‘Double show-up fee’, in case by chance there is an uneven distribution of 
personalities between the two conditions of these variables. Any potential 
moderator variables that are driven by personality will need to be excluded from my 
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regression models in order to avoid corrupting the observed relationships between 
personality variables and the outcome measures.  
 
For items scored on a Likert scale (for example, self-reported trust which is scored 
on an eleven-point scale) I use ordinary linear regression, while for dichotomous 
variables (for example, the two behavioural measures) I use logistic regression. To 
assist with the interpretation of my results, I also consider the magnitude of the 
observed effects. Unlike significance values, effect size is immune to the influence of 
sample size and should provide a more transparent indicator of the association 
between my predictor and outcome variables. As an effect size, Cohen’s (1992) r is 
appropriate for this study due to my analyses being correlational rather than 
involving the comparison of group means. In discussing the effect sizes I refer to .10 
≤ r ≤ .30 as a ‘weak’ effect, .30 ≤ r ≤ .50 as  ‘moderate’ and r ≥ .50 as ‘strong’, 
however, given that these thresholds are somewhat nebulous (e.g. Durlak, 2009) I 
predominantly use them to facilitate comparisons within the results (e.g. between 
traits for a particular outcome measure, or between outcome measures). The results 
of these checks are discussed in Section 5.4.2.1.  
 
 
5.3.2.3 Correlations and t-tests  
 
Having identified my potential moderator variables that are not driven by 
personality (and therefore can be included in my models), I test whether these 




variables are associated with any of my trust-related outcome measures. Any that 
show a significant association are then included in the relevant regression models.  
 
 
5.3.2.4 Regression models 
 
My initial model for each outcome measure includes just the five personality traits. 
Subsequent models include any moderator variables and, finally, I run a set of thirty 
models that test in turn the predictive capacity of each personality facet. In each 
case, the facet replaces its host trait in the model to feature alongside the other four 
personality traits (for example, the first Neuroticism facet, anxiety, is modelled 
alongside Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. While 
there does not appear to be a standard way to enter the NEO traits and facets as 
predictors in regression models, it is likely that including all facets in a single model 
would result in some degree of corruption of the coefficients. My proposed method 
is similar to that used by Weiss and Costa (2005). The results of these analyses are 
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5.4 Results and Discussion 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive analyses 
 
5.4.1.1 Sample  
 
One hundred and forty individuals participated in both the questionnaire and the 
trust game, while an additional thirty people attended only the questionnaire 
session. The first 121 participants were paid £5 for the questionnaire while the 
remaining 49 were paid £7.50, as detailed above. All were paid between £2.50 - £20 
for their participation in the trust game session. Both payments included a £2.50 (or 
£5, for the final 49 people) show-up fee. Payment for both sessions was given, 
confidentially, at the end of the trust game session.46  
 
The majority of the analyses in this write-up relate to those 140 participants (N140) 
who completed the full experiment. However, in discussing my regression models 
for self-reported trust I compare these findings with those obtained when using a 
different subsample of participants (N122); I describe this subsample in Section 
5.4.1.4.  
 
                                                          
46
 Several additional people participated in some of the trust game sessions, to ensure I would have 
enough participants (at least 6 per session) to play the game. These people were not primed to 
behave in any particular way and were paid for the game session only.  




Below I describe the characteristics of the sample, their mean scores on the control, 
predictor and outcome variables and any adjustments I make to the coding for each 
variable before using it in my analyses.  
 
 
5.4.1.2 Demographic variables 
 
Gender 49% of the sample were female.  
 
Age Although the participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 24 years, the mean age was 
20 years and 93% were aged 18 – 21. With only two participants aged 23 and one 
aged 24, it would not be appropriate to code these ages separately. I have therefore 
coded ages 22 – 24 together.  
 
Academic discipline The spread across academic departments was broad, with most 
departments at the University of Essex represented. Students of Biology comprised 
the largest proportion of the sample (18%), followed by those of Literature, Film and 
Theatre Studies (11%), Psychology (10%), and Computer Science and Electrical 
Engineering, Government, Mathematics and Sociology (each at 6.4%, indicating 
eight or nine participants). The remaining 35% were split between, amongst others: 
Economics, Business, Hotel School, History, Language and Linguistics, Law, 
Philosophy and Art History. I do not control for discipline in the analyses – this was 
included purely to check the reach of the study – for example, if 75% of my 
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participants had been Economics students I would have expressed more caution 
about the results due to their likely understanding of economic games.  
 
Undergraduate/ postgraduate status I included a measure of undergraduate versus 
postgraduate status in order to check that this recruitment criterion had been 
effective. While I was largely successful in recruiting only undergraduates, due to the 
procedures used by the Lab my sample does include four postgraduates: the Lab 
relies on participants, once registered, seeking to update their information on the 
system when they cease being an undergraduate.  
 
Year of study Thirty-seven percent of the sample are coded as being in the first year 
of their degree, 36% in the second, 19% in the third and 8% in the fourth. This takes 
into account that of the four postgraduates three reported being in their first or 
second year of study. I recoded these to be in their fourth year.  
 
Ethnicity Similarly to my education variable, I included this measure as a check and it 
revealed that I had recruited five participants who do not regard themselves as 
being of UK or Irish ethnicity but instead are “Other White”. I had specified UK 
nationality when recruiting participants, so it is possible that these five were born 
outside of the UK and Ireland. I am not able to determine how long these individuals 
have lived in the UK, so it is possible that the cultural influences on their responses 
and behaviour are different to those of the majority of my participants. In addition, I 
have two participants who preferred not to disclose their ethnicity. I have kept these 




seven participants in the dataset because in a sample of 140 people any differences 
are not likely to have an impact on the results.  
 
Financial insecurity Fifty-two percent reported living comfortably or doing alright, 
while 19% were finding it quite or very difficult. The mean score was 2.61 (SD = 
1.001), indicating that on average the participants were ‘doing alright’.  
 
Religion Twenty-seven participants (19%) reported a religious affiliation. Of these, 
eight (6%) reported being Roman Catholic, nine (6%) Church of England or Anglican, 
five (4%) other Christian, and one each were Greek or Russian Orthodox, Sikh, 
Buddhist, Muslim and other non-Christian, and one preferred not to say.  
 
Religiosity All participants were asked how religious they are, irrespective of 
whether they are affiliated with a particular religion. On a scale from ‘0’ (not at all) 
to ‘10’ (very religious), participants’ mean score was 1.79 (SD = 2.04). This breaks 
down into a mean score of 3.96 (SD = 1.79) for those who belong to a religion, and 
1.27 (SD = 1.73) for those who do not.   
 
Quality of home neighbourhood Seventy-two percent reported feeling safe or very 
safe, and 6.4% reported feeling very unsafe walking along after dark in the area 
where they lived before coming to university. The following percentages reported 
having many or very many reasons to complain about: noise (8%), air pollution (8%), 
lack of access to green spaces (6%), water quality (4%), crime (25%) and litter (24%).  
 




5.4.1.3 Outcome measures  
 
Self-reported generalised trust On average, participants scored 5.02 (SD = 2.06), with 
females scoring slightly lower (mean = 4.82, SD = 2.10) than males (mean = 5.21, SD 
= 2.02). The 122 participants whose Agreeableness score remained unchanged after 
standardising the trust facet report a similar mean score (mean = 4.95, SD = 1.95), 
with males scoring similarly to those in N140 (mean = 5.25, SD = 1.83) but females 
scoring lower on average than those in N140 (mean = 4.57, SD = 2.04).  
 
Behavioural trust Sixty-five participants (46%) chose to invest their initial 
endowment when playing as the Sender (i.e. to trust). This is similar to the figure 
reported by Ermisch et al. (2009), who implemented a game with a similar design 
and reported that around 40% of those playing as the Sender chose to invest their 
money. The slightly higher rate of investment in the present study may have been 
due to the lower stake (£5 versus £10) and the participants being students (Naef and 
Schupp [2009a] found that students show more trust than the general population; 
although see Naef & Schupp for a discussion of studies that found the opposite).  
 
Behavioural trustworthiness Fifty participants (36%) were trustworthy and elected to 
return £10 to the Sender. Ermisch et al. (2009) reported that of those Returners who 
were trusted, around 50% were trustworthy. The difference in these figures may be 
partly due to the difference in design between the two studies, with my participants 
deciding how much money to return to the Sender before they knew whether the 




Sender had trusted them. It is noted in the literature that being trusted may induce 
trustworthy behaviour (Zak, Kurzban, & Matzner, 2004). This may also have been 




Self-reported and behavioural trust  
 
Of the 65 participants who were trusting in the trust game, 28 (43%) scored 
between 6 – 10 in self-reported generalised trust (where 10 = most people can be 
trusted). Of the 76 who were not trusting in the trust game, 35 (47%) scored 
between 6 – 10 in self-reported generalised trust (where 10 would indicate ‘most 
people can be trusted’).  
 
Of the 63 participants who scored 6 – 10 on the GTQ (indicating an above-average 
level of self-reported trust), 28 (44%) invested their £5 stake when playing as the 
Sender. Of the 77 people who scored 0 – 5 on the GTQ (indicating low self-reported 
trust), 37 (48%) invested.  
 
These results indicate that self-reported trust, as measured by the GTQ, does not 
differentiate between those who will and those who will not invest their initial stake 
when playing as the Sender in the trust game. Furthermore, those who report 
caution on the GTQ are marginally more likely to invest their stake during the trust 
game. However, this result may be due to chance differences in the proportions of 
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GTQ-cautious versus GTQ-trusting who played as the Sender in Game 1 (when we 
can reasonably expect people to show more trust). Examining the crosstabs does 
indeed show this to be the case: of the 72 people who played as the Sender in Game 
1, 44 (61%) were GTQ-cautious. This split is not seen in those who played as the  
Sender in Game 2, where 49% were GTQ-cautious. Thus, the apparent nonsensical 
finding regarding who is and is not likely to show behavioural trust may simply be an 
artefact caused by random variation in the proportion of GTQ-trusting versus GTQ-
cautious who were randomly assigned to be the Sender in Game 1.  
 
 
Behavioural trust and trustworthiness 
 
Of the 65 people who were trusting, 37 (57%) were also trustworthy. Of the 76 
people who were not trusting, thirteen (17%) were trustworthy.  
 
Of the fifty participants who were trustworthy in the trust game, 37 (74%) invested 
their £5 stake as the Sender. Of those who were not trustworthy, 31% invested.  
 
While these findings suggest an association between behavioural trust and 
behavioural trustworthiness, we may again be observing an ‘order of play’ effect. 
However, examining the crosstabs for these measures appears to disconfirm this 
with 48% of the trustworthy, and 53% of the untrustworthy, participants playing as 
the Sender in Game 1.  
 





Self-reported trust and behavioural trustworthiness 
 
Of the fifty people who were trustworthy in the trust game, 25 (50%) scored 
between 6 – 10 in self-reported generalised trust. Of the ninety participants who 
were not trustworthy, 38 (42%) scored between 6 – 10 in self-reported trust.  
 
Of the 63 participants who scored 6 – 10 on the GTQ, 40% were trustworthy, while 
of the 77 who were cautious, 33% were trustworthy.  
 
There are small differences in the proportions of GTQ-trusting participants who 
were trustworthy and untrustworthy, and similar rates of trustworthiness amongst 
those who scored higher and lower on self-reported trust. It is not clear whether 





Here I describe the mean scores on the personality traits and facets. As above, these 
data refer to the sample of 140 who completed the study; any differences in the 
wider sample of 170 (i.e. including those who did not play the trust game) are 
flagged. I used the US version of the NEO-PI-3, so these categories are based on the 
coding system for the US population.  
  




Table 5.3: Mean scores on NEO personality traits and facets 
 N140 
 Females Males 
Neuroticism High High 
Extraversion Average Average 
Openness High High 
Agreeableness Average Average 
Conscientiousness Low Low 
N1 Anxiety Average Average/ high 
N2 Angry hostility Average/ high Average 
N3 Depression High High 
N4 Self-consciousness Average/ high High 
N5 Impulsiveness High Average/ high 
N6 Vulnerability High  High 
E1 Warmth Average Average 
E2 Gregariousness Average Average 
E3 Assertiveness Average Average 
E4 Activity Average Low/ average 
E5 Excitement-seeking High High 
E6 Positive emotions Average Average 
O1 Fantasy High High 
O2 Aesthetics Average Average 
O3 Feelings Average/ high Average/ high 
O4 Actions Average/ high Average/ high 
O5 Ideas High High 
O6 Values High High 
A1 Trust Average Low/ average 
A2 Straightforwardness Average Average 
A3 Altruism Average Average 
A4 Compliance Average Average 
A5 Modesty Average Average 
A6 Tender-mindedness Average Average 
C1 Competence Low Low 
C2 Order Low/ average Low/ average 
C3 Dutifulness Low Low/ average 
C4 Achievement striving Low Average 
C5 Self-discipline Low Low 










On average the participants reported high Neuroticism (mean = 101.50, SD = 23.83), 
average Extraversion (mean = 115.00, SD = 23.12), high Openness (mean = 124.83, 
SD = 20.64), average Agreeableness (mean = 113.79, SD = 20.65) and low 
Conscientiousness (mean = 106.11, SD = 24.13). Similar results are obtained when 





Neuroticism Across the sample, both male and female participants scored average or 
high on each facet within Neuroticism: females reported average anxiety, average/ 
high angry hostility and self-consciousness, and high depression, impulsiveness and 
vulnerability. Males reported average angry hostility, average/ high anxiety and 
impulsiveness, and high depression, self-consciousness and vulnerability.  
 
Extraversion On average, participants reported between low/ average and high 
levels of each facet within Extraversion: females scored average on warmth, 
gregariousness, assertiveness, activity and positive emotions, and high on 
excitement-seeking. Males scored low/ average on activity, average on warmth, 
gregariousness, assertiveness and positive emotions, and high on excitement-
seeking.  
 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
294 
 
Openness Participants scored average or high on all facets of Openness: females 
scored average on aesthetics, average/ high on feelings and actions, and high on 
fantasy, ideas and values. Males scored average on aesthetics, average/ high on 
feelings and actions, and high on fantasy, ideas and values.47  
 
Agreeableness Across the sample, participants scored low/ average to high on the 
Agreeableness facets: females scored average on all facets (trust, 
straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty and tender-mindedness). Males 
scored low/ average on trust and average on straightforwardness, altruism, 
compliance, modesty and tender-mindedness.48  
 
Conscientiousness Participants scored low – average on all facets of 
Conscientiousness: females scored low on competence, dutifulness, achievement 
striving and self-discipline, and low/ average on order and deliberation. Males scored 
low on competence and self-discipline, low/ average on order and dutifulness, and 
average on achievement striving and deliberation.49  
 
  
                                                          
47
 The scores change slightly when the participants who only completed the questionnaire are 
included: Females and males score high on actions, and females score very high on ideas.   
48
 When including the participants who only did the questionnaire, females score low on trust.  
49
 Including all 170 questionnaire participants, females score average on achievement-striving and 
males score low/ average on deliberation.  






Given the homogeneity of this sample and the use of a US version of the NEO-PI-3, it 
is not known how these results compare to the UK average or to the average 
undergraduate student in the UK. The self-selection format of participant 
recruitment may mean that my sample is not representative of even the broader 
University of Essex undergraduate population that meets my participation criteria: 
perhaps the more free and easy students do not feel sufficiently inspired by the idea 
of sitting in a social sciences laboratory, while the more conscientious are too busy 
working. It is also possible that these scores are illustrative of the struggles that can 
plague one during late adolescence, and particularly when living away from home 
for the first time.  
 
It is worth bearing in mind that the data quoted above are vulnerable to 
participants’ use of the scale, although the five categories (coded very low, low, 
average, high and very high) do eliminate outliers. I recoded to these categories 
according to the gendered ‘adult norms’ specified in the NEO-PI-3 Self-Report Profile 
Form, after having re-coded the reverse-coded items as indicated on the NEO-PI-3 




                                                          
50
 The NEO-PI-3 Hand-Scorable Answer Sheet and Self-Report Profile Form may be available from PAR 
Inc (www4.parinc.com).  
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Agreeableness and its trust facet 
 
As described earlier, the Agreeableness trait comprises six facets, one of which is 
called trust. When predicting self-reported generalised trust, any observed effect for 
Agreeableness could be driven by this trust facet (which is likely to correlate highly 
with the outcome measure). To investigate and negate this effect I have generated 
an alternative Agreeableness trait score for each participant, which includes a 
standardised trust score (set to the mean score on this facet) in place of their real 
score. As part of the Agreeableness trait score, this effectively renders the trust facet 
inconsequential in the regression analyses. Clearly, however, for those participants 
who had originally scored particularly low or high on trust, assigning the mean may 
have altered their Agreeableness score; artificially raising it for those low on trust, or 
lowering it for those high on trust. Since their score on the outcome measure will 
not have been similarly adjusted this will introduce additional, uncontrolled error 
into the observed relationship between Agreeableness and the outcome measure. 
 
To avoid corrupting the relationship between Agreeableness and the outcome 
measure, I use in these analyses only those participants whose Agreeableness score 
(when coded from 1 – 5) remained unchanged when using this standardised trust 
facet score. This results in a subset of 122 of the original 170 questionnaire 
participants; 101 of these 122 people participated in the full experiment, while 21 
were questionnaire-only participants. Unfortunately, this does mean that I am not 
excluding participants at random but disproportionately excluding those who had 
scored very low, high or very high on the trust personality facet. However, this does 




permit investigation of the effect of trait Agreeableness when the trust facet is 
removed from the analyses. In discussing the results of my main analyses, I report 
the findings for this subset of 122 people in comparison to those for the 140 who are 
the main focus for the results.  
 
 
5.4.1.5 Additional variables  
 
Positive reciprocity On average, participants reported high levels of positive 
reciprocity (mean = 5.90, SD = .84) with a range of scores from 2.67 to 7.  
 
Negative reciprocity Across the sample, participants reported moderate levels of 
negative reciprocity (mean = 3.03, SD = 1.14) with a range from 1 to 7.  
 
Attitude towards risk Willingness to take risks was measured on a 0 – 10 scale, 
where 0 represents “not at all willing to take risks”, and 10 represents “very willing 
to take risks”. On average, participants scored 6.17 (SD = 1.98). Reponses on the 
battery of items measuring willingness to take risks in different contexts generated a 
range of results. On average, they reported being least willing to take risks while 
driving (mean = 2.33, SD = 2.27), financially (mean = 3.41, SD = 2.29) and with their 
health (mean = 3.74, SD = 2.82) and more willing to take risks with their occupation 
(mean = 4.79, SD = 2.32) and faith in people (mean = 5.50, SD = 2.26), and most 
willing to take risks during leisure activities (mean = 7.03, SD = 1.94).  
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Betrayal aversion (measured during the game session) Betrayal aversion was 
measured during the trust game session as described in Section 5.2.2.3 above. A 
positive score indicates that the person has an aversion to betrayal. On average, 
participants scored -1.07 (SD = 22.33), with a range from -50 to 70.  
 
Reason for decision as the Sender (qualitative) Of the 65 participants who chose to 
invest the money, 39 (60%) cited an other-regarding reason – for example, “to 
maximise both our payoffs” or “to give player 2 an opportunity to take away some 
money”. Five (13%) of those people were keen just to help their game partner and/ 
or to bring more money into the game, and did not appear concerned about 
whether they would receive money in return.  
 
Reason for decision as the Returner (qualitative) Of the fifty people who were 
trustworthy, 43 (86%) cited an other-regarding reason (such as “I feel player 1 
should be rewarded” or “I wanted both of us to leave with some money”. Of the 
ninety participants who elected to keep the £15 (i.e. who were not trustworthy), 25 
(28%) indicated that they had misunderstood the rules of the game or were working 
from otherwise faulty logic (mainly along the lines of  “I did not trust them to invest 
in the first place”); I suspect they thought this was a prisoner’s dilemma game, 
where the two players have to make compatible decisions in order to not be 
penalised (presumably the equivalent here would be: invest/ return £10; not invest/ 
return £0). In addition, two players who elected to return £10 appeared to have 
made a similar mistake, however, they felt it worth the risk to return £10 (“I trusted 
player 1 to invest in me, and they did”, and “I felt generous doing this but it required 




trusting someone else to share with no guarantees”). The instructions were 
provided in print and read out; presumably, either the participants had not been 
concentrating or the instructions were not clear enough.  
 
Donation to charity Almost 50% of the participants made a donation to charity: 
thirty-eight (27.0%) participants donated fifty pence, 23 (16.3%) donated £2.50, two 
(1.2%) donated £2 and one (.6%) each donated £1 and £1.50 and £22.50.  
 
 
5.4.1.6 Confounding factors  
 
Below, I describe the distribution of participants across these session characteristics, 
discussing in more detail (in Section 5.4.2) those variables that can be evaluated 
without being confused with other session characteristics.  
 
Session size - questionnaire The questionnaire data was collected in 29 sessions and 
session size varied between one and eighteen participant(s) with the following 
proportions of participants in groups of each size: one person (1%), two people (1%), 
three people (14%), four (7%), five (6%), six (6%), seven (14%), eight (3%), nine 
(12%), ten (12%), eleven (6%), fourteen (10%), and eighteen (9%)51.  
 
                                                          
51
 Due to rounding, these proportions may not add up to 100%. 
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Session size - trust game There were eighteen trust game sessions: twenty-six 
percent of respondents attended sessions involving six people, 21% attended those 
holding eight people, 33% ten people, 9% twelve people and 11% sixteen people.  
 
Time in the academic year Around 44% of the cases were collected in the Autumn 
term, 41% in the Spring term and 15% in the Summer term. Nine percent of cases 
were collected close to Christmas.  
 
Time in the term – questionnaire Eleven percent of cases were collected in the first 
three weeks of a term, 66% during the middle four weeks and 23% towards the end 
of term (final few weeks).  
 
Time in the term – trust game Eleven percent of cases were collected in the first 
three weeks of a term, 63% during the middle four weeks and 26% towards the end 
of term.  
 
Time of day - questionnaire Seventeen percent of questionnaires were started 
before 11:30am, 20% between midday – 13:30, 53% between 14:00 – 15:30 and 
10% at 16:00 or later.  
 
Time of day – trust game Thirteen percent of cases attended game sessions that 
started up until 11:30am, 35% between midday and 13:30, 49% between 14:00 – 
15:30, and finally 3.6% at 16:00 or later.  
 




Unofficial participant Fifteen percent of trust game participants were asked to sign a 
form indicating awareness that an unofficial participant would join the session. With 
only fourteen people in this category, there are too few to statistically evaluate any 
unintended effect.  
 
Double show-up fee Approximately 40% of participants signed up to the study while 
a double show-up fee was on offer.  
 
Proportion who played Game 1 as the Sender Seventy-two (42%) participants played 
the first game as the Sender. This is lower than the 50% one would expect, due to 
the presence of stand-in participants when I did not have the right number of 
participants to run the session (as mentioned above). These extra participants’ data 
is not included in these analyses.  
 
While each of these variables may potentially have influenced participants’ 
responses and behaviour, the distribution of participants would make controlling for 
them unviable; for example, to account for session size and time of day would result 
in some groups having very low numbers of participants. Due to the self-selection 
nature of these sessions, it would also be impossible to distinguish any apparent 
session effects from true interpersonal differences (for example, those who signed 
up for a session at 9am on a Monday may be different to those who signed up for a 
session at 11am or 2pm). In Section 5.4.3 I therefore test the influence of just two of 
these variables: the award of a double showup fee and whether the participant 
played their first round of the trust game as the Sender or Returner.  





5.4.2 Preliminary analyses 
 
The goal of this study is to investigate the relationship between personality and 
generalised trust, and to attempt to unpick the relationships between self-reported 
generalised trust and behavioural trust and trustworthiness as measured via the 
trust game. Here I examine the relationships between personality and some 
potential control variables, and also the experimental measures of betrayal aversion 
and charity donation. I then take an initial look at the correlations between my three 
trust-related outcome measures.  
 
 
5.4.2.1 Preliminary models: moderating variables 
 
Here I discuss the results of the preliminary regression models that were designed to 
test (a) whether the potential control variables are themselves associated with 
personality (and thus should be excluded from the analyses), and (b) whether those 
that are not associated with personality are significantly predictive of the outcome 
measures.52  
 
The personality traits are scaled such that a higher score indicates the individual 
identifies more strongly with it. Table 5.4 below shows the unstandardised 
                                                          
52
 In bivariate correlation analyses, none of these variables were so highly correlated with any other 
measure as to indicate multicollinearity. 




coefficients, the standard errors and effect size (r) for each personality trait as a 
predictor of each control and experimental variable. The bottom row gives the 
proportion of the variance that is accounted for by each model. Below, I discuss the 




























Neuroticism -.55 (.17) -.26 -.03 (.08) -.03 (.10) .31 (.09) .29 1.00 (.20) .88 (.21) -.70 (2.19) .06 (.08) 
Extraversion .30 (.16) .09 (.07) .20 (.09) .18 .11 (.09) .85 (.19) 1.02 (.20) -1.40 (2.04) -.12 (.08) 
Openness .54 (.17) .27 .14 (.07) .17 -.08 (.09) .09 (.09) 1.31 (.20) 1.41 (.21) -.12 (2.10) .11 (.08) 
Agreeableness -.28 (.14) -.16 .14 (.06) .19 -.47 (.08) -.47 -.05 (.08) .73 (.16) .09 1.12 (.17) -2.79 (1.77) .29 (.07) .36 
Conscientiousness -.27 (.15) .20 (.06) .25 -.08 (.08) -.09 (.08) 1.15 (.17) 1.07 (.19) -.65 (1.89) -.01 (.07) 
R
2
 .22 .19 .27 .13 .05 .05 .03 .17 
Bold text indicates coefficient significant at p < .05 or lower; underlined indicates borderline significance (.05 ≤ p ≤ .06).  
These models do not control for demographic variables (age, gender, year of study).  




Potential control variables 
 
Willingness to take risks (higher score indicates more willing to take risks)  
A higher level of Openness is associated with being more willing to take risks, while a 
higher level of Neuroticism is associated with being less willing to take risks. 
Agreeableness demonstrates a borderline significant association, such that a higher 
level of Agreeableness is associated with a lower willingness to take risks (p ≤ .06). 
Overall, personality traits account for 22% of the variance in willingness to take risks. 
Controlling for demographic variables resulted in the same associations, except for a 
significant effect of Extraversion (.32 [.16] .17) and a non-significant effect of 
Agreeableness (-.25 [.14] -.15).  
 
Positive reciprocity (higher score indicates higher level of positive reciprocity) 
Reporting a higher level of positive reciprocity is associated with scoring higher on 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. A higher level of positive reciprocity is also 
marginally associated with a higher level of Openness. Personality accounts for 19% 
of the variance in positive reciprocity. Controlling for demographic variables 
generated very similar results, except for a significant effect of Openness (.15 [.07] 
.18).  
 
Negative reciprocity (higher score indicates higher level of negative reciprocity) 
A higher level of negative reciprocity is associated with a significantly lower level of 
Agreeableness. Personality accounts for 27% of the variance in negative reciprocity. 
Controlling for demographic variables did not result in any changes to these findings.  




Financial insecurity (higher score indicates greater difficulty n household income) 
A higher level of financial insecurity is significantly associated with a higher score on 
Neuroticism. It is not clear whether those who are higher in Neuroticism are more 
likely to report financial difficulties, or if those who are experiencing financial 
difficulties are more likely to score higher on Neuroticism. This effect persists when 
controlling for age, gender and year of study.  
 
Game 1 as Sender (= 1; 0 = Played Game 1 as the Returner) 
Given that this variable was manipulated at random during the second session, it 
cannot have a meaningful relationship with participants’ personality. However, by 
chance, there is a marginal effect such that participants who were higher in 
Agreeableness were slightly less likely to play Game 1 as the Sender (p ≤ .06). 
Reassuringly, personality accounts for only 5% of the variance in likelihood of playing 
Game 1 as the Sender. A model that controlled for age, gender and year of study 
resulted in similar findings – except for a significant effect of Agreeableness (.70 
[.17] .10).  
 
Double show-up fee As anticipated, the receipt of a double show-up fee is not 
associated with any personality traits. This indicates that – at least at the trait level – 
there was no coincidental clustering of personality scores within payment 
‘condition’. Controlling for demographic variables did not change these findings.  
 
 






I included a measure of betrayal aversion and the opportunity to make a donation to 
charity in part to test how these items would function. If their associations with 
personality make sense theoretically, this would lend support to the conclusion that 
these items may have worked well (although further testing should be carried out in 
other studies). In neither case did controlling for demographic variables change the 
findings.  
 
Betrayal aversion (positive score indicates an aversion to betrayal; a higher score 
meaning stronger aversion)  
This measure did not show any significant relationships with personality variables. 
Significant relationships would have been expected had this variable truly measured 
betrayal aversion. In fact, personality accounts for just under 3% of the variance in 




The dataset for this model excludes an upper outlier (£22.50) by recoding it to 
match the next highest amount donated, £2.50. This model indicates that the Big 
Five personality traits account for just under 17% of the variance in the amount of 
money one donates to charity, with Agreeableness demonstrating the only 
significant association. This makes sense given the prosociality of those with high 
Agreeableness.  







Potential control variables  
 
As noted above, personality accounts for 19 – 27% of the variance in positive 
reciprocity, risk aversion and negative reciprocity. If included alongside the 
personality variables in my regression models, these would be likely to mask the 
actual relationship between personality and the outcome measures. I therefore 
exclude these variables from my models.  
 
Financial insecurity is a variable that could moderate the relationship between 
personality and the trust-related outcome variables, since fewer resources may 
make one more inclined to be cautious rather than trusting (and perhaps less likely 
to transfer money in the trust game).  Examining the correlations for this variable 
reveals a significant positive association with trait Neuroticism and five of the 
Neuroticism facets (angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness and 
vulnerability) and with the feelings facet of Openness. In addition, it reports a 
significant negative relationship with trait Conscientiousness and four 
Conscientiousness facets (competence, order, dutifulness and self-discipline). With 
this balance of associations, it appears that this may not be a straightforward case of 
“financial insecurity makes you anxious”; I therefore exclude this variable from my 




main analyses (although see Appendix 5F for a table of results from models that 





My measure of betrayal aversion is not significantly associated with any of the 
personality traits. It is therefore not clear whether this item operates as a functional 
measure of betrayal aversion. Inspection of the correlation analyses (Appendix 5C) 
shows that it does correlate negatively with behaviour as the Sender (rho = -.18, p < 
.05), indicating that those who score higher on betrayal aversion are less likely to 
invest their initial £5 stake when playing as the Sender. While this makes sense 
intuitively, I would have expected to see some correlation with personality measures 
(such as Neuroticism’s angry hostility or vulnerability). Due to the question marks 
over this measure I exclude it from my models.  
 
Order of play (having played Game 1 as the Sender) is not significantly associated 
with personality, however it does significantly correlate with behavioural trust (rho = 
.22, p = .01); those who play their first round of the trust game as the Sender are 
significantly more likely to invest their £5 stake than are those who had played first 
as the Returner. It is therefore important to control for this effect in my models. .  
 
The payment of a double show-up fee to some participants does not appear to have 
generated any coincidental associations with personality, with this variable 
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demonstrating no significant relationships with personality traits. Examination of the 
correlation coefficients however does show significant associations with feeling (rho 
= .19, p < .05) and ideas (rho = .18, p < .05; both from the Openness trait) and 
altruism (Agreeableness; rho = .18, p < .05).  
 
Of these potential control variables, the established self-report measures show 
significant associations with personality and are to be excluded from the main 
models. This leaves two to check in preliminary regression analyses, to test whether 
they do have a significant association with the outcome measures: order of play and 
the payment of a double show-up fee (see Section 5.4.3 below).  
 
In the next section, I look briefly at the correlations between the personality 
variables and between the trust-related outcome measures. I then briefly consider 
the utility of the positive and negative reciprocity measures, before turning to my 
initial regression models.  
 
 
5.4.2.3 Correlations between personality traits and facets 
 
A brief examination of the correlation matrix (Appendix 5C) reveals significant inter-
trait correlations at the trait and facet levels. Given the nature of personality, this is 
to be expected and it does fit with the indications from the existing literature (as 
discussed in Section 5.1.2). However, it should be borne in mind when considering 
the results discussed in Section 5.4.3 that any observed effects are likely to vary 








5.4.2.4 Correlations between self-reported trust, behavioural trust and 
trustworthiness 
 
Consistent with previous studies, self-reported trust did not correlate with 
behavioural trust (rho = .01, ns). However, it also correlated only weakly (and non-
significantly) with behavioural trustworthiness (rho = .14, ns). Behavioural trust and 
trustworthiness demonstrated a moderate correlation, rho = .41 (p < .001).  
 
 
In the section below, I investigate the degree of support shown in my data for the 
use of positive and negative reciprocity as proxy measures, for trustworthiness and 
betrayal aversion (respectively).  
 
 
5.4.2.5 Positive and negative reciprocity 
 
In Section 5.2.1.1 I note that positive reciprocity may be associated with 
trustworthiness, and negative reciprocity with betrayal aversion. An independent 
groups t-test, where trustworthiness is the grouping variable and positive reciprocity 
score the dependent variable, revealed that on average those who were trustworthy 
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reported significantly higher level of positive reciprocity than those who were not 
trustworthy (t = 2.68, df = 128, p < .05; r = .23. 95% CI = .09 - .62). This association is 
however weaker than one might expect from a reliable proxy measure. Meanwhile, 
negative reciprocity and betrayal aversion achieve only a non-significant correlation 
(rho = .08, ns). This is not surprising, given the uncertainty regarding this measure of 
betrayal aversion. For the present data, therefore, positive and negative reciprocity 
could not be recruited as proxy measures for trustworthiness and betrayal aversion. 
However, further investigation should be undertaken with different samples (and 
perhaps a revised measure of betrayal aversion).  
 
 
5.4.3 Regression models 
 
My preliminary models are limited to testing for the effects of being paid a double 
show-up fee and of playing Game 1 as the Sender. Examining the correlations (self-
reported trust) and t-test statistics (behavioural trust and trustworthiness) between 
these variables and each outcome measure reveals only one significant association: 
those who played Game 1 as the Sender were significantly more likely to show 
behavioural trust (phi = .22, p ≤ .01).  
 
Here I test whether this variable adds anything to the model when tested alongside 
personality as a predictor of behavioural trust. As can be seen in Table 5.4 below, 
Model B3 (which accounts for having played Game 1 as the Sender) explains 22% of 
the variance in behavioural trust, while the personality traits alone account for 16%. 




Controlling for demographic variables (age, gender and year of study) did not change 
the results, but does make the model account for 29% of the variance in total.  
 
Receiving a double show-up fee does not appear to influence behaviour in the trust 
game when playing as the Sender (OR = 1.17, ns) or the Returner (OR = 1.40, ns); this 
result does not change when excluding those who appeared to misunderstand the 
rules of the game (OR = 1.47, ns).  
 
Tables 5.5 – 5.8 below display the regression coefficients for the series of models 
that evaluated the extent to which personality predicts each of the three outcome 
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(B (SE), effect size r) 
Behavioural trust (N140) 
(OR (SE), effect size r) 
 N170 N140 N122 A1 A2 A3 A4 
Double show-up fee     1.17 (.40)   
Game1AsSender      2.75 (.38) .27 3.12 (.42) .30 
Neuroticism -.43 (.16) -.21 -.40 (.19) -.19 -.54 (.22) -.25 .76 (.22) .76 (.22) .74 (.22) .78 (.23) 
Extraversion .25 (.15) .13 .37 (.18) -.19 .06 (.19) .65 (.20) .12 .65 (.20) .12 .66 (.21) .11 .65 (.22) 12 
Openness -.07 (.17) -.04 (.18) .04 (.20) 1.98 (.22) .19 1.96 (.22) .18 1.91 (.22) .18 2.11 (.23) .20 
Agreeableness .63 (.14) .35 .57 (.15) .31 .46 (.20) .23 1.23 (.17) 1.23 (.17) 1.35 (.18) 1.41 (.19) 



















 Behavioural trustworthiness (N140) 
(OR (SE), effect size r) 
Behavioural trustworthiness (N112)  
(OR (SE), effect size r) 
 B1 B2 B3 B4 C1 C2 C3 C4 
Double show-up fee  1.40 (.40)    1.47 (.45)   
Game1AsSender   .90 (.38)    1.04 (.41)  
Neuroticism .75 (.21) .75 (.21) .75 (.21) .72 (.24) .83 (.23) .84 (.23) .83 (.23) .80 (.25) 
Extraversion .85 (.20) .85 (.20) .85 (.20) .84 (.22) .97 (.22) .97 (.22) .97 (.22) .89 (.24) 
Openness 1.27 (.21) 1.24 (.21) 1.28 (.21) 1.33 (.23) 1.21 (.23) 1.18 (.23) 1.21 (.23) 1.29 (.25) 
Agreeableness 1.63 (.18)  13 1.62 (.18) .13 1.62 (.18) .13 1.91 (.20) .18 1.62 (.19) .13 1.60 (.19) .13 1.62 (.19) .13 1.91 (.22) .18 




















a Models control for age, gender and year of study.b R2 when age, gender and year of study excluded from model. c Nagelkerke R Square.  
N122 includes only participants whose Agreeableness score remained unchanged after standardising the trust facet across all participants.  
N112 excludes participants who misunderstood the rules of the game. Models C4, D4 and E4 control for age, gender and year of study.  
Bold text indicates coefficient significant at p < .05 or lower; underlined indicates borderline significance (.05 ≤ p ≤ .06). 






5.4.3.1 Predicting self-reported generalised trust  
 
As far as I am aware, this study is the first to use the full NEO personality inventory to 
test the relationship between personality and self-reported generalised trust. Table 
5.6 shows the results of the series of regression models that assess the extent to 
which the Big Five traits and facets predict self-reported trust (significant p-values 
indicated by bold text; borderline significant [.05 ≤ p ≤ .06] coefficients underlined).  
 
Table 5.6 gives results for participants who completed both the questionnaire and the 
trust game (N140), and participants whose trait Agreeableness score remained 
unchanged after the trust facets was standardised to exclude it from this trait in the 
regression analyses (N122; see Appendix 5D for results for the full sample of 
questionnaire participants, N170). Analyses for N140 and N170 use the full, 
unadjusted Agreeableness trait score, while those for N122 use the Agreeableness 
score that incorporates the standardised trust facet.  
 
The trait coefficients are those obtained when the five traits are the only personality 
variables in the model, while the coefficient given for each facet is that obtained 
when it replaces its parent trait in the regression model alongside the other four 
personality traits. In the text below I describe the results obtained from the models 
using N140, however, I do flag any differences that are observed when using N122.  
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Research question 1 asked which personality traits and facets are associated with self-
reported generalised trust.  
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between Agreeableness and self-
reported generalised trust. As seen in Table 5.6, this expectation was supported by 
the data (B = .57, p < .001; r = .31), with a unit increase in Agreeableness associated 
with a .57 increase in self-reported trust, however, the relationship between 
Agreeableness and self-reported trust does vary depending on which facet was 
specified in the model. Similar effects were observed in the N122 subsamples and in 
models that did not control for demographic variables.  
 
The finding of a positive relationship makes sense theoretically, as discussed earlier. 
Of the two previous studies that examined the personality predictors of self-reported 
trust, one reported a significant association for Agreeableness (Dohmen et al., 2008). 
However, this trait achieved a very low effect size which suggests the significance of 
the coefficient may have been due to the large sample size. In the NEO-PI-3, 
Agreeableness does hold the facet trust. I have retained the trust facet to avoid 
disrupting the coding thresholds, however, while this may have some effect on the 
coefficients it should not exert a massive influence given that it is only one of six 
facets that sum to determine the Agreeableness score (and that these scores are re-
coded to a 5-point scale before analysis).  
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that Extraversion should be positively associated with self-
reported trust. Extraversion significantly predicted self-reported trust (B = .37, p < 




.05; r = .19), although its relationship with the outcome measure did vary across the 
facet models. As shown in Table 5.6, this effect was maintained when demographic 
variables were excluded from the model, but not when using the adjusted 
Agreeableness trait (N122; B = .06, ns).  
 
Both previous regression studies (Dohmen et al., 2008; Albanese et al., 2013) 
reported a non-significant effect of Extraversion on self-reported trust. Clearly, the 
more thorough measure of Extraversion did not reveal any outright significant 
association, although some significant (though weak) effects were unearthed. 
Examining just the correlations, Becker et al. (2012) reported a significant association 
between Extraversion and self-reported trust, although at r = .09 this was just below 
the value accepted as equating to a weak effect size.  
 
Hypothesis 3 postulated that Neuroticism would be negatively associated with self-
reported trust. As shown in Table 5.5, Neuroticism did have a significant negative 
association with generalised trust (B = -.40, p < .05; r = -.19), such that a unit increase 
in Neuroticism was associated with a .40 drop in self-reported trust. A similar effect is 
observed in the N122 subsample, irrespective of whether demographic variables are 
included in the model. The finding of a negative association between Neuroticism and 
self-reported trust echoes the findings from previous studies (Dohmen et al., 2008; 
Albanese et al., 2013; Becker et al., 2012).  
 
Conscientiousness was not associated with self-reported trust when demographic 
variables were included in the model. Excluding demographics (and using N140 and 
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thus the full Agreeableness trait), Conscientiousness significantly predicted self-
reported generalised trust (B = -.32, p < .05; r = -.17). This effect was not quite 
significant in the reduced sample N122. Openness was not significantly associated 
with self-reported trust in any of the trait or facet models.  
 
In both of the previous regression studies, Conscientiousness was found to 
significantly predict self-reported trust. However, in one of these (Dohmen et al., 
2008) the coefficient seems small enough to suggest its significance may be driven by 
sample size. Albanese et al. (2013) reported a coefficient of -.100 (p < .01), however, 
it is not clear whether this is the standardised or unstandardised coefficient and 








Table 5.6: Coefficients for NEO-PI-3 variables when predicting self-reported GTQ 
score (unstandardised coefficients (SE), effect size r) 
 N140 N122 
 With demog. No demog. With demog. No demog. 
Neuroticism -.40 (.19) -.19 -.41 (.19) -.19 -.54 (.22) -.25 -.51 (.22) -.23 
Extraversion .37 (.18) -.19 .35 (.17) .18 .06 (.19) .07 (.19) 
Openness -.04 (.18) -.03 (.18) .04 (.20) .05 (.19) 
Agreeableness .57 (.15) .31 .58 (.15) .32 .46 (.20) .23 .47 (.19) .23 
Conscientiousness -.30 (.16) -.32 (.16) -.17 -.29 (.18) -.31 (.17) 
N1 Anxiety -.31 (.18) -.32 (.18) -.25 (.21) -.21 (.20) 
N2 Angry hostility -.17 (.18) -.19 (.17) -.20 (.19) -.22 (.18) 
N3 Depression -.65 (.20) -.28 -.67 (.20) -.29 -.73 (.23) -.34 -.73 (.22) -.34 
N4 Self-consciousness -.19 (.19) -.21 (.19) -.16 (.21) -.14 (.20) 
N5 Impulsiveness -.37 (.21) -.41 (.20) -.18 -.52 (.23) -.23 -.58 (.23) -.25 
N6 Vulnerability -.39 (.18) -.19 -.41 (.18) -.20 -.62 (.21) -.29 -.62 (.21) -.29 
E1 Warmth .23 (.18) .23 (.17) -.05 (.20) .02 (.19) 
E2 Gregariousness .19 (.15) .18 (.15) .09 (.16) .10 (.16) 
E3 Assertiveness .22 (.18) .16 (.17) .17 (.20) .07 (.19) 
E4 Activity .09 (.18) .07 (.18) -.09 (.19) -.09 (.19) 
E5 Excitement-seeking .11 (.19) .10 (.18) -.04 (.21) -.10 (.21) 
E6 Positive emotions .38 (.17) .22 .39 (.16) .22 .15 (.19) .21 (.18) 
O1 Fantasy -.22 (.18) -.21 (.17) -.16 (.19) -.18 (.18) 
O2 Aesthetics .05 (.16) .05 (.15) .12 (.16) .12 (.16) 
O3 Feelings .07 (.17) .03 (.16) .20 (.17) .16 (.17) 
O4 Actions .06 (.18) .07 (.17) -.18 (.18) -.14 (.17) 
O5 Ideas -.02 (.17) -.02 (.17) .17 (.19) .13 (.19) 
O6 Values -.01 (.21) .02 (.20) .12 (.22) .17 (.21) 
A1 Trust 1.24 (.13) .67 1.24 (.13) .67 1.16 (.15) .59 1.17 (.15) .59 
A2 Straightforwardness .24 (.17) .24 (.16) .21 (.18) .17 (.18) 
A3 Altruism .19 (.21) .23 (.21) .47 (.23) .20 .49 (.23) .21 
A4 Compliance .21 (.15) .20 (.15) .09 (.16) .10 (.16) 
A5 Modesty .08 (.16) .07 (.15) -.02 (.17) -.04 (.17) 
A6 Tender-mindedness .34 (.19) .30 (.18) .13 (.20) .18 (.19) 
C1 Competence -.05 (.19) -.05 (.18) -.04 (.21) -.03 (.20) 
C2 Order -.33 (.14) -.19 -.34 (.14) -.19 -.30 (.16) -.32 (.16) -.18 
C3 Dutifulness -.29 (.19) -.32 (.18) -.13 (.19) -.16 (.19) 
C4 Achievement striving -.30 (.14) -.18 -.33 (.14) -.20 -.36 (.15) -.22 -.40 (.15) -.25 
C5 Self-discipline -.15 (.17) -.20 (.17) -.13 (.20) -.19 (.19)  
C6 Deliberation -.08 (.18) -.11 (.18) .01 (.19) -.03 (.19) 
Bold font indicates coefficient significant at p ≤ .05; underlined coefficient indicates borderline 
significance (.05 < p ≤ .06).  
Demographic variables included were age, gender and year of education: these were all non-significant 
in every model except for N122, where gender was borderline significant (p = .057).  
N140: total sample of participants who completed the questionnaire and the trust game; model uses 
the full Agreeableness trait, with facet A1 (trust) intact. 
N122: subsample of N170; model uses the adjusted Agreeableness trait, with facet A1 (trust) 
standardised to its mean and thereby excluded from these analyses.  
Trait coefficients (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness): 
association with GTQ when traits are the only personality variables in the model (i.e. no individual 
facets included). 
Facets: coefficient indicates association with GTQ when this facet replaces its parent trait in the model 
(e.g. the coefficient for N1 [Anxiety] indicates the association between N1 and GTQ when N1 replaces 
Neuroticism in the model alongside Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness).  
 




Facets Using the N140 subsample, and controlling for demographic variables, six 
facets significantly predicted self-reported trust. Two belong to Neuroticism 
(depression, B = -.65, p < .01; r = -.28 and vulnerability, B = -.39, p < .05; r = -.19) and 
are associated, respectively, with a .65 and .39 drop in self-reported trust per unit 
increase in score on the relevant facet. The remaining facets that show significant 
associations with self-reported trust are positive emotions (Extraversion. B = .38, p < 
.05; r = .22) and trust (Agreeableness. B = 1.24, p < .007; r = .67) and two 
Conscientiousness facets, order (B = -.33, p < .05; r = -.19) and achievement striving 
(B = -.30, p < .05; r = -.18). These indicate an increase of .38 in self-reported trust per 
unit increase in positive emotion, an increase of 1.24 per unit increase in trust, and a 
drop of.33 and .30 respectively per unit increase in the remaining two facets.  While 
trait Agreeableness is associated with self-reported trust, these analyses show that 
trust is the only Agreeableness facet to have a significant effect. When not 
controlling for demographic variables, a significant effect is also observed for 
impulsiveness (Neuroticism).  
 
As shown in Table 5.6, excluding the trust facet from the Agreeableness trait (N122) 
results in significant effects for depression, impulsiveness and vulnerability 
(Neuroticism), trust and altruism (Agreeableness), order and achievement-striving 
(Conscientiousness). The heightened effects (relative to N140) for vulnerability and 
altruism appear due to the nature of the subsample, which is similar on self-
reported trust but higher in vulnerability and lower in altruism. The lack of a 




significant effect for positive emotion appears to be due to disproportionate 
representation of ‘average’ scores on this facet and fewer cases scoring ‘very high’.  
 
One of the previous predictive studies reports a significant effect of Agreeableness 
(Dohmen et al., 2008), and Becker et al. (2012) report a significant correlation with 
self-reported trust. This is interesting, given that their measure of personality (the 
fifteen-item BFI-S) does not ask about trust but just asks the following three items, 
each beginning “I see myself as someone who...”: (1) “... is sometimes rude to 
others”, (2) “... has a forgiving nature”, and (3) “... is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone”. Logically, it would make sense that these three descriptions would apply 
to somebody who trust others. Similarly to the three-item social trust scale (as 
described in Chapters 2 and 3), the items measuring the NEO trust facet measure 
one’s beliefs about other people in general rather than about known others (for 
example, “I believe that most people are basically well-intentioned”; McCrae & 
Costa, 2010: 106). However, while I find that trust is the only Agreeableness facet to 
show an association with self-reported trust, it is clearly possible that the overall 
state of ‘being agreeable’ is associated with being more trusting.  
 
The negative effect of the Neuroticism facets, and the positive effect of positive 
emotions fits with Smillie’s (2008) Approach/ Avoidance model.  
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5.4.3.2 Predicting behavioural trust 
 
The coefficients for the regression of personality on behavioural trust are displayed 
below in Table 5.7.  
 
 
Research question 2 asked which traits and facets predict behavioural trust.  
 
Traits As reported in Table 5.7, Extraversion (OR = .65, p < .05; r = .12) and Openness 
(OR = 2.11, p < .001; r = .20) were significantly associated with behavioural trust, 
indicating that a unit increase in Extraversion or Openness is associated with, 
respectively, .65 and 2.11 times the likelihood of investing £5 when playing as the 
Sender (i.e. demonstrating trust during the trust game). Similar effects are found for 
these two traits when demographic variables are excluded from the model.  
 
From the results of an experimental study, Becker et al. (2012) report significant 
correlations between behavioural trust and Openness but also Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness. Conversely, Müller and Schwieren (2012) found significant 
correlations for Neuroticism and Agreeableness, with significant effects in regression 
analysis for Neuroticism, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness (see Sections 









Table 5.7: Coefficients for NEO-PI-3 variables when predicting behavioural trust and 
trustworthiness (odds ratio (SE) effect size r)   
 Behavioural trust Behavioural trustworthiness 
 With demog. No demog. With demog. No demog. 
Neuroticism .78 (.23) .74 (.22) .72 (.24) .75 (.21) 
Extraversion .65 (.22) .12 .66 (.21) .11 .84 (.22) .85 (.20) 
Openness 2.11 (.23) .20 1.91 (.22) .18 1.33 (.23) 1.27 (.21) 
Agreeableness 1.41 (.19) 1.35 (.18) 1.91 (.20) .18 1.63 (.18) .13 
Conscientiousness .79 (.20) .77 (.19) .75 (.21) .76 (.19) 
N1 Anxiety .87 (.22) .82 (.21) .91 (.22) .85 (.20) 
N2 Angry hostility 1.22 (.21) 1.07 (.19) .93 (.23) 1.00 (.19) 
N3 Depression .91 (.25) .87 (.24) .82 (.26) .82 (.24) 
N4 Self-consciousness .68 (.24) .61 (.23) .14 .77 (.23) .72 (.22) 
N5 Impulsiveness .83 (.26) .82 (.24) .53 (.27) .17 .71 (.23) 
N6 Vulnerability .56 (.25) .16 .59 (.22) .14 .72 (.23) .80 (.20) 
E1 Warmth .50 (.24) .19 .53 (.22) .17 .98 (.22) .77 (.21) 
E2 Gregariousness .52 (.20) .18 .53 (.19) .17 .68 (.19) .11 .73 (.21) 
E3 Assertiveness 1.18 (.21) 1.20 (.20) 1.24 (.23) .84 (.21) 
E4 Activity .99 (.20) .95 (.20) .97 (.22) .79 (.21) 
E5 Excitement-seeking .91 (.21) .88 (.21) .87 (.23) .90 (.21) 
E6 Positive emotions .72 (.20) .74 (.19) .73 (.22) .77 (.19) 
O1 Fantasy 1.55 (.23) .12 1.42 (.21) 1.27 (.23) 1.16 (.21) 
O2 Aesthetics 1.78 (.19) .16 1.75 (.19) .15 1.28 (.19) 1.29 (.18) 
O3 Feelings 1.77 (.21) .16 1.60 (.19) .13 1.30 (.21) 1.22 (.19) 
O4 Actions 1.08 (.20) 1.00 (.19) 1.19 (.22) 1.11 (.20) 
O5 Ideas 1.60 (.21) .13 1.53 (.20) .12 1.19 (.21) 1.17 (.20) 
O6 Values .70 (.24) .78 (.22) .75 (.27) .90 (.23) 
A1 Trust 1.22 (.21) 1.20 (.19) 1.75 (.21) .15 1.53 (.18) .12 
A2 Straightforwardness 1.34 (.20) 1.32 (.19) 1.63 (.21) .13 1.50 (.19) .11 
A3 Altruism 1.44 (.25) 1.41 (.24) 2.01 (.26) .19 1.55 (.23) .12 
A4 Compliance 1.40 (.18) 1.33 (.17) 1.66 (.19) .14 1.46 (.17) .10 
A5 Modesty 1.26 (.19) 1.28 (.17) 1.32 (.19) 1.37 (.17) 
A6 Tender-mindedness .95 (.22) .85 (.21) 1.50 (.22) 1.17 (.20) 
C1 Competence .97 (.22) .89 (.21) .98 (.23) .87 (.21) 
C2 Order .89 (.18) .88 (.17) .81 (.19) .81 (.17) 
C3 Dutifulness .94 (.22) .87 (.21) 1.01 (.23) .95 (.21) 
C4 Achievement striving .98 (.17) .93 (.16) .86 (.18) .89 (.16) 
C5 Self-discipline .60 (.21) .14 .59 (.21) .14 .70 (.22) .70 (.20) 
C6 Deliberation .70 (.22) .70 (.21) .84 (.23) .80 (.21) 
For all models, N = 140. Bold font indicates coefficient significant at p ≤ .05; underlined coefficient 
indicates borderline significance (.05 < p ≤ .06).  
Trait coefficients (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness): 
association with GTQ when traits are the only personality variables in the model (i.e. no individual 
facets included).  
Facet coefficients: association with GTQ when this facet replaces its parent trait in the model (e.g. the 
coefficient for N1 [Anxiety] indicates the association between N1 and GTQ when N1 replaces 
Neuroticism in the model alongside Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness).  
Demographic variables included were age, gender and year of education. Year of education tended to 
significantly predict behavioural trust in most models, as did age. All three variables tended to 
significantly predict behavioural trustworthiness.   
Models predicting behavioural trust also controlled for having played Game 1 as the Sender.  
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At certain times, the following traits also become significant:  
 
The odds ratio (OR) for Agreeableness reaches significance in the models for twelve 
facets, for example, Neuroticism’s anxiety, angry hostility and self-consciousness. In 
these twelve models the coefficient for Agreeableness ranges from 1.46 (p < .05, r = 
.10) to 1.78 (p < .01, r = .16), indicating that one’s likelihood of investing (as the 
Sender in the trust game) increases by up to 78% per unit increase in Agreeableness. 
The variation in this trait’s relationship with behavioural trust, across the facet 
models, illustrates the interrelatedness that exists across the NEO personality 
constructs.  
 
In previous studies, Müller and Schwieren (2012) reported correlations between 
behavioural trust and Neuroticism and Agreeableness, and associations for these 
plus Conscientiousness in a regression model that also accounted for age and 
gender. Meanwhile, Becker and colleagues (2012) reported that Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness significantly correlated with behavioural trust. Clearly this is not 
unquestioningly supported by my main analyses. T-test analyses of the relationships  
between behavioural trust and Agreeableness, and behavioural trust and 
Conscientiousness, also show non-significant associations indicating that there is no 
relationship even when the other traits are excluded from the models.  
 
These differences may be due in part to differences in the design of the games used. 
In Müller and Schwieren’s (2012) trust game, both the Sender and Returner began 
the game with the same endowment and were each at liberty to transfer any 




amount to their game partner. Becker et al.’s (2012) game also allowed the Sender 
and Returner to transfer any amount, although it is not clear whether only the 
Sender or both participants began the game with a monetary stake. These design 
differences may well have had an impact on the cognitive and affective processes 
engaged by the Senders and therefore the responses of participants with different 
personality trait/ facet configurations.  
 
Facets Behavioural trust is predicted by several personality facets: vulnerability 
(Neuroticism. OR = .56, p < .05; r = .16), gregariousness (Extraversion. OR = .52, p < 
.001; r = .18), warmth (Extraversion. OR = .50, p < .01; r = .19), aesthetics (Openness. 
OR = 1.78, p < .01; r = .16), feelings (Openness. OR = 1.77, p < .01; r = .16), ideas 
(Openness. OR = 1.60, p < .05; r = .13) and self-discipline (Conscientiousness. OR = 
.60, p < .05; r = .14) are significantly predictive of behavioural trust. These results 
indicate that the likelihood of investing is significantly reduced per unit increase in 
vulnerability (by 46%), gregariousness (48%), warmth (50%) or self-discipline (40%), 
and significantly increased per unit increase in aesthetics (by 78%), feelings (77%) or 
ideas (60%). The effect of fantasy (Openness. OR = 1.55, p = .052) is borderline 
significant. Interestingly, no facets within Agreeableness are significantly associated 
with one’s likelihood of investing when playing as the Sender in the trust game.  
 
With the exception of fantasy (which is no longer borderline significant), these 
associations are also found when demographic variables are excluded from the 
model. In addition to these, however, in a personality-only model self-consciousness 
also shows a significant association with behavioural trust (OR = .61, p < .05; r = .14).  




As far as I am aware, only one other study has investigated the relationships 
between personality facets and behaviour in the trust game. Müller and Schwieren 
(2012) found, in a model that included only the thirty personality facets, that 
behaviour as the Sender is significantly negatively predicted by anxiety, angry 
hostility and depression (Neuroticism), positively associated with trust and 
straightforwardness (Agreeableness) and negatively associated with order and 
deliberation (Conscientiousness).  
 
From the theoretical discussion in Section 5.1.2, Müller and Schwieren’s (2012) 
results make sense while mine are slightly less intuitive. The negative association 
with vulnerability (e.g. sensitivity to loss) makes sense, as could the negative effect 
of gregariousness (e.g. sensitivity to reward) and self-discipline (e.g. keen to make 
good decisions and be efficient). However, I would have expected warmth to be 
associated with investing – particularly given that if they do not invest, their game 
partner leaves with nothing. In addition, it is not immediately apparent why ideas 
and aesthetics should be associated with investing, unless this relates to increased 
cognitive flexibility to see their game partner’s predicament.  
 
Examining the items that measure these facets offers some explanation. While the 
items that measure gregariousness clearly target the extent to which the 
respondent prefers the company of other people, they might not differentiate 
between sociability and some form of excitement-seeking. For example, alongside 
items that ask directly about preferences regarding spending time alone versus with 




other people are items such as “I’d rather vacation at a popular beach than an 
isolated cabin in the woods” (McCrae & Costa, 2010: 103). While this does obviously 
indicate a preference regarding the presence of other people, I can imagine a 
number of other reasons why one may or may not want to spend their holiday on a 
crowded beach.  
 
Similarly, the warmth facet measures attachment and interaction style with known 
others and people one meets face-to-face. It is possible that the distinctly 
impersonal setting of the computer-based trust game does not inspire warm 
feelings, particularly when the game partner is an anonymous stranger. Two items 
appear to measure one’s response to strangers – one is “I really like most people I 
meet” (McCrae & Costa, 2010: 103), while the second could either indicate a 
genuine warmth towards strangers or simply the individual’s proclivity for looking as 
though they are having a good time.  
 
And finally, the Openness facets: while aesthetics is ostensibly about appreciation of 
various art forms, the questions appear to measure the extent to which one is 
moved by the arts. This could be measuring affective responsiveness, for example 
romanticism, in which case it may make sense that those who score highly on 
aesthetics could be subtly moved by the plight of the Returner. A closer look at the 
items measuring ideas also makes this finding a little less peculiar: measuring the 
respondent’s interest in what could be broadly termed ‘philosophical and 
intellectual puzzles’, it is possible that those who score highly on this facet are 
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motivated to contemplate the best outcome from the game (or do so automatically 
without effort), i.e. to bring as much money into play as possible.  
 
 
5.4.3.3 Predicting behavioural trustworthiness 
 
Research question 4 asked which traits and facets are associated with behavioural 
trustworthiness. The results of the regression models for behavioural 
trustworthiness are presented in Table 5.7.  
 
Traits Behavioural trustworthiness is predicted only by Agreeableness (OR = 1.91, p < 
.01; r = .18): a unit increase in Agreeableness is associated with almost twice the 
likelihood of returning £10 to the Sender. This supports hypothesis 4. Elsewhere, 
Openness significantly predicts trustworthiness when Agreeableness is replaced by 
trust (OR = 1.55, p < .05; r = .12) or straightforwardness (OR = 1.58, p < .05; r = .13), 
indicating that the likelihood of being trustworthy increases by approximately 56% 
per unit increase in Openness, when either of these facets is accounted for.  
 
Becker et al. (2012) reported that behaviour as the Returner in the trust game was 
correlated with Agreeableness and Openness, while Müller and Schwieren (2012) 
found no significant associations for behavioural trustworthiness at the trait level. 
Again, these differences may be partially due to the design of these games, which 
undertook different procedures for eliciting responses from the Returner. Becker 
and colleagues (2012) used the strategy method, asking Returners to specify in 




advance how much they would send back to the Sender for all possible investments 
they could receive. In contrast, Returners in Müller and Schwieren’s (2012) study 
provided their response after learning how much money the Sender had invested 
with them. In both studies, Returners were allowed to transfer any amount rather 
than having their choice constrained.  
 
It is likely that the strategy method will have encouraged participants to think 
through their responses, thus engaging a different level of cognitive processing than 
the more instinctive response that I was aiming to measure. In addition, it has been 
noted that the experience of being trusted tends to have an influence on 
behavioural response – i.e. level of trustworthiness – perhaps via the release of the 
neurotransmitter oxytocin (Zak et al., 2004). Therefore, Müller and Schwieren’s 




Facets As shown in Table 5.7, when controlling for demographic variables 
trustworthiness is predicted by the Neuroticism facet impulsiveness (OR = .53, p < 
.05; r = .17 – although this effect becomes non-significant when demographics are 
excluded from the model) and by the Extraversion facet gregariousness (OR = .68, p 
< .05; r = .11 – which also becomes non-significant when the demographic variables 
are omitted), in addition to four of the Agreeableness facets: trust (OR = 1.75, p < 
.01; r = .15), straightforwardness (OR = 1.63, p < .05; r = .13), altruism (OR = 2.01, p < 
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.01; r = .19) and compliance (OR = 1.66, p < .01; r = .14).53 These results show that 
the likelihood of returning £10 to the Sender significantly drops by 32% with every 
unit increase in gregariousness, and is significantly increased by a unit increase in 
trust (a 75% increase in likelihood), straightforwardness (63%), altruism (100%) and 
compliance (66%). These associations predominantly remain when demographic 
variables are excluded from the model, although altruism becomes only borderline 
significant. These associations largely persist when the demographic variables are 
removed from the model, however, the effects of impulsiveness and gregariousness 
become non-significant, and that of altruism becomes borderline significant.  
 
These findings show that behaviour as the Returner in the trust game – at least, in 
this trust game, with this sample – was predominantly motivated by kindness. This 
fits the qualitative data, with 62% of those who transferred £10 to the Sender citing 
reasons such as “it was only fair” or “I felt they should be rewarded”. 
 
Müller and Schwieren (2012) found a significant correlation for competence, but 
only when the amount invested by the Sender was above a certain threshold.  
 
The reduced likelihood of returning £10 for those with high gregariousness 
accompanies a reduced likelihood of investing when playing as the Sender; as noted 
above, the items measuring gregariousness may be measuring a preference for 
extrinsic rewards (particularly amongst the demographic I sampled). It is interesting 
                                                          
53
 Excluding those who appeared to misunderstand the rules of the game results in only minor 
changes to these findings (see Appendix 5D for a comparison of the coefficients from the two 
samples).  




that tender-mindedness (Agreeableness) did not show an association with 
trustworthiness, especially given the altruistic reasons stated by those who were 
trustworthy. However, the items that measure tender-mindedness are related to 
broader social issues (e.g. attitudes towards people who are homeless). This may 
therefore not transfer to the lab/ game context.   
 
  




Table 5.8: Regression coefficients and effect sizes for the significant predictors  
 
Self-reported trust (N122) 
B (SE) r 
Behavioural trust 
OR (SE) r 
Trustworthiness 
OR (SE) r 
Neuroticism -.54 (.22) -.25   
Extraversion  .65 (.22) .12  
Openness  2.11 (.23) .20 (occasional) 
Agreeableness .46 (.20) .23 (occasional) 1.91 (.20) .18 
Conscientiousness (occasional)   
N1 Anxiety    
N2 Angry hostility    
N3 Depression -.73 (.22) -.34   
N4 Self-consciousness    
N5 Impulsiveness -.52 (.23) -.23  .53 (.27) .17  
N6 Vulnerability -.62 (.21) -.29 .56 (.25) .16  
E1 Warmth  .50 (.24) .19  
E2 Gregariousness  .52 (.20) .18 .68 (.19) .11 
E3 Assertiveness    
E4 Activity    
E5 Excitement-seeking    
E6 Positive emotions    
O1 Fantasy    
O2 Aesthetics  1.78 (.19) .16  
O3 Feelings  1.77 (.21) .16  
O4 Actions    
O5 Ideas  1.60 (.21) .13  
O6 Values    
A1 Trust 1.16 (.15) .59  1.75 (.21) .15 
A2 Straightforwardness   1.63 (.21) .13 
A3 Altruism .47 (.23) .20  2.01 (.26) .19 
A4 Compliance   1.66 (.19) .14 
A5 Modesty    
A6 Tender-mindedness    
C1 Competence    
C2 Order -.30 (.16) -.18   
C3 Dutifulness    
C4 Achievement striving -.36 (.15) -.22   
C5 Self-discipline  .60 (.21) .14  
C6 Deliberation    
Trait and ‘Game1AsSender’ coefficients taken from Table 5.4. Facet coefficients taken from 
Tables 5.5 – 5.7. Bold font indicates coefficient significant at p < .05 or lower; underlined 
borderline significant at .05 ≤ p ≤ .06.  
All models control for age, gender and year of study. Models predicting behavioural trust 




5.4.4 The drivers of self-reported trust, behavioural trust and trustworthiness 
 
The predictors of self-reported trust clearly differ from those of behavioural trust 
and trustworthiness. The significant associations for each outcome measure are 




given in Table 5.8 and below I summarise my findings regarding the predictors of 
self-reported versus behavioural trust, self-reported trust versus trustworthiness, 
and behavioural trust versus trustworthiness.  
 
 
5.4.4.1 Self-reported and behavioural trust 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.3.3), no reason has really been offered in the 
theoretical or empirical literature for expecting one’s behaviour in the trust game to 
relate to self-reported generalised trust. While it is conventional to use the trust 
game as a measure of generalised trust, it is obvious that this offers a very specific 
context to the trust scenario.  
 
In fact, it is not clear that the Sender in the trust game responds to their 
predicament as a ‘trust’ scenario, because this behaviour is not at all correlated to 
trust as measured by the NEO-PI-3. Rather, it is positively associated with trait 
Openness and the Openness facets aesthetics, feelings and ideas, and negatively 
associated with the facets vulnerability, gregariousness, warmth and self-discipline. 
Self-reported trust, in contrast, is negatively associated with trait Neuroticism, the 
Neuroticism facets depression, vulnerability and impulsiveness, and the facets 
altruism, fantasy, achievement-striving and order. The only effect that is common to 
both self-reported and behavioural trust is the negative effect of vulnerability.  
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These findings strongly suggest that behaviour as the Sender in (this version of) the 
trust game is not motivated by the same cognitive and affective processes as 
responses to the generalised trust question (GTQ). The strong relationship between 
the GTQ and the NEO trust facet indicates that the GTQ does indeed measure trust. 
However, further research is needed to determine what the trust game measures: 
the results of the current study strongly suggest that the decision is related to the 
ability to affectively connect with the Returner and a cognitive aptitude for 
reflecting on the optimal outcome. Research has shown that one’s propensity for 
this type of cognitive processing is diminished by activation of the amygdala’s fight/ 
flight response or the perception of threat (e.g. Dimoka, 2010), which may account 
for the role of vulnerability in promoting a decision to keep the £5. However, these 
results could be largely due to the design of the game used in this study. It would be 
interesting to test the personality associations with a revised design, such that the 
Returner also begins the game with £5 (and the multiplication factor of the invested 
amount is adjusted accordingly).  
 
These results suggest that a decision to return £10 to the Sender – which entails a 
recognition of the favour the Sender has done for the Returner, and the willingness 
to accept a lower payoff – is driven by Agreeableness; whatever drives 
Agreeableness appears to endow its bearer with intrinsic motivation to reciprocate. 
If we look back to Reward Sensitivity Theory (RST; Section 5.1.2.2), it is perhaps 
these individuals who gain vicarious enjoyment from rewarding others.  
 
 




5.4.4.2 Self-reported trust and trustworthiness 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.3.3), there is some reason to expect self-
reported trust to be related to behavioural trustworthiness. The personality-based 
drivers of the two outcome measures offer some support for this, despite the lack of 
a significant correlation between them.  
 
Four Agreeableness facets are similarly significantly predictive of trustworthiness: 
trust, straightforwardness, altruism and compliance. While trust is not the strongest 
it does have a significant association with trustworthiness, which supports the 
theories described in Section 5.1.2. These findings also offer partial support for the 
theories associated with neuroscience 
 
Self-reported trust and behavioural trustworthiness are both significantly influenced 
by Agreeableness, and in particular by the Agreeableness facet trust. However, the 
effect of Agreeableness on trustworthiness goes farther than it does for self-
reported trust, with four of its facets demonstrating a substantial association.  
 
With the Oxford English Dictionary defining ‘trustworthiness’ as “able to be relied on 
as honest or truthful” (Oxford University Press, 2015), it seems as though Returner 
behaviour in the trust game may indeed be an indicator of trustworthiness. It is not 
clear from these results whether we may in fact be observing a preference for 
cooperation (which has previously been reported as correlating with Agreeableness 
in public goods games; Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2011), however, in the role of 
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Returner, trustworthiness and cooperation are possibly a single preference. As 
noted in Section 5.4.3.3, the qualitative data indicate a desire to reciprocate the 
Sender’s goodwill rather than a grudging acceptance that it is more socially 
acceptable to return £10 than to return £0. This indicates that whether we label it 
‘trustworthiness’ or ‘cooperation’, this behaviour is undeniably driven by volitional 
reciprocal intentions and a desire to treat the game partner well. Again, this may be 
due in part to the game design used in this study – the Returner is aware that the 
Sender could have just kept their £5, so the more Agreeable person may be inclined 
to view the Sender’s investment as a kind gesture and to show their gratitude for 





In this section I summarise my findings with regard to the degree of support 
indicated for Personality Theory (Delhey & Newton, 2003) and the apparent 
relatedness of self-reported trust and behaviour as the Sender and Returner in the 
trust game. I then reflect on what this study has taught me regarding my three 








Personality Theory  
 
According to the results of this study, self-reported generalised trust is inhibited by 
Neuroticism as well as its facets depression, vulnerability and impulsiveness. In the 
broader sample (N140) and full sample (N170), self-reported trust is also associated 
with the Extraversion facet positive emotions (representing trait optimism). These 
findings support the theory described in Section 5.1.2.4, which posited that trust 
should be associated with positive affect (Approach behaviours) and caution with 
negative affect (Avoidance behaviours). Clearly, these findings demonstrate some 
support for the Personality Theory of generalised trust.  
 
 
Relationships between self-reported trust and behaviour in the trust game 
 
As noted above, there is not a great deal of overlap in the personality-based 
predictors of self-reported trust and behaviour as the Sender in the trust game. I 
have thus been unable to find empirical or theoretical support for the common 
assumption that the trust game offers us a behavioural measure of generalised 
trust. In contrast, a relationship between self-reported trust and behaviour as the 
Returner does appear more tenable, both theoretically and empirically. Those who 
score highly on the prosocial personality trait Agreeableness report a higher level of 
generalised trust and they are more likely to return a positive amount to the Sender 
when playing as the Returner. Qualitative data suggest that the latter inclination is 
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driven by a desire to show kindness to their game partner rather than any 
assumption that other people would do the same for them.  
 
 
5.5.1 Lessons, limitations and recommendations for future research  
 
I now turn to reflect on what I have learned from this study regarding my three 
outcome measures; self-reported trust and behaviour as the Sender and Returner in 
the trust game.  
 
 
The generalised trust question  
 
With the GTQ having received much criticism in the literature (regarding its lack of 
specificity, its bipolar response scale and the fact that it is only one item), it is 
interesting to note that it stands up rather well to comparison with the six-item NEO 
trust facet: part of an inventory that has for some time been regarded as the gold 
standard in personality assessment (University of Cambridge, 2015). It is also 
interesting to note that there are no grounds on which we should expect the GTQ to 
correlate with behaviour as the Sender in the trust game (see Naef & Schupp’s 
[2009] concerns regarding what the GTQ measures).   
 
Given that my questionnaire did also measure the other two items from the three-
item social trust scale, in future research I could re-run these analyses using these 




two items, and the mean score on the social trust scale, as outcome measures in 
place of the GTQ. This would enable me to compare their personality-based 




The trust game: Sender behaviour 
 
There are a number of unexpected but ultimately informative observations to be 
made from this study regarding the decision made by the Sender: the possibility that 
the decision to invest was driven by altruism rather than by trust; the possibility that 
this game design in fact measures caution (which, if comparable to the generalised 
trust question, may not be the opposite end of a bipolar scale with trust and 
therefore may be associated with different predictor variables); and, that the initial 
stake may have been too low to stimulate a trust-based decision.  
 
Trust versus altruism or cooperation As noted above, the likelihood of participants 
investing their £5 stake was not associated with the Agreeableness facet trust. In 
addition, the only overlap between the predictors of self-reported and behavioural 
trust was that both were negatively associated with the Neuroticism facet 
vulnerability. Adding this to the qualitative data, which shows that the majority of 
those who invested were motivated by other-regarding concerns, it appears that in 
this experiment the decision to invest was not usually a trust decision. This may 
largely be due to the Returner starting the game with £0, as discussed above, 
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perhaps prompting the Sender to be either cooperative or altruistic. The design used 
was developed intentionally in order to polarise participants, in particular, to make 
the decisions for Sender and Returner difficult so there would be a good chance that 
the decisions would be made for a reason rather than arbitrarily. It would be helpful 
if future work could test a similar design, but where both the Sender and Returner 
start the game with £5 (and the multiplication factor applied to the invested amount 
adjusted accordingly). It would be interesting to test which personality elements 
predict Sender behaviour under these conditions; in theory the decision to invest 
should not be driven by altruism because both begin the game with the same 
amount.  
 
Measuring trust versus distrust For those who chose to keep their £5, the qualitative 
data indicate that this was very much about not trusting that their game partner 
would return any money to them. It is therefore possible that what this game 
actually measured was distrust. These results may be illustrative of Dimoka’s (2010) 
findings, from neurological investigations, that trust is associated with the reward 
region while distrust is associated with the emotional and negative affect region (at 
least in part, the amygdala). Dimoka also flags that (a) emotional processing occurs 
before cognitive processing, and (b) activation of the amygdala, which is the home 
of the fight/ flight reflex, tends to be immediate and decisive. With Neuroticism 
associated with negative affect, and those with high Neuroticism more prone to 
amygdala activation, it is natural that high Neuroticism would be associated with a 
decision to keep the £5. With this in mind, my findings offer only partial support to 
Holm and Nystedt’s (2008: 536) assertion that “... if the issue of trust is addressed in 




non-hypothetical settings, subjects appear to be driven by other motives that are 
more related to concepts such as kindness and fairness”; it is for those who invest, 
but according to the qualitative data for many of those who were cautious distrust 
was very much a driving factor in their decision to keep the £5.  
 
Value of the initial stake From a study that elicited participants’ expectations of their 
game partner’s trustworthiness, Sapienza et al. (2013) note that the Sender’s 
behaviour is not driven by trust for small amounts of money. The initial stake held by 
the Sender was constrained by my budget for this experiment, however, it is 
possible that £5 is too low an amount to warrant a decision based on trust (even for 
students, who are notoriously poor). For those adept at self-regulation (high 
Agreeableness; Jensen-Campbell et al., 2002), the primary concern was to make the 
game fair for their game partner, while for those without this facility at their 
disposal (or for whom financial hardship was a more pressing issue), concern about 
their own potential losses won out and they kept the money. It would be interesting 
to test whether the personality predictors of Sender behaviour varied if the initial 
stake were raised to £10 or £15.  
 
And finally, a note regarding the comparability of the generalised trust question and 
behaviour as the Sender: Holm and Nystedt (2008) report that while they found no 
correlation between self-reported trust and behaviour as the Sender in the trust 
game when there was a monetary incentive, self-reported and behavioural trust did 
correlate when there was no incentive. Therefore, it may be the case that the trust 
game measures generalised trust, but only when the scenario – much like the 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
342 
 
generalised trust question – is free of consequence. This suggests that self-reported 
trust cannot necessarily be regarded as an indication of one’s actual likely behaviour 
given a scenario that requires trust, but should perhaps be regarded as an indication 
of the person’s outlook. Given that the incentivised trust game is inherently not free 
of consequence, this cannot be assumed to measure generalised trust. This may give 
cause to question Naef and Schupp’s (2009b) efforts to develop a survey measure of 
trust that correlates with behaviour in the trust game, and what their new item 
actually measures.   
 
Ideally, future work should examine the predictors of decisions in an incentivised, 
and a non-incentivised, trust game. In addition, it would be helpful if the 
questionnaire also included Naef and Schupp’s (2009b) new measure of self-
reported trust, so that its predictors can be compared with those of the standard 
generalised trust question as well as behaviour in both the incentivised and non-
incentivised game.  
 
It may also be informative to experiment with a range of starting endowments and 
patterns of endowment – i.e. whether just the Sender begins the game with a 
monetary stake or both the Sender and Returner do so. Investigation of the 
predictors of Sender behaviour in each design may help us to establish exactly when, 








The trust game: Returner behaviour 
 
Returning £10 to the Sender was associated with a higher level of Agreeableness. 
This is to be expected, given that those higher in Agreeableness tend to be more 
compassionate and inclined to choose other-regarding behaviour over self-interest 
(van den Bos, van Dijk, Westenberg, Rombouts, & Crone, 2009). In addition, the 
significant coefficient for the trust facet may support Evans and Revelle’s (2008) 
suggestion that those who are trusting are more likely to see the Sender ‘as a 
partner rather than as an opponent’ (p.1592). My participant information sheet did 
specifically refer to ‘game partner’ rather than ‘opponent’, so it is possible that this 
was noted by those whose prosocial inclinations outweighed any concerns about 
their own vulnerability to potential losses.  
 
As discussed in Section 5.4.1.5, it appears as though a fair proportion of my 
participants (21% of 140 people) misunderstood the rules of the trust game. While I 
made every effort to explain this clearly, it appears that some had mistaken it for a 
prisoner’s dilemma game and assumed that their decision as the Returner somehow 
had to match the Sender’s decision. I am not aware of another study that has asked 
participants why they made the decisions they did, so it is not currently known how 
often this or a similar misunderstanding occurs. It would therefore be advisable for 
future studies to include a measure of participants’ rationale behind their decisions. 
Studies should also make it very clear in the instructions that the only consideration 
for the Sender and Returner is how much money they would like to transfer.  
 




Miscellaneous improvements to the study design 
 
At the start of the trust game session – after I had read out the participant 
information sheet and before Game 1 began – zTree. asked the participants four 
questions, ostensibly to check they had understood the rules of the game but also to 
make them aware of the rules if they had been otherwise engaged up until that 
point. As should undoubtedly be expected, some participants had difficulty 
answering these questions, especially Question 4 which asked them how much the 
Sender may receive in return if they invest their £5 (£0 or £10).  
 
It may have helped their understanding if I had included in the instruction sheet a 
decision tree to illustrate each possible monetary outcome. I had elected not to 
include this due to a concern that it might encourage participants to ignore the text, 
however, it appears some did this anyway. Therefore, including such a diagram 
might ensure that those who do not read the text can at least become aware of the 
rules with little effort.  
 
And finally, it is not clear whether my measure of betrayal aversion worked. It would 
be very useful to conduct cognitive interviewing on this measure to find out how 
participants interpret and respond to the question. It could also be informative to 
undertake a similar exercise regarding decisions in the trust game – and preferably 
for different designs of the game.  
 





5.5.2 Overall conclusions 
 
Within a rather homogenous sample of a relatively homogenous population, I have 
found that self-reported generalised trust (as measured using the GTQ) is related to 
personality (as measured by McCrae and Costa’s [2010] NEO-PI-3), as are the 
decisions made by the Sender and Returner in (this version of) the trust game. 
Additionally, I have found evidence that the GTQ does measure self-reported trust, 
and it appears that behaviour as the Returner in (this version of) the trust game can 
be taken as an indicator of trustworthiness.  
 
Behaviour as the Sender has been slightly more difficult to pigeonhole and does 
require closer investigation as described above. However, initial indications suggest 
that it should not be used as an indicator of generalised trust equivalent to a 
behavioural measure of the GTQ. Importantly, the evidence so far suggests that 
neither should the non-correspondence between these two measures be taken as 
an indication of weakness on the part of the generalised trust question.  
 
The individual-level drivers of generalised trust are not likely to inspire policy change 
or widespread social reform. They can, however, help us to understand the origins 
of generalised trust rather than just its moderators. While the social and societal 
theories regarding the aetiology of generalised trust do have important points to 
make regarding environmental influences on our perceptions and behaviour they 
cannot truthfully be cited as describing its origins. The evidence base for the 
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individual-level theories is building and, especially with contributions from the fields 
of social and personality neuroscience, it will be interesting to see how far we can go 
towards uncovering the processes that underlie trust and its associated behaviours.  
  










I began this thesis by discussing the importance of social cohesion and social capital 
– in particular, bridging social capital – and the value of subjective measures. As 
noted in Chapter 1, a new use of these indicators emerged several years ago with 
Harrison et al.’s (2011) proposed set of indicators of the perceived progress of 
society, which measure perceptions of Lockwood’s (1964) social integration (the 
degree of cohesion versus discord between individuals within society) and system 
integration (the degree of cohesion versus discord between the parts that maintain 
the functioning of society, such as its institutions).  
 
In this chapter I briefly describe the aims of my earlier chapters and their findings. I 
then discuss some of the potential implications of my findings from chapters 4 and 5 
and, finally, in my overall conclusions I briefly re-examine some of the explanations 
noted in Chapter 3 regarding the apparent decline in generalised trust (and thus 
social cohesion) over the past several decades.  
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6.2 Chapters 2 to 5 
 
Chapter 2 investigated the degree of measurement invariance across time 
demonstrated by four of Harrison et al.’s (2011) proposed indicators of the progress 
of society: Social Trust, Trust in Institutions (represented here as two constructs: 
Political Trust and Trust in the Law), Evaluations of National Performance and the 
(perceived) Quality of Public Services. I found that events such as the financial crisis 
can have a detrimental impact on the integrity of theoretical constructs, as 
respondents’ evaluations on a single aspect cease to be driven by heuristics and 
instead reflect the objective state of affairs. With data collected both before and 
during the financial crisis, the Evaluations of National Performance domain failed to 
achieve full scalar equivalence. It was necessary to draw out satisfaction with the 
economy as a standalone factor before this model could show equivalence across 
time.  
 
To my knowledge, this is the first empirical investigation into the measurement 
invariance of these indicators over time and, perhaps fortuitously, the years 
spanned permitted realisation of the potential objectivity of these measures. While 
perhaps predominantly of interest to those involved in the design of surveys and the 
development of social indicators, similar research involving data from subsequent 
years could be informative regarding the extent of public response to the financial 
crisis and whether it has also damaged public opinion regarding the performance of 
the government or the functioning of democracy, perhaps permitting the re-
grouping of this theorised factor via the modification of existing heuristics.  





In Chapter 3, I investigated the existing theoretical and empirical literature relating 
to the individual-level and society-level theories of the origins of generalised trust. 
At the individual level, these are Personality Theory (Delhey and Newton, 2003) and 
Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the moral foundations of trust (MFTT), while Societal 
Theory bears similarities to Rothstein and Stolle’s (2008) Institutional Theory. In my 
review of the literature, I found that there was a dearth of empirical examinations of 
theories at both of these levels in comparison to the vast literature that has 
examined the theories that posit the social origins of generalised trust. Particularly 
troubling was that Personality Theory had in one study been tested using 
inappropriate proxy measures (that in fact are more likely to be indicators of social-
level theories), from which the authors concluded that personality was not relevant 
to social trust (Delhey & Newton, 2003). I closed this chapter with the 
recommendation that further research should be undertaken to test the individual-
level theories.  
 
In chapters 4 and 5 I followed up on this recommendation by implementing 
theoretically-driven tests of the two individual-level theories of generalised trust. In 
Chapter 4 I investigated the relationship between generalised trust and Schwartz’s 
human values. In addition, I examined the extent to which these relationships vary 
cross-nationally – i.e. in different societal contexts (according to the level of 
corruption and income inequality in society). I found that Schwartz’s Self-
transcendence (combined Universalism and Benevolence) and Security values (and 
perhaps the combined Conformity/ Tradition value, depending on one’s view 
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regarding the appropriateness of including demographic variables in the model) do 
indeed predict generalised trust, thereby supporting Uslaner’s (2002) theory of the 
moral foundations of trust.  
 
The Level 2 variables – national levels of corruption and income inequality – also 
predict self-reported trust, with lower corruption and income inequality associated 
with higher reported levels of trust. In testing the stability of the effects of the 
human values (on generalised trust), I found that each of the values constructs 
generally demonstrates a stable relationship with generalised trust cross-nationally 
(although there was a marginal effect for Conformity/ Tradition, which reported a 
borderline significant coefficient in random slopes analysis). This suggests that, on 
average, human values are affected by the characteristics of society in a manner 
similar to generalised trust.  
 
In Chapter 5 I tested Personality theory, which posits that generalised trust is driven 
by and is indeed an aspect of personality. Given the on-going debate in the literature 
regarding whether the generalised trust question measures trust or trustworthiness, 
I investigated not only the extent to which personality predicts self-reported 
generalised trust, but also  behaviour as the Sender and Returner in the trust game 
(which are commonly used as behavioural measures of trust and trustworthiness 
respectively).  
 
I discovered that self-reported trust is predicted by personality, as are the two 
behaviours measured in the trust game. However, in this design of the game, self-




reported and behavioural trust share no personality-based predictors except that 
both demonstrate a negative relationship with the vulnerability facet of 
Neuroticism. While self-reported trust is strongly related to the trust facet of 
Agreeableness, in this study this facet shows no relationship at all to behaviour as 
the Sender. It is therefore not yet clear that the trust game measures trust, or that 
the GTQ should be expected to correlate with this behaviour. From participants’ 
responses to the qualitative items, it appears that in this game design investing as 
the Sender is driven primarily by concern for the game partner, while declining to 
invest is associated with distrust or caution.  
 
It appears likely, however, that this game design did measure trustworthiness since 
this behaviour was positively associated with Agreeableness. Agreeableness is likely 
to imbue the Returner with a drive to be fair to their game partner rather than to 
prioritise self-interest. With self-reported trust also showing an association with this 
trait, it is possible that both the GTQ and trustworthiness are driven by prosocial 




6.3 Who trusts and why?  
 
At the beginning of Chapter 4, I flagged the rhetorical question of who trusts and 
why. As one may intuitively expect, it appears as though those who prioritise 
egalitarian values are more likely to report a higher level of generalised trust. 
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Generalised trusters tend to report low Neuroticism and high Agreeableness. In 
some models trust is positively associated with trait Extraversion and positive 
emotions (dispositional optimism). Generalised trusters score low on the 
Conscientiousness facets order and achievement striving. Feelings of vulnerability 
and concern for Security are associated with lower levels of trust, as are (amongst 
others) high scores on the Neuroticism facets impulsiveness and depression and the 
prioritisation of values that indicate concern for the standing of one’s own social 
group.  
 
Generalised trust is also more likely to be reported by those who live in more 
progressive societies, where corruption and income inequality are low.54 These 
findings therefore indicate support for the Societal Theory of generalised trust; that 
one’s evaluation of the trustworthiness of others is in part associated with the 
nature of the society in which one lives.  
 
The relationships between personality traits and trust make sense according to the 
neuroscientific literature, where high Agreeableness has been found to be positively 
associated with so-called ‘effortful control’ – the automatic inhibition of a dominant 
response55 in favour of a preferred (but subdominant) response (Jensen-Campbell et 
al., 2002) – while high Neuroticism is associated with a lower level of cognitive 
control over the dominant response (Augustine, Larsen, & Lee, 2013).  
                                                          
54
 Given their extremely strong correlation with corruption, this effect would also be observed for 
societies with higher GDP per capita and with higher government efficacy. 
55
 A dominant response may be, for example, for the Returner to keep the £15 because this is in their 
own favour. A subdominant response may be to transfer £10 to the Sender, keeping only £5 for 
oneself, in order to reciprocate the favour (had the Sender not invested their £5, the Returner would 
have ended the game with £0).  





Essentially – and, as may intuitively be expected – generalised trusters trust because 
they are not sufficiently concerned to be distrustful. Conversely, particularised 
trusters are cautious because they are prone to feelings of vulnerability. However, 
there is a caveat. It is not clear whether the Agreeable individual really wants to 
report that they think most people can be trusted (or that they really want to return 
£10 to their game partner and keep only £5 for themselves). We are simply 
measuring the response they decided to give. This is not to imply that they 
responded disingenuously; rather, that while the Agreeable person probably will 
give strangers the benefit of the doubt (and probably will behave in a trustworthy 
manner), this may not have been their immediate affective reaction when first faced 
with the question. While those who are low in Agreeableness are less likely to be 
able to self-regulate any negative emotional response and therefore may report 
their first response, the Agreeable person’s ‘effortful control’ system will enable 
them to quickly select their response to most situations.  
 
 
6.4 Implications of my findings for research into generalised trust, and the 
importance of individual-level characteristics  
 
In this section I discuss the possible implications of my findings for the individual-
level theories of generalised trust and for broader research in this field. I also discuss 
the potential benefits of considering individual-level characteristics (such as 
personality) in social research.  





The individual-level theories of generalised trust 
 
The results of chapters 4 and 5 clearly offer encouragement for both Uslaner’s 
(2002) theory of the moral foundation of trust and Personality Theory (Delhey & 
Newton, 2003). However, it is not clear whether each model independently 
accounts for a substantial proportion of the variance in generalised trust or if they 
simply overlay each other. This is not a question I can answer from the results 
discussed here, but examination of this in future research would be of value.  
 
In the event that the effects of personality and values are found to be driven by the 
same underlying mechanism, careful consideration would need to be given to 
whether these can really be regarded as two separate theories and, if not, whether 
the continuance of both theories serves to blur our understanding of trust or if they 
are complementary. These theories may or may not both be crucial to our 
understanding of generalised trust, but they may both be important to elucidating 
the social manifestations of our personality and value orientations.  
 
 
Broader research into generalised trust 
 
As discussed earlier, previous research has primarily focussed on the social drivers of 
generalised trust. My findings indicate that generalised trust is associated with 




individual-level characteristics. Our personality and values are key in driving our 
perceptions, feelings and behaviour; these characteristics will therefore contribute 
to the nature of our engagement with our social environment. It would be 
interesting to examine the degree of variance in self-reported generalised trust that 
is ‘explained’ by the socially-oriented theories once the effects of personality are 
accounted for.  
 
The second key finding from this research is that this study does not support the use 
of the trust game as a behavioural measure of generalised trust. While further 
research is needed, using different samples and different designs of the trust game, 
there is as yet no theoretical or empirical justification for expecting self-reported 
trust and behaviour in the trust game to correlate. While there do appear to be 
theoretical and empirical reasons to expect self-reported generalised trust to 
correlate with behavioural trustworthiness, the results of my study suggest this may 
not be for the reason most commonly cited in the literature: while many suggest 
that a correlation between these measures is likely to be due to an assumption that 
others are like ourselves, my findings support Evans and Revelle’s (2008) suggestion 
that in fact those who are more prosocial and cooperative are more likely both to 
trust and to be trustworthy (and, in the context of the trust game, they are perhaps 
more likely to regard their Sender as a game partner than as a competitor).  
 
These findings, if replicated by future studies, suggest the need for a change to the 
way the generalised trust question, and generalised trust as a concept, are regarded 
in the literature.  





Regarding the relevance of individual-level characteristics to social research 
 
The individual-level theories of generalised trust, particularly alongside insights from 
the fields of social and personality neuroscience, offer immense opportunities for 
developing our understanding of the relationships between our perceptions, our 
behaviour and our neural functioning. By considering these related fields of 
research, similar opportunities may be realised by those concerned with other 
cognitions or behaviours. While social factors (for example, our occupation or socio-
economic status) and societal factors (for example, the degree of government 
effectiveness and corruption) do undoubtedly have a role to play in driving the way 
in which we interact with our environment (and the people and institutions in it), 
consideration of the individual’s temperament or predispositions could be 
exceptionally informative if appropriate attention is given to the development of 
theoretical orientations.  
 
While I appreciate that fielding a very long questionnaire requires a time luxury (and 
perhaps a budgetary luxury) that large-scale social surveys generally do not have, 
the periodic inclusion of a similar personality inventory in a longitudinal, 
representative population survey could be immensely helpful to researchers across 
the life sciences, in particular, psychological and health sciences. It would further our 
understanding of not only changes over time but also (if fielded alongside 
appropriate partner questions) how to encourage changes in attitudes and 




behaviour. Other fields that may draw particular benefit from the availability of such 




6.5 Overall conclusions 
 
The initial and underlying concern of this thesis was with the measurement of social 
and system integration, and the importance of both of these to a high-functioning 
society. Much emphasis has been placed on generalised trust as an indicator of 
social cohesion and of the ‘wellness’ of society, and the apparent decline of 
generalised trust over time has been seen by many as a cause for concern.  
 
The increasing diversity within UK towns and cities may prompt stronger concerns 
for those who have a more restricted moral community; the clearer presence within 
society of people who they perceive to be substantially different to themselves (due 
for example to differences in appearance or in cultural practices) may raise concerns 
about the security and standing of their own social group. Meanwhile, as the pace of 
life (and associated pressures) increase, increasing levels of stress may be putting 
everybody at heightened risk of negative affective states (such as depression) which, 
in turn, are associated with increased feelings of vulnerability and a lower likelihood 
of reporting that most people can be trusted.56 While the authorities report interest 
in boosting bridging social capital, these efforts may need to be supplemented with 
                                                          
56
 It goes without saying that the higher prevalence of negative affect that is likely in low quality 
societies is likely to raise the proportion of the population that report caution over trust.  
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interventions that seek specifically to alleviate the concerns of those who are low in 
generalised trust and whose primary concern is for the wellbeing of the existing 
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Table 2A: Fieldwork dates, sample size and response rate for Rounds 2 – 5 of the ESS 
 Fieldwork dates Total sample Response rate (%) 
Target: 01/09/-- – 31/12/--  70.0 
ESS2 27/09/04 – 16/03/05 1,897 50.6 
ESS3 05/09/06 – 14/01/07 2,394 54.6 
ESS4 01/09/08 – 19/01/09 2,352 55.8 
ESS5 31/08/10 – 28/02/11 2,422 56.3 
Data source: www.europeansocialsurvey.org  
 







Table 2B: Descriptive statistics (weighted by design weight; sample size and % missing data unweighted) 















services Econ. Gov. Democ. 
ESS2              
Mean 3.59 3.68 4.29 5.12 6.12 5.18 5.64 5.59 5.56 5.40 5.34 4.37 5.14 
SD 2.24 2.12 2.34 2.33 2.31 2.14 1.98 2.00 2.06 2.28 2.07 2.27 2.33 
Skewness .228 .099 .014 -.284 -.595 -.325 -.344 -.306 -.340 -.185 -.385 .010 -.228 
Kurtosis -.436 -.508 -.554 -.514 -.112 -.189 -.082 -.128 -.287 -.492 -.253 -.527 -.471 
N 1870 1860 1874 1857 1890 1893 1888 1883 1835 1881 1832 1865 1810 
% Missing 1.4 2.0 1.2 2.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.7 3.3 0.8 3.4 1.7 4.6 
ESS3              
Mean 3.41 3.53 4.20 5.00 6.00 5.37 5.68 5.76 5.56 5.23 5.22 4.05 4.93 
SD 2.17 2.08 2.34 2.36 2.34 2.13 2.00 2.01 2.12 2.33 2.14 2.31 2.32 
Skewness .092 .027 -.048 -.304 -.598 -.432 -.348 -.504 -.452 -.192 -.406 -.021 -.204 
Kurtosis -.698 -.532 -.568 -.558 -.119 -.036 -.039 .168 -.151 -.541 -.154 -.607 -.391 
N 2348 2340 2349 2352 2380 2384 2385 2384 2307 2381 2309 2353 2353 
% Missing 1.9 2.3 1.9 1.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 3.6 0.5 3.6 1.7 5.2 
ESS4              
Mean 3.56 3.63 4.32 5.17 6.24 5.29 5.58 5.69 5.75 5.95 3.13 3.60 4.88 
SD 2.23 2.16 2.46 2.43 2.40 2.18 2.03 2.08 2.10 2.21 2.11 2.32 2.43 
Skewness .099 .034 -.063 -.298 -.703 -.443 -.349 -.462 -.469 -.468 .419 .249 -.158 
Kurtosis -.525 -.500 -.662 -.542 .045 -.185 -.102 -.060 -.034 -.187 -.165 -.545 -.606 
N 2325 2312 2318 2315 2344 2348 2347 2341 2278 2343 2318 2325 2258 
% Missing 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 3.1 0.4 1.4 1.1 4.0 
ESS5              
Mean 3.43 3.52 4.11 5.24 6.24 5.35 5.75 5.60 5.77 6.29 3.49 4.29 4.97 
SD 2.26 2.22 2.41 2.39 2.35 2.13 1.91 2.02 2.08 2.14 2.03 2.34 2.40 
Skewness .152 .064 .001 -.340 -.732 -.471 -.385 -.381 -.503 -.608 .300 -.107 -.221 
Kurtosis -.749 -.756 -.745 -.477 .111 -.227 -.020 -.135 -.167 -.024 -.186 -.697 -.570 
N 2365 2350 2344 2333 2395 2415 2405 2396 2273 2394 2359 2299 2237 
% Missing 2.4 3.0 3.2 3.7 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.1 6.2 1.2 2.6 5.1 7.6 
Data source: European Social Survey Rounds 2 – 5 (2004 – 2010)  
  

















































































































































































Figure 2C.3: CFA measurement model for ESS5 
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Figure 3A.1: Yamagishi et al.’s (1999: 147, Figure 1) graphical representation of two 
items from the social trust scale. Reproduced with permission from John Wiley & 
Sons. Copyright © Blackwell Publishers Ltd with the Asian Association of Social 














Figure 3A.2: Rahn and Transue’s (1998: 549, Figure 1) representation of the trajectories of the three social trust items. Reproduced with 
permission from John Wiley & Sons. Copyright © 1998 International Society of Political Psychology. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 
Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK. 












Figure 3B: Costa and McCrae’s (1999) five-factor personality system (circle directing 
attention to the basic tendencies added by me). Figure taken from J. S Wiggins (Ed), 
The five-factor model of personality. Copyright © 1996 Guilford Publications Inc. 


















Age in years (%)
a
  
Highest level of education - ISCED (%)  15-24 25-49 50-64 65+ 
 
ESS3 Euro. ESS3 Euro. ESS3 Euro. ESS3 Euro. 0-1 2 3 4 5-6 
Austria 2336 46.2 20.8 12.3 37.5 37.7 16.9 17.6 8.9 16.4 .9 22.3 62.0 7.7 7.1 
Belgium 1766 46.6 14.7 12.1 34.1 35.6 18.4 18.1 15.7 17.2 12.6 23.3 36.2 .0 27.8 
Bulgaria 1239 40.0 11.4 13.6 31.9 35.5 25.4 20.1 15.4 17.2 6.9 24.8 47.5 .0 20.9 
Switzerland 1748 46.1 10.8 11.8 37.0 37.4 20.7 18.8 15.6 16.0 6.3 19.5 47.0 4.3 22.9 
Cyprus 915 46.5 13.0 16.0 36.0 36.0 20.8 16.5 11.0 12.2 17.0 11.5 46.0 .0 25.5 
Germany 2780 49.2 10.5 11.8 37.2 36.5 20.3 18.4 17.9 19.3 3.0 12.1 56.5 6.9 21.6 
Denmark 1449 48.9 7.7 11.2 33.0 35.1 24.4 19.9 16.4 15.2 1.6 18.8 36.4 .0 43.1 
Estonia 1419 43.3 14.4 14.8 32.5 35.1 18.4 18.2 19.7 16.9 3.9 22.0 39.3 3.9 30.9 
Spain 1795 48.5 12.1 11.8 39.8 40.6 16.1 16.5 17.4 16.6 35.9 20.7 16.8 8.5 18.0 
Finland 1644 47.5 10.8 12.5 31.1 33.2 23.0 21.1 17.9 16.0 18.8 13.7 36.1 .0 31.4 
France 1951 48.5 11.4 13.0 37.3 34.2 20.6 17.9 12.1 16.3 16.1 13.8 43.8 .0 26.3 
United Kingdom 2292 47.2 12.3 13.0 34.0 35.3 19.5 17.8 16.2 15.9 23.6 23.6 12.7 .0 40.1 
Hungary 1407 41.7 10.0 12.9 34.6 35.8 22.9 20.1 17.1 15.8 5.2 28.6 45.8 5.6 14.7 
Ireland 1525 45.6 13.7 15.1 37.2 38.0 17.2 15.4 11.4 10.9 15.6 21.9 22.5 .0 40.1 
Netherlands 1814 47.7 9.4 12.0 37.9 36.5 21.0 19.0 13.5 14.3 9.5 31.4 27.5 7.3 24.2 
Norway 1530 49.8 11.2 12.4 36.3 35.2 20.5 18.2 12.7 14.8 1.1 17.5 34.6 9.8 37.0 
Poland 1620 47.2 17.3 16.2 33.9 36.0 19.3 18.2 12.7 13.0 2.7 26.2 55.9 3.8 11.4 
Portugal 2114 41.0 10.9 12.1 32.6 37.0 21.3 17.8 19.5 17.3 58.8 14.9 16.1 .0 10.1 
Russian Federation 2293 41.4 17.1 17.0 35.8 37.7 17.7 16.6 14.1 13.4 6.4 12.4 32.8 .0 48.4 
Sweden 1582 48.8 11.1 12.4 32.3 33.3 23.3 19.7 15.9 17.3 12.5 18.3 42.1 .0 27.1 
Slovenia 1324 44.8 14.9 13.1 33.6 38.0 20.6 19.2 16.8 15.6 3.2 24.2 52.0 .0 20.7 
Slovakia 1621 48.2 15.1 15.8 38.2 37.8 18.6 17.9 11.5 11.8 2.1 18.9 67.4 .0 11.6 
Ukraine 1859 42.7 11.6 15.8 31.9 36.4 21.7 17.2 20.2 16.2 11.3 8.9 27.1 .0 52.7 
a
 Data taken from Eurostat (Euro.) are % of entire population; ESS rescaled to account for this. 
b
 % 25-64 year olds who have attained ISCED 3 – 6. ESS data 
weighted by design weight, calculated from Round 3 integrated dataset (edition 3.4). “NA” indicates data not available. 
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Table 4A.2: Descriptive data (occupation, financial comfort and generalised trust)  




Professional  N 
Living 
comfortably Coping Difficult 
Very 
difficult N Mean (SD) 
Austria 2326 16.9 2279 39.1 50.6 7.5 2.7 2326 5.12 (2.35) 
Belgium 1767 23.1 1753 37.8 41.8 16.0 4.4 1767 4.98 (2.28) 
Bulgaria 1248 17.1 1241 1.0 24.0 39.3 35.6 1236 3.39 (2.77) 
Switzerland 1758 19.1 1741 51.1 37.4 8.5 3.0 1746 5.69 (2.16) 
Cyprus 933 10.4 919 20.6 55.2 21.8 2.5 925 4.24 (2.64) 
Germany 2828 17.1 2801 24.9 56.8 13.8 4.5 2824 4.79 (2.30) 
Denmark 1451 30.0 1435 67.7 26.7 4.3 1.4 1446 7.05 (2.07) 
Estonia 1420 23.7 1390 9.2 60.4 22.7 7.7 1397 5.34 (2.20) 
Spain 1802 12.3 1784 32.8 50.6 13.9 2.7 1797 5.10 (1.99) 
Finland 1645 24.3 1641 23.3 65.3 9.4 2.0 1645 6.58 (1.85) 
France 1948 21.1 1950 31.3 54.5 12.8 1.4 1951 4.47 (2.23) 
United Kingdom 2301 24.7 2285 42.5 42.5 12.6 2.3 2292 5.37 (2.13) 
Hungary 1409 11.7 1405 5.6 49.5 32.9 12.0 1408 4.35 (2.55) 
Ireland 1582 26.4 1562 48.3 40.8 9.4 1.5 1587 5.35 (2.36) 
Netherlands 1814 33.0 1807 48.0 40.3 8.9 2.8 1815 5.78 (2.03) 
Norway 1533 17.1 1532 56.2 36.2 5.9 1.7 1533 6.89 (1.77) 
Poland 1629 15.1 1619 6.1 58.2 32.6 3.1 1624 4.08 (2.38) 
Portugal 2117 8.2 2076 8.3 52.9 25.8 13.0 2082 4.07 (2.34) 
Russian Federation 2306 17.7 2270 4.2 32.6 40.5 22.7 2285 3.92 (2.75) 
Sweden 1585 23.5 1577 59.1 33.0 6.7 1.3 1583 6.34 (2.02) 
Slovenia 1329 18.9 1310 45.8 42.4 9.1 2.7 1325 4.10 (2.64) 
Slovakia 1670 17.1 1649 11.1 46.7 30.5 11.7 1663 4.29 (2.37) 
Ukraine 1877 21.6 1828 .8 20.7 48.5 30.0 1841 4.10 (2.85) 
Data source: ESS Round 3 integrated dataset (edition 3.4). Data weighted by design weight.  
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Table 4A.3: Descriptive data (Schwartz’s human values constructs)  
 Schwartz's value priorities, centred: Mean (SD)   
 





Austria 2331 0.28 (0.83) 0.46  (0.71) 0.71 (0.64) -0.31 (1.01) -0.57 (0.97) .58 (.56) -.44 (.83) 
Belgium 1767 0.18 (0.83) 0.60 (0.56) 0.77 (0.56) 0.08 (0.85) -0.19 (0.90) .68 (.45) -.05 (.70) 
Bulgaria 1244 0.76 (0.79) 0.44 (0.63) 0.65 (0.64) 0.30 (1.01) 0.14 (0.98) .55 (.51) .22 (.84) 
Switzerland 1744 0.17 (0.86) 0.78 (0.59) 0.82 (0.57) -0.01 (0.89) -0.58 (0.95) .80 (.47) -.30 (.72) 
Cyprus 915 0.74 (0.59) 0.39 (0.52) 0.68 (0.51) 0.30 (0.71) -0.30 (0.85) .52 (.43) .05 (.66) 
Germany 2826 0.32 (0.90) 0.60 (0.65) 0.75 (0.63) -0.06 (0.92) -0.32 (1.01) .68 (.52) -.19 (.80) 
Denmark 1451 -0.17 (0.93) 0.64 (0.67) 0.99 (0.58) -0.27 (0.95) -0.04 (1.02) .81 (.50) -.16 (.80) 
Estonia 1418 0.59 (0.78) 0.62 (0.62) 0.63 (0.66) 0.04 (0.93) 0.00 (0.91) .62 (.52) .02 (.76) 
Spain 1800 0.67 (0.74) 0.74 (0.54) 0.85 (0.57) 0.21 (0.88) 0.03 (0.87) .80 (.46) .12 (.74) 
Finland 1644 0.43 (0.93) 0.80 (0.66) 0.76 (0.67) -0.10 (0.88) 0.06 (0.96) .78 (.55) -.02 (.76) 
France 1951 0.22 (0.96) 0.94 (0.69) 0.82 (0.73) 0.09 (0.96) -0.33 (0.98) .88 (.56) -.12 (.73) 
United Kingdom 2300 0.40 (0.86) 0.59 (0.68) 0.77 (0.63) -0.04 (0.94) -0.23 (1.04) .68 (.52) -.14 (.81) 
Hungary 1413 0.76 (0.74) 0.46 (0.60) 0.55 (0.67) 0.07 (0.93) -0.48 (0.92) .51 (.49) -.21 (.73) 
Ireland 1603 0.49 (0.84) 0.59 (0.66) 0.67 (0.69) 0.15 (0.93) -0.20 (1.02) .63 (.54) -.02 (.79) 
Netherlands 1816 0.05 (0.78) 0.59 (0.58) 0.63 (0.58) -0.21 (0.89) -0.10 (0.85) .61 (.46) -.15 (.73) 
Norway 1533 0.15 (0.87) 0.62 (0.67) 0.81 (0.61) -0.21 (0.97) 0.22 (0.96) .72 (.50) .00 (.80) 
Poland 1625 0.58 (0.73) 0.56 (0.52) 0.48 (0.60) 0.23 (.085) 0.32 (0.75) .52 (.44) .27 (.67) 
Portugal 2106 0.47 (0.73) 0.52 (0.56) 0.64 (0.65) 0.22 (0.84) -0.25 (0.95) .58 (.51) -.01 (.74) 
Russian Federation 2313 0.76 (0.82) 0.44 (0.66) 0.41 (0.70) 0.13 (1.02) -0.11 (0.98) .42 (.54) .01 (.85) 
Sweden 1585 -0.10 (0.89) 0.67 (0.69) 0.81 (0.66) -0.06 (0.90) -0.24 (0.92) .74 (.54) -.15 (.73) 
Slovenia 1329 0.28 (0.78) 0.46 (0.58) 0.46 (0.59) 0.16 (0.84) -0.19 (0.90) .46 (.45) -.02 (.73) 
Slovakia 1668 0.64 (0.69) 0.44 (0.54) 0.35 (0.62) 0.24 (0.86) 0.15 (0.77) .40 (.47) .20 (.69) 
Ukraine 1853 0.77 (0.83) 0.57 (0.63) 0.50 (0.70) 0.19 (0.94) 0.23 (0.93) .54 (.54) .21 (.76) 
Data source: ESS Round 3 integrated dataset (edition 3.4). Data weighted by design weight.  
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Table 4A.4: Descriptive data (Level 2 variables) 
 
GDP  Gini CPI  
Government 
effectiveness 
Austria 32131.49 31.00 8.22 1.90 
Belgium 30998.35 25.00 7.25 1.85 
Bulgaria 2950.48 31.90 3.98 0.11 




Germany 29714.24 28.30 7.80 1.63 
Denmark 40829.07 23.20 9.50 2.17 
Estonia 8162.93 37.20 5.97 0.92 
Spain 21863.75 32.50 6.98 1.55 
Finland 32411.75 26.90 9.70 2.18 
France 29395.47 32.70 6.98 1.69 
United Kingdom 33030.64 36.80 8.58 1.82 
Hungary 8693.41 24.40 5.00 0.92 
Ireland 40967.49 35.90 7.37 1.63 
Netherlands 33869.22 30.90 8.87 1.99 
Norway 53990.30 25.80 8.75 1.94 
Poland 6561.72 34.10 3.72 0.51 
Portugal 15801.18 38.50 6.43 1.06 
Russian Federation 3966.00 40.00 2.57 -0.47 
Sweden 35668.22 25.00 9.20 1.99 
Slovenia 15116.93 28.40 5.93 0.93 
Slovakia 8781.73 25.80 4.02 0.76 
Ukraine 1369.62 29.00 2.40 -0.61 
GDP – mean score from 2001 – 2006 
Gini – score from date nearest to 2006, as available 
CPI – mean score from 2001 – 2006 






























































































































































                
Universalism .092 -.008 1 
               
Benevolence .106 -.061 .302 1 
              
Security -.197 .225 .016 -.021 1 
             
Tradition -.096 .157 .155 .133 .248 1 
            
Conformity -.053 .102 .008 -.020 .249 .350 1 
           
Self-
transcendence 
.115 -.033 .815 .667 .004 .170 .003 1 
          
Conformity/ 
Tradition 
-.083 .155 .095 .066 .276 .756 .763 .106 1 
         
Openness .103 -.181 -.191 -.175 -.466 -.499 -.482 -.242 -.645 1 
        
Age -.032 .089 .184 .122 .242 .358 .325 .186 .384 -.305 1 
       
Gender (m = 1) .030 -.091 -.111 -.133 -.122 -.100 -.027 -.135 -.072 .102 -.045 1 
      
Education .127 -.169 .020 -.034 -.180 -.197 -.149 -.007 -.210 .191 -.220 .045 1 
     
Occupation .128 -.179 .052 -.003 -.137 -.110 -.058 .033 -.097 .109 .036 .057 .395 1 
    
GDP .310 -.467 .102 .183 -.238 -.125 -.089 .165 -.129 .163 -.004 .043 .022 .059 1 
   
Gini -.146 .166 -.010 -.058 .127 .066 -.011 -.036 .033 -.065 .011 -.036 -.112 -.024 -.274 1 
  




.293 -.479 .102 .188 -.232 -.116 -.101 .167 -.131 .170 -.004 .049 -.061 .050 .883 -.345 .965 1 
Coefficients in bold text are significant at p < .001; those in italic text are significant at p < .05
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Please enter your ID code and check to make sure you have entered it correctly. This 




This questionnaire will ask you about yourself and your opinions. Your answers are 
completely anonymous and the data you provide will only be used for statistical 
analysis. You are free to leave the survey at any time if you wish to, without penalty. 
 
Many of the questions are written in American English - this was unavoidable due to 
copyright and I hope it won't cause you any problems. Please read each question 
and its response options carefully before selecting your answer and be as honest as 
possible. If you do encounter any problems, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come over to you. 
 
Please note that there is no 'back' button in the questionnaire and at no time should 
you click on the 'back' button in the web browser - this would make the survey 
inaccessible and the answers you have already given would be lost. 
 




Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t 
be too careful in dealing with people? Please indicate on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted. 
 
 




Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance, or would they try to be fair? 
[Sliding scale as above, with end points: “Most people would try to take advantage 
of me” (0) and “Most people would try to be fair” (10)] 





Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly 
looking out for themselves?  
[Sliding scale as above, with end points: “People mostly look out for themselves” (0) 
and “People mostly try to be helpful” (10)] 
 




In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place 
yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?  
[Sliding scale, with end points: “Left” (0) and “Right” (10)] 
 




How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take 
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? 
[Sliding scale, with end points: “Not at all willing to take risks” (0) and “Very willing 
to take risks” (10)] 
 




People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate your 
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To what degree do the following statements apply to you personally?  
Please answer according to the following scale:  
1 means “does not apply to me at all” 
7 means “applies to me perfectly”  
 
(a) If someone does me a favour, I am prepared to return it (positive) 
(b) If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter 
what the cost (negative) 
(c) If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him/ her 
(negative) 
(d) I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before (positive) 
(e) If somebody offends me, I will offend him/ her back (negative) 
(f) I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before 
(positive)  
 










How well would you say you yourself are managing financially these days? Would 
you say you are...  
1 Living comfortably 
2 Doing alright 
3 Just about getting by 
4 Finding it quite difficult 
5 Finding it very difficult?  
 




(For Schwartz’s (2001) Human Values Scale questions, respondents are filtered to 
the gender-appropriate version of this scale. This version is for males.)  
 
Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and tick the box 
on each line that shows how much each person is or is not like you.  
 
  




Response options:  
1. Very much like me  
2. Like me 
3. Somewhat like me 
4. A little like me 
5. Not like me 
6. Not like me at all 
 
 
A Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do 
things in his own original way.  
B It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and 
expensive things.  
C He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated 
equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.  
D It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he 
does.  
E It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that 
might endanger his safety. 
F He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is 
important to do lots of different things in life. 
G He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should 
follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. 
H It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even 
when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them. 
I It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention 
to himself. 
J Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” himself.  
K It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes 
to be free and not depend on others.  
L It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for 
their well-being.  
M Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognise his 
achievements.  
N It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all 
threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.  
O He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting 
life.  
P It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing 
anything people would say is wrong.  
Q It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what 
he says.  
R It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to 
people close to him.  
S He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the 
environment is important to him.  
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T Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by 
his religion or his family.  
U He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things 
that give him pleasure.  
 




The 240 items measuring personality appeared next in the questionnaire. However, 
due to copyright, the questions cannot be reproduced here. The NEO-PI-3 measures 
the Big Five personality traits, each comprising six facets. Each facet is measured by 
six items. Permission was granted for me to reproduce three items in this thesis. 
One item measuring trust features in Section 5.4.3.1, and two items measuring 
gregariousness and warmth appear in Section 5.4.3.2.  
 




I would now like to ask you some demographic questions about yourself.  
 
Firstly, how old are you? 




Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination? 




If [Yes]:  
 
Which religion or denomination do you belong to? 




Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you 
say you are? 




What is your ethnic group?  
[List taken from UK census, with additional item “I’d rather not say”] 







The next few questions relate to your studies here at Essex.  
 





Which department are you in? If you have ties to more than one department, please 
select the one you regard as your primary discipline. 




Are you registered as a full-time or part-time student?  




Which year of study are you in? If you are registered as a part-time student, please 
report the year you would be in if you were studying full-time (for example, if you 
are in your third year of part-time study and this is equivalent to the second year of 
a full-time degree, you would select "second").  




Finally, I would like to ask you a couple of questions about the area you lived in 
before coming to university.  
 
Firstly, how safe did you - or would you - feel walking alone in this area after dark? 
1. Very safe 
2. Safe 
3. Unsafe 
4. Very unsafe  
 




Secondly, and again thinking of the area you lived in before coming to university... 
Please think about the immediate neighbourhood of your home. Did you have very 
many reasons, many reasons, a few reasons, or no reason at all to complain about 
each of the following problems?  
 









You have reached the end of the questionnaire. Thank you for taking part! 
 
The next screen will confirm that your data has been recorded. You will then be free 
to leave the Lab - please do so as quietly as possible to avoid distracting other 
participants. Please remember to take your ID code with you and to bring this back 
with you next week.  
 




If you have any concerns about your wellbeing, Student Support or Nightline may be 
able to help. During term time, the Student Support office is open Monday to Friday 
from 10:30am - 4pm. They are based in room 4N.6.2 and can be contacted via 
telephone on 01206 872365. Nightline is open from 10pm - 8am each night during 
term time: 01206 872020. Further information about both services (including 














Consent form: Session 1 
 
In this session, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire that should take about 35 
minutes. The questionnaire will ask you about yourself and your opinions. The data 
collected will be stored online in a user account on the Qualtrics online survey platform. 
Only the primary experimenter has the password to this account.  
 
The data collected will be completely anonymous. You will be identified only by a unique ID 
code, which is stapled above (face down). Your code will remain attached to this consent 
form until next week’s session. Until then, this form will be stored securely in accordance 
with EssexLab rules and nobody will have access to both your ID code and the data you have 
given. After next week’s session, the ID code will be removed and disposed of.  
 
When downloaded from Qualtrics, the data will be stored on the primary experimenter’s 
computer. Your data from today will be matched to your data from next week’s session and 
used only for statistical analysis. The results will be reported in the primary experimenter’s 
PhD thesis and may be published in one or more journal articles. In accordance with 
EssexLab rules, the dataset may be made available to other users after this project has 
finished.  
 
For your participation in this session you will receive £5. This compensates you for the time 
taken and includes a £2.50 show up fee. As mentioned in the invitation email, you will 
receive this payment at the end of next week’s session.  
 
Your participation in this study is purely voluntary and you may withdraw your participation 
or your data at any time without giving a reason.  
 
If you have any questions about this study, you can contact Elissa via: esibley@essex.ac.uk 





I have read the above description of this study, my questions have been answered and I give 
my consent to participate. 
 
Signature:  ______________________________________________________ 
 
Name (printed): ______________________________________________________ 
 
Date:    _____________________  
  











This session will involve filling in a questionnaire online. It should take on 
average 35 minutes.  
 
Please take your time to read the on-screen instructions, as well as the questions 
and the available response options. Please answer the questions as honestly as 
possible. Your responses to the questionnaire are completely anonymous and it 
will not be possible for anybody to identify you from your data.  
 
The first page asks you to enter a password in order to start the questionnaire. 
This password will appear on the two screens at the front of the Lab when we are 
ready to begin. The second page will ask you to enter your ID code. This is the 
code that’s printed (face down) on the slip of paper attached to your consent 
form. Please enter this code carefully to ensure accuracy and then click ‘next’. 
The on-screen instructions will lead you through the questionnaire.  
 
As described previously, this is the first of two sessions and you will receive your 
£5 payment for this session next week.  
 
Please make sure your mobile phone and any other devices are on ‘silent’ and do 
not use them in the Lab. Also, please do not communicate with the other 
participants. If you have a question, raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come over to you.  
 
Please leave these instructions, as well as your signed consent form and your ID 
















Consent form: Session 2 
 
In this session you will be asked to play a game that should take about 20 minutes. The 
decisions you make during the game will be recorded and stored on the secure EssexLab 
server before being downloaded onto the experimenter’s computer.  
 
All data will be recorded and stored anonymously - each participant is identified only by a 
unique, randomly-selected ID code (this will be the same code as you were given in Session 
1). Your code will be used to match your data from the two sessions and cannot be used to 
trace your data back to you. At the end of this session, your code will be removed from your 
consent forms and disposed of.  
 
The resulting dataset will be used for statistical analysis. The results will be reported in the 
experimenter’s PhD thesis and the findings may be published in one or more journal articles. 
In accordance with EssexLab rules, the dataset may be made available to other users after 
the project has finished.  
 
For your participation in this session you will receive a £2.50 show up fee plus possible 
additional earnings as described in the instructions. The show up fee and any additional 
earnings will be paid to you at the end of the experiment, along with your £5 payment for 
Session 1.  
 
If you have any questions about this study, you can contact Elissa via: esibley@essex.ac.uk 
 
Your participation in this study is purely voluntary and you may withdraw your participation 
or your data at any time without giving a reason.  
 




I have read the above description of this study, my questions have been answered and I give 
my consent to participate. 
 
 
Signature:  ______________________________________________________ 
 
Name (printed): ______________________________________________________ 
 
Date:    _____________________  
  












This session will involve playing a game. In this game there are two people, 
Player 1 and Player 2. Everybody will play this game twice – once as Player 1 and 
once as Player 2. Half of you will play the first game as Player 1 and half will play 
as Player 2. For each game you will be randomly and anonymously paired with a 
different person in the Lab.  
 
The game will be played via computer. There will be no face-to-face interaction 




Rules of the game  
 
Player 1 will be given £5 at the start of the game. This is theirs to keep, or if they 
wish to they can invest it with Player 2. Player 2 will start the game with zero.  
 
If Player 1 decides to keep their £5, the game is over; Player 1 scores £5 and 
Player 2 scores £0.  
 
If Player 1 decides to invest their £5, it becomes £15: Player 2 would then have 
£15 and Player 1 would have zero.  
 
Player 2 must decide how much of this £15 to send to Player 1. Player 2 has only 
two alternatives – they may send Player 1 either £0 or £10. Player 2 is asked to 
make this decision before they know whether Player 1 has invested or kept their 
£5.  
 
The amount of money played for in this game directly equates to real money. If 
Player 1 decides to keep their £5, this decision is final and determines both 
players’ scores for that game (Player 1 scores £5, Player 2 scores £0). If Player 1 
invests, Player 2’s decision on how to allocate the £15 is final: If they decide to 
give Player 1 £0, Player 1 will score £0 while Player 2 will score £15; if they give 
Player 1 £10, Player 1 will score £10 and Player 2 will score £5.  
 
You will be told your scores after both games have been played. At this point, 
you will also find out which game you will be paid for. You will be paid according 
to your score in one of the two games, with Game 1 or Game 2 having been 
selected at random by the computer program. For example, if Game 1 is 
selected, everybody in this Lab session will be paid according to their score in 
Game 1.  
 
 
As with last week, please make sure your mobile phone and any other electronic 
devices are on ‘silent’ and do not use them in the Lab. Also, please do not 
communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, raise your hand 
and an experimenter will come over to you.  
 
 












TW N1 N2 N3 N4 





Behavioural trust .005 1.000 .412
**
 .002 -.048 .107 -.039 
Behavioural trustworthiness .135 .412
**
 1.000 -.011 -.128 .012 -.078 





N2 Angry hostility  -.213
*





 .107 .012 .518
**
 .158 1.000 .564
**
 







N5 Impulsiveness  -.168
*









N6 Vulnerability  -.211
*









E1 Warmth  .226
**











 -.100 -.128 -.092 -.232
**
 
















E5 Excitement-seeking  .038 .049 .026 -.192
*
 -.047 -.076 -.249
**
 
E6 Positive emotions  .307
**









O1 Fantasy  .032 .115 .089 -.045 -.001 .135 -.029 
O2 Aesthetics  .130 .270
**
 .160 .082 -.032 .169
*
 .058 
O3 Feelings  .068 .155 .056 -.044 .111 .160 -.008 
O4 Actions  .209
*







O5 Ideas  .018 .180
*
 .068 -.128 -.177
*
 .116 -.038 
O6 Values  .130 -.043 .034 -.014 -.236
**
 -.011 .073 

















 -.011 .065 
A3 Altruism  .172
*
 .117 .144 .084 -.397
**
 .003 -.085 






 .057 .149 









A6 Tender-mindedness  .174
*
 .075 .156 .048 -.147 .084 .021 







C2 Order  -.098 -.102 -.094 -.046 -.056 -.210
*
 -.140 










C5 Self-discipline  .012 -.224
**





C6 Deliberation  -.006 -.116 -.060 .140 -.162 -.079 .036 
Neuroticism  -.257
**


















Openness  .106 .249
**









 .051 .006 






 .128 .065 





Age -.096 -.022 .133 -.056 .112 -.008 .014 




 .006 -.064 
Year of study -.090 -.162 -.084 .002 .136 .045 .081 




 .156 -.094 .083 .091 
Misunderstood rules -.163 -.072 -.261
**
 .135 .044 .081 .161 
Sender Game 1 -.083 .217
*
 -.051 .058 .000 .062 .145 
Betrayal aversion .012 -.181
*
 -.115 -.038 .009 -.018 .043 














Negative reciprocity -.024 -.036 -.114 -.043 .376
**
 -.107 -.080 
Willingness to take risks .146 .109 .059 -.325
**
 -.099 -.050 -.381
**
 
Double showup fee .092 .079 .106 -.026 -.109 -.002 -.034 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5C: Correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho)  
  







 .114 .017 .036 .038 
Behavioural trust -.045 -.124 -.078 -.241
**
 .027 .005 .049 
Behavioural trustworthiness -.147 -.050 .055 -.212
*















































N5 Impulsiveness  1.000 .209
*
 .081 .093 .154 .112 .166 
N6 Vulnerability  .209
*







































































 .114 .083 .012 .291
**
 




 .076 -.011 .052 .216
*
 


























 .148 -.023 .021 .063 .232
**
 
O6 Values  .069 -.119 .187
*
 .082 -.082 -.140 .026 






 .146 -.082 .100 .087 






 -.046 -.140 






 -.018 .108 .161 






 -.093 -.136 







A6 Tender-mindedness  -.035 -.142 .141 .024 -.050 .062 .010 















 .011 .026 .115 .270
**
 -.049 




 -.019 .119 .277
**
 -.049 






















C6 Deliberation  -.312
**










































 -.025 -.068 
















Age .133 .006 -.080 -.038 .157 .033 .040 
Gender .218
**
 .103 -.142 -.067 .245
**
 .112 .074 
Year of study .126 -.011 -.038 .020 .077 .078 .063 
Charity donation -.106 .000 .086 -.087 -.121 -.090 -.022 
Misunderstood rules .159 .089 .119 -.020 -.006 .061 -.013 
Sender Game 1 -.036 -.055 .010 .045 .001 .044 -.029 





 -.029 -.046 .009 -.012 .095 
Positive reciprocity .015 -.143 .264
**
 .047 .157 .172
*
 .138 
Negative reciprocity .143 -.006 -.004 .087 .158 .050 .140 
Willingness to take risks -.025 -.270
**





Double showup fee -.016 -.062 .154 -.003 .059 .052 .073 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  




Table 5C: Correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho)  
  
E6 O1 O2 O2 O4 O5 O6 
Generalised trust .307
**
 .032 .130 .068 .209
*
 .018 .130 
Behavioural trust .006 .115 .270
**
 .155 .084 .180
*
 -.043 
Behavioural trustworthiness .023 .089 .160 .056 .151 .068 .034 
N1 Anxiety -.274
**
 -.045 .082 -.044 -.285
**
 -.128 -.014 
N2 Angry hostility  -.241
**











 .160 -.077 .116 -.011 
N4 Self-consciousness -.417
**
 -.029 .058 -.008 -.258
**
 -.038 .073 









N6 Vulnerability  -.388
**


















E2 Gregariousness  .316
**




 -.023 .082 
E3 Assertiveness  .224
**
 .083 -.011 .176
*
 .138 .021 -.082 
E4 Activity  .465
**
 .012 .052 .135 .249
**
 .063 -.140 
























































 1.000 .146 .369
**
 .157 

































A1 Trust  .360
**
 .028 .127 .066 .227
**
 -.045 .091 
A2 Straightforwardness  .126 -.020 -.023 -.086 -.023 -.093 .124 













A4 Compliance  .018 -.007 .141 -.090 .173
*
 .083 .147 
A5 Modesty  -.056 .008 .110 -.080 .019 .033 .258
**
 















C1 Competence  .188
*
 -.129 .001 .049 -.048 .177
*
 -.010 




 -.019 -.054 
C3 Dutifulness  .211
*





C4 Achievement striving  .234
**
 -.086 -.032 .026 .034 .099 -.013 
C5 Self-discipline  .204
*
 -.140 -.089 -.070 -.062 -.061 -.075 






 -.007 -.052 
Neuroticism  -.359
**
 .083 .157 .123 -.223
**








































 .064 .105 .154 .241
**
 
Conscientiousness  .161 -.185
*
 -.052 .001 -.166 .084 -.025 
Age -.041 .022 .025 .092 .053 -.027 .003 
Gender -.055 -.002 .040 .028 -.028 .095 -.077 
Year of study .002 .085 .008 .115 .114 -.009 -.076 
Charity donation -.023 .064 .182
*
 .107 -.015 .022 .179
*
 
Misunderstood rules -.021 .043 -.054 .084 -.263
**
 .012 .044 
Sender Game 1 -.067 -.074 .052 .014 .033 .059 -.033 
Betrayal aversion .005 -.065 -.116 .075 -.131 .061 .083 
Financial insecurity -.048 .064 .124 .203
*










Negative reciprocity -.036 .029 -.130 -.002 -.068 -.153 -.077 
















** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
390 
 
Table 5C: Correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho) 
  





 .086 .003 .174
*
 .068 
Behavioural trust .045 .079 .117 .177
*
 .120 .075 -.012 
Behavioural trustworthiness .204
*
























 -.147 -.128 
N3 Depression -.266
**







 .065 -.085 .149 .151 .021 -.270
**
 






 -.074 -.035 -.278
**
 




 .051 .122 -.142 -.379
**
 








 -.027 .141 .182
*
 




 .024 -.018 














E5 Excitement-seeking  .087 -.140 .161 -.136 -.112 .010 -.117 









O1 Fantasy  .028 -.020 .252
**
 -.007 .008 .319
**
 -.129 
O2 Aesthetics  .127 -.023 .296
**
 .141 .110 .403
**
 .001 
O3 Feelings  .066 -.086 .289
**
 -.090 -.080 .278
**
 .049 
O4 Actions  .227
**





O5 Ideas  -.045 -.093 .254
**


















 .104 .152 .097 








 .116 .071 









































 1.000 .055 




 .055 1.000 
C2 Order  -.006 .022 .100 .078 -.009 -.003 .408
**
 




 .117 .067 .155 .606
**
 
C4 Achievement striving  .087 .104 .177
*
 .037 .014 -.010 .588
**
 
C5 Self-discipline  .066 .077 .084 -.024 -.104 .029 .597
**
 


















 .121 .158 
Openness  .047 -.072 .318
**





























Conscientiousness  .109 .161 .213
*
 .109 -.039 .053 .767
**
 
Age -.014 -.133 -.092 -.058 -.115 -.066 .081 
Gender -.180
*
 .051 -.125 -.090 .139 -.049 -.097 
Year of study -.030 -.093 -.053 -.015 -.140 .116 .121 











Misunderstood rules -.095 .037 .101 -.079 .086 -.014 .022 
Sender Game 1 -.110 -.006 -.041 .017 -.147 -.055 .047 
Betrayal aversion -.033 -.080 -.135 -.098 -.005 -.033 -.038 
Financial insecurity -.160 .003 .008 -.118 -.041 .064 -.212
*
 
























 -.091 .056 .007 
Double showup fee .018 .017 .179
*
 .083 .027 .044 .084 
**.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  




Table 5C: Correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho)  
  
C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 N E 





Behavioural trust -.102 -.030 -.080 -.224
**
 -.116 -.017 -.060 
Behavioural trustworthiness -.094 .034 -.057 -.113 -.060 -.097 .003 





N2 Angry hostility  -.056 -.174
*

























N5 Impulsiveness  -.185
*

































E2 Gregariousness  .026 -.019 .029 .168
*
 -.129 -.125 .653
**
 
















































O3 Feelings  -.180
*
 .113 .026 -.070 -.002 .123 .366
**
 











O5 Ideas  -.019 .219
**
 .099 -.061 -.007 -.020 .098 
O6 Values  -.054 .073 -.013 -.075 -.052 -.037 .087 





A2 Straightforwardness  .022 .257
**
 .104 .077 .237
**
 -.110 -.034 




 .084 .157 -.143 .341
**
 
A4 Compliance  .078 .117 .037 -.024 .181
*
 -.050 -.102 
A5 Modesty  -.009 .067 .014 -.104 .052 .069 -.207
*
 
A6 Tender-mindedness  -.003 .155 -.010 .029 .019 -.039 .121 





















 -.163 .091 








 -.160 .134 
































 1.000 -.078 -.189
*
 
Neuroticism  -.163 -.160 -.147 -.341
**
 -.078 1.000 -.271
**
 














Agreeableness  .076 .272
**
 .150 .082 .232
**
 -.152 .057 
Agreeableness (A1 standardised) .041 .242
**
 .122 .024 .191
*














Age -.047 .026 .021 .017 -.136 .009 .016 
Gender -.050 -.042 .127 .035 -.030 .022 .028 
Year of study -.039 .100 .089 .091 -.045 .037 .033 
Charity donation -.048 .037 -.072 -.122 .084 .035 -.054 
Misunderstood rules .048 .149 .118 .053 .128 .129 .051 
Sender Game 1 -.020 -.058 -.014 .058 .020 .061 -.045 


















 .147 -.134 .191
*
 
Negative reciprocity -.103 -.128 -.138 -.041 -.198
*
 .032 .112 







Double showup fee -.055 .113 .038 -.089 -.098 -.070 .076 
**.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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(A1 S) C Age Gender 
Year of 
study 
Generalised trust .106 .313
**
 .089 -.047 -.096 -.114 -.090 
Behavioural trust .249
**
 .139 .159 -.106 -.022 -.045 -.162 




 -.074 .133 .170
*
 -.084 
N1 Anxiety -.076 .153 .168
*
 -.108 -.056 -.036 .002 









 .051 .128 -.329
**
 -.008 .006 .045 
N4 Self-consciousness -.020 .006 .065 -.219
**
 .014 -.064 .081 











N6 Vulnerability  -.109 -.061 .040 -.339
**
 .006 .103 -.011 






 .150 -.080 -.142 -.038 
E2 Gregariousness  .098 .007 -.042 .006 -.038 -.067 .020 









E4 Activity  .137 -.025 -.030 .325
**
 .033 .112 .078 
E5 Excitement-seeking  .332
**
 -.068 -.069 -.129 .040 .074 .063 






 .161 -.041 -.055 .002 
O1 Fantasy  .572
**
 .099 .109 -.185
*
 .022 -.002 .085 






 -.052 .025 .040 .008 
O3 Feelings  .609
**
 .024 .064 .001 .092 .028 .115 




 .105 -.166 .053 -.028 .114 
O5 Ideas  .651
**
 .090 .154 .084 -.027 .095 -.009 






 -.025 .003 -.077 -.076 




 .109 -.014 -.180
*
 -.030 




 .161 -.133 .051 -.093 








 -.092 -.125 -.053 




 .109 -.058 -.090 -.015 




 -.039 -.115 .139 -.140 






 .053 -.066 -.049 .116 
C1 Competence  .054 .081 -.014 .767
**
 .081 -.097 .121 
C2 Order  -.147 .076 .041 .661
**
 -.047 -.050 -.039 






 .026 -.042 .100 
C4 Achievement striving  -.019 .150 .122 .770
**
 .021 .127 .089 
C5 Self-discipline  -.117 .082 .024 .791
**
 .017 .035 .091 








 -.136 -.030 -.045 
Neuroticism  .038 -.152 -.078 -.282
**
 .009 .022 .037 
Extraversion  .315
**
 .057 .003 .131 .016 .028 .033 











 -.121 -.059 -.063 




 1.000 .142 -.112 .257
**
 -.061 
Conscientiousness  -.082 .191
*
 .142 1.000 -.027 .002 .022 
Age .062 -.121 -.112 -.027 1.000 .079 .691
**
 
Gender .012 -.059 .257
**
 .002 .079 1.000 .035 
Year of study .096 -.063 -.061 .022 .691
**
 .035 1.000 




 -.024 -.119 .143 -.144 
Misunderstood rules -.005 .019 .083 .094 .000 .157 .064 
Sender Game 1 .068 -.133 -.121 .016 -.027 -.142 -.005 
Betrayal aversion -.024 -.130 -.126 -.061 -.053 -.110 -.008 
Financial insecurity .148 -.106 -.003 -.227
**









 -.024 .118 -.051 




 -.166 -.096 -.192
*
 -.113 
Willingness to take risks .306
**
 -.071 -.166 -.130 .100 -.073 .049 
Double showup fee .150 .086 .110 .034 .062 .081 .011 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a
 N = 140; otherwise, N = 170 
 
  




























 -.051 -.115 -.109 
N1 Anxiety .156 .135 .058 -.038 .149 
N2 Angry hostility  -.094 .044 .000 .009 .238
**
 
N3 Depression .083 .081 .062 -.018 .235
**
 
N4 Self-consciousness .091 .161 .145 .043 .235
**
 
N5 Impulsiveness  -.106 .159 -.036 -.028 .247
**
 
N6 Vulnerability  .000 .089 -.055 -.069 .280
**
 
E1 Warmth  .086 .119 .010 .018 -.029 
E2 Gregariousness  -.087 -.020 .045 -.063 -.046 
E3 Assertiveness  -.121 -.006 .001 -.082 .009 
E4 Activity  -.090 .061 .044 -.128 -.012 
E5 Excitement-seeking  -.022 -.013 -.029 -.022 .095 
E6 Positive emotions  -.023 -.021 -.067 .005 -.048 
O1 Fantasy  .064 .043 -.074 -.065 .064 
O2 Aesthetics  .182
*
 -.054 .052 -.116 .124 
O3 Feelings  .107 .084 .014 .075 .203
*
 
O4 Actions  -.015 -.263
**
 .033 -.131 .041 
O5 Ideas  .022 .012 .059 .061 -.035 
O6 Values  .179
*
 .044 -.033 .083 -.074 
A1 Trust  .118 -.095 -.110 -.033 -.160 
A2 Straightforwardness  .287
**
 .037 -.006 -.080 .003 
A3 Altruism  .271
**
 .101 -.041 -.135 .008 
A4 Compliance  .245
**
 -.079 .017 -.098 -.118 
A5 Modesty  .268
**
 .086 -.147 -.005 -.041 
A6 Tender-mindedness  .187
*
 -.014 -.055 -.033 .064 
C1 Competence  -.009 .022 .047 -.038 -.212
*
 
C2 Order  -.048 .048 -.020 -.142 -.322
**
 
C3 Dutifulness  .037 .149 -.058 -.048 -.216
*
 
C4 Achievement striving  -.072 .118 -.014 -.156 -.107 
C5 Self-discipline  -.122 .053 .058 -.049 -.211
*
 
C6 Deliberation  .084 .128 .020 .073 -.079 
Neuroticism  .035 .129 .061 -.002 .287
**
 
Extraversion  -.054 .051 -.045 -.073 .040 
Openness  .140 -.005 .068 -.024 .148 
Agreeableness  .318
**
 .019 -.133 -.130 -.106 
Agreeableness (A1 standardised) .379
**
 .083 -.121 -.126 -.003 
Conscientiousness  -.024 .094 .016 -.061 -.227
**
 
Age -.119 .000 -.027 -.053 .075 
Gender .143 .157 -.142 -.110 .090 
Year of study -.144 .064 -.005 -.008 .116 
Charity donation 1.000 .095 .002 -.025 -.101 
Misunderstood rules .095 1.000 .057 .096 .118 
Sender Game 1 .002 .057 1.000 -.136 .053 
Betrayal aversion -.025 .096 -.136 1.000 .025 
Financial insecurity -.101 .118 .053 .025 1.000 
Positive reciprocity .221
**
 .100 -.032 -.105 .005 
Negative reciprocity -.168
*
 .086 .041 .075 .107 
Willingness to take risks -.007 -.198
*
 -.070 -.015 -.038 
Double showup fee .186
*
 .085 -.019 .082 -.018 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).*.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5C: Correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rho)  










Generalised trust -.065 -.024 .146 .092 
Behavioural trust .064 -.036 .109 .079 
Behavioural trustworthiness .181
*
 -.114 .059 .106 
N1 Anxiety -.002 -.043 -.325
**
 -.026 




 -.099 -.109 






N5 Impulsiveness  .015 .143 -.025 -.016 
N6 Vulnerability  -.143 -.006 -.270
**
 -.062 
E1 Warmth  .264
**
 -.004 .105 .154 
E2 Gregariousness  .047 .087 .110 -.003 
E3 Assertiveness  .157 .158 .107 .059 





E5 Excitement-seeking  .138 .140 .386
**
 .073 





O1 Fantasy  .155 .029 .230
**
 .091 





O3 Feelings  .222
**
 -.002 .140 .190
*
 
O4 Actions  -.052 -.068 .456
**
 .055 







O6 Values  .090 -.077 -.031 .148 
A1 Trust  .030 -.132 .134 .018 





















 -.091 .027 




 .056 .044 
C1 Competence  .234
**
 -.086 .007 .084 
C2 Order  .176
*
 -.103 -.054 -.055 
C3 Dutifulness  .365
**
 -.128 -.059 .113 
C4 Achievement striving  .284
**
 -.138 .036 .038 
C5 Self-discipline  .224
**
 -.041 -.079 -.089 






















 -.071 .086 




 -.166 .110 
Conscientiousness  .285
**
 -.166 -.130 .034 
Age -.024 -.096 .100 .062 
Gender .118 -.192
*
 -.073 .081 








Misunderstood rules .100 .086 -.198
*
 .085 
Sender Game 1 -.032 .041 -.070 -.019 
Betrayal aversion -.105 .075 -.015 .082 
Financial insecurity .005 .107 -.038 -.018 
Positive reciprocity 1.000 -.111 .160 .144 
Negative reciprocity -.111 1.000 .130 .053 
Willingness to take risks .160 .130 1.000 .066 
Double showup fee .144 .053 .066 1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  






Table 5.5: Coefficients for NEO-PI-3 variables when predicting self-reported GTQ 
score (unstandardised coefficients (SE), effect size r) 
 N170 N122 
 
With 
demog. No demog. 
With 
demog. No demog. 
Neuroticism -.43 (.16) -.21 -.45 (.16) -.22 -.54 (.22) -.25 -.51 (.22) -.23 
Extraversion .25 (.15) .13 .23 (.15)  .06 (.19) .07 (.19) 
Openness -.07 (.17) -.05 (.16)  .04 (.20) .05 (.19) 
Agreeableness .63 (.14) .35 .63 (.13) .35 .46 (.20) .23 .47 (.19) .23 
Conscientiousness -.29 (.15) -.15 -.32 (.15) -.17 -.29 (.18) -.31 (.17) 
N1 Anxiety -.32 (.16) -.16 -.34 (.15) -.17 -.25 (.21) -.21 (.20) 
N2 Angry hostility -.18 (.16) -.17 (.15) -.20 (.19) -.22 (.18) 
N3 Depression -.59 (.18) -.27 -.61 (.17) -.28 -.73 (.23) -.34 -.73 (.22) -.34 
N4 Self-consciousness -.19 (.16) -.20 (.16) -.16 (.21) -.14 (.20) 
N5 Impulsiveness -.34 (.18) -.16 -.36 (.17) -.17 -.52 (.23) -.23 -.58 (.23) -.25 
N6 Vulnerability -.49 (.17) -.24 -.50 (.16) -.24 -.62 (.21) -.29 -.62 (.21) -.29 
E1 Warmth .19 (.16) .18 (.15) -.05 (.20) .02 (.19) 
E2 Gregariousness .13 (.13) .12 (.13) .09 (.16) .10 (.16) 
E3 Assertiveness .23 (.16) .19 (.15) .17 (.20) .07 (.19) 
E4 Activity .07 (.15) .06 (.15) -.09 (.19) -.09 (.19) 
E5 Excitement-seeking .04 (.16) .03 (.16) -.04 (.21) -.10 (.21) 
E6 Positive emotions .32 (.15) .18 .34 (.14) .19 .15 (.19) .21 (.18) 
O1 Fantasy -.25 (.15) -.24 (.15) -.16 (.19) -.18 (.18) 
O2 Aesthetics .03 (.14) .04 (.14) .12 (.16) .12 (.16) 
O3 Feelings .03 (.14) .01 (.14) .20 (.17) .16 (.17) 
O4 Actions -.03 (.15) -.01 (.14) -.18 (.18) -.14 (.17) 
O5 Ideas .04 (.16) .05 (.15) .17 (.19) .13 (.19) 
O6 Values .02 (.18) .06 (.17) .12 (.22) .17 (.21) 
A1 Trust 1.12 (.12) .63 1.11 (.11) .63 1.16 (.15) .59 1.17 (.15) .59 
A2 Straightforwardness .26 (.15) .23 (.15) .21 (.18) .17 (.18) 
A3 Altruism .40 (.18) .18 .39 (.18) .18 .47 (.23) .20 .49 (.23) .21 
A4 Compliance .27 (.14) .16 .25 (.13) .09 (.16) .10 (.16) 
A5 Modesty .21 (.15) .19 (.14) -.02 (.17) -.04 (.17) 
A6 Tender-mindedness .39 (.16) .21 .35 (.16) .19 .13 (.20) .18 (.19) 
C1 Competence -.09 (.17) -.10 (.17) -.04 (.21) -.03 (.20) 
C2 Order -.37 (.13) -.20 -.38 (.13) -.21 -.30 (.16) -.32 (.16) -.18 
C3 Dutifulness -.21 (.16) -.25 (.16) -.13 (.19) -.16 (.19) 
C4 Achievement striving -.27 (.13) -.16 -.28 (.13) -.17 -.36 (.15) -.22 -.40 (.15) -.25 
C5 Self-discipline -.10 (.16) -.16 (.15) -.13 (.20) -.19 (.19)  
C6 Deliberation -.10 (.16) -.13 (.16) .01 (.19) -.03 (.19) 
Bold font indicates coefficient significant at p ≤ .05; underlined coefficient indicates borderline 
significance (.05 < p ≤ .06).  
Demographic variables included were age, gender and year of education: these were all non-
significant in every model except for N122, where gender was borderline significant (p = .057).  
N170: total questionnaire sample; model uses the full Agreeableness trait, with facet A1 (trust) intact.  
N122: subsample of N170; model uses the adjusted Agreeableness trait, with facet A1 (trust) 
standardised to its mean and thereby excluded from these analyses.  
Trait coefficients (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness): 
association with GTQ when traits are the only personality variables in the model (i.e. no individual 
facets included). 
Facets: coefficient indicates association with GTQ when this facet replaces its parent trait in the 
model (e.g. the coefficient for N1 [Anxiety] indicates the association between N1 and GTQ when N1 
replaces Neuroticism in the model alongside Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness).  
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Appendix 5E  
 
 
Table 5E: Regression coefficients for behavioural trustworthiness (odds ratio 
(standard error) effect size) 
 N140 N122 
 With demog. No demog. With demog. No demog. 
Neuroticism .72 (.24) .75 (.21) .80 (.54) .83 (.23) 
Extraversion .84 (.22) .85 (.20) .89 (.24) .97 (.22) 
Openness 1.33 (.23) 1.27 (.21) 1.29 (.25) 1.21 (.23) 
Agreeableness 1.91 (.20) .18 1.63 (.18) .13 1.91 (.22) .18 1.62 (.19) .13 
Conscientiousness .75 (.21) .76 (.19) .83 (.23) .76 (.20) 
N1 Anxiety .91 (.22) .85 (.20) 1.00 (.24) .92 (.22) 
N2 Angry hostility .93 (.23) 1.00 (.19) 1.04 (.24) 1.12 (.21) 
N3 Depression .82 (.26) .82 (.24) .76 (.30) .77 (.27) 
N4 Self-consciousness .77 (.23) .72 (.22) .87 (.26) .80 (.24) 
N5 Impulsiveness .53 (.27) .17 .71 (.23) .68 (.30) .82 (.26) 
N6 Vulnerability .72 (.23) .80 (.20) .75 (.24) .86 (.21) 
E1 Warmth .98 (.22) .77 (.21) 1.17 (.24) 1.05 (.22) 
E2 Gregariousness .68 (.19) .11 .73 (.21) .62 (.22) .13 .61 (.20) .14 
E3 Assertiveness 1.24 (.23) .84 (.21) 1.17 (.25) 1.34 (.22) 
E4 Activity .97 (.22) .79 (.21) 1.14 (.25) 1.20 (.22) 
E5 Excitement-seeking .87 (.23) .90 (.21) .84 (.26) .99 (.24) 
E6 Positive emotions .73 (.22) .77 (.19) .79 (.24) .86 (.21) 
O1 Fantasy 1.27 (.23) 1.16 (.21) 1.29 (.24) 1.13 (.21) 
O2 Aesthetics 1.28 (.19) 1.29 (.18) 1.18 (.21) 1.24 (.19) 
O3 Feelings 1.30 (.21) 1.22 (.19) 1.34 (.24) 1.29 (.21) 
O4 Actions 1.19 (.22) 1.11 (.20) .97 (.25) .92 (.23) 
O5 Ideas 1.19 (.21) 1.17 (.20) 1.16 (.24) 1.08 (.22) 
O6 Values .75 (.27) .90 (.23) .74 (.30) .84 (.25) 
A1 Trust 1.75 (.21) .15 1.53 (.18) .12 1.68 (.22) .14 1.47 (.19) .11 
A2 Straightforwardness 1.63 (.21) .13 1.50 (.19) .11 1.93 (.25) .18 1.81 (.23) .16 
A3 Altruism 2.01 (.26) .19 1.55 (.23) .12 2.02 (.29) .19 1.56 (.25) 
A4 Compliance 1.66 (.19) .14 1.46 (.17) .10 1.47 (.20) .11 1.32 (.17) 
A5 Modesty 1.32 (.19) 1.37 (.17) 1.46 (.20) .10 1.49 (.18) .11 
A6 Tender-mindedness 1.50 (.22) 1.17 (.20) 1.50 (.24) 1.08 (.21) 
C1 Competence .98 (.23) .87 (.21) 1.11 (.26) .91 (.23) 
C2 Order .81 (.19) .81 (.17) .82 (.21) .79 (.19) 
C3 Dutifulness 1.01 (.23) .95 (.21) 1.22 (.26) 1.00 (.23) 
C4 Achievement striving .86 (.18) .89 (.16) .92 (.21) .92 (.18) 
C5 Self-discipline .70 (.22) .70 (.20) .77 (.24) .72 (.22) 
C6 Deliberation .84 (.23) .80 (.21) .95 (.25) .82 (.22) 
Bold font indicates coefficient significant at p ≤ .05; underlined coefficient indicates borderline 
significance (.05 < p ≤ .06).  
N140: total sample of participants who completed the questionnaire and the trust game; model uses 
the full Agreeableness trait, with facet A1 (trust) intact. 
N112: excludes those participants (from N140) who had misunderstood the rules of the trust game.  
Demographic variables included were age, gender and year of education.  
Trait coefficients: association with GTQ when traits are the only personality variables in the model 
(i.e. no individual facets included).  
Facet coefficients: association with GTQ when this facet replaces its parent trait in the model (e.g. the 
coefficient for N1 [Anxiety] indicates the association between N1 and GTQ when N1 replaces 
Neuroticism in the model alongside Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness). 
 
  






Table 5F: Regression coefficients controlling for financial insecurity 
 
Self-reported trust 
B (SE) r 
Behavioural 
trust  
OR (SE) r 
Behavioural 
trustworthiness 
OR (SE) r  N140 N122 
Neuroticism  -.48 (.22) -.22   
Extraversion .39 (.17) .20  .64 (.22) .12  
Openness   2.10 (.24) .20  
Agreeableness .53 (.15) .29 .42 (.20) .21  1.86 (.21) .17 
Conscientiousness -.32 (.16) -.17 -.36 (.18) -.20   
N1 Anxiety     
N2 Angry hostility     
N3 Depression -.57 (.21) -.25 -.71 (.23) -.33   
N4 Self-consciousness     
N5 Impulsiveness  -.50 (.24) -.22  .57 (.28) .15 
N6 Vulnerability  -.55 (.22) -.26 .51 (.27) .18  
E1 Warmth     
E2 Gregariousness    .65 (.19) .12 
E3 Assertiveness     
E4 Activity     
E5 Excitement-seeking     
E6 Positive emotions .40 (.17) .23    
O1 Fantasy     
O2 Aesthetics   1.76 (.19) .15  
O3 Feelings   1.76 (.21) .15  
O4 Actions     
O5 Ideas   1.65 (.21) .14  
O6 Values     
A1 Trust 1.24 (.13) .67 1.14 (.16) .57  1.77 (.22) .16 
A2 Straightforwardness    1.70 (.21) .14 
A3 Altruism  .45 (.23) .19  1.98 (.26) .19 
A4 Compliance    1.61 (.19) .13 
A5 Modesty     
A6 Tender-mindedness .36 (.19) .19   1.56 (.22) .12 
C1 Competence     
C2 Order -.40 (.15) -.23 -.39 (.17) -.23   
C3 Dutifulness     
C4 Achievement striving -.32 (.15) -.19 -.42 (.15) -.26   
C5 Self-discipline   .59 (.22) .14  
C6 Deliberation     
Bold font indicates coefficient significant at p ≤ .05; underlined coefficient indicates borderline 
significance (.05 < p ≤ .06).  
N140: total sample of participants who completed the questionnaire and the trust game; model uses 
the full Agreeableness trait, with facet A1 (trust) intact. 
N112: excludes those participants (from N140) who had misunderstood the rules of the trust game.  
All models included age, gender, year of education and financial insecurity. The models for 
behavioural trust also controlled for order of play.  
Trait coefficients: association with GTQ when traits are the only personality variables in the model 
(i.e. no individual facets included).  
Facet coefficients: association with GTQ when this facet replaces its parent trait in the model (e.g. the 
coefficient for N1 [Anxiety] indicates the association between N1 and GTQ when N1 replaces 
Neuroticism in the model alongside Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness). 
 
 





Adelstein, J. S., Shehzad, Z., Mennes, M., DeYoung, C. G., Zuo, X.-N., Kelly, C., . . . Castellanos, 
F. X. (2011). Personality is reflected in the brain’s intrinsic functional architecture. 
PloS one, 6(11), e27633-e27633.  
Aghajani, M., Veer, I. M., van Tol, M.-J., Aleman, A., van Buchem, M. A., Veltman, D. J., . . . 
van der Wee, N. J. (2014). Neuroticism and extraversion are associated with 
amygdala resting-state functional connectivity. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 14(2), 836-848.  
Ahmed, A. M., & Salas, O. (2009). The relationship between behavioral and attitudinal trust: 
a cross-cultural study. Review of social economy, 67(4), 457-482.  
Albanese, G., De Blasio, G., & Sestito, P. (2013). Trust and preferences: evidence from survey 
data. Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No, 911.  
Allin, P. (2007). Measuring societal wellbeing. Economic & Labour Market Review, 1(10), 46-
52.  
Allport, G. W. (1961). Pattern and Growth in Personality. London: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc. 
Allum, N., Patulny, R., Read, S., & Sturgis, P. (2010). Re-evaluating the links between social 
trust, institutional trust and civic association. In J. Stillwell, P. Norman, C. Thomas & 
P. Surridge (Eds.), Spatial and Social Disparities (pp. 199-215). London: Springer  
Allum, N., Read, S., Sturgis, P., Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Billet, J. (2011). Evaluating change 
in social and political trust in Europe. In E. Davidov, P. Schmidt & J. Billiet (Eds.), 
Cross-Cultural Analysis: Methods and Applications (pp. 35-53). Hove: Routledge. 
Augustine, A. A., Larsen, R. J., & Lee, H. (2013). Affective Personality Traits and Cognition. In 
M. D. Robinson, E. R. Watkins & E. Harmon-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of Cognition and 
Emotion. New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
Becker, A., Deckers, T., Dohmen, T. J., Falk, A., & Kosse, F. (2012). The relationship between 
economic preferences and psychological personality measures CESifo working 
paper: Behavioural Economics, No. 3785. 
Berggren, N., & Jordahl, H. (2006). Free to trust: Economic freedom and social capital. 
Kyklos, 59(2), 141-169.  
Bidner, C., & Francois, P. (2011). Cultivating Trust: Norms, Institutions and the Implications 
of Scale*. The Economic Journal, 121(555), 1097-1129.  
Bilsky, W., Janik, M., & Schwartz, S. H. (2010). The structural organization of human values: 
Evidence from three rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology, 42(5), 759-776.  
Bjørnskov, C. (2007). Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison. Public 
choice, 130(1-2), 1-21.  
Bjørnskov, C. (2008). Social trust and fractionalization: A possible reinterpretation. European 
Sociological Review, 24(3), 271-283.  
Boer, D., & Fischer, R. (2013). How and when do personal values guide our attitudes and 
sociality? Explaining cross-cultural variability in attitude–value linkages. 
Psychological bulletin, 139(5), 1113-1147.  
Boer, D. P., Starkey, N. J., & Hodgetts, A. M. (2008). The California Psychological Inventory – 
434- and 260-item Editions. In G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), The 
SAGE Handbook of Personality Theory and Assessment: Personality Measurement 
and Testing (Vol. 2, pp. 97-113). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Bohnet, I., Greig, F., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R. (2008). Betrayal aversion: Evidence 
from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. The American 
Economic Review, 98(1), 294-310.  
Boix, C., & Posner, D. N. (1998). Social capital: Explaining its origins and effects on 
government performance. British journal of political science, 28(4), 686-693.  




Bouckaert, G., & Van de Walle, S. (2003). Comparing measures of citizen trust and user 
satisfaction as indicators of ‘good governance’: difficulties in linking trust and 
satisfaction indicators. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 69(3), 329-
343.  
Bouckaert, G., Van de Walle, S., Maddens, B., & Kampen, J. K. (2002). Identity vs 
Performance: An overview of theories explaining trust in government. Public 
Management Institute, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.  
Boyce, C. J., Wood, A. M., & Powdthavee, N. (2013). Is personality fixed? Personality 
changes as much as “variable” economic factors and more strongly predicts changes 
to life satisfaction. Social Indicators Research, 111(1), 287-305.  
Boyle, G. J., Matthews, G., & Saklofske, D. H. (2008). Personality theories and models: an 
overview. In G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of 
personality theory and assessment: personality measurement and testing (Vol. 1, pp. 
1-31). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of 
social capital. American journal of political science, 41(3), 999-1023.  
Brehm, S., Kassin, S., & Fein, S. (1999). Social Psychology. New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
Brown, T. A. (2006). Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research. London: The Guilford 
Press. 
Burks, S. V., Carpenter, J. P., & Verhoogen, E. (2003). Playing both roles in the trust game. 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51(2), 195-216.  
Butler, J., Giuliano, P., & Guiso, L. (2012). Trust, values and false consensus Discussion Paper 
Series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, No. 6916: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Byrne, B. M. (2012). Structural equation modeling with Mplus: Basic concepts, applications, 
and programming. London: Routledge. 
Canache, D., Mondak, J. J., & Seligson, M. A. (2001). Meaning and measurement in cross-
national research on satisfaction with democracy. Public Opinion Quarterly, 65(4), 
506-528.  
Canli, T. (2006). Biology of personality and individual differences. New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
Canli, T., Zhao, Z., Desmond, J. E., Kang, E., Gross, J., & Gabrieli, J. D. (2001). An fMRI study of 
personality influences on brain reactivity to emotional stimuli. Behavioral 
neuroscience, 115(1), 33-42.  
Caprara, G. V., Alessandri, G., & Eisenberg, N. (2012). Prosociality: the contribution of traits, 
values, and self-efficacy beliefs. Journal of personality and social psychology, 102(6), 
1289-1303.  
Carver, C. S. (2004). Negative affects deriving from the behavioral approach system. 
Emotion, 4(1), 3-22.  
Carver, C. S., & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affective 
responses to impending reward and punishment: the BIS/BAS scales. Journal of 
personality and social psychology, 67(2), 319-333.  
Cattell, H. E., & Mead, A. D. (2008). The sixteen personality factor questionnaire (16PF). In G. 
J. Boyle, G. Matthews & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of personality 
theory and assessment: personality and testing (Vol. 2, pp. 135-178). London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. 
Chen, C., Lee, S.-Y., & Stevenson, H. W. (1995). Response style and cross-cultural 
comparisons of rating scales among East Asian and North American students. 
Psychological Science, 6(3), 170-175.  
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
400 
 
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2005). Trust in government: The relative importance of 
service satisfaction, political factors, and demography. Public Performance & 
Management Review, 28(4), 487-511.  
Chuah, S.-H. (2010). Do Human Values Explain Economic Behavior? An Experimental Study 
ICBBR Working Paper Series (No. 2010-01): Nottingham University Business School  
Citizen, G. (2007)  Retrieved 2 September 2012, from 
http://www.globalcitizen.net/intro/?page=1953 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 155-159.  
Cohen, M. X., Young, J., Baek, J.-M., Kessler, C., & Ranganath, C. (2005). Individual 
differences in extraversion and dopamine genetics predict neural reward responses. 
Cognitive Brain Research, 25(3), 851-861.  
Comrey, A. L. (2008). The Comrey personality scales. In G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews & D. H. 
Saklofske (Eds.), Sage handbook of personality theory and testing: personality 
measurement and assessment (Vol. 2, pp. 113-134). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Coromina, L., & Davidov, E. (2013). Evaluating Measurement Invariance for Social and 
Political Trust in Western Europe over Four Measurement Time Points (2002-2008). 
ASK. Research&Methods(22), 37-54.  
Corr, P. J. (2004). Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality. Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 28(3), 317-332.  
Corr, P. J. (2008). Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST): Introduction. In P. J. Corr (Ed.), The 
reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Davidov, E. (2008). A cross-country and cross-time comparison of the human values 
measurements with the second round of the European Social Survey. Survey 
Research Methods, 2(1), 33-46.  
Davidov, E. (2010). Testing for comparability of human values across countries and time with 
the third round of the European Social Survey. International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology, 51(3), 171-191.  
Davidov, E., Cieciuch, J., Meuleman, B., Schmidt, P., Algesheimer, R., & Hausherr, M. (2015). 
The Comparability of Measurements of Attitudes toward Immigration in the 
European Social Survey Exact versus Approximate Measurement Equivalence. Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 79(S1), 244-266.  
Davies, R., Wilkins, C., Harrison, E. K., Sibley, E., & Owen, D. (2011). Quality of life in 
ethnically diverse neighbourhoods. European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions: Dublin, Ireland: Eurofound. 
Davis, K. L., & Panksepp, J. (2011). The brain's emotional foundations of human personality 
and the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral 
Reviews, 35(9), 1946-1958.  
De Raad, B., & Van Oudenhoven, J. P. (2008). Factors of values in the Dutch language and 
their relationship to factors of personality. European Journal of Personality, 22(2), 
81-108.  
DeHoog, R. H., Lowery, D., & Lyons, W. E. (1990). Citizen satisfaction with local governance: 
a test of individual, jurisdictional, and city-specific explanations. The Journal of 
Politics, 52(3), 807-837.  
Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2003). Who trusts?: The origins of social trust in seven societies. 
European Societies, 5(2), 93-137.  
Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2005). Predicting cross-national levels of social trust: global pattern 
or Nordic exceptionalism? European Sociological Review, 21(4), 311-327.  
Delhey, J., Newton, K., & Welzel, C. (2011). How general is trust in “most people”? Solving 
the radius of trust problem. American sociological review, 76(5), 786-807.  
Denters, B., Gabriel, O. W., & Torcal, M. (2007). Political confidence in representative 
democracies. In J. W. van Deth, J. R. Montero & A. Westholm (Eds.), Citizenship and 




involvement in European democracies. a comparative analysis (pp. 66-87). New 
York: Routledge. 
Depue, R. A., & Collins, P. F. (1999). Neurobiology of the structure of personality: dopamine, 
facilitation of incentive motivation, and extraversion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
22(3), 491-517.  
DeYoung, C. G., Hirsh, J. B., Shane, M. S., Papademetris, X., Rajeevan, N., & Gray, J. R. (2010). 
Testing predictions from personality neuroscience: Brain structure and the Big Five. 
Psychological Science, 21(6), 820-828.  
DeYoung, C. G., Peterson, J. B., & Higgins, D. M. (2002). Higher-order factors of the Big Five 
predict conformity: Are there neuroses of health? Personality and individual 
differences, 33(4), 533-552.  
DeYoung, C. G., Peterson, J. B., & Higgins, D. M. (2005). Sources of openness/intellect: 
Cognitive and neuropsychological correlates of the fifth factor of personality. 
Journal of personality, 73(4), 825-858.  
Dimoka, A. (2010). What does the brain tell us about trust and distrust? Evidence from a 
functional neuroimaging study. Mis Quarterly, 34(2), 373-396.  
Dinesen, P. T. (2013). Where you come from or where you live? Examining the cultural and 
institutional explanation of generalized trust using migration as a natural 
experiment. European Sociological Review, 29(1), 114-128.  
Dinesen, P. T., & Sønderskov, K. M. (2013). Ethnic diversity and social trust: the role of 
exposure in the micro-context. Paper presented at the Ethnic Diversity and Social 
Capital conference, Berlin, Germany.  
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., & Sunde, U. (2008). Representative trust and reciprocity: 
prevalence and determinants. Economic Inquiry, 46(1), 84-90.  
Durlak, J. A. (2009). How to select, calculate, and interpret effect sizes. Journal of Pediatric 
Psychology, 34(9), 917-928.  
Easton, D. (1965). A framework for political analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall  
Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British journal of 
political science, 5(4), 435-457.  
Elliot, A. J., & Thrash, T. M. (2008). Approach and avoidance temperaments. In G. J. Boyle, G. 
Matthews & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of personality theory and 
assessment: Personality theories and models (Vol. 1, pp. 315-334). London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. 
Ermisch, J., & Gambetta, D. (2006). People's Trust: the design of a survey-based experiment 
ISER Working Paper Series (No. 2006-34): Institute for Social and Economic Research 
(ISER), University of Essex. 
Ermisch, J., & Gambetta, D. (2011). The long shadow of income on trustworthiness ISER 
Working Paper Series (No. 2011-08): Institute for Social and Economic Research 
(ISER), University of Essex. 
Ermisch, J., Gambetta, D., Laurie, H., Siedler, T., & Noah Uhrig, S. (2009). Measuring people's 
trust. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 172(4), 
749-769.  
ESS. (2006). Final Source Questionnaire (Round 3, 2006/7) Amendment 03, from 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round3/fieldwork/source/ESS3_source
_main_questionnaire.pdf 
ESS. (2012). Sampling for the European Social Survey Round VI: principles and requirements. 
Mannheim, European Social Survey, GESIS. 
ESS. (2014a). ESS-2 2004 Documentation Report. Edition 3.5: Bergen, European Social 
Survey Data Archive, Norwegian Social Science Data Services. 
ESS. (2014b). ESS-3 2006 Documentation Report. Edition 3.5: Bergen, European Social 
Survey Data Archive, Norwegian Social Science Data Services. 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
402 
 
ESS. (2014c). ESS-4 2008 Documentation Report. Edition 5.3: Bergen, European Social Survey 
Data Archive, Norwegian Social Science Data Services. 
ESS. (2014d). ESS-5 2010 Documentation Report. Edition 3.2: Bergen, European Social 
Survey Data Archive, Norwegian Social Science Data Services. 
ESS. (2014e). ESS-6 2012 Documentation Report. Edition 2.1: Bergen, European Social 
Survey Data Archive, Norwegian Social Science Data Services. 
. European Social Survey Round 2 Data (2004). Data file edition 3.4. Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. 
. European Social Survey Round 3 Data (2006). Data file edition 3.5. Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. 
. European Social Survey Round 4 Data (2008). Data file edition 3.5. Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway - Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. 
. European Social Survey Round 5 Data (2010). Data file edition 3.2. Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services, Norway - Data Archive and distributor of ESS data. 
Evans, A. M., & Revelle, W. (2008). Survey and behavioral measurements of interpersonal 
trust. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(6), 1585-1593.  
Ewen, R. B. (2010). An Introduction to Theories of Personality. London: Psychology Press, 
Taylor & Francis Group. 
Farrell, G., Thirion, S., Dubois, J., Glatzer, W., Nascimento, I., Redelsperger, C., & Amoroso, B. 
(2008). Well-being for all: concepts and tools for social cohesion Trends in Social 
Cohesion. Strasbourg CEDEX: Council of Europe Publishing. 
Fehr, E. (2008). On the economics and biology of trust. Paper presented at the IZA discussion 
papers, No. 3895. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009010729 
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., Von Rosenbladt, B., Schupp, J., & Wagner, G. G. (2003). A 
nationwide laboratory examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating 
behavioural experiments into representative surveys Working Paper No. 141. 
University of Zurich: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics. 
Field, A. (2000). Discovering statistics using SPSS for Windows: advanced techniques for the 
beginner. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Finseraas, H., & Jakobsson, N. (2012). Trust and Ethnic Fractionalization: The Importance of 
Religion as a Cross-Cutting Dimension. Kyklos, 65(3), 327-339.  
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental economics, 10(2), 171-178.  
Forbes, C. E., Poore, J. C., Krueger, F., Barbey, A. K., Solomon, J., & Grafman, J. (2014). The 
role of executive function and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the expression of 
neuroticism and conscientiousness. Social neuroscience, 9(2), 139-151.  
Forrest, R., & Kearns, A. (2001). Social cohesion, social capital and the neighbourhood. 
Urban studies, 38(12), 2125-2143.  
Freitag, M. (2003). Beyond Tocqueville: The origins of social capital in Switzerland. European 
Sociological Review, 19(2), 217-232.  
Freitag, M., & Bühlmann, M. (2009). Crafting trust the role of political institutions in a 
comparative perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 42(12), 1537-1566.  
Furnham, A., Eysenck S. B. G. & Saklofske, D. H. (2008). The Eysenck personality measures: 
fifty years of scale development. In G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), 
The SAGE handbook of personality theory and assessment: personality measurement 
and testing (Vol. 2, pp. 199-218). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Gardini, S., Cloninger, C. R., & Venneri, A. (2009). Individual differences in personality traits 
reflect structural variance in specific brain regions. Brain research bulletin, 79(5), 
265-270.  
Gelissen, J., & de Graaf, P. M. (2006). Personality, social background, and occupational 
career success. Social Science Research, 35(3), 702-726.  




Gerlitz, J.-Y., & Schupp, J. (2005). Zur Erhebung der Big-Five-basierten 
persoenlichkeitsmerkmale im SOEP. DIW Research Notes, 4, 2005.  
Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., & Soutter, C. L. (2000). Measuring trust. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 811-846.  
Glaser, M. A., & Denhardt, R. B. (2000). Local government performance through the eyes of 
citizens. Journal of Public Budgeting Accounting and Financial Management, 12(1), 
49-73.  
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the 
moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366-385.  
Graziano, W. G., & Tobin, R. M. (2013). The cognitive and motivational foundations 
underlying agreeableness. In M. D. Robinson, E. R. Watkins & E. Harmon-Jones 
(Eds.), Handbook of cognition and emotion (pp. 347-364). New York: The Guilford 
Press. 
Gundelach, B. (2014). In diversity we trust: the positive effect of ethnic diversity on 
outgroup trust. Political Behavior, 36(1), 125-142.  
Haas, B. W., Ishak, A., Denison, L., Anderson, I., & Filkowski, M. M. (2015). Agreeableness 
and brain activity during emotion attribution decisions. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 57, 26-31.  
Haas, B. W., Omura, K., Constable, R. T., & Canli, T. (2007). Is automatic emotion regulation 
associated with agreeableness? A perspective using a social neuroscience approach. 
Psychological Science, 18(2), 130-132.  
Hahn, E., Gottschling, J., & Spinath, F. M. (2012). Short measurements of personality–
Validity and reliability of the GSOEP Big Five Inventory (BFI-S). Journal of Research in 
Personality, 46(3), 355-359.  
Hahn, T., Dresler, T., Ehlis, A.-C., Plichta, M. M., Heinzel, S., Polak, T., . . . Fallgatter, A. J. 
(2009). Neural response to reward anticipation is modulated by Gray's impulsivity. 
Neuroimage, 46(4), 1148-1153.  
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral 
intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20(1), 98-116.  
Hamamura, T. (2011). Social class predicts generalized trust but only in wealthy societies. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43(3), 498-509.  
Harrison, E., Jowell, R., & Sibley, E. (2011). Developing attitudinal indicators of societal 
progress. ASK Research & Methods, 20(1), 59-80.  
Helliwell, J. F., & Putnam, R. D. (2004). The social context of well-being. Philosophical 
transactions-royal society of London series B biological sciences, 359, 1435-1446.  
Herreros, F. (2012). The state counts: State efficacy and the development of trust. 
Rationality and Society, 24(4), 483-509.  
Herreros, F., & Criado, H. (2008). The state and the development of social trust. 
International Political Science Review, 29(1), 53-71.  
Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The political relevance of political trust. American Political 
Science Review, 92(4), 791-808.  
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and 
organizations across nations. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Holm, H., & Nystedt, P. (2008). Trust in surveys and games - a methodological contribution 
on the influence of money and location. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(4), 522-
542.  
Hooghe, M. (2011). Why there is basically only one form of political trust. The British Journal 
of Politics & International Relations, 13(2), 269-275.  
Hooghe, M., Marien, S., & Pauwels, T. (2011). Where do distrusting voters turn if there is no 
viable exit or voice option? The impact of political trust on electoral behaviour in the 
Belgian Regional Elections of June 2009. Government and Opposition, 46(2), 245-
273.  
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
404 
 
Hudson, J. (2006). Institutional Trust and Subjective Well‐Being across the EU. Kyklos, 59(1), 
43-62.  
Hundt, N. E., Brown, L. H., Kimbrel, N. A., Walsh, M. A., Nelson-Gray, R., & Kwapil, T. R. 
(2013). Reinforcement sensitivity theory predicts positive and negative affect in 
daily life. Personality and individual differences, 54(3), 350-354.  
Inglehart, R. (1999). Trust, well-being and democracy. In M. E. Warren (Ed.), Democracy and 
trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of 
traditional values. American sociological review, 65(1), 19-51.  
Jensen-Campbell, L. A., Rosselli, M., Workman, K. A., Santisi, M., Rios, J. D., & Bojan, D. 
(2002). Agreeableness, conscientiousness, and effortful control processes. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 36(5), 476-489.  
John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: history, measurement, and 
theoretical perspectives. In L. A. Pervin & O. P. John (Eds.), Handbook of Personality: 
Theory and Research (2nd ed., pp. 102-138). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Johnson, N. D., & Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 32(5), 865-889.  
Judge, T. A., Higgins, C. A., Thoresen, C. J., & Barrick, M. R. (1999). The big five personality 
traits, general mental ability, and career success across the life span. Personnel 
psychology, 52(3), 621-652.  
Kaase, M. (1999). Interpersonal trust, political trust and non‐institutionalised political 
participation in Western Europe. West European Politics, 22(3), 1-21.  
Kampen, J. K., De Walle, S. V., & Bouckaert, G. (2006). Assessing the Relation Between 
Satisfaction with Public Service Delivery and Trust in Government. The Impact of the 
Predisposition of Citizens Toward Government on Evalutations of Its Performance. 
Public Performance & Management Review, 29(4), 387-404.  
Kaufman, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide governance indicators: A 
summary of methodology, data and analytical issues World Bank Policy Research 
(No. 5430): The World Bank. 
Kearns, A., & Forrest, R. (2000). Social cohesion and multilevel urban governance. Urban 
Studies, 37(5/6), 995-1017.  
Killip, D., Mahfoud, Z., & Pearce, K. (2004). What is an intracluster correlation coefficient? 
Crucial concepts for primary care researchers. Annals of Family Medicine, 2(3), 204-
208.  
Kim, M. (2009). Cross‐National Analyses of Satisfaction with Democracy and Ideological 
Congruence. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 19(1), 49-72.  
Knack, S. (2002). Social capital and the quality of government: evidence from the states. 
American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), 772-785.  
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country 
investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-1288.  
Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2012). Testing the pearl hypothesis: Natural resources and trust. 
Resources Policy, 37(3), 358-367.  
Kong, D. T. (2013). Examining a climatoeconomic contextualization of generalized social 
trust mediated by uncertainty avoidance. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 
44(4), 574-588.  
Kotzian, P. (2011). Conditional trust: The role of individual and system-level features for 
trust and confidence in institutions. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 
5(1), 25-49.  
Krosnick, J. A., Narayan, S. S., & Smith, W. R. (1996). Satisficing in surveys: Initial evidence. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 




Kunisato, Y., Okamoto, Y., Okada, G., Aoyama, S., Nishiyama, Y., Onoda, K., & Yamawaki, S. 
(2011). Personality traits and the amplitude of spontaneous low-frequency 
oscillations during resting state. Neuroscience letters, 492(2), 109-113.  
Lazzarini, S. G., Madalozzo, R., Artes, R., & Siqueira, J. d. O. (2005). Measuring trust: An 
experiment in Brazil. Brazilian Journal of Applied Economics, 9(2), 153-169.  
Lee, C.-S. (2013). Welfare states and social trust. Comparative Political Studies, 46(5), 603-
630.  
Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of the HEXACO personality 
inventory. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39(2), 329-358.  
Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 3(1), 475-507.  
Listhaug, O., & Ringdal, K. (2008). Trust in political institutions. In H. Ervasti, T. Fridberg, M. 
Hjerm & K. Ringdal (Eds.), Nordic social attitudes in a European perspective. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Lockwood, D. (1964). Social Integration and System Integration. In G. K. Zollschan & W. 
Hirsch (Eds.), Explorations in Social Change. London: Routledge. 
LSE. (2008). Social cohesion, trust and participation: social capital, social policy and social 
cohesion in the European Union and candidate countries: European Observatory on 
the Social Situation - Social Capital Network. 
Marien, S. (2013). Measuring political trust across time and space. In M. Hooghe & S. Zmerli 
(Eds.), Political Trust: Why context matters (pp. 13-46). Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Marien, S., & Hooghe, M. (2011). Does political trust matter? An empirical investigation into 
the relation between political trust and support for law compliance. European 
Journal of Political Research, 50(2), 267-291.  
Martin, P., & Lynn, P. (2011). The effects of mixed mode survey designs on simple and 
complex analyses ISER Working Paper Series (No. 2011-28): Institute for Social and 
Economic Research (ISER), University of Essex. 
Matthews, G. (2008). Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory: A critique from cognitive science. In 
P. J. Corr (Ed.), The reinforcement sensitivity theory of personality (pp. 482-507). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McCrae, R. R., Costa, J., Paul T, & Martin, T. A. (2005). The NEO–PI–3: A more readable 
revised NEO personality inventory. Journal of personality assessment, 84(3), 261-
270.  
McCrae, R. R., & Costa Jr, P. T. (1996). Toward a new generation of personality theories: 
Theoretical contexts for the five-factor model. In J. S. Wiggins (Ed.), The five-factor 
model of personality (pp. 51-87). London: The Guilford Press. 
McCrae, R. R., & Costa Jr, P. T. (1999). The five-factor theory of personality. In O. P. Johns, R. 
W. Robbins & L. A. Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality: theory and research (Vol. 
2, pp. 139-153). London: The Guilford Press. 
McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. (2010). NEO Inventories professional manual. Lutz, FL: 
Psychological Assessment Resources Inc. 
McCrae, R. R., Jang, K. L., Livesley, W. J., Riemann, R., & Angleitner, A. (2001). Sources of 
structure: Genetic, environmental, and artifactual influences on the covariation of 
personality traits. Journal of personality, 69(4), 511-535.  
McCrae, R. R., Martin, T. A., & Costa, P. T. (2005). Age trends and age norms for the NEO 
Personality Inventory-3 in adolescents and adults. Assessment, 12(4), 363-373.  
Morales‐Vives, F., De Raad, B., & Vigil‐Colet, A. (2012). Psycholexical Value Factors in Spain 
and Their Relation with Personality Traits. European Journal of Personality, 26(6), 
551-565.  
moralfoundations.org. (2015). MoralFoundations.org  Retrieved 23 September, 2015, from 
http://moralfoundations.org/ 
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
406 
 
Morgeson, F. V., & Petrescu, C. (2011). Do they all perform alike? An examination of 
perceived performance, citizen satisfaction and trust with US federal agencies. 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 77(3), 451-479.  
Müller, J., & Schwieren, C. (2012). What can the Big Five personality factors contribute to 
explain small-scale economic behavior? Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 12-
028/1. 
Muthen, B., & Muthen, L. (2013). Confirmatory Factor Analysis  Retrieved 27 March 2013, 
from http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/9/9.html 
Naef, M., & Schupp, J. (2009a). Can we trust the trust game? A comprehensive examination 
Royal Holloway College, Discussion Paper Series (No. 2009-05): Royal Holloway, 
University of London. 
Naef, M., & Schupp, J. (2009b). Measuring trust: Experiments and surveys in contrast and 
combination SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Reseach, No. 167. Berlin. 
Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. International Political 
Science Review, 22(2), 201-214.  
Nezlek, J. B. (2008). An introduction to multilevel modeling for social and personality 
psychology. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(2), 842-860.  
NSD. (2012a). ESS2 - 2004 Deviations - United Kingdom  Retrieved 27 March 2013, from 
http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round2/deviations-land.html?land=826 
NSD. (2012b). ESS4 - 2012 Deviations - United Kingdom  Retrieved 27 March 2013, from 
http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round4/deviations-land.html?land=826 
NSD. (2013a). The comparability of attitude measurements: Measurement equivalence  
Retrieved 20/09/15, from 
http://essedunet.nsd.uib.no/cms/topics/immigration/2/all.html 
NSD. (2013b). Human Values  Retrieved 23 August, 2014, from 
http://essedunet.nsd.uib.no/cms/topics/1/4/2.html  
NSD. (2013c). Multilevel Models, Chapter 3: The basic two-level models  Retrieved 25 April, 
2015, from http://essedunet.nsd.uib.no/cms/topics/multilevel/ch3/all.html  
Nye, J. S., Zelikow, P., & King, D. C. (1997). Why people don't trust government. London: 
Harvard University Press. 
Olivera, J. (2013). On changes in general trust in Europe UCD Geary Institute Discussion 
Paper Series (Geary WP2013/01). 
Olver, J. M., & Mooradian, T. A. (2003). Personality traits and personal values: a conceptual 
and empirical integration. Personality and individual differences, 35(1), 109-125.  
Orbell, J., & Dawes, R. M. (1991). A “cognitive miser” theory of cooperators advantage. 
American Political Science Review, 85(2), 515-528.  
Oskarsson, S., Svensson, T., & Öberg, P. (2009). Power, Trust, and Institutional Constraints 
Individual Level Evidence. Rationality and Society, 21(2), 171-195.  
Paldam, M. (2009). The macro perspective on generalized trust. In G. T. Svendsen & G. L. H. 
Svendsen (Eds.), Handbook of Social Capital: The Troika of Sociology, Political 
Science and Economics (pp. 354-372). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
Park, C.-u., & Subramanian, S. (2012). Voluntary association membership and social 
cleavages: a micro–macro link in generalized trust. Social Forces, 90(4), 1183-1205.  
Parks-Leduc, L., Feldman, G., & Bardi, A. (2014). Personality traits and personal values: a 
meta-analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review. doi: 
10.1177/1088868314538548 
Paxton, P. (2007). Association memberships and generalized trust: A multilevel model across 
31 countries. Social forces, 86(1), 47-76.  
Pickering, A., & Corr, P. J. (2008). JA Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) of 
personality. In G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), The SAGE Handbook 
of Personality Theory and Assessment (Vol. 1, pp. 239-256). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, Inc. 




Polillo, S. (2012). Globalization: Civilizing or destructive? An empirical test of the 
international determinants of generalized trust. International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology, 53(1), 45-65.  
Pollet, T. V., Roberts, S. G., & Dunbar, R. I. (2015). Extraverts have larger social network 
layers. Journal of Individual Differences, 32(3), 161-169.  
Press, O. U. (2015). Oxford Dictionaries  Retrieved 14 September, 2015, from 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American democracy. New 
York: Simon & Schuster  
Rahn, W. M., & Transue, J. E. (1998). Social trust and value change: The decline of social 
capital in American youth, 1976–1995. Political Psychology, 19(3), 545-565.  
Reeskens, T. (2009). On the Nature of Generalized Trust. A Cross-National Inquiry into the 
Relation between Human Values and Generalized Trust. Paper presented at the 
106th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto.  
Reeskens, T., & Hooghe, M. (2008). Cross-cultural measurement equivalence of generalized 
trust. Evidence from the European Social Survey (2002 and 2004). Social Indicators 
Research, 85(3), 515-532.  
Robbins, B. G. (2011). Neither government nor community alone: A test of state-centered 
models of generalized trust. Rationality and Society, 23(3), 304-346.  
Robbins, B. G. (unpub). Wherever You Go, No Matter the Weather, Always Bring Your Own 
Sunshine: Revisiting Thermal Climate Models of Generalized Trust with Cross-
National Panel Data, 1981-2009. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195140 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2195140  
Roberts, S. G., Wilson, R., Fedurek, P., & Dunbar, R. (2008). Individual differences and 
personal social network size and structure. Personality and individual differences, 
44(4), 954-964.  
Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S. H., & Knafo, A. (2002). The big five personality factors and 
personal values. Personality and social psychology bulletin, 28(6), 789-801.  
Rosenberg, M. (1957). Misanthropy and attitudes toward international affairs. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 1(4), 340-345.  
Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2002). How political institutions create and destroy social capital: 
An institutional theory of generalized trust. Paper presented at the 98th Meeting of 
the American Political Science Association in Boston, MA. 
Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital: an institutional theory of 
generalized trust. Comparative Politics, 40(4), 441-459.  
Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. World 
politics, 58(1), 41-72.  
Sapienza, P., Toldra‐Simats, A., & Zingales, L. (2013). Understanding trust. The Economic 
Journal, 123(573), 1313-1332.  
Schäfer, G., Feith, M., Fritz, M., Johansson-Augier, A., & Wieland, U. (2007). Europe in 
figures - Eurostat yearbook 2006-07: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg. 
Schoon, I., & Cheng, H. (2011). Determinants of political trust: a lifetime learning model. 
Developmental Psychology, 47(3), 619-631.  
Schwartz, S. H. (2001). European Social Survey Core Questionnaire Development – Chapter 
7: A proposal for measuring value orientations across nations. London: European 
Social Survey, City University London. 
Schwartz, S. H. (2006). A theory of cultural value orientations: Explication and applications. 
Comparative sociology, 5(2), 137-182.  
Schwartz, S. H. (2007a). Universalism values and the inclusiveness of our moral universe. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 38(6), 711-728.  
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
408 
 
Schwartz, S. H. (2007b). Value orientations: measurement, antecedents and consequences 
across nations. In R. Jowell, C. Roberts, R. Fitzgerald & G. Eva (Eds.), Measuring 
attitudes cross-nationally: lessons from the European Social Survey (pp. 161-193). 
London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 




Segarra, P., Ross, S. R., Pastor, M. C., Montañés, S., Poy, R., & Molto, J. (2007). MMPI-2 
predictors of Gray’s two-factor reinforcement sensitivity theory. Personality and 
individual differences, 43(3), 437-448.  
Sharpe, J. P., Martin, N. R., & Roth, K. A. (2011). Optimism and the Big Five factors of 
personality: Beyond neuroticism and extraversion. Personality and individual 
differences, 51(8), 946-951.  
Shweder, R., Much, N., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The "Big Three" of Morality, 
(Autonomy, Community, Divinity) and the "Big Three" Explanations of Suffering. In 
A. M. Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), Morality and health (pp. 119-169). London: 
Routledge, Inc. 
Simon, J. J., Walther, S., Fiebach, C. J., Friederich, H.-C., Stippich, C., Weisbrod, M., & Kaiser, 
S. (2010). Neural reward processing is modulated by approach-and avoidance-
related personality traits. Neuroimage, 49(2), 1868-1874.  
Sirgy, M. J. (2011). Societal QOL is More than the Sum of QOL of Individuals: The Whole is 
Greater than the Sum of the Parts. Applied Research in Quality of Life, 6(3), 329-334.  
Smillie, L. D. (2008). What is reinforcement sensitivity? Neuroscience paradigms for 
approach-avoidance process theories of personality. European Journal of 
Personality, 22(5), 359-384.  
Smith, P. B. (2004). Acquiescent response bias as an aspect of cultural communication style. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35(1), 50-61.  
Snijders, T. A. B., & Bosker, R. J. (2012). Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and 
Advanced Multilevel Modeling (2nd ed.). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Steel, P., Schmidt, J., & Shultz, J. (2008). Refining the relationship between personality and 
subjective well-being. Psychological Bulletin, 134(1), 138-161.  
Stelmack, R. M., & Rammsayer, T. H. (2008). Psychophysiological and biochemical correlates 
of personality. In G. J. Boyle, G. Matthews & D. H. Saklofske (Eds.), The SAGE 
handbook of personality theory and assessment: personality theories and models 
(Vol. 1, pp. 33-55). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Stiglitz, J., Sen, A., & Fitoussi, J.-P. (2009). The measurement of economic performance and 
social progress revisited. Paris: Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress. 
Stoop, I. (2007). If it bleeds, it leads: the impact of media-reported events. In R. Jowell, C. 
Roberts, R. Fitzgerald & G. Eva (Eds.), Measuring attitudes cross-nationally: lessons 
from the European Social Survey. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
Sturgis, P., Patulny, R., & Allum, N. (2009). Re-evaluating the individual level causes of trust: 
a panel data analysis. Paper presented at the Reciprocity: theories and facts 
conference Milan, Italy.  
Sturgis, P., Patulny, R., Allum, N., & Buscha, F. (2012). Social connectedness and generalized 
trust: a longitudinal perspective ISER Working Paper Series (No. 2012-09): Institute 
for Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of Essex. 
Sturgis, P., & Smith, P. (2010). Assessing the validity of generalized trust questions: What 
kind of trust are we measuring? International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 
22(1), 74-92.  




Thomas, C. W. (1998). Maintaining and restoring public trust in government agencies and 
their employees. Administration & society, 30(2), 166-193.  
Thomassen, J. (2001). European Social Survey Core Questionnaire Development – Chapter 4: 
Media and communications questions. London: European Social Survey, City 
University London. 
UNE. (2000). Chapter 4 - Analysing the data (Part II - Descriptive statistics): Determinig if 
skewness and kurtosis are significantly non-normal  Retrieved 27 March 2013, from 
http://www.une.edu.au/WebStat/unit_materials/c4_descriptive_statistics/determi
ne_skew_kurt.html  
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Uslaner, E. M. (2004). Trust and Corruption. In J. G. Lambsdorff, M. Taube & M. Schramm 
(Eds.), The New Institutional Economics of Corruption. London: Routledge. 
Uslaner, E. M. (2008). Where You Stand Depends Upon Where Your Grandparents Sat The 
Inheritability of Generalized Trust. Public Opinion Quarterly, 72(4), 725-740.  
Van de Walle, S., & Bouckaert, G. (2003). Public service performance and trust in 
government: the problem of causality. International Journal of Public 
Administration, 26(8-9), 891-913.  
Van de Walle, S., Van Roosbroek, S., & Bouckaert, G. (2008). Trust in the public sector: is 
there any evidence for a long-term decline? International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 74(1), 47-64.  
van den Bos, W., van Dijk, E., Westenberg, M., Rombouts, S. A., & Crone, E. A. (2009). What 
motivates repayment? Neural correlates of reciprocity in the Trust Game. Social 
cognitive and affective neuroscience. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsp009 
Van der Veld, W. M., & Saris, W. E. (2011). Causes of generalized social trust. In E. Davidov, 
P. Schmidt & J. Billiet (Eds.), Cross-Cultural Analysis: Methods and Applications 
London: Routledge. 
Vauclair, C. M., & Fischer, R. (2011). Do cultural values predict individuals' moral attitudes? 
A cross‐cultural multilevel approach. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41(5), 
645-657.  
Vecchione, M., Alessandri, G., Barbaranelli, C., & Caprara, G. (2011). Higher‐order factors of 
the big five and basic values: Empirical and theoretical relations. British Journal of 
Psychology, 102(3), 478-498.  
Volk, S., Thöni, C., & Ruigrok, W. (2011). Personality, personal values and cooperation 
preferences in public goods games: A longitudinal study. Personality and individual 
differences, 50(6), 810-815.  
von Collani, G., & Grumm, M. (2009). On the dimensional structure of personality, 
ideological beliefs, social attitudes, and personal values. Journal of Individual 
Differences, 30(2), 107-119.  
Wagner, A. F., Schneider, F., & Halla, M. (2009). The quality of institutions and satisfaction 
with democracy in Western Europe—a panel analysis. European Journal of Political 
Economy, 25(1), 30-41.  
Wang, L., & Gordon, P. (2011). Trust and institutions: A multilevel analysis. The Journal of 
Socio-Economics, 40(5), 583-593.  
Weiss, A., & Costa Jr, P. T. (2005). Domain and facet personality predictors of all-cause 
mortality among Medicare patients aged 65 to 100. Psychosomatic medicine, 67(5), 
724-733.  
Wiggins, J. S. (1996). The five-factor model of personality: Theoretical perspectives. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Yamagishi, T., Kikuchi, M., & Kosugi, M. (1999). Trust, gullibility, and social intelligence. Asian 
Journal of Social Psychology, 2(1), 145-161.  
Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
410 
 
Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and 
Japan. Motivation and emotion, 18(2), 129-166.  
Yang, K., & Holzer, M. (2006). The performance–trust link: Implications for performance 
measurement. Public Administration Review, 66(1), 114-126.  
You, J. s. (2012). Social trust: Fairness matters more than homogeneity. Political Psychology, 
33(5), 701-721.  
Zak, P. J., & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. The Economic Journal, 111(470), 295-321.  
Zak, P. J., Kurzban, R., & Matzner, W. T. (2004). The neurobiology of trust. Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences, 1032(1), 224-227.  
Zimdars, A., & Tampubolon, G. (2012). Ethnic diversity and Europeans' generalised trust: 
how inclusive immigration policy can aid a positive association. Sociological 
Research Online, 17(3). doi: 10.5153/sro.2643  
Zmerli, S., Newton, K., & Montero, J. R. (2007). Trust in people, confidence in political 
institutions, and satisfaction with democracy. In J. W. van Deth, J. R. Montero & A. 
Westholm (Eds.), Citizenship and involvement in european democracies: a 




The experiment in Chapter 5 was financed in part by ESSEXLab Seedcorn funding and 
in part by funds from my ESRC Research Training Support Grant (with thanks to 
colleagues in ISER for their support with this).  
 
The survey data in this chapter was collected using Qualtrics software, Version 
57,397 of the Qualtrics Research Suite. Copyright © 2014 Qualtrics. Qualtrics and all 
other Qualtrics product or service names are registered trademarks or trademarks of 




Copyright © Elissa J. Sibley 2015 All rights reserved. Please do not cite without permission
